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Abstract 
 
 
When a family or a group of friends visit a beach or a park for their enjoyment and 
recreation and find that they are not able to use the beach or the park or are told to move off 
the beach or away from the park because a publicly exhibited sporting event is making use of 
this public space, a conflict of rights arises.  The family or group of friends is not wrong in 
questioning the rights of a sports association to exclusive use of a public space for their 
public sporting event. 
 
The thesis assesses whether the public possess rights at public places and whether these 
public rights are adequately safeguarded during public sporting events by reason of the 
development of the common law in public nuisance litigation.  Common law public rights 
such as a public right to quietude, a public right to safety, and a public right to recreation are 
discussed.  Courts may intervene to protect inferred common law public rights during public 
sporting events and may declare public sporting events unlawful.  This thesis finds that 
common law public rights may not be impinged by the staging of public sporting events at 
public places.  Only by means of reform of the law may common law rights be displaced and 
public sporting events be lawfully staged.  Public sports are a special category of human 
activity that depend upon sanction from Parliament for legitimacy.  
 
This thesis argues that law reform in the form of a sports code is warranted owing to the 
participation of the Executive in promoting public sport in breach of common law 
proscription of such promotion where it impinges upon public rights.  Regulation in the 
sporting arena is not a modern legal development and this thesis describes examples of 
regulation from the year 1194 onwards.  Each historical regulation can be viewed as attempts 
by the Executive to control excesses or breaches of the law in public exhibitions of sport. 
 
Because publicly exhibited sporting events are liable to proscription as public nuisances, 
following the common law case law, and because the public’s rights to use of public spaces 
may be carelessly inhibited, this thesis argues that legislative reform in the form of a Sports 
Code is warranted.
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A word on citation 
 
This thesis uses a modified version of the Oxford Standard Citation of Legal Authorities (Oxford Standard).  A 
modified version has been adopted because the content of this thesis has appeal to an audience wider than the 
legal community – namely, the sports industry, media, local government, parliamentarians, and politicians, in a 
wide variety of common law jurisdictions.  The esoteric nature of citation in the Oxford Standard is believed to 
be detrimental to a full understanding of the arguments of this thesis by those persons who possess no legal 
training.  Consequently, the following amendments of the Oxford Standard are utilized throughout this thesis: 
 
Where the Oxford Standard recommends that only a number following the citation of a court report be used to 
denote the page at which judicial dicta are to be found, this thesis will use the phrase “at p” followed by the 
page number. 
 
Where the Oxford Standard recommends that only a number within a square bracket following the neutral 
citation of a court report be used to denote the paragraph at which judicial dicta are to be found, this thesis will 
use the phrase “at para” followed by the paragraph number within a square bracket. 
 
Where the Oxford Standard recommends that only an acronym be used to signify the court which made the 
decision in the case referenced, this thesis will use the full name of the court, where appropriate. 
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Note 
 
The central legal question raised in this thesis, namely, whether a publicly exhibited sporting event can impinge 
upon public rights, was initially brought to the mind of the author consequent to a personal experience of the 
author and the author’s mother.  The author competed in the Royal Windsor Triathlon at Windsor and Eton in 
England in June 2002.  The running leg of this triathlon race followed a route along the road bordering 
Windsor Castle, down to the Thames and across the Thames down the Eton High Street to Eton College and 
returning.  During the race the author’s mother, who was spectating, and was stationed on the bridge over the 
Thames between Windsor and Eton, became involved in a heated argument with a local resident.  The local 
resident was upset that she was unable to take her Sunday morning walk with her dog without being bumped 
by the participants in the triathlon race and by crowds of people spectating, or otherwise inconvenienced by the 
barriers that were erected by race officials to guide the competitors through the running leg of the course.  She 
complained that both she and her dog had to duck and weave through the crowd of spectators and through 
athletes competing in the race to avoid being assaulted. 
 
The complaint of the local resident left an indelible imprint on the mind of the author.  The local resident had 
raised important questions about the lawfulness of the triathlon event staged at Windsor and the impact that 
this publicly exhibited sporting event had on her rights to use of the public highway for walking and for 
walking her dog.
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Every day, all round the world, people are engaged in sports, physical exercise, and recreative 
pursuits.  Some are professional athletes, earning a living from their athletic ability; some are 
amateur athletes dedicated to peak performance; and others are ordinary folk maintaining 
their health and enjoyment of life.  Each of these persons, from the extraordinary superstar 
to the common people, make use of a wide variety of places and spaces, some privately 
owned, others publicly owned. 
 
The health-conscious, as well as ordinary folk who enjoy recreative pursuits, have interest in 
preserving for their benefit public places and spaces where they can partake of physical 
exercise and practise sports and other pastimes.  These people also have interest in ensuring 
that their peaceable lives are not disturbed arbitrarily.  In addition to recreative pursuits, 
there exist sports organisations and sports promoters who stage sports events open to the 
amateur sports enthusiast.  Further, there exists a sports industry whereby sports 
administrators, promoters, television corporations and advertisers, ply a lucrative trade 
staging sports events and exhibitions to the public.  Their interest is principally pecuniary. 
 
 
1. A Scenario 
 
Imagine a scenario.  Imagine a beach.  It is a beautiful sunny Sunday morning.  Not too hot; 
nor too cold.  You and your family have had a very busy week meeting the demands of a 
modern-day lifestyle.  Your past week was filled with work commitments, helping the 
children with their homework, ferrying children to and from tennis lessons, or swimming 
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training, band practise, ballet classes, and the like.  Saturday was absorbed by supporting 
your children at a soccer match, followed by shopping for the week’s groceries, cleaning the 
house, and hosting a barbeque for family and friends.  Sunday finally arrives – a day to spend 
happily with your family.  Owing to the beautiful weather, you decide on a trip to the beach.  
Your spouse and your children would love to relax on the beach and frolic in the water.  
You pack up towels, beach umbrellas, surfboards, boogie boards, buckets, and spades, into 
your car.  After driving to the beach, you set yourself down on the beach, by the shore.  You 
take the children for a swim in the surf and build sandcastles on the shoreline. 
 
And then, all of a sudden, a man comes up to you and tells you to move.  You and your 
family are told to get out of the water and move off the beach.  Around you various people 
are erecting fences and barricades with Kellogg cereal advertisements attached to them.  A 
VIP marquee is built on the beach.  Television crews occupy the public beach and cameras 
start filming.  And crowds descend upon you.  It would appear, from all the goings on, that a 
surfing event, beach volleyball event, surf-lifesaving championship event, or beach cricket 
event sponsored by a major television network, is to be staged at the very spot where you are 
seated.  You question what is happening and why it is happening.  You wonder about your 
rights. 
 
 
2. A Conflict 
 
The desires of professional athletes and sports organisations, in plying their trade and in 
making profit from the public exhibition of sport, can come into conflict with individual 
members of the public peaceably going about their lives.  This thesis argues that when a 
publicly exhibited sport event is staged, that event can impinge upon a number of public 
rights.  These public rights arise from natural law jurisprudence and have been delimited, 
defined and elucidated by the courts in each common law jurisdiction.  These public rights 
are common law rights that have been explained and refined over hundreds of years of 
judgments.  These public rights are rights which the people generally possess by virtue of the 
common law declarations in public nuisance cases and by virtue of the judgments supporting 
those declarations.  This thesis will detail and explain the nature of these public rights in 
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respect of their relationship to the human activity of sport through an assessment of the 
common law case law on public nuisance.  Whilst there is no statutory provision which spells 
out and protects public rights of access to and use of public spaces for individual recreative 
pursuits, there exists, at common law at least, a means by which public rights may be 
protected from interference from activities which include publicly exhibited sport events.  
The common law offence of public nuisance is the only law of general application subsisting 
in our present legal system capable of staving the diminution of public rights within the 
sports context.  In applying the common law offence of public nuisance to publicly exhibited 
sport events, the liberty to practice sport is defined. 
 
 
3. Sport, the Crown and the common law: an overview 
 
Very few publicly exhibited sporting activities are regulated by statute.  Those that are 
include only horseracing, motorcar racing and boxing, and some major sporting events held 
at major sports stadia;1 though not every common law jurisdiction has legislation to cover 
even these three sports.  The reasons why only these sporting activities warrant legislative 
                                                
1 See, eg, Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 1986 (NSW); the Racing Administration Act 1988 (NSW); the 
Racing Act 2002 (Qld); the Horse Racing Act, Revised Statutes of British Columbia 1996, c. 198; the New York 
Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law c 47-A; the California Business and Professions Code, ss 
18600-18618 and 19420-19421; Motor Racing Events Act 1990 (Qld); and Australian Grand Prix Act 1994 
(Vic) are but a few examples of this regulation.  Recent legislative enactments in the Australian states of New 
South Wales and Victoria establish a general set of rules for the management and conduct of sporting events 
that are declared to be “major sporting events”.  But even these enactments are narrow in their scope.  In 
respect of the New South Wales Major Events Act 2009, it is worth noting that only one publicly exhibited 
sporting event has been authorized under the Major Events Regulation 2010 in New South Wales – the Sydney 
International FIFA Fan Fest.  Under the Victoria legislation, the Major Sporting Events Act 2009, the term 
“major sporting event” is defined pursuant to section 3 to include sporting events such as the Australian Tennis 
Open, the Australian Grand Prix, and the Australian Rules Football Grand Final, and analogous events.  
Further, the Victoria Act defines “sports event”, under section 3 of the Act, to mean;  
“(a) a type of match, game or other event; or  
(b) a series of matches, games or other events; or  
(c) a tournament,  
involving the playing of sport (whether or not for competition) at a ground or other place (whether 
indoors or outdoors) to which persons are admitted on payment of a fee or charge, or after making a 
donation, to view the playing of the sport or to enter or remain at the ground or place and, in the case 
of sports event that consists of a series of matches, games or other events or a tournament, includes 
any opening or closing ceremonies connected with the series or tournament.”   
Excluded from this definition are sports events staged at public places such as beaches and parks and roads at 
which members of the public spectate without paying any fee to so do, including triathlon events, surfing 
events and surf lifesaving tournaments.  The many public sporting events that take place at beaches and parks 
and on roads are not covered by the legislation. 
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regulation is chiefly historical,2 and are intimately connected with the historical impact which 
these sports had on public culture in former ages.3  The growth of new sports and the 
popularity of new forms of publicly exhibited sporting events, in modern times, highlight for 
us today, as the sports of horseracing and boxing did for our forebears in former ages, 
questions as to the lawfulness of such activities where they impact upon the public generally.  
Triathlons, Marathons, Cycling Criterions, are staged in public spaces such as parks, beaches 
and roads.  Use of these same limited public spaces by members of the public who live in 
modern-lifestyle apartments with little or no personal outdoor space yields a potential 
conflict. 
 
The common law offence of public nuisance may be seen as a useful, though perhaps not 
desirable or effective, legal framework by which we can define and delimit the manner in 
which publicly exhibited sports can be staged.  One of the purposes of this thesis, in 
identifying the common law offence of public nuisance as a means for controlling the 
circumsantances in which sporting events may be staged in public and as a means for 
declaring and upholding public rights which would otherwise be nullified if the staging of a 
public sporting event proceeded, is to underscore that publicly exhibited sporting events are 
at risk of proscription as public nuisances.  The other purpose is to underscore that public 
rights may dissipate in modern civic life unless we consciously seek to balance the needs of 
all citizens.  Television networks and advertising agencies invent new forms of sport, such as 
the Red Bull Air Race World Series4 or Beach Cricket,5 in order to enhance their individual 
                                                
2 Sir William Holdsworth, eg, is of the view that the recreations and sports of various classes of society during 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were matters of statutory intervention in the interests of the state.  Rich 
and poor, high and low alike, must help the state – by the labour of their bodies if they could not help with 
their counsel or their wealth, he says.  Holdsworth sees the statutes 12 Ric II c 6, 11 Hen IV c 4, and 17 Edw 
IV c 3 as encouraging the practising of archery alone was a policy initiative to train the public in the skills of 
archery so that they might be useful to the realm in the fighting of wars or in defending the realm.  His reading 
of these statutes as ordering the people to leave playing at ‘hand ball or foot ball’ or ‘such other unthrifty 
games’, and to practice at bows and arrows on Sundays and other festival days: Sir William Holdsworth A 
History of English Law (4th edn Methuen & Co London 1936) vol 11, at p 446.   
3 See the statutes enacted in Hanoverian England such as 13 Geo 2 c. 19 (1740) [which prohibited certain types 
of horse racing]; 15 Geo 2 c. 19 (1742); and 18 Geo 2 c. 34 (1745) [concerning prohibitions on species of horse 
racing, and entitled, ‘An Act to explain amend and make more effectual the laws in being to prevent excessive 
and deceitful gaming and to restrain and prevent the excessive increase of horse races’]. 
4 <http://www.redbullairrace.com> (1 May 2008).  The Red Bull Air Race World Series is staged in cities 
around the world, such as Perth, Western Australia, and makes use of public parks for the seating of spectators: 
see <http://www.westernaustralia.com/RedBullAirRace> (19 May 2008). 
5 <http://www.xxxxgoldbeachcricket.com.au/Default.aspx> (1 May 2008).  Beach Cricket is a promotional 
activity which uses the public beaches of Australia to stage a cricket match between two teams of retired 
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profile.  It is not suggested in this thesis that such innovative public or cultural activities 
should not take place.  Rather, what is here contended is that these publicly exhibited sports 
events ought to be staged lawfully in accordance with the common law, or in accordance 
with a proposed legislative regime, and ought to be subject to a rigorous assessment with the 
aim of achieving a balance between competing rights of use of public spaces.  This 
assessment task is entrusted, by virtue of our common law and constitutional heritage, to the 
Crown and the courts, until such time as Parliament will intervene to provide a 
comprehensive legislative scheme. 
 
The means by which the common law might apply to sport may be perceived as amorphous.  
But in applying the common law offence of public nuisance to the human activity of sport, 
the courts are not refashioning common law principles.  The task is not didactic or 
sententious.  The task is merely analytical.  The common law offence of public nuisance 
operates, as many common law offences do, through the application of a broad legal 
principle to a very wide variety of factual situations.6  Sporting events are no exception to the 
operation of the common law offence of public nuisance.  Where a sporting event creates 
obstruction,7 annoyance or discomfort to the public,8 endangers the life, or health of the 
public,9 it may be proscribed as a public nuisance.   The type of sport event does not of itself 
                                                
professional cricket players on the beach.  It is sponsored by a beer company and a television company of 
Australia. 
6 In his critical assessment of the common law offence of public nuisance, Spencer writes: “Why is making 
obscene telephone calls like laying manure in the street?  Answer: in the same way as importing Irish cattle is 
like building a thatched house in the borough of Blanford Forum; and as digging up the wall of a church is like 
helping a homicidal maniac to escape from Broadmoor; and as operating a joint-stock company without a royal 
charter is like being a common cold; and as keeping a tiger in a pen adjoining the highway is like depositing a 
mutilated corpse on a doorstep; and as selling unsound meat is like embezzling public funds…  All are, or at 
some time have been said to be, a common (alias public) nuisance.” JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical 
Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55, at p 55.  For a detailed exposition on the law of nuisance generally, see FH 
Newark ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ (1949) 65 LQR 480. 
7 See eg Shaw’s Jewelry Shop Inc v New York Herald Co 170 AD 504, 156 NYS 651 (NY App Div 1915), aff’d 224 
NY 731, 121 NE 890 (1918); R v Moore (1832) 3 B & Ald 184; R v Cross (1812) 3 Camp 244.  See further 
discussion in Part 2 of this thesis. 
8 See eg Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, (1995) at p 840; see State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway 96 
Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978); State of New York v Bridgehampton Road Races Corp 54 AD 2d 929, 388 NYS 
2d 131 (1976); Bedminster Township v Vargo Dragway Inc 434 Pa 100 (1969); Jones v Queen City Speedways Inc 276 NC 
231, 172 SE 2d 42 (1970); Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 25, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 
ACWS(3d) 776 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice); Stretch v Romford Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 763; Gilmour 
v Green Village Fire Department Inc 2 NJ Super 393, 63 A 2d 918 (1949); Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 
156.  See further discussion in Part 2 of this thesis. 
9 See eg Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] OR 595, [1952] 4 DLR 93, [1952] OWN 516 (Ontario High Court); State ex 
rel Attorney General v Canty 207 Mo 439 (1907).  An assessment of the possible impact of the common law 
 14 
determine whether the sport event may be proscribed as a public nuisance.  The only 
question to ask is whether the sport event has created an obstruction or an annoyance or 
discomfort to the public.  Various sports have been held to be public nuisances when 
conducted at certain places and in a certain manner: clay pigeon and pigeon shooting was 
held to be a public nuisance in R v Moore.10  A roller skating rink was held to be a public 
nuisance in Newell v Izzard.11  In Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co,12 horseraces held on 
Sundays were held to be a nuisance.  The holding of a regatta was held to be a nuisance in 
Bostock v North Staffordshire R Co.13  Public boxing has been held to be a public nuisance in 
several cases.  An indictment for a public nuisance by keeping a house for public boxing and 
cockfighting was adjudged good by the King’s Bench in R v Higginson.14  Public boxing 
matches were held to be a nuisance, and injunctions were granted, in Bellamy v Wells,15 in The 
Columbian Athletic Club v State, ex rel McMahan,16 and in Commonwealth v McGovern.17  The tee 
and golf hole on a golf course was held to be a public nuisance in Castle v St Augustine’s Links 
Limited.18  And in Johnson v City of New York,19 the Court of Appeals of New York held that a 
motorcar race about the streets of New York was a public nuisance in the circumstances of 
the case.  A sports event may be public nuisances when conducted too often,20 when 
conducted at certain times or days,21 or when conducted at certain places.22 
 
What is also observable through the appraisal of the common law case law, in this thesis, is 
that sports, and particularly public sports, are inclined to generate public nuisances given the 
content and the manner of their exhibition.  
                                                
offence of public nuisance on the sport of boxing, which medical research has now confirmed is dangerous to 
health, rather than being of benefit to health, and other sports such as pseudo combat-warfare, is discussed 
further, in Part 2 of this thesis. 
10 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184 (King’s Bench). 
11 [1944] 3 DLR 118 (New Brunswick Supreme Court) at p 123. 
12 [1899] 1 IR 345. 
13 (1852) 5 De G & Sm 584, (1852) 64 ER 1253. 
14 (1762) 2 Burr 1232. 
15 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
16 143 Ind 98, 40 NE 914 (1895). 
17 116 Ky 212, 75 SW 261 (1903). 
18 (1922) 38 TLR 615. 
19 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, (1906). 
20 See eg Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
21 See eg Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 ACWS(3d) 776; Dewar v City and 
Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345; Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
22 See eg Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906); Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 
71 JP 478; Newell v Izzard [1944] 3 DLR 118 (New Brunswick Supreme Court); Bostock v North Staffordshire R Co 
(1852) 5 De G & Sm 584, (1852) 64 ER 1253. 
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In applying the principles of public nuisance to the human activity of sport, two interrelated 
tasks are undertaken.  On the one hand, a judge will determine whether a publicly exhibited 
sport can be lawfully staged at the place, and time, and in the manner proposed.  A judge will 
thus define the extent of the rights of the professional athlete and sports organisation to 
make use of private spaces or public spaces to ply their trade.  On the other hand, a judge 
will determine the existence of a public right, such as a public right to quietude or a public 
right to use of public places for recreation.  In order to find a public nuisance a judge must 
determine that a public right exists, which public right has been impinged upon by the 
staging of the publicly exhibited sport event.  The consequence of this doubled deliberation 
is that a publicly exhibited sport could be declared to be unlawful as being a common law 
offence known as a public nuisance where it impinges public rights.  Such exhibitions would 
then be abated. 
 
That the common law offence of public nuisance remains a pertinent, efficacious and 
utilitarian remedy was opined recently by appellate courts in the United Kingdom and the 
United States.23  Many public sporting events now take place at night, sometimes even of a 
Sunday night, although this was not formerly the case.  Occasionally these games involve 
riotous, violent, or bacchanalian behaviour on the part of spectators.24  In many countries 
publicly exhibited sports events do attract violent crowds.  Why such games take place at 
                                                
23 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at paras [10] and [36] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and para [45] 
(Lord Roger of Earlsferry), [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982; Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & 
Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003), at p 97 of the former report; and Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Racing 
Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003). 
24 There are, literally, hundreds of stories of riots and public violence at publicly exhibited sport events. 
Consider such football events as that on Sunday evening, 17th April, 2005, eg, between the soccer clubs South 
Melbourne, which draws support largely from Melbourne’s Greek community, and Preston, almost exclusively 
backed by the Macedonian community.  Tensions exist between the two tribal teams, exacerbated by the 
disparate ethnicity of the supporter base.  Some 100 to 400 spectators invaded the pitch, and flares, darts and 
bottles were thrown onto the pitch.  Some 50 police officers were required to quell the riot.  No arrests were 
made, the police fearing that they would lose their personnel to the violence.  See B Packham P Desira and H 
Lloyd-McDonald ‘Football Clubs Face Expulsion’ Herald Sun Fox Sports 
<http://foxsports.news.com.au/story/0,8659,15016210-23215,00.html> (20 April 2005); and ⎯ ‘Clubs Face 
Expulsion After Melbourne Soccer Riot’ ABC Sport Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
<http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200504/s1347485.htm> (20 April 2005). Similar scenes occurred 
when fans of the Croatian-backed football team Sydney United battled Serbian supporters of the rival White 
Eagles in suburban Sydney ⎯ ‘Soccer Riot Enquiry’ ABC National Radio Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/brkfast/stories/s1325386.htm> (20 April 2005); ⎯ ‘Crowd Violence Will 
Not Be Tolerated: O’Neill’ ABC Sport Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
<http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200504/s1348805.htm> (20 April 2005). 
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night, when alcohol consumption is likely to be considerable, and when the management of 
the sport invariably knows that trouble might arise between the opposing fans of the teams 
participating in the event, rather than at a more genteel time such as of a Saturday afternoon 
or Saturday morning, for example, is a germane query.25  Considering that sporting events 
comprise of increasing levels of noise, music, and drunken revelry, occurring at night, it is 
reasonable to question whether the holding of sporting events at night, irrespective of any 
commercial value which might be considered relevant to the sporting association conducting 
the sport in terms of television broadcast revenue, creates untoward annoyance or 
disturbance to the public, or endangers the safety of the public, thus amounting to a public 
nuisance at common law.26  This thesis seeks to challenge assumptions and to highlight the 
disadvantages of laissez-faire policy in the context of public sport events. 
 
The Executive of government has a pivotal role to play, subject to any legal reform by 
Parliament, in ensuring that the exigencies of public sport events do not impact unfairly on 
the communities that the Executive represents.  In relation to any violent or riotous acts at 
football games in the future, the Executive, in this instance characterized by the Attorney-
General, may well have success in obtaining an injunction against a Football Federation, for 
                                                
25 It may be that the holding of occasional sporting events of a night time does not amount to a public 
nuisance; yet the holding of events on weeknights, or on a Sunday night, might amount to a public nuisance in 
particular circumstances.  This is, in effect, the decision in Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156.  In this 
case Justice Romer enjoined a boxing club proprietor from carrying on boxing matches at his premises in 
London so as to cause a nuisance to the plaintiffs, including any crowd caused to be assembled by the boxing 
contests held in the club premises.  The complaint of nuisance in the case rested not on the fact of noise 
generated from inside the club, but by noise generated outside the club by patrons coming to and going from 
the club.  These patrons made great noise by “cheering, hooting, and whistling, especially when the combatants 
and their friends arrive at or leave the club, and when the result of the contest is announced, and during the 
time that the police are endeavouring to cause the crowd to move on or disperse.” (p 161).  The boxing 
contests at the club were held “from time to time in the season between October and August, in the basement 
of the club premises, generally about midnight or later.” (pp 160-161).  The plaintiffs’ witnesses gave evidence 
that the time at which the sports events were conducted, and at which times the crowds of patrons conducted 
themselves noisily, prevented them from sleep until a late hour in the morning.  Justice Romer, in giving 
judgment for the plaintiffs stated, at p 162: “…unless the defendants be restrained by injunction, the occasions 
of nuisance I have referred to will probably be repeated, for the arrangements of the club are that these special 
[boxing] contests shall take place at least four times in the course of each season,…  Under these 
circumstances, and having regard to the serious nature of the nuisance,… being one taking place and 
preventing sleep on the part of those suffering from it for some time before and for some hours after midnight, 
I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction… for it certainly cannot in my 
judgment be successfully contended by the defendant that, in holding these contests and so collecting noisy 
crowds at the late hour he does, he is using the club premises in an ordinary way or is not materially interfering 
with the ordinary comfort of existence of the occupiers of No. 33 Gerrard Street…” 
26 For discussion on the definition of public nuisance see Part 1, below. 
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example, thereby preventing the playing of a game at night and mandating that such game 
take place at another time, perhaps of a Saturday morning, for example, if at all.27   
 
All personal activity must yield in some degree to the collective right in every civilized 
community.  Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in disposing of a public nuisance suit, 
adopted the comments of Horace Wood in A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances, stating 
that public nuisance encompasses:  
“that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable or 
unlawful use by a person of his own property, real or personal, or from 
his own improper, indecent or unlawful personal conduct, working an 
obstruction of, or injury to, a right of another or of the public…  It is a 
part of the great social compact to which every person is a party, a 
fundamental and essential principle in every civilized community, that 
every person yields a portion of his right of absolute dominion….”28 
 
 
4. The structure of this thesis 
 
Following discussion of the historical regulation of sport activity from the middle ages and 
onwards, in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the assessment of the common law offence of public 
nuisance and its application to the human activity of sport proceeds in four distinct and 
linked parts. 
 
                                                
27 Note that a further subsequent game between the Sydney teams Sydney United, drawing its support from the 
Croatian community and Bonnyrigg, drawing support from the Serbian community, resulted in further violence 
amongst fans after the football game, albeit that the game was played on a Saturday afternoon at a neutral 
sports ground, the Parramatta Stadium, and that there was no violence in the football grandstand itself.  See, ⎯ 
‘Sydney Soccer Fans Arrested After Clash’ ABC Sport Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
<http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200504/s1357033.htm> (1 May 2005); V Devai ‘Violent Fans 
Deserve Life Bans’ AAP Fox Sports <http://foxsports.news.com.au/story/0,8659,15144055-23215,00.html> 
(1 May 2005); P Badel ‘Another Day of Shame in Sydney’ The Sunday Telegraph Fox Sports 
<http://foxsports.news.com.au/story/0,8659,15138157-23215,00.html> (1 May 2005). 
28 City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation, 213 Ill 2d 351 (2004) at p 365, citing HG Wood A Practical Treatise on 
the Law of Nuisances (3rd edn Bancroft-Whitney San Francisco 1893) at s 1 at p 1-3. 
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The first part of this thesis looks at the nature of those public rights which may be impinged 
upon by the staging of publicly exhibited sport events, such as a public right to quietude,29 
and argues the existence of a public right to use of public spaces for personal recreation.  
The existence of a public right to use of public spaces for personal recreation rests on 
jurisprudential opinion that sport is a natural right. 
 
The second part of this thesis reviews the law of public nuisance.  This is an important task 
as there is little critical analysis of the common law offence of public nuisance (there being 
only three meritorious articles in the past 50 years)30 and a review has not been conducted 
since Spencer’s salient appraisal of public nuisance more than twenty years ago.31  There are 
no analyses of the relationship between the common law offence of public nuisance and 
sport.  The recent definitive judgment of the United Kingdom House of Lords on public 
nuisance in R v Rimmington,32 and the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois33 and 
of the Court of Appeals of New York,34 each dealing with appeals on public nuisance suits, 
highlights the need for an updated critique.  The first part of this thesis assesses the 
definition of public nuisance; the remedies available against a public nuisance; the 
constitutional importance of ex officio and relator actions in public nuisance and the role of 
the Executive in such suits; whether the offence is ill-defined, incapable of application to the 
human activity of sport; and last, the question as to the modern relevance of the offence of 
public nuisance and the utility of public nuisance 
 
                                                
29 See eg Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345. 
30 The three articles to receive judicial comment in recent years are: (1) JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical 
Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55, cited in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 
3 WLR 982, at para [6]; Goldstein v R, R v R [2003] EWCA Crim 3450 at para [10], [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 
2882; (2) J Cassels ‘Prostitution and Public Nuisance: Desperate Measures and the Limits of Civil Adjudication’ 
(1985) 63 Can Bar Rev 764, cited Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] 20 OR (3d) 229 at p 269; and (3) 
Developments ‘The Paths of Civil Litigation: The Use of the Public Nuisance Tort Against the Handgun 
Industry’ (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 1759, cited in Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 
91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003) at p 109 (Rosenberger J.).  The only other article which touches on the crime of 
public nuisance receiving recent judicial comment is an article from 1949 by Professor Newark: FH Newark 
‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ (1949) 65 LQR 480, cited eg in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29 at 
para [121]; Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1. 
31 JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55. 
32 [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982. 
33 City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004). 
34 Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003); Wheeler v Lebanon 
Valley Racing Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003). 
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Part Three of this thesis sets out the many ways in which sport events have been held in 
numerous common law jurisdictions to be public nuisances.  This comprises of a survey of 
the caselaw wherein common law public nuisance has been applied to sport events.  
Precedent demonstrates that publicly exhibited sport events create obstruction and 
inconvenience to the public in the exercise of a public right of way, endangerment to public 
safety, discomfort and inconvenience to the public exercising a public right of quietude, and 
endangerment to public health.  This survey is designed to highlight the fact that publicly 
exhibited sport events can impact adversely on the public and can impinge upon public rights.  
A concomitant aspect of the survey in Part Three is to discredit false assumptions which 
might exist respecting the lawfulness of all publicly exhibited sports. 
 
In Part Four, the thesis assesses the limits of governmental authority to promote or to 
license publicly exhibited sport events.  This thesis argues that the Executive of government 
– the Crown – has a primary role to play in the management of publicly exhibited sporting 
events, consistent with that exercised in the middle ages, and that legislative reform is 
necessary to provide a comprehensive and improved means for managing such activities.  
The nature of the common law offence of public nuisance, as well as historical legal sources, 
support this argument.  This thesis offers a solution to the legal and practical difficulties that 
arise in applying public nuisance to sport, making use of comparative legal analysis with the 
regulatory framework of France, and suggests that Parliament must pass a new regulatory 
framework to manage public exhibitions of sport. 
 
This thesis recommends in its concluding chapters that legislative reform in the form of 
either amendment to local government Acts or a new legislative regime dealing with all 
public exhibitions of sports, be promulgated.  Such reform is necessary because: 
- Public exhibitions of sport are at risk of proscription as common law public 
nuisances because they can and do impinge upon public rights by causing 
obstruction or interference to the public in the exercise of rights common to all. 
- Public rights such as the public right of way on the highway, the public right to 
quietude, and the public right to recreation, for example, are arbitrarily impinged 
upon by publicly exhibited sports. 
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- Neither the executive of government, who oftentimes promote public sporting 
events through wholly owned events and promotions corporations, nor local 
governments, who invariably grant licenses for a fee to sports event organizers 
enabling them to conduct their publicly exhibited sport event at a beach, park or 
road under the management, care and control of the local council, have power at law 
to authorize, sanction or permit a common law offence.  Both forms of government 
are, in fact, accomplices to a public nuisance offence. 
 
 
5. The nature of the inquiry undertaken 
 
This thesis provides a general discourse on the common law offence of public nuisance 
across common law jurisdictions and includes analysis of the legal development of the 
common law offence of public nuisance in some of the common law jurisdictions of the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada and the United States.  It is worth noting that 
not every common law jurisdiction possesses judgments on common law public nuisance as 
applied to sporting activity.  No jurisdiction of Australia, for example, contains a judgment 
on the application of common law public nuisance to sports activity.35  It is necessary to turn 
to the common law jurisdictions of England and Wales, Ireland, New York, New Jersey, 
British Columbia and Ontario, for example, to discover case law where sporting activity has 
been declared to be a public nuisance.  There is but one common law of Australia – and the 
common law of Australia is informed by these precedents on public nuisance litigation.  
These juridical pronouncements provide strong persuasive and, where appropriate to each 
jurisdiction, binding authority in respect of the unlawfulness of publicly exhibited sporting 
events where public rights are impinged upon.  Reference is made to specific legislative 
provisions and local government regulations in the states of Queensland and New South 
Wales in Australia, in particular, to provide examples of the manner in which the Executive 
participates in and promotes public exhibitions of sport.  The assessment in this thesis 
                                                
35 There is, however, case law in respect of actions in private nuisance arising from damage caused to residential 
property adjoining golf clubs and golf courses – see, eg, Challen v McLeod Country Golf Club [2004] QCA 358 
(Court of Appeal of Queensland); Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 214 
(Supreme Court of Victoria); Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton (NSW Court of Appeal, 23 June 1998); 
Pringle v Ryde-Parramatta Golf Club (NSW Court of Appeal, 23 February 1978); and Lester-Travers v City of 
Frankston [1970] VR 2 and discussion at n 855 and accompanying text. 
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highlights how public rights such as a right to quietude, a right to safety and a right to 
recreation, may be ignored in the promotion of public sport activity.  The intention of this 
broad-ranging approach is to provide an overview of the common law rules that may have 
application to each common law jurisdiction and to argue for the need for legislative reform 
to safeguard both public rights and public sport. 
 
The principal contention of this thesis is that legislative reform is required to both protect 
publicly exhibited sports from proscription as common law public nuisances and to protect 
public rights – those rights subsisting in the public and common to all the public, and 
declared by the courts  – from a gradual dissipation.  The arguments made in this thesis, in 
respect of the common law offence of public nuisance, are applicable to each common law 
jurisdiction and are directed to none in particular.  The common law judgments in public 
nuisance cases in each separate jurisdiction reveal a surprising degree of cross-reference to, 
and reliance upon, the common law precedents of multiple common law jurisdictions.  The 
arguments are thus somewhat universal. 
 
The question to be addressed in this thesis is whether common law public rights are 
adequately protected from arbitrary impingement by the conduct of public sport events at 
public places by reason of the development of the common law in public nuisance litigation, 
or whether, owing to the participation of the Executive in promoting public sport, law 
reform in the form of a sports code is warranted.  The fact that public rights might be 
ignored or might be disrupted by the staging of sporting events at public places justifies 
consideration of the appropriateness of law reform.  Also of note are increasing occurrences 
of public exhibitions of sport at public places,36 and evidence of reluctance on the part of the 
Executive to prosecute offences in sport and a failure to uphold basic rights, such as a public 
right to safety, in sports activity.37  How are public rights best protected and preserved in an 
                                                
36 Note eg that a sport such as Triathlon was only devised on 24 September 1974, in San Diego, California, and 
developed in the 1980s, with the International Triathlon Union forming only on 1 April 1989. 
<http://www.triathlon.org/about/> (3 November 2011). 
37 See eg see R Horrow Sports Violence: The Interaction Between Private Lawmaking and the Criminal Law (Carrollton 
Press Arlington Virginia 1980) at pp 110-160. Horrow examines the results of his own 1978 survey of 34 
prosecutors, who were solicited about the relative legal inaction against athletes. Many prosecutors feel that 
prosecuting professional athletes for actions taken during competition would not have a deterrent effect, as 
most athletes would not view their actions as criminal: see JH Katz ‘From the Penalty Box to the Penitentiary – 
The People Versus Jesse Boulerice’ (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 833 at pp 853- 854. See also BC Nielsen ‘Controlling 
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environment where the Executive is a promoter of public exhibitions of sport and has policy 
interest in promoting sporting activity in the community?   
 
In being a promoter of public exhibitions of sport that impinge upon public rights, the 
Executive is complicit in the commission of a public nuisance offence at common law.  
Public rights may be arbitrarily impinged upon by the staging of public sporting events at 
public places such as beaches parks and roads.  Whilst there is a body of law addressing 
circumstances where relief has been obtained, the danger is that the public’s rights might be 
continually impinged.  The problem is that it is unlawful for the Executive or for Local 
Government to license public sport at common law, in circumstances where such public 
sport impinges upon public rights.  Yet it continually happens and public rights to recreation, 
quietude or safety, are in fact ignored, unknown or unrecognized in modern times.  The 
mere fact that public rights and natural rights may be lost warrants consideration as to 
whether an adequate legal mechanism exits to protect and preserve such rights.   
 
This thesis argues that whilst juridical pronouncements have, at times and intermittently, 
restrained sport activity in order to protect public rights in cases of public nuisance, in 
contemporary society and in light of increasing levels of public exhibitions of sport and sport 
promotion, a uniform approach is appropriate.  It is not so much that the development of 
the common law offence of public nuisance has gone astray as to warrant legislation; but 
rather, that legislation is warranted in order to adequately ensure that the Executive takes 
into consideration potential impingement of public rights when promoting or licensing 
public exhibitions of sport.  Legislative reform would promote the need for balanced 
consideration of public rights on the one hand and the cultural and social benefits of public 
sporting activity on the other.  Public sports are a special category of human activity that 
depend upon sanction from Parliament for legitimacy because of the risk of impingement of 
public rights and natural rights.   
 
It is a radical idea which this thesis discusses.  To suggest that our venerable and venerated 
fun runs, marathon events, triathlon and multisport festivals, ironman and surf lifesaving 
                                                
Sports Violence: Too Late for Carrots – Bring on the Big Stick’ (1989) 74 Iowa L Rev 681. See also W Hechter 
‘The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports’ (1979) 19 Crim LQ 425. 
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competitions may be unlawful at common law because they are public nuisances causing 
obstruction or inconvenience to the public in the exercise of their public rights may appear 
extreme.  But, upon detailed research and analyses of case law, this appears to be the legal 
reality.  A few sports – horseracing, motorsports and boxing – are regulated to varying 
degrees by statute.  And in a couple of common law jurisdictions very recent legislation in 
respect of major sports events has established a regime for the licensing and management of 
major sports events of significant cultural importance.38  But not all sports can be said to be 
protected from proscription, pursuant to legislation. 
 
 
                                                
38 See, eg, Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) and Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic).  Both enactments are 
narrow in their scope and regulate only those sporting events declared to be major sporting events. In respect 
of the New South Wales Major Events Act 2009, only one publicly exhibited sporting event has been 
authorized under the Major Events Regulation 2010 in New South Wales – the Sydney International FIFA Fan 
Fest.  Under the Victoria legislation, the Major Sporting Events Act 2009, the term “major sporting event” is 
defined pursuant to section 3 to include sporting events such as the Australian Tennis Open, the Australian 
Grand Prix, and the Australian Rules Football Grand Final, and analogous events at which spectators are 
admitted on payment of a fee or charge.  Excluded from this definition are sports events staged at public places 
such as beaches and parks and roads at which members of the public spectate without paying any fee to so do, 
including triathlon events, surfing events and surf lifesaving tournaments.  The many public sporting events 
that take place at beaches and parks and on roads are not covered by the legislation 
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Chapter 2 
 
Historical sources of regulation of sporting events 
 
 
Regulating publicly exhibited sports events ought not to be seen as novel or as officious.  We 
know that neither the Crown nor subordinate administrative bodies such as local 
governments has power at common law or under statute to license the staging of a publicly 
exhibited sporting event where that event creates a public nuisance by impinging on public 
rights – it is a fundamental rule of common law that no one can license a public nuisance but 
Parliament.39  There is a need to balance competing interests in the use of public spaces such 
as beaches, parks, and roads.  One way in which competing interests can arise is where the 
use of a public beach by individual citizens engaging in recreative or healthful exercise on 
that public beach competes with the use of that same public beach by a professional sports 
association staging a sporting competition in which prize money is offered. 
 
It is helpful for us to realise that governmental regulation and governmental licensing of 
public sporting activities has existed within the common law legal system since at least the 
year 1194.  There is a considerable body of historical statutory rules controlling or limiting 
sports activities staged at public spaces which provide useful analogy to the type of 
regulation which is now warranted because of the fact that the manner in which publicly 
exhibited sports events are staged can create public nuisances.  Whilst various policy reasons 
may be read to apply to the promulgation of numerous Crown edicts and statutes 
throughout the preceding millennium (and, indeed, legal historians have attempted to argue 
that singular policy reasons justify various statutes regulating public sports in the middle 
                                                
39 See, further, the discussion on the limitations on the Executive of government and on local authorities to 
promote or to license activities deemed to be a public nuisance in Part 4 of this thesis.  See, also, Johnson v City of 
New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906); Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478. In The Case of 
Proclamations Coke said that “the King cannot change any part of the common law, nor create any offence by 
his proclamation… without Parliament”: 12 Co Rep 74 at p 75, 77 ER 1352 at p 1353, [1610] EWHC KB J22.   
See also JD Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford University Press Oxford 1999) at p 112. 
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ages),40 the fact that proclamations and statutes on sports existed at all indicates that there 
existed policy reasons justifying their promulgation.  The policy aspects of these historical 
statutes and proclamations provide useful analogy to the policy aspects of the current 
problem discussed in this thesis; namely, that the manner in which publicly exhibited sports 
events are staged may create public nuisances at common law.  The historical sources 
discussed in this chapter demonstrate that regulations were ordinarily consistent with the 
common law proscription of public events based on the principles of the Royal Peace and 
public nuisance.  The historical sources appraised herein comprise of Crown proclamations 
as well as statutes. 
 
The purpose of this brief review of historical sources of regulation of sporting activities is to 
highlight, by way of analogy, that the Crown has always played a critical role in managing any 
impingement of public rights occurring when sporting activities are staged at public spaces, 
and in limiting harm created by sporting activities staged in public spaces.  These sources 
highlight the parens patriae responsibility of the Crown, a responsibility which exists, so far as 
it applies to the field of sports, to ensure that intemperance or overindulgence in publicly 
exhibited sporting activity does not wantonly create harm to the public or to the Crown.41  
The Crown’s historical relations with its subjects, in recognizing and responding to the 
                                                
40 Sir William Holdsworth, eg, is of the view that the recreations and sports of various classes of society during 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were matters of statutory intervention in the interests of the state.  Rich 
and poor, high and low alike, must help the state – by the labour of their bodies if they could not help with 
their counsel or their wealth, he says.  Holdsworth sees the statutes 12 Ric II c 6, 11 Hen IV c 4, and 17 Edw 
IV c 3 as encouraging the practising of archery alone was a policy initiative to train the public in the skills of 
archery so that they might be useful to the realm in the fighting of wars or in defending the realm.  His reading 
of these statutes as ordering the people to leave playing at ‘hand ball or foot ball’ or ‘such other unthrifty 
games’, and to practice at bows and arrows on Sundays and other festival days: Sir William Holdsworth A 
History of English Law (4th edn Methuen & Co London 1936) vol 11, at p 446. 
41 See, further, the discussion on the doctrine of parens patriae and the discussion of the case law commenting on 
it, in Chapter 15, below, at pp 371-381.  The parens patriae responsibilities of the Executive arise in the context 
of public sports in three ways.  First, the jurisdiction arises as a logical extension of the ancient prerogative duty 
in respect of children and the mentally impaired.  Secondly, parens patriae jurisdiction may be invoked in suits 
involving public rights because public rights are indivisible from the Crown.  Thirdly, common law judgments 
in respect of public land may equate public land as ‘trust land’.  Any acts purportedly harming trust land 
invokes parens patriae jurisdiction. In British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at para [67], 
[2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 1, the Supreme Court of Canada, citing Stein v Gonzales [1984] BCSC 344, 
(1984) 14 DLR(4th) 263 at pp 265 and 268 (McLachlin J), attributed the duty of enforcing public rights to the 
Crown’s role as parens patriae.  See also Re Eve [1986] SCC 36 at paras [31]-[43], (1986) 2 SCR at pp 407-17, 
(1986) 31 DLR(4th) at pp 14-21, cited with approval in Marion’s Case [1992] HCA 15 at paras [68]-[70], (1992) 
175 CLR 218; and see British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at para [76], [2004] 2 SCR 74, 
(2004) 240 DLR(4th) 1, citing SE Thorne (tr) Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press Cambridge 1968) vol 2, at pp 166-67. 
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advent of public exhibitions of sports, reflect principles of moderation and prudence which 
are the hallmarks of estimable law.42   It is important for us to approach these historical 
sources with an open mind and to avoid the pitfalls of chronocentrism.43  Chronocentrism is 
temporal chauvinism.  Lawyers who hold to this idea believe the law in their own time to be 
more highly developed, or more relevant to human experience in general, than in the era 
which has preceded them.  Such lawyers draw artificial and illusory boundaries between the 
principles of law of previous generations and that of their own time.  They complain that it is 
not possible to transpose the law, institutions, notions, and principles, operating in previous 
generations to contemporary times without explaining ostensible fundamental societal 
changes.  And they would refute Maitland’s counsel that, “If we are content to look no 
further than the text-books – the books written by lawyers for lawyers – we may read our 
ways backwards to Blackstone (d 1780), Hale (d 1676), Coke (d 1634), Fitzherbert (d 1538), 
Littleton (d 1481), Bracton (d 1268), Glanvill (d 1190), until we are in the reign of Henry of 
Anjou, and yet shall perceive that we are always reading of one and the same body of law, 
though the little body has become great, and the ideas that were few and indefinite have 
become many and explicit.”44  Yet, if we eschew a chronocentric attitude, we can perceive 
that the problem we are faced with today (a problem where there is competing interest in the 
use of public spaces such as public beaches, parks, and roads, between individual citizens on 
the one hand and organised sporting activity on the other hand), is similar, though not the 
same, to the problems which earlier governments faced.  How do we, as a society, through 
our government, facilitate recreative activity and healthful exercise whilst limiting the harm 
that can arise in an unregulated sports environment?  And what are the principles of law 
behind either prohibitive or permissive regulation.  There is a balance to be achieved. 
                                                
42 See eg, Montesquieu Bk 3 ch 9; Bk 5, chs 14 and 16; Bk 11, ch 4; and Bk 19, chs 4 and 5: R Caillois (ed) 
Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1; AM Cohler BC 
Miller and HS Stone (tr) Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 
112; or JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws (G Bell & Sons 
London 1914)  Under Bk 5, ch 14, Montesquieu writes: “Under moderate governments, the law is prudent in 
all its parts…” 
43 Chronocentrism is a conceited tendency of a contemporary peoples, its values and politics, to see itself as 
more important, more highly developed, or more relevant to human experience in general than any other era of 
human evolution.  Legal scholars who hold a chronocentric perspective may believe the law in their own time 
to be superior to that which has preceded them.  Their view is that the present moment is intellectually 
privileged in comparison with the past.  Chronocentrism is a term known in scholarship in the arts and in 
history.  See eg GS Morson Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (Yale University Press New Haven and 
London 1994) at p 236. 
44 FW Maitland Historical Essays (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1957) at p 97. 
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If we look briefly at the several enactments concerning sports and games, whether Royal 
Proclamations or Statutes, we see comparable policy reasons underlying their promulgation.  
Considerations of public order and the desire to limit violence feature predominantly in the 
reasons for the establishment of laws on sports activities staged in public. 
 
 
1. Historical Proclamations 
 
The Crown has periodically promulgated laws to regulate the practice of sport in public 
spaces.  The earliest of these laws are the proclamation of Richard I in 1194, the Statuta 
Armorum of Edward I in circa 1292, and the Proclamatio facta pro Conservatione Pacis of Edward 
II in 1314.  At other times in history, Heads of State have similarly issued edicts to limit 
human sporting activities which caused harm to the public.  Such other edicts are also 
detailed herein.  The earliest regulation of public sporting activity concerned tournaments,45 
jousts,46 football,47 and fencing.  Later edicts touched on horse racing. 
                                                
45 Strutt, adopting the opinion of Fauchet, is of the opinion that the word tournament in English came from 
the practice of the knights running par tour, that is, by turns at the quintain – a post used as a target in tilting 
exercises – wheeling about successively in a circle to repeat their course.  In process of time, says Strutt, the 
knights improved upon this pastime, and to make it the more respectable ran one at another, which certainly 
bore a much greater semblance of a real engagement, particularly when the knights were divided into large 
parties, and meeting together combated with clubs or maces, beating each other soundly without any favour or 
paying the least respect to rank or dignity. J Strutt The Sports and Pastimes of the People of England (Chatto and 
Windus London 1876) at pp 201-202; Fauchet’s Origines des Chevaliers: C Fauchet Origines des Chevaliers, Armoiries, 
et Heraux (Paris 1600);  
46 Strutt lays it down authoritatively that tournaments and jousts differed materially.  The jousts were initially 
considered as less honourable than the tournaments; according to the customs and laws of the jousts and 
tournaments relating to use of the lance, sword, and helmet.  The tournament was a conflict with many knights, 
separated into groups, and opposed at the same time.  The joust or lance game, termed in the Latin of the day 
justa, and in French, jouste, was a sportive combat when only one man contested another.  Jousts were often 
included in tournaments, and usually took place when the grand conflict of the tournament was finished.  But 
the joust, according to the laws of chivalry, might be made exclusive of tournament also.  By the fourteenth 
century, the popularity of jousts with its appeal to spectators killed off the mêlée style tournament and 
tournaments faded into obscurity.  The last tournaments were recorded as having taken place at Dunstable in 
the years 1334 and 1342.  See J Strutt The Sports and Pastimes of the People of England (Chatto and Windus London 
1876) at pp 216-218; C du Fresne du Change Glossarium ad Scriptores mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis (Paris 1840–) 
under head ‘Justa’; R Barber and J Baker Tournaments (Boydell and Brewer London 2000) at pp 32-33 and 34; Sir 
F Madden B Bandinel and others (ed) Collectanea Topographica et Genealogica (London 1834-1843) vol 4, at pp 389-
395; and EM Thompson (ed) Adam de Murimuth’s Continuatio Chronicarum (London 1889) at pp 123-124 and 223-
224.  For an account of young tourneyers in London in about the year 1180 see HE Butler (tr) W Fitzstephen 
A Description of London in Sir Frank M Stenton Norman London. An essay ... With a translation of William Fitz Stephen's 
Description (G Bell and  Sons London 1934).  See also ‘William fitz Stephen: Description of the city of London 
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2. The Proclamation on Tournaments of Richard I in 1194 
 
Richard I (1189-1199) promulgated an innovative decree on 20th August 1194 allowing 
tournaments to be staged in public in England, against the Catholic Church’s interdiction on 
the practice of tournaments.48  The decree was a pragmatic attempt to curb the inherent 
dangers of a sporting craze that would brook no opposition.  The Proclamation on 
Tournaments49 of 20th August 1194 established a regulatory system that enabled tournaments 
to be held legitimately.  Only five places in England were declared to be official tournament 
sites in the proclamation:  between Salisbury and Wilton (Wiltshire), Warwick and 
Kenilworth (Warwickshire), Stamford and Warinford (probably Suffolk), Brackley and 
Mixbury (Northamptonshire), and Blyth and Tickhill (Nottinghamshire).  Any knights who 
wished to tourney had to first obtain a license from the Crown in the form of a charter for 
                                                
(1170-1183)’, in DC Douglas and GW Greenaway (ed) English Historical Documents 1042-1189 (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode London 1953) at p 960. 
47 For detail on the earliest counts of football as a publicly exhibited sport, see HE Butler (tr) W Fitzstephen: A 
Description of London in Sir Frank M Stenton Norman London. An essay ... With a translation of William Fitz Stephen's 
Description (G Bell and Sons London 1934).  See also ‘William fitz Stephen: Description of the city of London 
(1170-1183)’ in DC Douglas and GW Greenaway (ed) English Historical Documents 1042-1189 (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode London 1953) at p 960. 
48 In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, tournaments were forbidden in ecclesiastical law and the knights who 
took part in them were liable to the severest spiritual penalties.  The reason given by the church for the 
prohibition of tournaments was clear: tournaments imperilled men’s lives and put their souls at risk: see —
‘Decreta Lateranensis Concilii’ in R Howlett (ed) Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I 
(Longman & Co London 1884) vol 1, Bk 3, at pp 219-220; C–J von Hefele (Bishop of Rottenburgh) & H 
Leclercq Histoire des Conciles d'après les documents originaux (Paris 1907–) vol 5, Bk 1, at p 729.  See also R Barber 
and J Baker Tournaments (Boydell and Brewer London 2000) at pp 17 and 139.  The ninth canon of the Council 
of the church held at Clermont in the year 1130 laid down a prohibition on all tournaments and forbade 
ecclesiastical burial to anyone fatally wounded in the sport.  The canon read: “We firmly prohibit those 
detestable markets or fairs, at which knights are accustomed to meet to show off their strength and their 
boldness and at which the deaths of men and dangers to the soul often occur.  But if anyone is killed there, 
even if he demands and is not denied penance and the viaticum, ecclesiastical burial shall be withheld from him” 
(C–J von Hefele (Bishop of Rottenburgh) & H Leclercq Histoire des Conciles d'après les documents originaux (Paris 
1907–) vol 5, Bk 1, at p 729).  The Clermont canon was repeated verbatim and confirmed at the Second 
Lateran Council in 1139 and also at the Council of Rheims in 1148 (See FH Cripps-Day The History of the 
Tournament in England (London 1918) at p 39).  At the Third Lateran Council in 1179 the canon reappeared for 
the last time with the actual word torneamenta added (Hefele & Leclercq (ibid) Bk 2, at p 1102).  The official 
attitude of the church remained unchanged for nearly two hundred years and it was not until the year 1316 that 
an Avignon Pope revoked the church’s ban on tournaments at the request of the French princes (Barber & 
Baker Tournaments (ibid) at p 139). 
49 See Rymer Foedera vol i, at p 65; Hoveden Chronica magistri vol iii, at p 268; R Howlett (ed) Chronicles of the reigns 
of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I edited from the manuscripts (Longman London 1884–1889) vol ii, ch IV, at p 422; 
Short extracts from Public Records Additional MS 4712 (British Library) at f 91b; and Harl MS 69 (British Library).  
See also R Barber and J Baker Tournaments (Boydell and Brewer London 2000) at pp 25-27; J Strutt The Sports 
and Pastimes of the People of England (Chatto and Windus London 1876) at p 206; and F Brandt Games, Gaming and 
Gamester’s Law (Henry Sweet London 1873) at p 140. 
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the tournament they desired to hold and could only engage in the tournament at one of the 
five sites approved in the decree.  To obtain a license for a tournament the knight had to pay 
a fee of ten marks.  In addition to this general license, all knights wanting to participate in a 
tournament as contestants had also to obtain a personal license, for which a fee was charged 
graduated according to his rank, ranging from twenty marks for an earl, ten marks for a 
baron, four marks for a knight possessing a landed estate and two marks for a landless 
knight.  No tourneyer of lower status than a landless knight was allowed to partake in the 
sport and foreign knights were specifically prohibited from tourneying in England.50  
Tournaments were unlawful unless practised in accord with the proclamation under sanction 
from the Crown. 
 
The Proclamation on Tournaments emphasized three legal principles which Richard I and his 
government saw as justifying his regulation of public exhibitions of tournaments.  It is not 
true that Richard I legitimized tournaments solely because he himself was a tourneyer.51  Nor 
was the revenue raised through the licensing system established under the Proclamation the 
principal motivating force.  The Proclamation on Tournaments was promulgated: “so that our 
peace shall not be broken, the power of our justiciary shall not be threatened and loss shall 
not fall on our royal forests.”52  The Crown was thus concerned that unregulated public 
                                                
50 ibid.  See also J Barker The Tournament in England 1100-1400 (Boydell Press Suffolk 1986) at pp 53-56. 
51 Richard I was a tourneyer himself.  Hoveden, who wrote his Annals about the year 1191, tells us that Richard 
I, being at Messina, the capital of Sicily, on his way to the Holy Land as a member of the Third Crusade, went 
with his convoy one Sunday afternoon to see popular sports exhibited without the walls of the city, and upon 
their return they met in the street a peasant driving an ass loaded with hollow canes.  The king and his 
entourage each took a cane, and began by way of sport to tilt one against another, arundines quas cannas 
vocant.  The king’s opponent was William de Barres, a knight of high rank in the household of the French king 
(quidam miles optimus de familia regis Franciae).  In the encounter they both broke their canes, and the king’s 
hood was torn by the stroke he received (fracta est cappa regis) which made him angry.  Riding with great force 
against the knight, he caused his horse to stumble with him, and while he was attempting to cast him to the 
ground his own saddle turned round and he himself was overthrown.  The king was provided with another 
horse, stronger than the former, which he mounted, and again assaulted de Barres, endeavouring by violence to 
throw him from his horse.  But the king could not throw de Barres because the knight clung fast to the horse’s 
neck.  Robert de Bretuil, earl of Leicester, laid hold upon de Barres to assist the king, but Richard forbade him 
to interfere, desiring that they might be left to themselves.  When they had combated a long time, adding 
threats to their actions, et dictis et factis, the king was much provoked, and commanded de Barres to leave the 
place and appear no more before him, declaring at the same time that he would ever after consider him an 
enemy.  But through the mediation of the King of France, a reconciliation was effected, and the knight was 
again restored to the favour of the monarch: F Brandt Games, Gaming and Gamester’s Law (Henry Sweet 
London 1873) at pp 131-132 relays Hoveden’s tale. 
52 Foedera vol i, at p 65; Hoveden Chronica magistri vol iii, at p 268; R Howlett (ed) Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, 
Henry II, and Richard I edited from the manuscripts (Longman London 1884–1889) vol ii, ch IV, at p 422; and Harl 
MS 69 (British Library). 
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exhibitions of tournaments risked breaches of the peace,53 public nuisance or damage (to the 
royal forests), or disregard for the law (whereby the power of our justiciary might be 
threatened).  Richard I thus cited fundamental common law principles, such as the Royal 
Peace and nuisance, as reason why tournaments were unlawful unless staged at particular 
designated places under Crown patronage.  The choice of only five sites throughout the 
realm was a deliberate attempt to limit the propensity to breaches of the peace and also to 
limit damage that was caused by the staging of tournaments.  As the tournament stretched 
over a wide area of countryside, generally, it was in the interests of the Crown to designate 
specific locations in advance for the exhibition of tournaments, well away from the most 
vulnerable places such as towns, monastic houses and royal forests.54  Further, Richard I 
sought to bring the public practice of the sport within his administrative and judicial 
authority both to protect his subjects from the Catholic Church’s reprove, and to enforce the 
legal view that no activity was beyond his jurisdiction. 
 
The Proclamation on Tournaments was inimitable; it set England apart from her 
neighbours.55  No other government in Europe at the time established a legal system that 
legitimised public sports as Richard I had done.  The unique nature of this decree allowed 
the model of English tournaments to develop distinctly from tournaments that were 
practised on the Continent.  Although the church still officially disapproved, in England it 
was permissible to tourney with governmental approval.  The fact that a tournament was 
lawful or unlawful, sanctioned or unsanctioned, gave it a special relationship with the Crown 
that was simply lacking in other countries.  This proclamation allowed English kings to exert 
a degree of control and influence over the sport that did much to enhance public sports, to 
limit the harm manifest in the staging of public sports, and to promote the cultural and 
chivalrous advantages arising from their existence. 
 
                                                
53 The public peace is the Royal peace and emanates from the constitutions of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, at a 
time when there was not yet a full and broad peace.  The King was the general patron and protector of the 
peace, a principle that later came to be known as parens patriae.  William I reinforced the notion of the King’s 
peace on the Conquest and provided special safeguard for his followers.  In the third of the Articles of William I, 
circa 1068, it is provided that: “all the men whom I brought with me or who have come after me shall be in my 
peace and quiet.”  See Sir Carleton Kemp Allen The Queen’s Peace (Stevens and Sons Limited London 1953) at 
pp 8-11 and 23-25. 
54 See R Barber and J Baker Tournaments (Boydell and Brewer London 2000) at p 25. 
55 R Barber and J Baker Tournaments (Boydell and Brewer London 2000) at p. 29. 
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3. The Statuta Armorum of Edward I in 1292 
 
Tournaments often engendered breaches of the peace, public crimes, and disturbances.  A 
tournament at Blyth in 1237 between northerners and southerners turned into a battle and 
the papal legate had to be called in to settle the competitors.56 The ‘Fair of Boston’ in 1288 
saw squires, participating in a tournament, run riot and burn half the town – perhaps one of 
the earliest examples of hooliganism in sport.57  The dilemma of public safety at tournaments 
was illustrated clearly by the pronouncement of the Statuta Armorum,58 which was 
promulgated by Edward I circa 1292.  The Statuta Armorum was concerned with arresting, or 
at the least minimizing, the harm created by the mass of participants in, and spectators of, 
tournaments that often ended in the pillage and slaughter of local villagers and 
townspeople.59  This statute was a formal legal attempt to prevent tournaments from 
impinging upon the public rights of safety and of life of residents living adjacent to the 
places where public tournament and jousting exhibitions were staged and was directed not 
only to the tourneyers themselves, but also to their retinues and attendants, who were the 
usual source of trouble – the supporters, as well as the players.  The decree came at a time 
when the welfare of ordinary members of the public was a real concern arising from the 
holding of tournaments. 
 
First in the proclamation was a command that no earl, baron, or other knight, attending at 
tournaments have more than three esquires in attendance to serve him at tournaments.   The 
penalty for earls, barons and knights for infringement of this regulation was forfeiture of his 
horse and his arms, and the pain of imprisonment at the pleasure of the governors of the 
tournament.  This part reads thus: - 
                                                
56 Matthew Paris Chronica Majora vol III, at p 404. 
57 R Barber and J Baker Tournaments (Boydell and Brewer London 2000) at p 148. 
58 See Danby Pickering (ed) The Statutes at Large (Joseph Bentham London 1762) vol 1.  See also A Luders (ed) 
The Statutes of the Realm: Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the 
House of Commons of Great Britain, From Original Records and Authentic Manuscripts, 11 vols (Record Commission 
London 1810-1828) vol 1, at pp 230-231. 
59  N Denholm-Young ‘The Tournament in the Thirteenth-Century’ in RW Hunt WA Pantin and RW Southern 
Studies in Medieval History Presented Frederick Maurice Powicke (Clarendon Press Oxford 1948) at pp 260-261, and 
264. 
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“At the request of the Earls and Barons and of the Chivalry of England, 
it is ordained and by our Lord the King commanded, that from 
henceforth none be so hardy, whether Earl, Baron, or other Knight, who 
shall go to the Tournament, to have more than three Esquires in Arms 
to serve him at the Tournament; and that every Esquire do bear a Cap of 
the Arms of his Lord, whom he shall serve that day, for Ensign.”60 
 
The proclamation regulated the permissible types of arms to be used in tournaments.  No 
knight or squire serving at the tournament was permitted to bear a sword pointed, or dagger 
pointed, or staff or mace, or truncheon or other weapon, but only a broad sword for 
tourneying.  All combatants who bore lances were commanded to be armed with 
breastplates, thigh-pieces, shoulder-pieces, and helmets, without any other kind of armour.  
In case of transgression, a knight was liable to forfeit his horse, and to imprisonment for one 
year.  An esquire found offending against the ordinance, in any point, liable to lose Horse 
and Harness, and to be imprisoned three years.  The rules of the tournament were to be 
strictly enforced; only competitors were allowed the privilege of combat.  All others were 
prohibited from combating with anyone outside the tournament:  “And if any man shall cast 
a knight to the ground, except they who are armed for their Lord's service, the knight shall 
have his horse, and the offender shall be punished as the Esquires aforesaid [namely, one 
year’s imprisonment].”61 
 
And spectators at the tournaments were prohibited from attending with arms: “they who 
shall come to see the tournament, shall not be armed with any manner of armour, and shall 
bear no sword, or dagger, or staff, or mace, or stone, upon such forfeiture as in the case of 
Esquires aforesaid [namely, one year’s imprisonment].”  And no boy or man on foot, coming 
for the same purpose, might appear with a sword, dagger, cudgel, or lance: “no groom or 
                                                
60 Danby Pickering (ed) The Statutes at Large (Joseph Bentham London 1762) vol 1.  See also A Luders (ed) The 
Statutes of the Realm: Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the House of 
Commons of Great Britain, From Original Records and Authentic Manuscripts, 11 vols (Record Commission London 
1810-1828) vol 1, at pp 230-231. 
61 ibid. 
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footman shall bear sword, or dagger, or staff, or stone; and if they be found offending, they 
shall be imprisoned for seven years.”62 
 
The regulations endeavoured to limit harm that was created by the practice of tournaments.  
The limiting of arms, the proscription on spectators and officials of bearing arms, the 
requirement that knights participating in tournaments wear appropriate protective armour; 
all these regulations were directed to limit the likelihood of personal injury, of breaches of 
the peace, and of endangering the safety or life of the people.  This proclamation 
demonstrates that the Crown was intimately concerned with the welfare of the people, 
consistent with their parens patriae jurisdiction, at the staging of a public sport. 
 
 
4. The Proclamatio facta pro Conservatione Pacis of Edward II in 1314 
 
The manner in which football and fencing, in particular, were practised in fourteenth century 
London was cited as justification for the issuance of a proclamation banning those two 
sports.  On 13th April 1314, Edward II commanded that a proclamation concerning the 
king’s peace, and forbidding certain sports to be practised publicly in London, be 
promulgated by the Mayor of London, Nicholaus de Farndone.  Only football and fencing 
were referred to in the proclamation.  The proclamation reads: - 
“Whereas our Lord the King is going towards the parts of Scotland, in 
his war against his enemies, and has especially commanded us strictly to 
keep his peace, as of right we are bound, and the more especially by 
reason of his going aforesaid; we do command you on behalf of the 
King, that no denizen, or stranger, shall do anything against his peace, or 
his dignity, or his crown, within the town or without; …and that no one 
shall keep within the City, or in the liberty thereof, a school for 
fencing…  And whereas there is great noise in the City, by some tumults 
arising from the kicking a great foot-balls in the public fields, from 
which many evils might arise which God forbid, we do command and do 
                                                
62 ibid. 
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forbid, by the King, upon pain of imprisonment, that such game shall be 
practised from henceforth within the City: and that all the points of old 
proclaimed in the said City, for keeping the peace of our Lord the King 
shall be well and strictly kept by day and by night, under the peril that 
thereunto pertains.”63 
 
In this proclamation Edward II commanded that nothing be done in London that was 
against the king’s peace, against his dignity, or against his crown.  Pursuant to the 
proclamation, public participation in sporting activities either in the public fields of London 
and in schools for fencing were proscribed.  Of note in this proclamation is that both the 
sports of football and fencing were so well known or established as public exercises or 
sports in the year 1314 that they merited comment in the form of a Royal Proclamation.  Of 
note, also, is that fencing and football were possessing such propensity to cause harm that 
they warranted intervention and proscription by the government of the day.  The Crown 
cited its duty to preserve the peace as a legitimate principle underscoring the prohibitions: 
for there is great uproar or inciting of quarrels, ‘et pur ceo graunt noise est en la Cite’, and certain 
rages or tumults, ‘par ascunes rageries’, and many other evils which are likely to occur, ‘dount 
plusours maux par cas purrount avenir’, arising from the playing at football in the public fields of 
London in the year 1314. 
                                                
63 Proclamatio facta pro Conservatione Pacis (Extract from the Liber Memorandorum) in HT Riley (ed) Munimenta 
Gildhallae Londoniensis; Liber Albus, Liber Custumarum, et Liber Horn (Longman London 1862) vol 3, at pp 439-
441.  See also Nicholas de Farndone, Mayor, in 1314, Liber Memorandorum (preserved at Guildhall) folio 66.  The 
Anglo-Norman text of the proclamation reads:- 
“Proclamatio faca pro Conservatione Pacis. 
Virtute istius brevis, Nicholaus de Farndone, tunc Major, fecit inquirere per probos homines singularum 
Wardarum de malefactoribus et nocte vagantibus, et fecit proclamare per totam Civitatem proclamationem 
subscriptam in haec verba:- 
Por ceo qu nostre Seignur le Roi est en alant vers les parties dEscoce, en sa guere sure ses enemis, et nous ad 
commande espessement sa pes fermement garder, come nous fumes de droit tenuz, et le plus especiaument pur 
son aler avantdit: vous comandoms depar le Roi, qe nul prive, nestrange, face chose counter sa pes, ne sa 
dignite, ne sa coroune, dedenz la ville ne dehors; ne qe nul aille armee, ne porte arme, suspecionousement deinz 
las Cite, en affray ne a peril del poeple; ne qu nul aille wakeraunt de nuyt par male agaite, ne en autre manere, 
outré corfu sonee; ne qe nul ne tiegne deinz la Cite, nen la fraunchise de ycele, escole de eskyrmerie.  Et sil 
aviegne qe nul destourbour de la pes le Roi, ou desobeissant a ses ministres, soit trouvee, tauntost soit pris et 
arrestu, et par my minister livere a la prison, et illueqes a demorer tant come par juggement soit delivere.  Et 
pur ceo qe graunt noise est en la Cite, par ascunes rageries de grosses pelotes de pee ferir en prees du poeple, 
dount plusours maux par cas purrount avenir, qe Dieu defend, comandoms et defendoms, par le Roi, sur peine 
denprisonement, tieu jeu user deinz la Cite desore enavant: et qe touz les poinz criez en la dite Cite aunciens, 
pur la pes nostre Seignur le Roi garder, soient bien et fermement gardez de jour et de nuyte, sur le peril qe 
appent.” 
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The issuance of the Proclamatio facta pro Conservatione Pacis in 1314 was the first Crown 
proclamation to refer to football and to ban its practice.  Football was not a new game in 
1314.  The game of football was noted as having been played in the public fields of London 
as early as 1180.  Fitzstephen describes the schoolboys and young men of London, on 
Carnival day, going out into the fields in the suburbs after dinner to play ball.64  But the game 
of football was not an innocent recreation devoid of harm.  The early form of the game, 
most often played on Shrove Tuesdays and other Holy Days, involved only slightly 
structured contests between the youth of neighbouring villages and towns.65  The sport, 
exhibited publicly over extensive public spaces such as public fields and on highways 
between villages, is depicted clearly in accounts of the sixteenth century: - 
“…As concerning footeball plaiying; I protest unto you, it maie rather 
bee called a freendly kinde of fight, then a plaie or recreation.  A bloodie 
and Murtheryng practise, then a fellowlie sporte or pastime.  For, dooeth 
not every one lye in waite for his adversarie, seekyng to overthrowe hym, 
and to picke hym on his nose, though it bee upon harde stones, in ditche 
or dale, in valley or hill, or what place so ever it be, he careth not, so he 
maie have him downe.  And he that can serve the moste at this fashion, 
he is counted the onely fellowe, and who but he:  So that by this meanes, 
sometimes their necks are broken, sometimes their backes, sometimes 
their legges, sometime their armes, sometyme one parte thrust out of 
joynte, sometime another…  But who so ever scapeth awaie the best 
goeth not scot-free, but is either sore wounded and brused, so as he 
dieth of it, or els scapeth very hardlie:  And no mervaile for thei have 
sleights to meete one betwixt twoo, to dashe hym against the harte with 
their elbowes, to hitte hym under the shorte Ribbes, with their gripped 
fistes, and with their knees, to catche him upon the hip, and to pick him 
on his necke, with an hundred suche murtheryng deviles:  And hereof 
                                                
64 HE Butler (tr) W Fitzstephen: A Description of London in Sir Frank M Stenton Norman London. An essay ... With a 
translation of William Fitz Stephen's Description (G Bell and Sons London 1934).  See also ‘William fitz Stephen: 
Description of the city of London (1170-1183)’ in DC Douglas and GW Greenaway (ed) English Historical 
Documents 1042-1189 (Eyre and Spottiswoode London 1953) at p 960. 
65 See further FP ‘Football in Medieval England and in Middle-English Literature’ (1929) 35(1) American 
Historical Review at pp 33-45. 
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groweth envie, malice, rancor, cholour, hatred, displeasure, enmitie, and 
what not els:  And sometimes fightyng, maulyng, contention, quarrell 
pickyng, murther, homicide, and greate effusion of blood, as experience 
daiely teacheth.”66 
 
 
5. Other historical proclamations 
 
The Crown also issued warrants, commissions and Letters Patent in connection with public 
exhibitions of sport.67  For example, a proclamation for revoking the Commission 
concerning Archery was issued by King James I.68  James I also issued a Declaration to his 
Subjects concerning lawful Sports to be used.69  Henry VIII issued Letters Patent to John 
Newman, and his wife Joan Newman, to keep open Bowling Alleys in London in 1537.70  
Elizabeth I issued Commissions granting rights of enforcement of statutory and common 
law proscriptions of sports and games to certified peace officers.71  And the Crown regulated 
                                                
66 P Stubbes The Anatomie of Abuses (Richard Jones London 1583) at f 120b.  Phillip Stubbes (fl 1583-1591) was 
a Puritan pamphleteer.  The Anatomie of Abuses is a denunciation of evil customs of the time which, in the 
author’s opinion, needed abolition.  It is one of the principal sources of information on the social and 
economic conditions of the period: M Drabble (ed) The Oxford Companion to English Literature (OUP Oxford 
1989) at p 946. 
67 See eg Cotton MS Titus B I (State Papers and Letters-Temporal Hen VII to Hen VIII, British Library) at 
folio 523; —‘Letter from King Henry VIII to Sir Thomas Arundell, Justice of the Peace for Cornwall’ in Stowe 
MS 142 (State Papers 1375-1810, British Library) at folios 14 and 15.  In a letter from Mr. Recorder Fleetwood 
to Lord Burghley, the Lord High Treasurer of England, on November 13, 1585, Fleetwood complains of the 
grant of a license to practise unlawful games.  In support of his complaint he notes the statute and common 
law proscriptions.  Lansdowne MS 44 (Burghley Papers 1585, British Library) at folios 123-124.  See also 
‘Letter of the Privy Council’ in Egerton MS 2644 (Barrington Papers British Library) vol I, at folio 27; and —
‘Letters Patent of Queen Elizabeth’ in Egerton MS 2623 (British Library) at folio 11.   
68 —‘By the King, A Proclamation for revoking the Commission concerning Archery’ in Proclamations etc. II 
(British Library) Shelfmark c.112.h.3, at document 2. 
69 —‘The Kings Majesties Declaration to His Subjects concerning lawful Sports to bee used’ in Royal Decrees and 
Declarations 1611-80 (British Library) Shelfmark 517.k.3.(6). 
70 —‘Copy of Letter Patent to John Newman, and his wife Joan Newman, to keep open Bowling Alleys in 
London. 29 Hen VIII’ in Additional MS 4535 (British Library) at folio 53.  Letters patent are a type of legal 
instrument in the form of an open letter issued by a monarch or government granting an office, a right, 
monopoly, title, or status to a person or to some entity such as a corporation.  The opposite of letters patent is 
letters close which are personal in nature and sealed so that only the recipient can read the contents of the letter.  
Letters patent are issued under the prerogative powers of the head of State and constitute a rare, if significant, 
form of legislation without the consent of Parliament.  They have remained an unhanged aspect of government 
administration and constitutional law for several hundred years:  See JJ Bagley Historical Interpretation: Sources of 
Medieval History (David & Charles Newton Abbott London 1972) vol 1, at pp 96-99, and 260-61. 
71 —‘Petition to the Council, Commission of Queen Elizabeth’ in Lansdowne MS 22 (Burghley Papers 1567, 
British Library) at folios 110 to 114; —‘Certificate from the Justices of various counties to the Lord Keeper of 
the names of persons duly qualified for the execution of the Commission’ in Lansdowne MS 110 (Burghley 
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sports in the new colony of Carolina in North America by proscribing certain sports and 
establishing a minister responsible for such regulation.72  On 13th January 1615, James I 
issued an Order touching Foot-Ball.  The proclamation stated: “Whereas greate disorders and 
tumults doe often arise and happen within the streetes and lanes neere adjoyninge to ye 
Cittye of London by playinge at the foote-ball: It is now Ordered that henceforthe all 
Constables doe from tyme to tyme represse and restrayne all manner of Footeball-playe in 
the lanes and streetes adjoyninge to the Cittye of London.”73 
 
A proclamation issued by the Governor of the colony of New South Wales, Lachlan 
Macquarie, on 11th September 1819, was directed to limit the harm generated by the staging 
of horseraces in Sydney.  The proclamation stated:  
“It being reported to His Excellency the Governor that frequent and 
numerous assemblages of people have of late taken place on the Race 
Course in Hyde Park, and that the amusement of horse racing instead of 
being confined as formerly, to a particular time and season, under the 
express sanction of His Excellency, has degenerated into a system of low 
gambling and dissipation, at once injurious to the property of those 
concerned in it, militating with the industry of the people, and subversive 
of order and good morals:  His Excellency is hereon pleased to order 
and direct, that no Horse Races shall in future take place on the Race 
Course in Sydney without special permission first had and obtained in 
writing from His Excellency for that express purpose; and all Magistrates 
and Peace Officers are hereby called on and required to disperse all such 
illegal meetings as shall hereafter take place at Sydney for the purpose of 
horse racing or other unsanctioned pastime.”74 
 
                                                
Papers, British Library) at folio 46; —‘Birch Collection: Warrants for Paying Money 1655-1658’ in Additional 
MS 4196 (British Library) at folios 258 and 330 
72 —‘The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina’ in Additional MS 19374 (British Library). 
73 S P Reg, JC Jeaffreson (ed) ‘Middlesex Sessions Rolls: 1615’ Middlesex county records: 1603-25 (1887) vol 2, at pp 
107-119 <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=65991> (2 April 2009). 
74 New South Wales State Reference Library MFLM 929.3944 1989: Colonial Secretary’s Papers 1788-1825 
[microform] AO/SR 6048.  336477 69370958. 
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Each of the foregoing proclamations manifest the Crown’s concern, as parens patriae, for the 
wellbeing of the people.75  Of concern for the Crown was the fact that public sporting 
activities created ‘disorders and tumults’ either in public parks (as was noted in the 
proclamation of Edward II in 1314 and the proclamation of Governor Macquarie of the 
Colony of Sydney in 1819) or in the streets and lanes of cities (as was noted in the 
proclamation of James I in 1615).  There is a principle of law perceptible in these 
proclamations: whilst any of the historical public sporting activities may have been popular, 
no jingoistic majoritarian passion could lawfully displace the public’s right to peace, security, 
or quietude or any of the other enumerated common law public rights.  Whilst it is possible 
to view each of these edicts as but exemplars of autocratic suppression, in truth these edicts 
tell a different story.  The Crown has a very real concern, as parens patriae, for the safety, 
health and wellbeing of the people, as well concern for the public peace.  Tournaments and 
football matches of earlier centuries were played over a wide area in royal forests, in cities 
and towns, on village greens and on the highways.  Historical horse races, in their profligacy, 
adversely impacted upon society.  The statutory and royal prohibitions were directed at the 
manner in which these public sporting activities occurred moreso than that the people 
                                                
75 cf Ordinance of Edward III in the year 1365 which proscribed the playing of football in public, along with 
other sports.  This Ordinance was promulgated not in cognizance of a power to protect the public peace, but in 
order to effect governmental policy for the teaching and training in the skill of archery. This Ordinance 
prohibited under penalty of imprisonment all and sundry from stone, wood and iron throwing games; handball, 
football, or hockey; coursing and cock-fighting, or other such idle games.  The Ordinance 39 Edw III (1365) 
memb 23d reads: “June 12. Westminster. To the sheriffs of London Order to cause a proclamation to be made 
that every able and bodied man of the said city on feast days when he has leisure shall in his sports use bows 
and arrows or pellets or bolts, and shall learn and practise the art of shooting, forbidding them under pain of 
imprisonment to meddle in the hurling of stones, loggats and quoits, handball, football, club ball, cambuc, cock 
fighting or other vain games of no value; as the people of the realm, noble and simple, used heretofore to 
practise the said art in their sports, whence by God’s help came forth honour to the kingdom and advantage to 
the king in his actions of war, and now the said art is almost wholly disused, and the people indulge in the 
games aforesaid and in other dishonest and unthrifty or idle games, whereby the realm is like to be without 
archers. By K. [Foedera] The like to singular the sheriffs of England [Ibid]”.  See HC Maxwell Lyte (ed) ‘Close 
Rolls, Edward III: June 1365’ Calendar of Close Rolls, Edward III, 1364-1368, (HMSO, London, 1910), vol 12, at 
pp 181-187.  Sports historians believe that the sport of throwing iron no doubt included contests with shot, 
discus or quoit.  Cambuc was a game in which a small wooden ball was propelled forward with a curved stick 
or mallet and thus the ancestor of golf, croquet and hockey.  Club ball was the term used to denote a rounders-
type game and believed to be the source of cricket and baseball.  See Sir Derek Birley Sport and the Making of 
Britain at p 36; Sir Guy Campbell ‘The Early History of English Golf’ in B Darwin (ed) History of Golf in Britain 
(London 1952) at pp 44-45.  Football was banned, as the historian Strutt suggests, “not, perhaps from any 
particular objection to the sport in itself, but because it co-operated, with other favourite amusements, to 
impede the progress of archery” (J Strutt The Sports and Pastimes of the People of England (Chatto and Windus 
London 1876) at p 94).  Other historians support this idea (Sir Derek Birley Sport and the Making of Britain at p 
36). 
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should be forbidden from practising any recreation.  It was the immoderation of publicly 
exhibited sporting activities that was injurious. 
 
Are the circumstances of the Dewar case in 1899,76 or the Rowing Regatta case in 1852,77 where 
residents living adjacent the racecourse or lake where public sports were exhibited suffered 
damage from spectators attending those events, so very different from the fear or 
inconvenience experienced by former villagers in former times?  Is the damage created by 
spectators urinating and throwing rubbish in resident’s gardens, trampling on their lawns, 
breaking down their fences, and otherwise disturbing their quietude, so very different from 
the bellicose mob engaging in a football game in the fourteenth century?  Is Mr and Mrs 
Dewar’s fear of the throwing of bottles of alcohol into their garden and of the use of 
expletives by a crowd attending horse races materially different from the experiences of 
villagers living adjacent to the place where a tournament was staged in the fourteenth 
century?  The reality in modern times is that athletes do commit crimes on the playing field; 
and for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is to settle personal scores.78  Those 
associated with sport, including players, do become involved in bribery scandals.79  The 
managers of our sports are on occasion corrupt.80  Athletes and spectators are killed at public 
sporting events.81  And riot and damage occurs often in the aftermath of competitions.82  
                                                
76 Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345. 
77 Bostock v North Staffordshire R Co (1852) 5 De G & Sm 584, (1852) 64 ER 1253. 
78 See eg, North American prosecutions against players in ice hockey: R v Ciccarelli [1989] 54 CCC(3d) 121; R v 
McSorley (2000) BCPC 116. 
79 See eg, the match-fixing scandals in cricket and the recent litigation over bans to players issued by the Board 
of Control for Cricket in India : Ajay Jadeja v BCCI & Ors, Case No FAOOS 226/2003, The High Court of 
Delhi at New Delhi; and Mohammad Azhuruddin v BCCI & Ors, Case No. CCCA 408/2003, High Court of 
Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. 
80 The International Olympic Committee, the pinnacle sports event administrator was involved in a widespread 
corruption scandal concerning the Summer Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000 and the Winter Olympic Games 
in Salt Lake City in 2002. 
81 There are literally thousands of accounts.  One study suggests that between 1933 and 1976 organised football 
in the United States claimed the lives of 1,198 participants: J Yates and W Gillespie ‘The Problem of Sport 
Violence and the Criminal Prosecution Solution’ (2002) 12 Cornell J L & Pub Pol’y 145 at p 148, citing RB 
Horrow ‘Violence in Professional Sports: Is it Part of the Game?’ (1982) 9 J Legis 1 at p 1.  Deaths in sport 
have been the subject of litigation.  See eg, R v Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83; R v Moore (1898) 14 TLR 229; 
and Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205.  We may also note the Hillsborough disaster in Britain.  
See eg, the litigation arising from the Hillsborough disaster: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 
1 AC 310.  Ninety-six spectators died, being crushed to death, and hundreds more were injured, as a result of 
crowd disorder in Spectator Pens 3 and 4 at the Leppings Lane end of the Hillsborough Football Stadium in 
Sheffield on 15th April 1989.  Lord Justice Taylor’s interim report on the incident included a number of 
recommendations relating to crowd control and safety at sporting events: The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15th 
April 1989, Inquiry by the Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor, Interim report, (HMSO, London, 1989).  Recommendations 
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These concerns are concerns that are similar to the concerns of previous governments 
regulating sport in previous centuries.  What concerned the Crown in the Middle Ages and 
what ought to concern the Crown today is the potential harm which public exhibitions of 
sport give rise to.  This harm is measured in the impact which public exhibitions of sporting 
events have on the local environment and on public rights.  Whether these public rights be 
the right to health or life, protected by the Crown’s ordinance of 1365, or whether these 
public rights be the right to quietude, protected by the grant of an injunction in Dewar,83 and 
in Bostock v North Staffordshire R Co,84 in the nineteenth century, is incidental.  Is a crowd of 
10,000 spectators occupying a public beach to observe a surfing competition incapable of 
damaging the flora and fauna of the beach?  Is such a crowd incapable of impinging on 
public rights?  The point is that the Crown was involved in previous times in protecting 
public rights, either directly through issuing proclamations or indirectly through civil suits for 
the abatement of sporting activities creating public nuisance.85  It is only the contemporary 
Crown, in the twenty-first century, who appear obtuse; reticent to control the excesses of, or 
risks associated with, publicly exhibited sporting events; and imperceptive of their 
paramount parens patriae responsibility to safeguard public rights.86 
 
 
                                                
made include the setting up of maximum capacities for terraces, reviews of safety certificates and improved 
planning and liaison by police and emergency services. 
82 See eg, Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds, Interim report (Popplewell report), 
(HMSO, London, 1985), Cmnd 9585 – a report on the fire at Bradford City Football Ground in 1985 which 
resulted in 56 deaths and the riot at Birmingham City Football Ground in 1985; and Committee of Inquiry into 
Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds, Final report (Popplewell report), (HMSO, London, 1986), Cmnd 9710 
– a report on the Heysel Stadium tragedy in Brussels in 1985 where 38 people were killed and 100 were injured 
when fans rioted. 
83 Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345. 
84 (1852) 5 De G & Sm 584, (1852) 64 ER 1253. 
85 Note eg Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478. 
86 For a comprehensive discussion concerning the several factors that have an effect on a prosecutor’s decision 
to adjudicate professional sport violence see R Horrow Sports Violence: The Interaction Between Private Lawmaking 
and the Criminal Law (Carrollton Press Arlington Virginia 1980) at pp 110-160.  Horrow examines the results of 
his own 1978 survey of 34 prosecutors, who were solicited about the relative legal inaction against athletes.  
Many prosecutors feel that prosecuting professional athletes for actions taken during competition would not 
have a deterrent effect, as most athletes would not view their actions as criminal: see JH Katz ‘From the Penalty 
Box to the Penitentiary – The People Versus Jesse Boulerice’ (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 833 at pp 853-854.  See also 
BC Nielsen ‘Controlling Sports Violence: Too Late for Carrots – Bring on the Big Stick’ (1989) 74 Iowa L Rev 
681.  Nielsen provides the view that: “Only through a strict ‘get tough’ policy of prosecutorial intervention will 
athletes reevaluate their attitudes and adjust their athletic activities to conform to socially acceptable forms of 
behaviour.” (ibid at p 711).  See also W Hechter ‘The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports’ (1979) 19 Crim LQ 
425. 
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6. Historical Statutes 
 
Proscriptions of public sporting activities were issued not only in the form of Crown 
proclamations, but were also provided by Parliament.  From the fourteenth century onwards, 
the Parliament was used by the King and his Council for the making of statutes.  Statutes 
from the fourteenth century onwards were not merely examples of the will of the Crown. 87  
Rather, the Executive did, in fact, rely on the Parliament to ameliorate proposed laws.88  
Parliament itself became more involved in legislation with the Parliament requesting the 
Crown to legislate on some particular matter.  Professor Plucknett states the parliamentary 
process thus: “As we pass through the fourteenth century, parliamentary legislation becomes 
more and more general… [W]e also find that Parliament will request the Crown to legislate 
upon some particular matter.  At first we find general complaints put in the form of a 
petition, either by particular members, or outsiders and local bodies.  Next, come petitions 
by the whole Commons.  Such petitions will state grievances and pray for a remedy.  When 
the Parliament is over, the Council will consider these requests at its leisure, and if it thinks 
legislation is necessary it will prepare it according to its discretion and publish it as a statute 
with parliamentary authority.”89  From Tudor times statutes became legislative acts of the 
Crown in Parliament.  These statutes originated in Parliament on the motion of some 
member or of a minister of the Crown, and consequently the whole community is 
understood to be involved in their creation.  It is from the early statutes proscribing sports 
that we can see the correlation between common law principles and those principles extant 
                                                
87 By contrast, a statute earlier than the fourteenth century, in the reign of Edward I, for example, is simply a 
law established by royal authority and cannot accurately be said to be illustrative of civic attitudes.  “… 
[W]hether [a statute] is established by the King in Council, or in a Parliament of nobles, or in a Parliament of 
nobles and commons as well, is completely immaterial.  It is equally immaterial what form the statute takes, 
whether it be a charter, or a statute enrolled and proclaimed, or merely an administrative expression of the royal 
will notified to the judicial authorities by means of a letter close…  In short, while we are in the reign of 
Edward I we feel the typical medieval atmosphere, which was, above all, intensely practical.  The great concern 
of the government was to govern, and if in the course of its duties legislation became necessary, then it was 
effected simply and quickly without any complications or formalities.” TFT Plucknett A Concise History of the 
Common Law (5th edn Little Brown & Co Boston 1956) at p 322. 
88 See eg Plucknett ibid. 
89 ibid at p 323.  The government did not always act upon a petition.  Even after a statute had been passed the 
Crown assumed wide powers of altering or suspending a statute.  At other times the Commons is found 
complaining that although they had petitioned for one thing, the Council had legislated along different lines of 
which they did not approve. 
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in the statutes.  There appears a remarkable consistency between the common law on the 
subject of sport and the statutes on that same field.90 
 
The edicts of Richard I in 1194 and Edward I in circa 1292, of Edward II in 1314, as detailed 
above, each provide purposes for the regulation of sport.  Principal among the purposes 
cited in each of the proclamations is the need to maintain the public peace, protect public 
safety, and minimize harm to communities where public sporting activity took place.  
Statutes promulgated by the English and British Parliament from the fifteenth century 
likewise cited purposes of public safety and the public peace.  The statute of 17 Edw 4 c. 3 
(1477), ‘Against Unlawful Games’, declared that any governor or occupier of any house, 
tenement, garden, or other place was forbidden from willingly suffering “any person to 
occupy or play any of the said games called closh, kailes, half-bowl, hand in and hand out, or 
queckboard, or any of them, within any of their said houses, tenements, gardens, or any 
other place, upon pain to have the imprisonment of three years, and to forfeit and lose for 
every offence, xx. li.”  Also forbidden were ‘dice, coits, tennis, and such like games’.  The 
statute cited as grounds for the proscriptions the fact that “divers and many murders, 
robberies, and other heinous felonies be oftentimes committed and done in divers parts of 
this realm, to the great inquieting and trouble of many good and well-disposed persons, and 
the importune loss of their goods” consequent to the playing of the enumerated sports and 
games.91 
                                                
90 This consistency can be seen in the language of the judges in the cases of Bell v The Bishop of Norwich (1566) 3 
Dyer 254b; Case of Monopolies (1602) 11 Co Rep 84b; Whaley v Pajot (1799) 2 B & P 51 (Lord Eldon CJ);  Hunt v 
Bell (1822) 1 Bing 1; and R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534; and statutes such as 33 Henry 8 c 9 (1541) and 16 
Charles 2 c 7 (1664).  The common law case law in various jurisdictions of America demonstrate similar 
consistency with both the common law principles in England and with the local and English statutes regulating 
sports and games: Commonwealth v McGovern 116 Ky 212, 75 SW 261 (1903); The State of Louisiana v The Olympic 
Club 17 So 599 (1895); The Columbian Athletic Club v State, ex rel McMahan 143 Ind 98, 40 NE 914 (1895); Johnson 
v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906), 109 AD 821, 96 NYS 754 (1905); Swigart v People of the State of 
Illinois 50 Ill App 181 (1892), 154 Ill 284, 40 NE 432 (1895); and Zwirn v Galento 288 NY 428, 43 NE2d 474 
(1942). 
91 The statutory provision reads in whole: “ITEM, whereas by the laws of this land no person should use any 
unlawful games, as dice, coits, tennis, and such like games, but that every person strong and able of body 
should use his bow, because that the defence of this land was much by archers, contrary to which laws the 
games aforesaid and many new imagined games, called closh [nine pins], kailes, half-bowl, hand in and hand 
out, and queckboard be daily used in divers parts of this land, as well by persons of good reputation, as of small 
having: and such evil disposed persons that doubt not to offend God in not observing their holy days, nor in 
breaking the laws of the lands to their own impoverishment, and by their ungracious procurement and 
encouraging do bring other to such games, till they be utterly undone and impoverished of their goods, to the 
pernicious example of divers of the King’s liege people, if such unprofitable games should be suffered long to 
continue, because that by the mean thereof divers and many murders, robberies, and other heinous felonies be 
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The statute 33 Hen 8 c. 9 (1541) stated as amongst its purposes, in part 5 of the Preamble to 
the statute, the fact that regulation of the “customable usage of tennis-play, bowls, cloysh, 
and other unlawful games, prohibited by many good and beneficial statutes by authority of 
parliament” was warranted because “great impoverishment hath ensued and many heinous 
murders, robberies and felonies were committed and done, and also the divine service of 
God by such misdoers on holy and festival days, not heard or solemnized, to the high 
displeasure of Almighty God…” 
 
The statute of 2 & 3 Phil & Mary c. 9 (1555) declared somewhat paranoically that public 
sporting activities were a front for unlawful religious meetings (conventicles), yet also 
declared that public sports such as bowling and tennis engendered crimes such as robberies 
and other misdemeanours and to breaches of the peace.  The statute reads:- 
“That where by reason of divers sundry Licenses heretofore granted to 
divers Persons, as well within the City of London and the Suburbs of the 
same, as also in divers other Places within your Highness Realm, for the 
having, maintaining and keeping of Houses, Gardens and Places for 
Bowling, Tennis, Dicing, White and Black, Making and Marring, and 
other unlawful Games prohibited by the Laws and Statutes of this 
Realm, divers and many unlawful Assemblies, Conventicles, Seditions 
and Conspiracies have and been daily secretly practised by idle and 
misruled Persons repairing to such Places; of the which, Robberies and 
                                                
oftentimes committed and done in divers parts of this realm, to the great inquieting and trouble of many good 
and well-disposed persons, and the importune loss of their goods, which plays in their said offences be daily 
supported and savoured by the governors and occupiers of divers houses, tenements, gardens, and other places, 
where they use and occupy their said ungracious and incommendable games:  Our sovereign lord the King in 
consideration of the premises, by the advice of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons in the said 
parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same hath ordained, that after the feast of Easter next 
coming, no person, governor nor occupier of any house, tenement, garden, or other place within this realm, 
shall willingly suffer any person to occupy or play any of the said games called closh, kailes, half-bowl, hand in 
and hand out, or queckboard, or any of them, within any of their said houses, tenements, gardens, or any other 
place, upon pain to have the imprisonment of three years, and to forfeit and lose for every offence, xx. li.” 
Dan Pickering (ed) The Statutes at Large, from the First Year of King Henry V to the Twenty-second Year of King Edw IV 
(Charles Bathurst London 1762) vol III, at p 445. 
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many other Misdemeanours have ensued, to the Breach of your 
Highness Peace…”92 
 
Other enactments dealing with breaches of the peace occasioned by public sporting activities 
include section 8 of 9 Anne c. 14 (1710).  This statute provided for penalties for persons 
committing assaults on others on account of gaming in sports including horse racing.93 
 
Each of these early statutes recognized, in their purposes, an observation that public 
exhibitions of sporting activity had propensity for violence, breaches of the peace, or 
impingement of public rights.  In Britain, the several statutes between the years 1388 and 
1845, a period of 457 years, declared various sports unlawful in their manner of practice and 
regulated the manner in which lawful sports and games could be conducted.94 
 
Statutes from the reign of Charles II and through Hanoverian times moved away from 
general prohibition of public sporting activity; repealed various then existing proscriptions; 
and thence regulated the manner in which the publicly exhibited sport of horseracing only 
                                                
92 —The Statutes at Large, from the First Year of King Edw IV to the End of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth (Charles Eyre 
and Andrew Strahan London 1786) vol II, at p 487. 
93 —The Statutes at Large from the Tenth Year of the Reign of King Will III to the End of the Reign of Queen Anne (Charles 
Eyre and Andrew Strahan London 1786) vol IV, at p 448.  The section reads: “VIII.  And for the preventing of 
such Quarrels as shall and may happen upon the Account of Gaming; Be it further enacted by the Authority 
aforesaid, That in case any Person or Persons whatsoever, shall assault and beat, or shall challenge or provoke 
to fight, any other Person or Persons whatsoever, upon Account of any Money won by gaming, playing or 
betting at any of the Games aforesaid, such Person or Persons assaulting or beating, or challenging or 
provoking to fight, such other Person or Persons upon the Account aforesaid, shall, being thereof convicted 
upon an Indictment or Information to be exhibited against him of them for that Purpose, forfeit to her 
Majesty, her Heirs and Successors, all his Goods, Chattels and Personal Estate whatsoever, and shall also suffer 
imprisonment without Bail or Mainprize, in the Common Gaol of the County where such Conviction shall be 
had, during the Term of two Years.” 
94 English statutes, such as 12 Ric 2 c. 6 (1388); 17 Edw 4 c. 3 (1477); 33 Hen 8 c. 9 (1541); and 1 Chas 1 c. 1 (1625) 
commanded that several sports, such as football and tennis, then known, were unlawful and therefore 
prohibited.  Some statutes during this period set specific penalties of imprisonment or fines for practising 
unlawful games: eg the statutes 11 Hen 4 c. 4 (1409) and 33 Hen 8 c. 9 (1541).  Statutes encouraged specific 
sports such as archery by regulating the times and places where such sports were allowed to be practiced and by 
controlling the manner in which sports were practiced: 3 Hen 7 c. 13 (1487); 11 Hen 7 c. 2 (1494); 3 Hen 8 c. 3 
(1511-12) [The Act reads: “All sorts of men under the age of forty years shall have bows and arrows, and use 
shooting; certain persons excepted, &c. (2) unlawful games shall not be used”]; 33 Hen 8 c. 9 (1541); 8 Eliz c. 10 
(1566); 13 Geo 2 c. 19 (1740) [which prohibited certain types of horse racing]; 15 Geo 2 c. 19 (1742); and 18 Geo 2 
c. 34 (1745) [concerning prohibitions on species of horse racing, and entitled, ‘An Act to explain amend and 
make more effectual the laws in being to prevent excessive and deceitful gaming and to restrain and prevent the 
excessive increase of horse races’]. 
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might be lawfully conducted.95  This new regulatory regimen was adopted in the British 
Dominions and preserved by the various States upon their independence.  This regimen 
required that the publicly exhibited sport of horseracing was unlawful unless such sport first 
obtained the warrant of the Crown.96 
 
The only other sports to have been made the subject of a regulatory regimen are the sports 
of boxing and motorcar racing.  Prize-fighting, a form of boxing, has been declared unlawful 
in several jurisdictions at various times;97 although never in the United Kingdom.  New York 
and New South Wales legalized the sport of boxing by means of statutes: section 1710 of the 
New York Penal Law, Consol. Laws, c. 40;98 New York Laws 1911, c. 779;99 the Professional 
Boxing Control Act 1980 (NSW);100 and the Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 1986 (NSW) 
[being “An Act to regulate the conduct of professional boxing; to constitute the Boxing 
Authority of New South Wales and to define its functions; to regulate the conduct of 
wrestling and amateur boxing contests…”].101  Motorcar racing is regulated by means of 
enactments such as the Motor Racing Events Act 1990 (Qld) and the Mount Panorama 
Motor Racing Act 1989 (NSW), for example. 
 
 
                                                
95 The British statutes 16 Chas 2 c. 7 (1664), and 9 Anne c. 14 (1710), and the nineteenth century acts 3 Geo 4 c. 
41 (1823) and Gaming Act 1845, 8 & 9 Vic c. 109 repealed previous proscriptions on sports and thenceforth 
controlled the manner of play by instituting laws on gaming in sports only. The Gaming Act 1850, alike the 
statutes 16 Car. 2 c. 7 (1664), 9 Anne c. 14 (1710), 13 Geo 2 c. 9 (1840), and 18 Geo 2 c. 34 (1845), as well as 
proscribing gaming in certain circumstances also controlled the manner in which the sport of horse racing, in 
particular, may lawfully be conducted. 
96 The laws espoused in these statutes, relating to horse racing, are preserved today in New South Wales in the 
Racing Administration Act 1998 (NSW).  Subsequent legislation in Queensland, such as the Racecourses Act 
1923 (Qld) (14 Geo 5 No. 23); the Racing Limitation Act 1946 (Qld) (11 Geo 6 No. 3); the Racing and Betting 
Act 1954 (Qld) (3 Eliz 2 No. 54); and the Racing and Betting Act 1980 (Qld) controlled the practice of the 
sport of horse racing also, requiring, in particular, the warrant of the executive government for such sport to be 
lawfully practiced. 
97 See eg Kentucky Statutes (1899), sections 1284-1288 [These sections prohibit prize-fighting and boxing]; Louisiana 
Act No 25 of 1890 [The Louisiana law prohibited prize-fighting]; and s 74 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). 
98 This proscribed boxing, sparing and prize-fighting except where sanctioned by the New York State Athletic 
Commission. 
99 This Act established the New York State Athletic Commission. 
100 Repealed by the Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 1986 (NSW). 
101 To be repealed by the Combat Sports Act 2008 (NSW).  The Combat Sports Act 2008 (NSW) will regulate 
the sports of “(a) boxing (or fist fighting) in any of its styles, (b)  kick boxing in any of its styles, (c) any sport, 
martial art or activity in which each contestant in a contest, display or exhibition of that sport, art or activity is 
required to strike, kick, hit, grapple with, throw or punch one or more other contestants and that is prescribed 
by the regulations…”: s 3 Combat Sports Act 2008 (NSW).  The Act received royal assent on 10th December 
2008, though is not yet in force: s 2 Combat Sports Act 2008 (NSW). 
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7. Contemporary Statutes 
 
In the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States, there exists legislation 
proscribing specific sports in specific circumstances or otherwise controlling the manner in 
which publicly exhibited sporting events might be conducted.   In the United Kingdom 
recent governments have legislated on football to control both the behaviour of spectators at 
football matches as well the behaviour of players: Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) and the 
Football (Offences) Act 1991 (UK).  For example, it would appear from section 3 of the 
Football (Offences) Act 1991 (UK) that both football players and spectators are prohibited 
from inciting racism during a football match.  New South Wales has statutes on boxing102 
and motorcar racing,103 and horse racing.104  Queensland has statutes on horse racing105 and 
motorcar racing,106 for example.  New York statutes require the license of the executive 
government, represented by the governor of the state, in sports such as horse racing and 
boxing: section 101 of the New York Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law c. 47-
A;107 and New York Boxing Sparing and Wrestling Law c. 912 of 1920.  The situation is the 
same in states such as New Hampshire, Kentucky and California, for example,108 and in 
Canada.109 
                                                
102 Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 1986 (NSW). 
103 Mount Panorama Motor Racing Act 1989 (NSW) and Motor Vehicle Sports (Public Safety) Act 1985 
(NSW). 
104 Australian Jockey Club Act 1873 (Private Act) (NSW) and Racing Administration Act 1998 (NSW). 
105 Racing Act 2002 (Qld). 
106 Motor Racing Events Act 1990 (Qld). 
107 Section 101 establishes the New York state racing and wagering board in the following terms: “There is 
hereby created within the executive department the New York state racing and wagering board, which board 
shall have general jurisdiction over all horse racing activities   The board shall consist of three members to be 
appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate.”  Following the establishment of 
license for the conduct of the sport of horse racing, s. 216 prohibits any racing not licensed: “Penalty for 
unlawful racing and betting. All racing or trials of speed between horses or other animals for any bet, stake or 
reward, except such as is allowed by this article or by special laws, is a public nuisance; and every person acting 
or aiding therein, or making or being interested in such bet, stake or reward is guilty of a misdemeanour and 
upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or penitentiary for a period of not more than 
one year; and in addition to the penalty prescribed therefor he forfeits to the people of this state all title or 
interest in any animal used with his privity in such race or trial of speed, and in any sum of money or other 
property betted or staked upon the result thereof.” 
108 Section 284:6 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes c. 284 [laws on horse and dog racing], and ss 3 and 11 
of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes c. 285 [laws establishing a Boxing and Wrestling Commission for the 
State]; s 21 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes c. 229 [laws on boxing and wrestling]; and s 215 of the Kentucky 
Revised Statutes, c. 230 [laws on horse racing]; and in California, ss 18600-18618 [‘the Boxing Act’, which 
establishes the State Athletic Commission for California, with a board, the members of which are appointed by 
the Executive and Legislature of the State], and ss 19420-19421 [which establishes the California Horse Racing 
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The regulation of publicly exhibited sporting events appears to be piecemeal and reactive.  
There is no logical principle by which modern legislative regulation of publicly exhibited 
sports focuses only on such sports as boxing, horse racing and motorcar racing.  There is no 
logical explanation for the reason why a horse race event is different to a football match, the 
former requiring legislation, the latter not.  The only explanation must be that this is a 
historical anomaly.  Given that the common law may proscribe public exhibitions of 
sporting contests on the grounds of public nuisance, it is curious that all sports do not 
necessitate a regulatory regimen similar to that existing for horseracing, boxing and motorcar 
racing. 
 
 
8. The nature of publicly exhibited sporting events throughout the Ages 
 
The particulars of a publicly exhibited sporting activity matter less in the eyes of the 
common law than the effects which the staging of such an activity has on public rights and 
the public peace.  Whether the sport is the tournament or joust of the Middle Ages, 
horseracing of Hanoverian Britain or football or a triathlon event in contemporary times, the 
legal affect of the activity is the same.  Each is culturally significant and laden with an 
arduous following.  Each draws throngs of crowds.  And each has potential to endanger the 
public peace, impact on public safety, and impinge on public rights.  Geoffrey of 
Monmouth,110 in his semi-fictitious History of the Kings of Britain, written in the year 1136, gives 
an account of the events at King Arthur’s plenary court at Whitsun: 
“By this time, Britain had reached such a standard of sophistication that 
it excelled all other kingdoms in its general affluence, the richness of its 
decorations and the courteous behaviour of all its inhabitants.  Every 
                                                
Board , with members appointed by the Governor of the State of California] of the California Business and 
Professions Code. 
109 See eg the Horse Racing Act, Revised Statutes of British Columbia 1996, c. 198; the Racing Commission 
Act, Statutes of Ontario 2000, c. 20; An Act respecting racing, Revised Statutes of Quebec, c. C-72.1; and An 
Act respecting the Régie des alcools, des courses et des jeux, Revised Statutes of Quebec, c. R-6.1. 
110 Geoffrey of Monmouth, who died in the year 1155, was probably a Benedictine monk of Monmouth.  He 
studied and worked at Oxford and was attached to Robert, earl of Gloucester.  He was appointed bishop of St 
Asaph in 1152.  He wrote his Historia Regnum Britanniae circa 1136.  See M Drabble (ed) The Oxford Companion to 
English Literature (5th edn OUP Oxford 1989) at p 386. 
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knight in the country who was in any way famed for his bravery wore 
livery and arms showing his own distinctive colour; and women of 
fashion often displayed the same colours… 
 
Invigorated by the food and drink they had consumed, they went out 
into the meadows outside the city and split up into groups ready to play 
various games.  The knights planned an imitation battle and competed 
together on horseback while their womenfolk watched from the top of 
the city walls and aroused them to passionate excitement by their 
flirtatious behaviour.  The others passed what remained of the day in 
shooting with bows and arrows, hurling the lance, tossing heavy stones 
and rocks, playing dice and an immense variety of other games: this 
without the slightest show of ill-feeling.  Whosoever won his particular 
game was then rewarded by Arthur with an immense prize.  The next 
three days were passed in this way.”111 
 
The popularity of these public exhibitions may be easily accounted for.  The jousts and 
tournaments are the progenitor of our modern games; of our football and cricket matches, 
our motorcar grand prix, and our horseraces.  The roar of the crowds, the echo of trumpets, 
the rush of competitors; these sounds are heard throughout the centuries and down to this 
day.  Yet not only is the link between the former and latter sporting activities cultural.  The 
link is also legal.  The legal principles applying in the twelfth century, which principles 
promoted King Richard to regulate these tournaments and jousts, are the progenitor of the 
legal principles applying now. 
 
                                                
111 N Wright (ed) The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth (Woodbridge 1985) at p 112; L Thorpe (tr) 
The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth (Harmondsworth 1966) at p 229-30. 
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Part 1 Public Rights and Natural Rights in Sport 
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Chapter 3 
 
Public rights at public spaces 
 
 
The existence of a public nuisance depends on the existence of a public right.112  A public 
nuisance can only exist where a public right is affected by some act or omission.  Justice 
Garman in City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation refers to a right common to the general 
public: “[T]he first element that must be alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the 
existence of a right common to the general public.  Such rights include the rights of public 
health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public convenience…”113  Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein,114 preferred the term common injury.  
A court must declare a common injury; that is, a public right impinged by the act or 
omission of a defendant in declaring a public nuisance. 
 
As explored in Part 3 of this thesis, in the context of sport, courts have declared that 
disparate publicly exhibited sporting events may impinge a number of public rights.  Publicly 
exhibited sporting events have been declared public nuisances where they have: 
(i) obstructed the public in the exercise of a public right of way;  
(ii) inconvenienced the public in the exercise of a public right of way;  
(iii) caused annoyance or discomfort to the public in their exercise of a public right to 
quietude;  
(iv) caused annoyance or discomfort to the public in their exercise of a public right to 
comfort; 
(v) harmed public safety; and 
(vi) harmed public health.  
                                                
112 See, further, the discussion at Part 2 of this thesis. 
113 213 Ill 2d 351 (2004) at p 370. 
114 [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982. 
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At the beginning of this thesis a scenario was illustrated to highlight a probable conflict 
between a pecuniarily motivated publicly exhibited sporting event and the rights of private 
individuals to use the same public space.  A publicly exhibited sporting event which makes 
use of a public beach, for example, may only be declared a public nuisance if there is a public 
right which such event impinges.  Is there a public right to use of public spaces for leisure or 
recreation?  Some jurisdictions recognize a public right to use of a public place.  In Copart 
Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc, the Court of Appeals of New York 
stated the definition of public nuisance in the state of New York includes conduct that 
“interfere[s] with use by the public of a public place.”115  Does our beachgoing family have a 
public right to use of a public beach for the purposes for which the public beach was 
created; namely, for recreation and enjoyment?  Can such a right be obstructed or 
inconvenienced or disturbed by a publicly exhibited sporting event staged at the public beach 
where our beachgoing family are peaceably enjoying their time together? 
 
The focus of this chapter concerns public rights at public spaces where members of the 
public habitually congregate or where the public have a pre-existing right of access, whether 
regulated or unfettered.116  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the law on rights of 
access to places such as the foreshore, beaches, parks, and commons.  Nor will this thesis 
address caselaw on trespass directly.  Statutory rules play a large part in regulating the right of 
                                                
115 41 NY 2d 564 at p 568, 394 NYS 2d 169, 362 NE 2d 968 (1977) (Cooke J citing New York Trap Rock Corp v 
Town of Clarkston 299 NY 77 (1948) at p 80; Melker v City of New York 190 NY 481 (1908) at p 488; Restatement, 
Torts, nn preceding s 822, p 217).  The definition proffered in Copart Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New 
York Inc was applied in Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995) at p 840 of the former report; 
Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003); and Wheeler v 
Lebanon Valley Racing Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003) at p 792 of the former report; and City of 
New York v Beretta USA Corp 315 F Supp 2d 256 (2004) at p 276. 
116 Note eg s 193 Law of Property Act 1925 (UK) which provides that members of the public shall have rights 
of access for air and exercise to any land which is a metropolitan common within the meaning of the 
Metropolitan Commons Acts, 1866 to 1898, or manorial waste, or a common, which is wholly or partly situated 
within a borough or urban district, provided that such right of access shall not include any right to draw or 
drive upon the land a carriage, cart, caravan, truck, or other vehicle, or to camp or light any fire thereon.  Note 
also s 2 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (UK) which grants rights of the public in relation to 
open countryside, commons, and any land above 600 metres from sea level, granting to any person the right to 
enter and remain on any access land for the purposes of open-air recreation provided that such person does 
not (i) drive or ride any vehicle; (ii) lights or tends a fire; (iii) bathes in any non-tidal water; (iv) engages in any 
operations of or connected with hunting, shooting, fishing, trapping, snaring, taking or destroying of any 
animals, birds or fish; and (v) intentionally remove, damage or destroy any plant, shrub, tree or root; amongst 
other restrictions. 
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access to, and rights of use at, national parks.117  Such rules might disallow persons visiting 
national parks from picnicking or playing games within a national park.  Further, local 
government by-laws may limit rights of use of parks and public reserves by time or by 
manner of use.118  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all the statutory rules 
existing in the disparate common law jurisdictions that may impact on public use at national 
parks.  Such statutory restrictions will not affect the nature of extant rights to use of public 
spaces; affecting only the manner in which a piece of public land may be used.  As 
McTiernan J said in Storey v The Council of the Municipality of North Sydney: “It is of course not 
incompatible with the notions of public recreation and public enjoyment that certain 
restrictions, both as to time and as to the activity pursued, should be placed on the use made 
by members of the public of a piece of land.”119   
 
Public land such as parks, beaches, and commons, for example, may be used for a variety of 
purposes and also may be restricted to certain purposes, yet may still be classified as a park 
or a public reserve dedicated to public use under legislation or consequent to deed.  The 
question will never arise that the public do not possess a public right to use of public land.  
Only the nature of the public right may be qualified by the uses which are made of public 
                                                
117 Note eg s 13 of the Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978 (Vic) which provides that members of the public are 
prohibited from using national parks in Victoria, Australia, except as provided for in regulations or under the 
Act, and s 14(2) which provides that the Minister may not authorize an activity likely to impair the wilderness 
character of a wilderness area; and s 7.1 of the Provincial Parks Act of Ontario, Canada, RSO 1990 c P34, 
grants power to the Minister to establish fees and charges for entrance into provincial parks for persons, 
vehicles, boats or aircraft and fees for the use of provincial parks or of any facilities or services in provincial 
parks.  Note also s 29 of the Park Act of British Columbia, Canada, RSBC 1996 c 344, which authorizes the 
Minister to make regulations respecting, eg, (i) killing, hunting, trapping, angling; (ii) the presence of pets, 
domestic animals; (iii) access to the park, conservancy or recreation area; (iv) regulating and controlling groups 
and the number of persons permitted to use facilities in, or to travel through, the park, conservancy or 
recreation area; and (v) establishing fees payable to the government for a park use permit or resource use 
permit. 
118 Note, eg, that pursuant to the local by-laws of the Noosa Shire Council the Council claims power to restrict 
the public in their use of public places such as gardens, recreation grounds, reserves, commons, foreshores, or 
of any land in the area dedicated to or vested in or under the control or management of the Council, or of 
which the Council is trustee, or in respect of which the Council is empowered to make local laws or any part 
thereof, including ‘canals’.  Restrictions include: (i) restricting the public use by time of day; (ii) restricting use 
by setting aside places where specified sports or games may be played and places where specified sports or 
games shall not be played; and (iii) restricting the public use by placing an amenity, convenience or building in a 
park under the control of a person or club for the purpose of a game or sport or recreation, and by granting to 
a person or club the privilege or the exclusive use of such amenity, convenience or building or a specified part 
of a park not exceeding such an area as may be reasonably necessary for the playing of the game, or sport or 
recreation for which it is intended to be used.  See rr 4(1), 15(4), 23(1), and 24(4), respectively, of the Sunshine 
Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks, Reserves and Foreshores. 
119 [1970] HCA 44, (1970) 123 CLR 574 at 577; Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 
CLR 54 at p 88. 
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land.  In Module2 Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council, the Supreme Court of Queensland discussed 
the meaning of the term ‘park’ in reference to a resumption of land by the respondent City 
Council under sections 7 and 10(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld).  The Court 
stated: 
“Examples abound of internationally famed areas described as parks 
which are given over to a number of recreational or sporting uses.  For 
example, Longchamp Racecourse is within the Bois de Boulogne.  
Regent’s Park has its famous zoo and Berlin’s Tiergarten also contains a 
zoo and other recreational facilities.  In Winnipeg City v St Vital Rural 
Municipality [[1945] 1 WWR 161] it was held that a piece of land used 
entirely as a golf course was being used for ‘public park purposes’.  In 
the course of his reasons, Bergman JA said [at pp 177-179]:  
‘In my opinion a parks board is permitted to exercise common 
sense in carrying out its statutory powers; and, in working out a 
scheme of public parks, it may elect to devote one of its parks 
exclusively to golf, without thereby depriving it of its character as 
a public park…  The best and most comprehensive definition of 
‘park’ which I have found, and the one which I adopt as my own, 
is contained in Northport Wesleyan Grove Camp Meeting Assn v 
Andrews (1908) 71 Atl 1027 at 1030 (Maine), and is as follows: ‘A 
‘park’ may be defined as a piece of ground set apart to be used 
by the public as a place for rest, recreation, exercise, pleasure, 
amusement, and enjoyment.’ ’ 
 
In the same case Dysard J observed [at p 180]: ‘The term ‘public 
park’ or ‘park’ generally connotes a portion of land of 
considerable extent, provided with the means and facilities of 
recreation and pleasure for the public at large without fee or 
charge. It may conceivably – and often does – include within its 
borders, baseball grounds, lawn bowling grounds, tennis courts, 
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and even golf courses.’”120 
 
The Court in Module2 Pty Ltd considered the definition of the term ‘park’ in Butterworths 
Australian Legal Dictionary noting that it refers to ‘land used for public health, recreation, 
enjoyment or other public purposes of a like nature’.121  The Court concluded: “The 
definition [in Butterworths Dictionary] is drawn from the reasons of Hemmings J in Wotton v 
Wingecarribee Shire Council & Anor [(1989) 68 LGRA 38 at p 47] who considered that phrase 
to be consistent with the defined meaning of ‘public reserve’ in the Local Government Act 
1919 (NSW) and views expressed in Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge [[1959] HCA 
63, (1959) 102 CLR 54].   
 
In Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge, Windeyer Justice said, discussing the meaning 
attributable to the term ‘public reserve’ in Australian jurisprudence:  
“It is not necessary for all members of the public to have free access to 
all parts of the land at all times.  It is not incompatible with a public 
reserve that persons can be excluded for misbehaviour or for any similar 
sufficient reason.  It is not incompatible with a place being dedicated for 
public recreation and enjoyment that its use be regulated, and that 
persons using it must use it having regard to the particular form of 
recreation and enjoyment which takes place there – whether, for 
example, it be a golf links, tennis court, ocean beach, zoological gardens 
or rifle range.  It is not incompatible with a public park or reserve that at 
particular times, as for example at night, the public are wholly excluded.  
And it is not necessarily incompatible with a place being a place for 
public recreation and enjoyment that certain persons are allowed access 
at times when the general public is excluded or are allowed into parts 
where the general public cannot go – for example research students may 
have special advantages in a public library, scientists in a public museum 
and so on.  But, as Walsh J. said in the Supreme Court, ‘the enjoyment 
of special privileges by members of the club, differing in kind from any 
                                                
120 [2006] QSC 71 at paras [27] and [28]. 
121 Nygh and Butt (eds) Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary (Butterworths Sydney 1997). 
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which the general public enjoy, is to be regarded as a material 
consideration in ascertaining whether the land is used for public 
purposes’ (1959) 4 LGRA at p 119.”122 
 
Menzies J stated similarly:  
“…[L]and open to common and general use for… public health, 
recreation, enjoyment or the like… does not mean that every member of 
the public must have an unfettered right to resort to every public reserve 
and to use the facilities there provided as and when he chooses free of 
charge.  There are public reserves of a character which requires close 
regulation of their public use, eg botanical gardens or a sports arena.  
Nor does it mean that no members of the public should have special 
privileges for the use of the reserve; eg to admit botanists to botanical 
gardens at times when they are closed to the general public would be 
consistent with their use as a public reserve.  Nor is an admission charge 
inconsistent with land being used as a public reserve.  What is required in 
every case where the question is whether land is used for a public reserve 
is a survey of all that happens upon the land to determine whether it is in 
fact set apart and used for the general welfare…”123 
 
Thus, the Randwick Racecourse in Sydney, used for horse racing under the exclusive 
management of the Australian Jockey Club, was appropriately regarded as a place of public 
recreation albeit that the public had no access as of right except upon race days, and that on 
race days those resorting there have to pay to enter.124 
                                                
122 Randwick Municipal Corporation v Rutledge [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at p 89 (Windeyer J). 
123 [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at p 65 (Menzies J). 
124 Menzies J concluded his analysis by stating: “…[I]t is beyond question that at all times material Randwick 
was, and was conducted as, a public racecourse, notwithstanding that it was open to racegoers only when 
meetings were held some twenty-seven times a year.  Hardie J decided that the land was not used for the 
purpose of public recreation on two grounds: (1) because it was not used or available for use by the public as of 
right, and (2) because taking everything into account, the land was not used for the purpose of public 
recreation.  For the reasons I have already given, I consider that the facts that, except upon race days, the 
public has no access as of right to the racecourse, and that on race days those resorting there have to pay to 
enter, do not establish that the racecourse was not used for public recreation or enjoyment.  Furthermore, the 
finding that the racecourse was not used for the purpose of public recreation because of the substantial 
restrictions upon the attendance of the public and the special position of the Australian Jockey Club and its 
members was, for the reasons I have given, in error.” [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at p 67 (Menzies J). 
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The foregoing analysis of the legal definition of the terms ‘park’ and ‘public reserve’ 
demonstrates that a wide variety of public places are properly and lawfully designated as 
park.  This chapter explores the nature of the public’s right to recreation.  The nature of the 
public’s rights to use of parks may be qualified by the purposes to which a public park is 
made available.  A public right to recreation may exist in respect of a park used as a 
Municipal Zoo, a park set aside exclusively for the use of the game of golf, or a park open to 
a variety of sporting and leisure activities.  This thesis does not argue that a public right to 
recreation cannot exist at a Zoo or at a park set aside exclusively for the game of golf, only 
that the public right to recreation at such places is qualified by the classification of the park 
as a Zoo or as a Golf Course.  This thesis focuses principally on the nature of public rights 
existing at public places where publicly exhibited sporting events are likely to be staged.  
Such places include public beaches, public parks, village and town greens, and commons. 
 
 
1. The meaning of public place 
 
Public land is a broad term used in legislation, such as for example in the Lands Acts in 
Australia and Canada, and delineates all Crown or State land which is preserved or reserved 
for public use.  Pursuant to the section 3 of the Land Act 1994 (Qld), for example, public 
use land is defined to mean “land dedicated to public use by a plan of subdivision.”  Crown 
land in Queensland dedicated to the public includes all land reserved for a community 
purpose and comprises ‘gardens’, ‘open spaces’, ‘parks’, beaches and the foreshore.125  Under 
section 1 of the Public Lands Act of Ontario, Canada, RSO 1990 c P43, ‘public lands’ 
includes lands designated as Crown lands; and s 24(1) provides that ‘lands’ means public 
lands and includes public lands covered with water.  All Crown lands are public lands: 
section 38(2) RSO c P43.  Respecting public reserves, section 3 of the Ontario Act provides 
that: “Where 25 per cent or more of the frontage of lands fronting on a body of water are 
public lands, lands comprising at least 25 per cent of the frontage and to such depth as the 
Minister considers appropriate shall be set apart for recreational and access purposes and, 
                                                
125 See Sch 6 definition ‘public purpose’; Sch 1 and s 23 Land Act 1994 (Qld). 
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where less than 25 per cent of the frontage of lands fronting on a body of water are public 
lands, all public lands fronting thereon and to such depth as the Minister considers 
appropriate shall be set apart for such purposes.”  And section 63 provides that: “Any part 
of the public lands that is a beach and is used for travel by the public is not by reason only of 
such use a highway within the meaning of any Act.”  Pursuant to the Local Government Act 
1993 (Vic) public places over which local authorities exercise management include parks 
where ‘park’ is defined, so far as relevant, to mean ‘an area of open space used for recreation, 
not being bushland’.  Under the Local Government Act 1993 (Vic) local authorities are 
accorded the management of public parks and, pursuant to section 36G must: (a) encourage, 
promote and facilitate recreational, cultural, social and educational pastimes and activities, 
and (b) provide for passive recreational activities or pastimes and for the casual playing of 
games, and (c) improve the land in such a way as to promote and facilitate its use to achieve 
the other core objectives for its management.’126  And in the Australian state of New South 
Wales, a public place is defined under section 4 of the Major Events Act 2009 and section 3 
of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 as: ““a place (whether or 
not covered by water), or part of premises, that is open to the public or is used by the public, 
whether or not on payment of money or other consideration, whether or not the place or 
part is ordinarily so open or used and whether or not the public to whom it is open consists 
only of a limited class of persons” and includes a road or road related area. 
 
It is, therefore, not inappropriate to state that public places connote all public beaches, the 
seashore, the foreshore, public parks, public reserves, lakes, rivers, and canals, and that such 
public places are set aside for public use viz for rights of way or for rights of recreation if 
founded at common law.  The sea and seashore itself may be regarded as a public place, 
particularly so because the public have a right of navigation on the sea.127  In Commonwealth of 
Australia v Yarmirr, discussing a claim for native title rights in respect of the sea and 
foreshore, the High Court of Australia noted that: “The successive assertions of sovereignty 
over what now are territorial waters, without any further or other act of the executive or 
                                                
126 See also Ballerini v Berrigan Shire Council [2004] VSC 321 (1 September 2004) 
127 Orr-Ewing v Colquhoun (1877) 2 App Cas 839; Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd v Anson [1911] 1 KB 171 at 
pp 198-9 (Fletcher Moulton J); Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable [1865] 11 HL Cas 192 at pp 207-08 (Lord 
Westbury); Iveagh v Martin [1961] 1 QB 232 at 272; and The Swift [1901] P 168; Commonwealth of Australia v 
Yarmirr [1999] FCA 1668 at para [548]; The Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56 at paras [96]-]98], (2001) 75 
ALJR 1582 at p 1604. 
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legislature, brought with them, and gave to the public, the public rights [of navigation and of 
fishing].”128  The people generally exercise a right to swim, bath, body surf, surf, dive, 
snorkel, wade, float, stand, sit and lay in the surf and waters at the seashores, which activities 
have been held to be concomitant with the right of navigation.129  On beaches and in parks, 
reserves and commons, the people generally exercise their rights of use of a public place by 
running along the beach or in the park, reserve, or common, by jogging, by walking, by 
sitting, by laying, by kite flying, or by picnicking at such places.  The people might also 
practice yoga, play catch with a ball, play cricket, kick a football, or read a book.  All of these 
activities might be appropriately summarised as a public right to recreation.   The existence 
of this right is discussed below. 
 
 
2. The context in which a public right to recreation might arise 
 
Whilst several major sporting events, such as triathlons, marathons and fun runs, comprise 
of amateur athletes in these respective events, and members of the public generally, other 
events that are staged in the public highways, public beaches, public parks, and other public 
places, are professional events involving only elite professional athletes who use a public 
place to ply their trade, earning tens of thousands of dollars as a result of the competition.  
These elite athletes, concomitant with the sports association of which they are members, and 
companies sponsoring the competition, appropriate a public place, such as a part of a beach 
or a part of a park, in order to make money for themselves.   
 
Whether a publicly exhibited sporting event staged at a public place comprises of amateur or 
professional athletes, or a mixture of both, in the process of using a beach or a park for their 
sports event they may prevent or obstruct the public from using the place appropriated, or 
otherwise inconvenience or cause discomfort to the public in their use of these public places.  
The Noosa Triathlon, for example, utilises a public park for the storage of bicycles and for 
the transition from the swimming, bicycling and running legs, and the beach and canals are 
                                                
128 The Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56 at para [99], (2001) 75 ALJR 1582 at 1605. 
129 Borough of Neptune City v Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea 294 A2d 47 at pp 54-55 (1972); Opinion of the Justices 365 
Mass 681 at p 686, 313 NE 2d 561 at p 566 (1974). cf Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 100 ER 1190; 
and Brinckman v Mately [1904] 2 Ch 313.  See further discussion at n 141, below. 
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appropriated for the swimming leg.  Similar scenarios exist at other noteworthy triathlon 
races, such as at Port Macquarie, in New South Wales, which is home to the Australian 
Ironman Triathlon.  There is no separate legislative Act of either the Queensland or New 
South Wales Parliaments authorising the appropriation of public places for these private 
purposes.  The Windsor Triathlon is run in Windsor, England.  The race uses the Thames 
for the swimming leg, preventing free access along the Thames to boats, a public park for 
the storage of bicycles and for the transition from one leg to another, and the public roads 
and footpaths for the bicycle and running legs.  The route of the run uses the Eton High 
Street, the Eton Windsor Bridge, and the public road up alongside the Castle wall to the top 
of the hill in Windsor near the Guildhall.  During the race the public road and parts of the 
public footpath is cordoned off to the public with metal barriers, gates and traffic cones.  
The public right to free and uninhibited access to and use of the roads and footpaths, for 
passage, as well as the public park for recreation, is obstructed during the running of the 
event by these barriers and also by the crowd which gathers to observe the participants in 
the race.  A similar situation exists at the London Triathlon.  That race is held at Victoria 
Dock in the east of London and utilises public streets, which are completely shut off to the 
public, for the cycle and run legs of the race.  Public streets are also usually blocked off to 
the public during marathon races which take place annually in many of the world’s major 
cities.  There is no specific legislation of the United Kingdom Parliament which authorises 
these enclosures for the purposes of conducting triathlon competitions.  Triathlon events 
involve the appropriation of parts of the sea and seashore, or lakes, or rivers, for the 
swimming leg of the race, parts of the beach, or foreshore, or public parks, for the transition 
from the swim to the bicycle leg, and the public roads and parks, for the cycling and running 
legs.  The public rights of way, of navigation, and of recreation, if founded at common law, 
may be obstructed or interfered with. 
 
Other commercial sporting events, such as Surf Lifesaving competitions, Ironman events, 
surfing competitions and volleyball competitions, use public beaches and the surf.  These 
events are generally conducted on a weekend so as to maximise revenue from television 
sponsorship for the sporting association holding the competition.  In Australia, all along the 
coastal beaches, Ironman sports and Surf-Lifesaving competitions, as well as triathlon races, 
mentioned above, involve open-water swimming, kayaking, and rowing on the sea and 
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seashore, and running along the beach.  Surfing competitions also take place on the public 
beaches; as do beach-volleyball competitions.  The events are popular, drawing considerable 
crowds, and are televised live on national television.  The Australian Surf Lifesaving 
Championships at Kurrawa Beach on the Gold Coast in 2005 drew a crowd of 18,000 
spectators on the beach.130  25,000 spectators crowded Coogee Beach in Sydney for the final 
of the Nutri-Grain Ironman Series which saw the winning competitors secure $50,000 in 
prize-money.131 8,000 spectators witnessed the Quicksilver Pro Surfing competition at 
Snapper Rocks on the Gold Coast in Queensland in March 2005.132  And 100,000 spectators 
were reported on Huntington Beach in California to witness the US Open Surfing Title.133 
These beach and surf sports can be conducted over an extensive area.  Beaches at the Gold 
Coast, in Queensland, often stage national championship events in Ironman endurance and 
surfing.  The Coolangatta Gold is a 46-kilometre event that comprises of ski, run, board, and 
swim legs, using several beaches from Surfers’ Paradise to Greenmount and back again.134  
The race was held between 1984 and 1992 and annually from 2005.135  On such occasions 
stands are erected on the beach and competitors race along the beach and in the surf at 
several beaches. 
 
Multisport entertainment ‘festivals’ are an increasing occurrence in many cities and towns.  
For example, the Gravity Games H2O is a multisport event involving the sports of 
wakeboarding, free motocross, and skateboarding, amongst others.136  In 2006 the event was 
held in the public parks along the Swan River in Perth, Western Australia, and in the river 
itself.  The parks were cordoned off with large barriers each carrying advertisements aimed at 
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youth.  Large marquees and loudspeakers were installed in the parks.  The X Games is also a 
publicly exhibited extreme sports event with both a Winter festival held in Aspen, Colorado, 
and a Summer festival held in Los Angeles.137  Winter sporting activities staged include 
skiing, snowboarding and snowmobile driving.  Summer sports comprise of skateboarding, 
motocross motorcycle driving, and freestyle BMX cycling. 
 
Each of these publicly exhibited sporting events may be declared a public nuisance at 
common law by obstructing the public in the exercise of their public right of way on the 
highway, in the exercise of their public right of navigation or of fishing on the sea; by 
inconveniencing the public in the exercise of these public rights; or by causing discomfort to 
the public in the exercise of these rights.  The public may also have a public right to use of 
public spaces such as beaches, the sea, the seashore, and parks, and commons, for their 
recreation.  A publicly exhibited sporting event which obstructs the public or inconveniences 
the public at a public beach, park or common may create a public nuisance.  The public right 
impinged upon at beaches, parks and commons is the public right to recreation. 
 
 
3. Public rights at public places by analogy to the public right of way 
 
Public rights at public places such as public beaches and public parks are analogous to the 
public right of way discussed in Chapter 11 of this thesis.  There is little or no factual 
difference between a sports association appropriating a public place, such as a beach, for 
their own use for a limited duration, and the facts of R v Cross,138 where a company operating 
a stage coach service used the public road at Charing Cross in London.  The only question 
which is raised is whether a public right to use of a beach exists.  Yet in both circumstances, 
a private entity, an incorporated body, makes use of a public place – either a road or a beach 
– for their own financial motives, and in that process obstructs, or at the very least interferes 
with, the public in the exercise of public rights.  The appropriation of a public place which 
causes obstruction or inconvenience or discomfort to the public in the exercise of their 
public right at that public place is a public nuisance at common law. 
                                                
137 <http://espn.go.com/action/xgames/> (22 April 2008). 
138 (1812) 3 Camp 244. 
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Common law public nuisances may arise not only on public roads, as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 11 below, but may also, and just as importantly, be created at any public 
place, such as the sea and the foreshore.  In Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd,139 on 
the question of nuisance, Lord Justice Denning was of the opinion that it was a public 
nuisance to discharge oil into the sea in circumstances where it is likely such oil will wash up 
on the shores and beaches thereby obstructing public rights and causing discomfort to the 
public in the exercise of their rights to use of the beaches.  Lord Justice Denning’s exact 
words were: “Applying the old cases to modern instances, it is, in my opinion, a public 
nuisance to discharge oil into the sea in such circumstances that it is likely to be carried onto 
the shores and beaches of our land to the prejudice and discomfort of Her Majesty’s 
subjects.  It is an offence punishable by the common law.”140  Highways and public places 
such as beaches or parks, may be regarded one and the same thing in public nuisance suits; 
particularly so because the public exercises rights over public places such as the sea, beaches, 
and parks, similarly to their exercise of rights to travel along the public highways.  
 
The public have public rights with respect to the sea and seashore.  All waters which are tidal 
and in which navigation is possible are subject to a public right of navigation, which is a 
public right of way: Orr-Ewing v Colquhoun.141  This right of navigation may in fact be more 
extensive than the public right of way in respect of the highway, as acknowledged by 
Fletcher Moulton J in Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd v Anson: “That the public have a 
right to the free use of the sea for the purposes of navigation has been unchallenged law 
from the earliest times. It has frequently been enunciated in the form that the sea is a public 
highway, and that ships have the right eundi, redeundi, et morandi over every part of it, no 
matter to whom the soil lying thereunder may belong…  In some respects, perhaps, the 
public rights of user of the sea for navigation are from the nature of the case more extensive 
than in the analogous case of a highway.  For instance, it is essential to navigation that there 
should be a free right of anchoring or otherwise securing in position the navigating vessel, 
                                                
139 [1954] 2 QB 182, [1954] 2 All ER 561 (Court of Appeal). 
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141 (1877) 2 App Cas 839; and Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd v Anson [1911] 1 KB 171 at pp 198-9 
(Fletcher Moulton J) 
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and there is nothing strictly analogous to this in the case of a highway.”142  The right includes 
the right to anchor, to remain for a reasonable time, to load and unload, and to moor or fix 
temporary moorings in certain circumstances.143  And so a publicly exhibited sporting event 
which obstructs the public right of way on the highway may likewise obstruct the public 
right of way on the sea (where the sporting event involves use of the sea for such activities as 
surfing, triathlon, open water swimming, kayaking, the use of surf skis, and rowing boats, 
etc) or the foreshore, because the public have rights of passage in respect of the foreshore 
incident to the right of navigation. 
 
But are there other public rights at public beaches and public parks capable of impingement 
by a publicly exhibited sporting event?  Is there a public right to recreation?  A member of 
the public may use a footpath for jogging or walking for his or her own health and wellbeing 
in similar manner to a park or a beach.  Just as a sport may create a public nuisance by 
appropriating the public roads for exclusive use and personal profit, so too, a sport may 
create a public nuisance by appropriating for exclusive use and personal profit a public 
beach, or a part of that beach, or a public park, or part of that park, or any other place where 
the public exercise public rights. 
 
 
4. The Blundell v Catterall blunder? 
 
In Blundell v Catterall,144 the Court of King’s Bench in 1821 by majority took a very narrow 
view of the public’s rights over the foreshore – that part of the beach which is alternatively 
covered with water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; the area technically 
defined as bordered by the mean high and low water marks.145  The majority rejected the 
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plaintiff’s claims that there was a public right of way over the foreshore when dry; that 
members of the public had a right to bathe in the sea; and that in order to exercise that right 
members of the public were entitled to cross the foreshore to reach the sea and could also 
remain on the foreshore for a reasonable time.  Instead, the majority opinion suggested that 
the public’s rights over the foreshore are only a right of navigation and a right to fish, and 
actions ancillary to those rights of navigation and fishing. 
 
In Blundell v Catterall, a wealthy baron sued the owners of a neighbouring summer resort 
hotel who rented out bathing machines. The case concerned an action for trespass for 
breaking and entering the plaintiff’s land.  Boys, employed to push the bathing machines 
through the surf, sometimes walked in front of the plaintiff’s property.  He contested their 
right to do this stating that although he held his private land subject to rights of navigation, 
he did not hold subject to rights of public passage or rights of bathing.  The defendant was 
charged with passing over, tearing up, damaging the sand, gravel, and soil of the seashore by 
walking, riding horses and wheeling bathing machines on the soil of the seashore.146  The 
facts were such that no bathing machines had been used upon the shore at the plaintiff’s 
estate before the establishment of the hotel in 1815, but it had been the custom for the 
public to cross it on foot for the purposes of bathing. 
 
The defendant contended for a common law right for all the king’s subjects to bathe on the 
seashore, and to pass over it for that purpose on foot, and with horses and carriages.  But by 
majority opinion the court refined the defendant’s claim.  The question, which the court 
determined was to be decided, was the narrower question thus stated by Holroyd J:  
“The question put in this case for our opinion, is the general question, 
whether there is a common law right for all the King’s subjects to bathe 
in the sea, and to pass over the seashore for that purpose, on foot and 
with horses and carriages.  But coupled with the facts stated in the case, 
the question really is, whether there is a common law right in all the 
King’s subjects to do so in the locus in quo, though the soil of the 
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seashore, and an exclusive right of fishing there in a particular manner 
(namely, with stake nets), are private property belonging to a subject, and 
though the same have been a special peculiar property from time 
immemorial.”147 
 
The court thus based its decision on the narrower ground of whether a public right to 
bathing at a seashore owned by a private individual exists at common law.  Indeed, Holroyd 
J stated: “My opinion, therefore, on this case, will not affect any right that has been or can be 
gained by prescription or custom.”148  The majority held that the defendant could not claim a 
right to bathe in the sea as a common law right because no authority except Bracton and a 
case in Lord Raymond which Justice Holroyd says is “a very loose and inaccurate note”149 
without further elaborating, supported such claim.  The majority, in contradistinction to Best 
J dissenting judgment, did not rely on the authorities as establishing a general right of way on 
the sea and seashore, which general right of way subsumes more specific rights such as a 
right to navigation, a right to fish, and a right to bathe or swim, &c.  The majority cited 
Hale’s De Jure Maris and De Portibus Maris as authority only for a public right of navigation 
and a public right of fishing and not as authority of a general public right to use of the sea 
and the seashore for all lawful purposes.150  Bayley J stated: “It is material to distinguish 
between the different descriptions of rights which the public may have: a right of navigation, 
which is for the general benefit of all the kingdom; and a right of fishing, which tends to the 
sustenance and beneficial employment of individuals; but it does not thence follow that they 
have also the right of bathing.”151  And Holroyd J stated: “And if the right of bathing, and of 
the incident foot and carriage way claimed for that purpose, cannot be established under 
such a general claim of right as I have before stated, it can only be supported under the 
specific claim of a public right of bathing, and of carriageway as incident thereto…  And 
then, I ask, where is such a right of bathing on the seashore, where it has become private 
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property, and may immemorially have been so, and of a carriage way for that purpose as 
incident thereto, when sought for, to be found as existing at common law, independently of 
usage and custom…?”152 
 
At the conclusion of the judgments Abbott CJ stated shortly what the decision of the court 
was: “But where one man endeavours to make his own special profit by conveying persons 
over the soil of another, and claims a public right to do so, as in the present case, it does not 
seem to me that he has any just reason to complain, if the owner of the soil shall insist upon 
participating in the profit, and endeavour to maintain his own private right, and preserve the 
evidence thereof.”153  The public thus have no right of way to bathe at the seashore of a 
private owner.  The littoral owner has exclusive private rights over his land. 
 
The holding in Blundell v Catterall may seem distinguishable on its facts and have little bearing 
on whether public rights exist at public places such as public beaches or public parks; 
whereby such public rights might be impinged upon by another.  But the problem, or 
perhaps the blunder, is that subsequent decisions appear to have reaffirmed Blundell v 
Catterall on broader terms.  The decision in Blundell v Catterall was followed some 78 years 
later in Llandudno Urban District Council v Woods,154 when Cozens-Hardy J remarked that the 
littoral owner had “prima facie a right to treat every bather, every nursemaid with a 
perambulator, every boy riding a donkey, and every preacher, on the shore” as a trespasser.  
In that case, the plaintiff local government had a lease of the foreshore granted by the 
Crown for a term of 21 years.  The court viewed the lease as granting private proprietary 
rights over the foreshore. 
 
Five years later still, Blundell v Catterall was again reaffirmed when the trustees to an infant 
Marquis enjoined bathing at the foreshore of his estate on the Isle of Thanet by schoolboys 
using his estate as a summer camp.  Although the court followed Blundell v Catterall, the court 
appears to have gone further than the ratio decidendi of Blundell v Catterall, holding, as is 
stated by the headnote, that the public have no common right to use the foreshore to pass or 
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repass thereon for the purpose of bathing in the sea, whether the foreshore is the property 
of the Crown or of a private owner.  Vaughan Williams LJ stated:  
“[T]he Crown holds the foreshore upon the terms that it must recognize 
the jus publicum, whatever it may be, over the foreshore, and do nothing 
inconsistent with that jus.  This jus, as regards the rights of navigation 
and of fishing – the right to use the foreshore for those purposes – has a 
great deal of authority to support it, but except as regards those rights, 
and in so far as any act of the Crown would defeat those rights, the 
Crown has beneficial ownership of the foreshore, and a private person, 
such as the present plaintiffs, would stand in the same position… 
Blundell v Catterall… is conclusive of the present case.”155  
 
Yet, in consideration of the facts of this case, the headnote summary is wrong, and the 
words of Vaughan Williams LJ must be regarded as obiter dictum, for the foreshore in 
question in the case was not Crown land, but was private property, as was the case in Blundell 
v Catterall.  Brinckman v Matley cannot be held to have decided anything on point of law 
further than what was decided in Blundell v Catterall, and so the question as to whether the 
public has a public right to recreation at the seashore where the seashore is Crown land and 
not owned privately, remains an open question which has yet to be determined in a court of 
law. 
 
The facts of Brinckman v Matley were almost identical to Blundell v Catterall, although occurring 
83 years apart.  In Brinckman v Matley the manor, including the foreshore, of Minster on the 
Isle of Thanet was granted to the plaintiff’s predecessors by Royal Charter on 24 December 
1611.  In July 1903 the defendant, who was headmaster of St Saviour’s Elementary School in 
Middlesex, with about 200 schoolboys, camped on the cliffs above Joss Bay which formed 
part of the foreshore on the plaintiff’s estate.  The defendant remained in the camp with the 
boys who were under his care and control for two months, without the consent of the 
plaintiff and entered upon the foreshore and bathed in the sea. 
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A curious anomaly appears to have arisen at common law in England; namely, that, as stated 
per curiam obiter in Alfred F Beckett Ltd v Lyons, “It is well known that in relation to the 
English foreshore many activities, including walking thereon, bathing therefrom, and 
beachcombing, have been generally tolerated by the Crown as owner of the foreshore, 
without at any time giving rise to any legal right in the public to continue them.”156  Yet does 
not a public right to use of land arise from long uninterrupted use by virtue of an implied 
dedication of land?157  Russell LJ, in Beckett v Lyons, does not consider the process by which 
public rights may be claimed by longer user of a public space as of right.   
 
The error of the courts approach in Beckett v Lyons can be seen in the following dicta of 
Harman LJ, where his Lordship, after citing from Lord Lindley in Gardner v Hodgson’s Brewery 
said: “If it be clear that the usage has long been practised under a claim of right; then the 
court will be astute to find a legal origin for it; but where another explanation is equally 
possible, this principle does not prevail. Here, I think, toleration is a sufficient 
explanation.”158  Dillon LJ in Mills v Silver, respectfully disputed that approach,159 although he 
refused to overrule and concluded somewhat lamely: “…in the context of Beckett v Lyons as a 
whole, I take the decision to come down to this; that it is well-known that public rights in 
law over the foreshore are very limited and that everything else done on the foreshore is by 
tolerance or licence of the Crown…”   
 
Contrary to Blundell v Catterall and Beckett v Lyons, there is a plethora of precedents to support 
a claim as of right based on long uninterrupted use.160  We know that on the foreshores of 
England bathing has occurred since at least the year 1821 when the matter was first litigated 
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in Blundell v Catterall.  Common law judgments have found a public right can arise where 
presumptions of dedication rest on use for only 3 years,161 or 7 years,162 20 years,163 or 40 
years.164  A public right to bathe at the seashore must now be recognised as part of the 
common law of England based on long uninterrupted use as of right by virtue of implied 
dedication of all seashores where the public habitually recreate. 
 
In his eloquent dissenting opinion in Blundell v Catterall, Best J believed free access to the sea 
as a privilege too important to be left to the arbitrary indulgence of private littoral lords of 
manors.165  Best J viewed the authorities of Bracton and Hale as establishing a general 
common law right of way over the sea and seashore which right of way subsumed the more 
specific rights of navigation, fishing, swimming or bathing, &c.  His Honour showed how 
rights of fishing were regarded as part of the general right of way over the seashore.166  Citing 
Hale, and applying the principles to the case of bathing on the seashore, Best J stated:  
“The universal practice of England shows the right of way over the 
seashore to be a common law right.  All sorts of persons who resort to 
the sea, either for business or pleasure, have always been accustomed to 
pass over the unoccupied parts of the shore with such carriages as were 
suitable to their respective purposes, and no lord of a manor has ever 
attempted to interrupt such persons…  Persons have at all times, at their 
pleasure, walked or ridden on the sands.  Men have, from the earliest 
times, bathed in the sea; and unless in places or at seasons when they 
could not, consistently with decency, be permitted to be naked, no one 
ever attempted to prevent them.  So far from allowing lords of manors 
                                                
161 Rowley v Tottenham UDC [1914] AC 95. 
162 R v Petrie (1855) 4 B & El 737, 119 ER 272. 
163 Poole v Huskinson (1843) 11 M & W 827, 152 ER 1039. 
164 Turner v Walsh (1881) 6 App Cas 636 (Privy Council). 
165 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268 at pp 274-75, 100 ER 1190. 
166 Justice Best, commenting on the common law right to fish at the seashore (such right found by the majority 
to be established by the common law), viewed the common law right to fish not as an independent common 
law right (as the majority so did), but as “part of the more general right of the subjects to the sea and its shores, 
[as] proved by Lord Hale… in part 1, cap. 8 De Jure Maris, p.11.” (Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268 at 
pp 284-85, 100 ER 1190 (Best J)). “I shall presently show from authority, that the right to fish is only a part of 
the general right of the subjects of England.  Persons have also crossed the beach for the purpose of fishing in 
the sea, and have brought back their fish over the beach, both on horses and in carriages.  These acts of 
fishermen are instances in support of the common law right of way.” (Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268 
at p 279, 100 ER 1190 (Best J)). 
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to restrain persons from bathing, it will give them every facility for this 
recreation.  Bathing promotes health…  It has been found as a fact, in 
this case, that it has been the custom for the public to cross the spot in 
question on foot for the purpose of bathing.”167 
 
In his interpretation of the authorities, Best J was of the opinion that: “The instances put by 
me, sufficiently demonstrate the existence of a universal custom in favour of a public right of 
way over the seashore.”168  His Honour concluded: 
“The shore of the sea is admitted to have been at one time the property 
of the King.  From the general nature of this property, it could never be 
used for exclusive occupation.  It was holden by the King, like the sea 
and the highways, for all his subjects.  The soil could only be transferred 
subject to this public trust; and general usage shows that the public right 
has been excepted out of the grant of the soil.  Our law books furnish us 
with little for our guidance on this subject; what is to be found seems to 
favour the common law right of way.  But unless I felt myself bound by 
an authority as strong and clear as an act of parliament, I would hold on 
principles of public policy, I might say public necessity, that the 
interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance… The principle 
of exclusive appropriation must not be carried beyond things capable or 
improvement by the industry of man.  If it be extended so far as to 
touch the right of walking over these barren sands, it will take from the 
people what is essential to their welfare, whilst it will give to individuals 
only the hateful privilege of vexing their neighbours…”169 
 
Justice Best’s opinion that public rights such as a right to bathing in the sea must exist at 
places owned by the Crown finds support from the majority judgment in the case which is 
otherwise dismissive of a common law public right to bathe in the sea.  Justice Bayley, giving 
judgment along with the majority, conceded that: “The King, for the public welfare, may 
                                                
167 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268 at pp 278-79, 100 ER 1190. 
168 ibid at pp 279-80. 
169 ibid at p 287. 
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suffer such a right to be exercised in those parts of the shore which remain in his hands to 
any extent which the convenience of the public may require.”170 
 
 
5. Understanding the Blundell v Catterall blunder 
 
The Blundell v Catterall case may be distinguishable on very narrow grounds – although the 
subsequent judgments of Llandudno and Brinckman v Matley have refused to see it in such 
light.  Professor Tim Bonyhady in The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public roundly 
criticises the judgment, stating that the decision is simply reflective of the very many 
judgments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that reduced public rights previously 
enjoyed by the public in favour of private property rights.171  Bonyhady’s viewpoint, along 
with that in other journal articles,172 is that the Blundell v Catterall decision can only be 
understood as part of a 200 year property law controversy as to the ownership of the 
foreshore, and must be read in conjunction with the long series of cases which established 
proprietary ownership over the foreshore.  Indeed, Bonyhady views the decision as at least 
partly a result of judicial bias in favour of the landed classes.173 
 
                                                
170 ibid at p 306. 
171 T Bonyhady The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public (Professional Books Abingdon 1987) at pp 6, 7-
9.  Legal history scholarship on littoral ownership of the foreshore reveals inconsistent theories whereby at one 
time, in both Saxon times and after the Norman conquest, and confirmed in decisions such as Bell v Gough 23 
NJL 624 at p 661 (1852), the adjacent upland owner both by express charter and by clear implication owned the 
foreshore, whereas subsequent legal opinion in Attorney-General v Philpot (unreported, see SA Moore A History of 
the Foreshore and the Law relating thereto (Stevens and Haynes London 1888) at p 262; W Taylor ‘The Seashore and 
the People’ (1925) 10 Corn LQ 303 at pp 306-307) and Hale’s De Jure Maris, ch iv sub ii, claim the foreshore as 
a ‘de jure communi’ belonging prima facie to the King.  The prima facie theory of Crown ownership of the 
foreshore was confirmed in Lord Advocate v Blantyre (1879) 4 AC 770 at p 773.  See W Taylor ‘The Seashore and 
the People’ (1925) 10 Corn LQ 303 at pp 306-11 and 326-28, citing, principally Moore A History of the Foreshore 
and the Law relating thereto (Stevens and Haynes London 1888) and Riggs ‘Alienability of the Foreshore’ 12 Col 
LR 402; and GS Parsons ‘Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore’ (1922) 22 Colum LR 706 at pp 706-711.  
See also JD Curtis ‘Coastal Recreation – Legal Methods for Securing Public Rights in the Seashore’ (1981) 33 
Me LR 69 at pp 73-77. 
172 ibid, citing H Hovenkamp ‘The Economics of Legal History’ (1983) 67 Minn LR 645 at pp 663-66; C Rose 
‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property’ (1986) 53 U Chicago LR 
at pp 711-12. 
173 T Bonyhady The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public (Professional Books Abingdon 1987) at p 9 
citing PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press Oxford 1979) at pp 97-98. 
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The majority judgments in Blundell v Catterall may be viewed as narrow only, in that they hold 
that a public right to bathe at the seashore, and to pass across the beach for the purposes of 
bathing, cannot exist at a place which is private property because the granting of private title 
extinguished the public right previously extant at that place.  In support of their decision 
upholding the private littoral owner’s rights of possession, the majority in Blundell v Catterall 
relied on Hale as authority on the nature and extent of the private littoral owner’s rights.  
Whilst the court recognized the public right to fish at the seashore, the court also found that 
the granting of private property extinguishes the public right to fish at the seashore adjoining 
private property.174  Justice Bayley opined: “If the soil is vested in an individual, is he to be 
deprived of the right of saying how that soil shall be used…?”; “[I]f an individual had the 
grant of the seashore from the Crown, and were using it for recreation or bathing, he or his 
family might be interrupted and deprived of all privacy by the exercise of this common law 
right [to bathe].”175  Yet subsequent decisions must now be read to disapprove of Blundell v 
Catterall.  In Lord Fitzhardinge v Purcell, although Parker J held that the Crown might grant title 
to the bed of the sea or of a tidal navigable river to a subject, his Lordship held that no such 
grant can operate to the detriment of the public right of fishing.176  In Arnhemland Aboriginal 
Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (Northern Territory),177 and in Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr, 
the court followed Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries,178 and Attorney General for British Columbia v 
Attorney General for Canada, where the Privy Council said: “In the tidal waters, whether on the 
foreshore or in creeks, estuaries, and tidal rivers, the public have the right to fish, and by 
reason of the provisions of Magna Charta no restriction can be put upon that right of the 
public by an exercise of the prerogative in the form of a grant or otherwise.”179  The 
judgment of the Privy Council in Attorney-General for British Columbia,180 and the judgment of 
                                                
174 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 100 ER 1190, at p 295 of the former report (Holroyd J citing Hale); 
at p 307 of the former report (Bayley J). 
175 ibid at p 306. 
176 [1908] 2 Ch 139 at 166-7, followed in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 314 at 
pp 329-30 (Brennan J). 
177 [2000] FCA 165 (the question for consideration was whether the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) excluded or 
extinguished the public right to fish). 
178 [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 329-30 (Brennan J), following Attorney General for British Columbia 
v Attorney General for Canada [1914] AC 153 at 170-71 (Viscount Haldane). 
179 [1914] AC 153 at p 171 (Viscount Haldane) (adopted by Brennan J in the course of his Honour’s reasons in 
Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47; (1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 329-30 (Brennan J) ) 
180 [1914] AC 153 at 170-71 (Viscount Haldane). 
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the Federal Court of Australia in Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr,181 must be understood 
to overrule Blundell v Catterall on this point.  Only legislation by parliament will abrogate 
public rights at the foreshore: Attorney-General for British Columbia,182 Harper v Minister for Sea 
Fisheries,183 Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr,184 Arnhemland Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of 
Fisheries (Northern Territory).185 
 
In securing private property rights, the court in Blundell v Catterall distinguished legal 
authority as unrepresentative of the common law,186 and, when faced with an absence of 
authority on point, interpreted this absence as meaning that the alleged public rights did not 
exist rather than that the activities in question had never previously been challenged because 
they had always been regarded as lawful.187  In dismissing the authority of Bracton, the Judges 
in Blundell v Catterall may be regarded as committing the ultimate transgression of the judicial 
activist in that they fail to apply precedent in favour of policy.  The majority ignore that 
advice of Lord Tenterden CJ who said in 1832: “the decisions of our predecessors, the 
judges of former times, ought to be followed and adopted, unless we can see very clearly 
that they are erroneous, for otherwise there will be no certainty in the administration of the 
law.”188  The Judges pay no heed to the advice of Blackstone who writes that precedents 
must be followed unless “flatly absurd and unjust; and that is so even if they appear unjust to 
                                                
181 [1999] FCA 1668 at paras [539]-[541]. 
182 [1914] AC 153 at 170-71 (Viscount Haldane). Viscount Haldane LC, speaking for the Privy Council said at p 
170: “Since the decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 10 HLC 593, 11 ER 1155, it has 
been unquestioned law that since Magna Charta no new exclusive fishery could be created by Royal grant in 
tidal waters, and that no public right of fishing in such waters, then existing, can be taken away without 
competent legislation.  This is now part of the law of England, and their Lordships entertain no doubt that it is 
part of the law of British Columbia.” 
183 [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 330. 
184 [1999] FCA 1668 at paras [543] and [549]. 
185 [2000] FCA 165 at para [52]. 
186 The majority in Blundell v Catterall viewed Bracton as unrepresentative of the common law. The majority 
opined that Bracton is not authority of the common law, but of the civil law only: “[I]ts principles have not only 
not been adopted into the common law, but are at variance with it, and therefore no guide to us; that the public 
right to the extent claimed in this case is not only not found to be established by our law, but that the 
established principles of our law are inconsistent with it.” Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 100 ER 
1190, at pp 290-91 of the former report (Holroyd J).  See also at pp 308-10 (Bayley J); and at p 312 (Abbott CJ). 
187 See T Bonyhady The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public (Professional Books Abingdon 1987) at p 7, 
citing Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 106 ER 1190; RG Hall The Rights of the Crown and the privileges of the 
subject in the seashores of the realm (2nd edn Stevens and Haynes London 1875) at pp 158-59; and H Gallienne 
Lemmon Public Rights in the Seashore (Pitman London 1934) at p 175. 
188 Selby v Bardons (1832) 3 B & Ad at p 17. 
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us, if they lay down settled law and are not repugnant to natural justice.”189  Bracton was 
regarded as good authority.  Best J, in his dissenting judgment in Blundell v Catterall, cited 
Bracton bk1 ch 2 s 6 as foundation for the existence of a public right to bathe at the seashore 
concomitant with the other public rights of way on the sea and seashore, the right to 
navigation and the right to fish, and noted that: 
“But our books show that this passage has been adopted into our law.  
Mr Justice Buller tells us that Callis quotes it as English law, and I have 
often heard Lord Kenyon speak with great respect of that writer.  Bracton 
has not stated this as civil law, he has made it part of his book…  He was 
Chief Justice of England in the reign of Henry the Third; and Lord Hale 
(History of the Common Law, ch. 7) says that in his time the common law 
was much improved and the pleadings were more perfect and orderly 
than in any preceding period of our history.  Surely such a man is no 
mean authority for what the common law was at the time he wrote.  In 
Fortescue, p. 408, Lord Chief Justice Parker says, ‘As to the authority of 
Bracton, to be sure many things are now altered, but there is no colour to 
say that it was not law at that time, for there are many things that never 
have been altered, and are law now.’ …I do not say that the whole of the 
passage in Bracton is now good law; it was all good law at the time he 
wrote, and all of it that is adapted to the present state of things is good 
law now.”   
 
Respecting the majority’s dismissal of Bracton as not representative of English law, and as 
being of relevance only to the civil law, as opined by Holroyd J at page 292 of the report, the 
majority fail to account for the how the development of the common law occurred 
consequent to an admixture of ancient customs and laws, and make no mention of 
Blackstone on this point who writes, with authority:  
“[T]he truth seems to be, that there never was any formal exchange of 
one system of laws for another: though doubtless by the intermixture of 
adventitious nations, the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and 
                                                
189 Commentaries i 70: Sir W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press Oxford 1765-1769) 
vol i, at p 70. 
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the Normans, they must have insensibly introduced and incorporated 
many of their own customs with those that were before established: 
thereby in all probability improving the texture and wisdom of the 
whole, by the accumulated wisdom of divers particular countries. Our 
laws, faith lord Bacon, are mixed as our language: and as our language is 
so much the richer, the laws are the more complete. And indeed our 
antiquarians and first historians do all positively assure us, that our body 
of laws is of this compounded nature.  For they tell us, that in the time 
of Alfred the local customs of the several provinces of the kingdom were 
grown so various, that he found it expedient to compile his dome-book 
or liber judicialis, for the general use of the whole kingdom.”190 
 
Further, the majority fail to adopt logic in their reasoning because they fail to consider how a 
public right to bathe in the seashore might arise by implied dedication of land from long 
uninterrupted use of a place for bathing.191  Evidence adduced in the case was that guest 
from the hotel adjacent to the plaintiff’s manor had used the seashore in question for some 6 
years for bathing, and further evidence was that other persons had used the seashore for 
bathing for many years.192 
 
The English decisions may thus represent a lack of judicial sympathy for public rights.  The 
methodology used in the dissenting judgment of Justice Best to found a public right to bathe 
at the seashore as but one part of a general common law public right to use of the sea and 
seashore for all lawful purposes, along with rights of navigation and of fishing, is preferred.  
                                                
190 Sir W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press Oxford 1765-1769) vol i, s 3, at p 64. 
191 R v Lloyd (1808) 1 Camp 261, 170 ER 950.  The case of R v Lloyd was decided in 1808, prior to the 1821 
Blundell v Catterall decision and thus the majority in Blundell v Catterall must be taken to have known that a right 
of way may be established by prescription; that is, the owner shall be presumed to have dedicated his land to 
the public.  In R v Lloyd Lord Ellenborough stated: “If the owner of the soil throws open a passage, and neither 
marks by any visible distinction, that he means to preserve all his rights over it, nor excludes persons from 
passing through it by positive prohibition, he shall be presumed to have dedicated it to the public.” ((1808) 1 
Camp 261 at p 262, 170 ER 950 at p 951.  Cases decided after Blundell v Catterall include: Poole v Huskinson 
(1843) 11 M & W 827, 152 ER 1039; R v Inhabitants of East Mark (1848) 11 QB 877 at p 882 (Lord Denman CJ), 
116 ER 701; Cubitt v Maxse (1873) LR 8 CP 704 at p 715 (Brett J); and Turner v Walsh (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 83, 
affirmed by the Privy Council ((1881) 6 App Cas 636); Mann v Brodie [1885] 10 App Cas 378.  See further below 
at section 7 of this Chapter. 
192 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 100 ER 1190, at p 279 of the former report (Best J), and at p289 of 
the former report (Holroyd J). 
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That such a public right to bathe, along with a public right to fish might be excluded or 
extinguished where the littoral owner is a private person, as opposed to the Crown, is the 
appropriate ratio decidendi of the case.  For otherwise the very narrow distinctions made by 
the majority in their opinions appear nonsensical and have bizarre practical application.  As 
Hall noted of the apparent inconsistency of the English courts in allowing a right of passage 
over the foreshore for fishermen, but not allowing it to mere strollers: “[I]t might have been 
expected that the courts would have allowed the shore to be used as a highway as much for 
one purpose as the other…  instead of thus virtually declaring the same man to be trespasser 
for bathing who was no trespasser when up to his knees or neck in water, in search of a 
lobster, a crab, or a shrimp.”193  The bizarre practical application of the Blundell v Catterall 
decision would see “the right to picnic in a rowboat while resting on the foreshore” as legal, 
but “brand as a trespass the same activities performed while sitting on a blanket spread on 
the foreshore.”194 
 
In the United States, the courts, “quick to sense the undemocratic character of the English 
rule”195 have consistently held that there is a public right of passage over the foreshore, as 
well as a right to bathe in the sea.196  This democratic jurisprudence, safeguarding public 
rights of recreation, is seen in the fact that the ‘great ponds’ of New England have been 
declared as free for public use since the year 1641.197  American courts have generally 
accepted the doctrine that ownership of the foreshore is in the State in trust for the 
                                                
193 RG Hall The Rights of the Crown and the privileges of the subject in the seashores of the realm (2nd edn Stevens and 
Haynes London 1875) at p 184. 
194 JD Curtis ‘Coastal Recreation – Legal Methods for Securing Public Rights in the Seashore’ (1981) 33 Me LR 
69 at p 83. 
195 ‘Water and Watercourses – Right of Public Passage along Great Lakes Beaches’ (1933) 31 Mich LR 1134 at 
pp 1138-39. 
196 See T Bonyhady The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public (Professional Books Abingdon 1987) at p 
12, noting JN Pomeroy A Treatise on the Law of Water Rights (West St Paul Minn 1893) s 222. 
197 Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance 1641; Inhabitants of West Roxbury v Stoddard 89 Mass (7 Allen) at p 166: the 
Court held that the colonists “intended to devote the great ponds to public use.”  Under the Ordinance any 
pond with a surface area in excess of 10 acres was a ‘great pond’ and was declared as free for public use.  This 
statute has been absorbed into the common law of Maine (Thornton v Foss 26 Me 402 (1847), Barrows v 
McDermott 73 Me 441 (1882)), Massachusetts (Storer v Freeman 6 Mass (Tyng) 435 (1810)), and New Hampshire 
(Clement v Burns 43 NH 609 (1862)).  See JM Gould A Treatise on the Law of Waters (2nd edn Callaghan Chicago 
1891) at p 165, noted in ‘Water and Watercourses – Right of Public Passage along Great Lakes Beaches’ (1933) 
31 Mich LR 1134 at fn 26, at p 1140; and in JD Curtis ‘Coastal Recreation – Legal Methods for Securing Public 
Rights in the Seashore’ (1981) 33 Me LR 69 at pp 71-73, 78-83. 
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beneficial use of the public.198  The public trust doctrine is one methodology that courts in 
the coastal States of the Unites States use to protect the public rights over the foreshore. 
Courts have upheld a public right of passage over the foreshore as incident to the right of 
navigation and have held that public rights at the foreshore extend to recreative pursuits.  In 
Borough of Neptune City v Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, the New Jersey Court stated: “We have no 
difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth century, the public rights in tidal 
lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well 
to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”199  There exists 
a right of passage along the shores of the Great Lakes.200  And some jurisdictions have 
extended public rights over the foreshore to the dry land adjoining the foreshore, including 
beaches and parks: note Borough of Neptune City where the court extended the public’s right to 
sunbathe and enjoy other recreational activities to privately owned dry sand beach;201 and 
Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association, where the court held that reasonable enjoyment 
of the foreshore and the sea could not be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand 
area is also allowed.202   
 
Even where the foreshore is deemed owned by a private individual, the courts in most 
American jurisdictions adopt the doctrine that the littoral owner takes title subject to a public 
right of passage.203  Although Massachusetts has refused to recognize a general public 
recreational right at the foreshore, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that 
the right of navigation includes activities such as boating, swimming or floating upon the 
                                                
198 See Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v Atlantis Beach Club Inc 879 A2d 112 (2005); and Matthews v Bay Head 
Improvement Association 471 A2d 355 at p 358 (1984).  See JD Curtis ‘Coastal Recreation – Legal Methods for 
Securing Public Rights in the Seashore’ (1981) 33 Me LR 69 at fn 1, citing Martin v Waddall 41 US (16 Pet) 367, 
410, 416 (1842); Koyer v Miner 172 Cal 448, 156 Pac 1023 (1916); Rochester v Barney 117 Conn 462, 169 Atl 45 
(1933); Brickell v Trammell 77 Fla 544, 82 So 221 (1919); Arnold v Mundy 6 NJL 1 (1821); People v Brennan 142 Misc 
225, 255 NYS 331 (1931); Galveston v Mann 135 Tex 319, 143 SW 2d 1028 (1940); and ‘Water and Watercourses 
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199 294 A2d 47 at pp 54-55 (1972). 
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fn 26, at pp 1142-1146, citing Illinois Central R R v Illinois 146 US 387, 13 Sup Ct 110 (1892). 
201 294 A2d 47 (1972). 
202 471 A2d 355 at p 365 (1984). 
203 See eg Brickell v Trammell 77 Fla 544, 82 So 221 (1919). 
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public waters covering the foreshore.204  And in Dewing v Old Black Point Association,205 the 
Superior Court of Connecticut opined that swimming in public waters was a public right.  In 
that case, the plaintiff was injured when she dove off the defendant’s raft into shallow 
waters.  The court dismissed her claim, based on common law public nuisance, being of the 
opinion that only an interference with the public right to swim in the waters of Long Island 
Sound would create a cause of action.  Recreational uses such as boating, bathing and skating 
upon the frozen surfaces of great ponds have also been recognized as public rights in New 
England: Fay v Salem & Danvers Aqueduct Co;206 Opinion of the Justices.207 
 
American jurisprudence strongly supports a public right of recreation at public places. 
 
 
6. Public rights at public places dedicated to the public for public use 
 
A public right to bathe or swim at the foreshore or a public right to recreation at the 
foreshore has not been litigated in Australia, although the common law of Australia does 
recognise a public right of navigation and a public right to fish: Commonwealth of Australia v 
Yarmirr;208 Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries;209 Arnhemland Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of 
                                                
204 Opinion of the Justices 365 Mass 681 at p 686, 313 NE 2d 561 at p 566 (1974). 
205 19 Conn Supp 230, 111 A 2d 29 (1954) at p 231 of the former report. 
206 111 Mass 27 (1872). 
207 118 Me 503, 106 Atl 865 (1919). 
208 [1999] FCA 1668 at paras [527]-[571]; The Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56 at paras [96]-]98], (2001) 
75 ALJR 1582 at p 1604; Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28 at para [388], (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
209 [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 329-330 (Brennan J).  His Honour said: “[These] were tidal 
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profit à prendre is qualified by the paramount right to fish vested in the public...  In Malcomson v O'Dea, it was 
held that, after Magna Charta, the Crown, in whom the title to the bed of tidal navigable rivers was vested, was 
precluded from granting a private right of fishery, the right of fishery being in the public.  The law so stated 
was followed in Neill v Duke of Devonshire.  And in Lord Fitzhardinge v Purcell, although Parker J held that the 
Crown might grant title to the bed of the sea or of a tidal navigable river to a subject, his Lordship held that no 
such grant can operate to the detriment of the public right of fishing.  The existence of a public right to fish in 
tidal waters was accepted by Stephen and Jacobs JJ in [New South Wales v The Commonwealth [1975] HCA 58, 
(1975) 135 CLR 337].”  And at para [98] the High Court Australia reiterated: “there is a fundamental 
inconsistency between the asserted native title rights and interests and the common law public rights of 
navigation and fishing, as well as the right of innocent passage.  The two sets of rights cannot stand together 
and it is not sufficient to attempt to reconcile them by providing that exercise of the native title rights and 
interests is to be subject to the other public and international rights.” 
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Fisheries (Northern Territory).210  Similarly in Canada: Attorney General for British Columbia v 
Attorney General for Canada.211  In The Commonwealth v Yarmirr,212 and Western Australia v Ward,213 
the High Court of Australia has stated categorically that there is a fundamental inconsistency 
between a native title right and interest said to amount to a right to occupy, use and enjoy 
waters to the exclusion of all others or a right to possess those waters to the exclusion of all 
others and common law public rights of navigation over and of fishing in those waters.  A 
publicly exhibited sporting event wish seeks to exclude the public from a part of the sea or 
the foreshore is in the same position as the claimants of native title.  The High Court of 
Australia will not recognize any claim of exclusive use of the territorial seas or the foreshore.  
Further, the common law will extend beyond the territorial limits at the low-water mark of 
the foreshore to protect public rights existing on the seas and the foreshore.214 
 
The consequence of Blundell v Catterall may be avoided where cities and towns take leases of 
                                                
210 [2000] FCA 165 at paras [48]-[49] and [92], applying Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 
168 CLR 314 at pp 329-330; Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; and Brinckman v Matley [1904] 2 Ch 313 at 
p 316.  At para [92] Mansfield J stated: “In my view, the public right to fish must carry with it a right of passage 
upon the waters in the intertidal zone for the purposes of fishing: Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, Vol 18, par 
614; Blundell v Catterall  (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; Brinckman v Matley [1904] 2 Ch 313 at 316.” 
211 [1914] AC 153 at pp 167 and 171.  The Privy Council said at p 171 (in a passage adopted by Brennan J in 
Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 329-330): “In the tidal waters, 
whether on the foreshore or in creeks, estuaries, and tidal rivers, the public have the right to fish, and by reason 
of the provisions of Magna Charta no restriction can be put upon that right of the public by an exercise of the 
prerogative in the form of a grant or otherwise.” 
212 [2001] HCA 56 at paras [96]-]98], (2001) 75 ALJR 1582 at p 1604. 
213 [2002] HCA 28 at para [388], (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
214 Whilst the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56 acknowledged there 
was uncertainty as to the jurisdiction of the common law in respect of the territorial sea, the court rejected any 
notion that common law public rights were not justiciable.  The court stated at para [34]: “If the contention 
that the common law does not ‘extend’, ‘apply’, or ‘operate’ beyond low-water mark is intended to mean, or 
imply, that, absent statute, no rights deriving from or relating to events occurring or places lying beyond low-
water mark can be enforced in Australian courts, it is altogether too large a proposition and it is wrong.  The 
territorial sea is not and never has been a lawless province [Post Office v Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740 at p 
754 (Diplock LJ)]. The courts of England and Wales and the courts of Australia have long since given effect to 
rights and duties which derive from transactions and events which have occurred in that area. The very 
existence of the body of Admiralty law denies the generality of a proposition understood in the way we have 
identified. It suggests at least that the reference to "common law", in the proposition about its reach, is to be 
understood as restricted to that part of the unwritten law which was administered in the common law courts.  
Reference to the history of the jurisdictional conflicts between the courts of Admiralty and the common law 
courts [Mears ‘The History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction’ in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (1908) 
vol 2, at pp 312-364; Prichard and Yale Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction (Selden Society 1992) vol 108, 
at xlvii-lviii] reinforces that view, especially when it is recalled that from 1536 [28 Hen 8 c 15] the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty in relation to crimes at sea was exercised by the judges of the common law courts 
as commissioners of oyer and terminer [Holdsworth A History of English Law (7th edn 1956) vol 1, at pp 550-
552]. 
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the foreshore and formally dedicate it to the public,215 or where the Crown or the State 
formally dedicates land to the public for public use.  Private property owners may also 
dedicate land to the public for a public purpose by deed.216  Statutes in all common law 
jurisdictions provide that the Crown or State may dedicate public land to the public for 
public use.  For example, section 4 of the Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978 (Vic) provides 
power to reserve Crown land for public purposes in Victoria; section 80 Crown Lands Acts 
(NSW) provide power to dedicate Crown land for public purpose in New South Wales; and 
note also section 15(2) of the Lands Act 1996 of British Columbia, Canada, RSBC 1996 c. 
245 which provides the Lieutenant Governor in Council power to reserve Crown Land for 
any purpose that is in the public interest. 
 
Where the Crown grants land for public use, the public will subsequently have a right to use 
of that land, though the use may be qualified by the purposes for which the land is granted.  
Dedication of land to a public use may be by virtue of a formal act of some kind, as the 
discussion by Windeyer J in Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge shows.217  With respect to 
New South Wales, his Honour suggested that ‘dedicate’ indicated (in the context of Crown 
land), “something binding the Crown and creating some right in members of the public or of 
a section of the public.”218  There was in Rutledge a dedication of land by Crown grant to 
trustees, although not to a public use.  Rutledge concerned the Randwick racecourse in Sydney 
and the question raised on appeal was whether such land was a public reserve available for 
use by the public as of right.  Whilst Menzies and Windeyer JJ held that the land in question 
was a place of public recreation, they decided that the land was not a public reserve available 
for use by the public as of right.219  The public had no public right to use the racecourse and 
                                                
215 139 LT 381 (1915), cited in ‘Water and Watercourses – Right of Public Passage along Great Lakes Beaches’ 
(1933) 31 Mich LR 1134 at fn 26, at p 1137. 
216 Note eg s 16 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (UK) provides a legislative regime by which 
private land might be dedicated to the public for public purposes in the United Kingdom. 
217 [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at pp 73-77, cited with approval in North Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v 
Sutherland Shire Council [1999] NSWCA 438 at para [99]. 
218 ibid at p 74. 
219 ibid at pp 67, 68 (Menzies J) and at pp 70, 88 (Windeyer J).  In Rutledge, the question to be determined was 
whether Randwick racecourse was rateable land, or came within an exception in s132(1)(a) of the Local 
Government Act 1919 covering “Land which is vested in the Crown or in a public body or in trustees and is 
used for a public reserve.”  The definition of ‘public reserve’ therefore fell for consideration.  Windeyer J 
stated, at page 88, the principles that determine whether land is to be used for public recreation and enjoyment.  
They were that (i) the land must be, in the relevant sense, open to the public generally as of right; and (ii) it 
must not be a source of private profit.  In the result, in Rutledge, it was held that Randwick racecourse was not a 
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it followed that the racecourse could not be properly described at law as a public reserve: 
“The term ‘public reserve’ – and the word ‘reserve’ alone, when not controlled by a 
definition or a context indicative of a different sense – have come to be used in common 
parlance in Australia in an imprecise way to describe an unoccupied area of land preserved as 
an open space or park for public enjoyment, to which the public ordinarily have access as of 
right.”220  A case to which Windeyer J referred in his judgment, Municipal Council of Sydney v 
Attorney General for New South Wales,221 illustrates dedication by a formal act to a public use.  
The Privy Council in Municipal Council of Sydney held that the dedication of Moore Park as 
‘permanent common’ by notice of dedication by the Governor published in the Government 
Gazette meant that the area was to “go forever for the common or public enjoyment”, in 
which may be seen that the area was to be open to the public generally as of right.  
Dedication of land to the public for a particular purpose, such as a racecourse,222 might not 
create a public right of use; though land which is dedicated to the public as a reserve may be 
used for a zoo or for other purposes concomitant with a public right of use.223  As Menzies J 
stated in Rutledge: “…[U]ses which by themselves would not seem to be obvious uses for a 
public reserve might, as part of a wider use, be properly regarded as part of a use for a public 
reserve, eg the establishment and management of a restaurant by private caterers or the 
hiring of pleasure boats in a public park, the provision of stalls for the sale of machinery at 
an agricultural show, the granting of privileges to members of a society in the use of 
zoological gardens.  Indeed, I have no reason to think that the actual decision in Spain’s Case 
that Taronga Park was used for a public park, was not correct.”224  The decision in Spain’s 
Case,225 was that Taronga Zoological Gardens were in fact used for a public reserve, and the 
circumstances which might be regarded as limiting the public’s right of use, such as the 
requirement for payment of a fee to enter the zoo, were not matters which the court viewed 
as incompatible with the land being a public reserve nor incompatible with the existence of a 
public right of use.  The existence of facilities or trades within the area of a public park or 
                                                
‘public reserve’ (at p 95). Neither was the land dedicated or used as a public reserve within the definition of 
such in s4 of the Local Government Act 1919.  The trust in Rutledge allowed uses of the land (for example as a 
training establishment) which were clearly not public purposes. 
220 [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at p 70. 
221 (1894) AC 444 (Privy Council). 
222 Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54. 
223 Mosman Municipal Council v Spain (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 492, 46 WN 174. 
224 [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at p 65, citing Mosman Municipal Council v Spain (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 492, 
46 WN 174. 
225 (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 492, 46 WN 174 
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public reserve dedicated to the public will not cancel the existence of a public right of use, 
though such public right of use may be qualified. 
 
As with public highways, land dedicated for public benefit creates, at common law, a public 
right to use of such places.  In reference to public roads, Lord Scott of Foscote recently 
noted, in Man O’War Station Ltd v Auckland City Council, that: “At common law, the 
dedication of land as a public highway creates a public right of passage.”226  So too with 
other public places, such as beaches, parks, or commons.  Of the beach in Enright v Coolum 
Resort Pty Ltd,227 a civil suit in negligence upon the death of a swimmer in the surf at a beach 
on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland, Justice Moynihan noted that it was Crown Land 
dedicated to the public for public use.  His Honour said: “Yaroomba Beach is crown land.  
By an order in council of 26 November 1997 the Governor in Council declared parts of the 
seashore and land under the sea at Yaroomba Beach a bathing reserve under the 
management and control of the defendant Council for the public benefit.”228  Beaches 
dedicated to the public for public use create a public right to use of the beach for recreation, 
physical activity, or right of way.  Tobias JA observed in Wyong Shire Council v Vairy, a 
decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, in a case concerning personal injuries 
suffered by the plaintiff after diving off a rock platform into the sea at a popular Central 
Coast, New South Wales, beach, that: “In coastal New South Wales and, no doubt, in other 
coastal areas of Australia, public authorities such as local government councils have the care, 
control and management of ocean beaches, tidal creeks and estuaries.  Members of the 
public enter these areas as of right for various recreational purposes including swimming and 
surfing.  In many cases the public authority encourages, actively or passively, and/or 
promotes the use of its beaches and creeks for those purposes.”229  Amongst the public 
rights that are created consequent to a formal dedication of land to the public for public use 
are public rights of way, a public right of recreation, a public right of surfing on the sea, and 
a public right of swimming at the foreshore. 
 
 
                                                
226 [2002] UKPC 32 (17 June 2002) at para [31]. 
227 [2002] QSC 394 (29 November 2002). 
228 ibid at para [5]. 
229 [2004] NSWCA 247 (27 July 2004) at para [15]. 
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7. Public rights arising by long uninterrupted use 
 
Where there is no formal dedication of land to the public for the public’s use, public rights in 
respect of land may yet arise where the public make uninhibited use of the land in question.  
Lord Blackburn stated in Mann v Brodie: “[W]here there has been evidence of a user by the 
public so long and in such a manner that the owner of the fee, whoever he was, must have 
been aware that the public were acting under the belief that the way had been dedicated, and 
has taken no steps to disabuse them of that belief, it is not conclusive evidence, but evidence 
on which those who have to find the fact may find that there was a dedication by the owner 
whoever he was.  It is therefore, I may say, in England never practically necessary to rely on 
prescription to establish a public way.”230  The criteria upon which a court will rely in making 
a presumption as to the existence of a public right in respect of use of land are: (1) Intention 
to dedicate, which is inferred where there is apparent acquiescence; (2) Acceptance by the 
public, which is inferred from the circumstances of use; (3) Use for a substantial period of 
time; (4) Use as of right; that is the public must believe themselves to be exercising a public 
right and their use must not be secret, by force or under license; and (5) Use without 
interruption; for by interrupting public use with the intention of stopping public enjoyment 
of a place, a relevant landowner can prevent the creation of public rights. 
 
The existence of a public right of recreation does not depend on a formal dedication.  More 
usually public rights arise consequent to an ‘implied dedication’ which is nothing more than a 
decision of the courts that the use of a public place by the public is treated as evidence of 
dedication of the land to the public for public use and as evidence of the existence of a 
public right to use of the place so dedicated.  Public rights in respect of land can arise 
irrespective of whether the land is owned by an individual in fee simple, or whether the land 
is Crown land.  In R v Lloyd, Lord Ellenborough stated: “If the owner of the soil throws 
open a passage, and neither marks by any visible distinction, that he means to preserve all his 
rights over it, nor excludes persons from passing through it by positive prohibition, he shall 
be presumed to have dedicated it to the public.”231  R v Inhabitants of East Mark holds that:  
                                                
230 [1885] 10 App Cas 378 at p 386 (Lord Blackburn). 
231 (1808) 1 Camp 261 at p 262, 170 ER 950 at p 951. 
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“dedication might be presumed against the Crown from long acquiescence in public user.”232 
And in Turner v Walsh the Privy Council affirmed that long continued user of a way by the 
public over land whether of the Crown or of a private owner gives rise to a presumption of 
dedication in the absence of anything to rebut it.233  Uninhibited use of land by the public, 
for their own purposes, whether those purposes be for recreation, sports, travel, passage, or 
otherwise, creates (1) an inference of dedication of the land to the public for use by the 
public; (2) an inference of acceptance of the land by the public for use of which it is made; 
and (3) the creation of a public right.   
 
Both the intention to dedicate the land to the public for public use, and the acceptance of 
the dedication, may be inferred from the circumstances of a long uninterrupted use of the 
land by the public.234  In the Canadian case of Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend,235 Justice Brooke 
reiterated: “Open and unobstructed use by the public for a substantial period of time is, as a 
rule, the evidence from which a trier of fact may infer both dedication and acceptance.  This 
principle seems to have been generally accepted…”236  Where a landowner apparently 
acquiesces in the public use, the courts simply may presume dedication: Mann v Brodie,237 
followed in Folkestone Corporation v Brockman,238 Williams-Ellis v Cobb,239 and in R v Oxfordshire 
County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council.240  In Sunningwell, Lord Hoffmann followed in 
Dalton v Angus, where Fry J (advising the House of Lords) rationalized the law of 
prescription as follows: 
“[T]he whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the 
presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. 
                                                
232 (1848) 11 QB 877; 116 ER 701. 
233 (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 83, affirmed by the Privy Council: (1881) 6 App Cas 636. 
234 R v Lloyd (1808) 1 Camp 261, 170 ER 950; Poole v Huskinson (1843) 11 M & W 827, 152 ER 1039; R v 
Inhabitants of East Mark (1848) 11 QB 877 at p 882 (Lord Denman CJ); Turner v Walsh (1881) 6 App Cas 636, at 
p 642; Mann v Brodie [1885] 10 App Cas 378; O’Neil v Harper (1913) 10 DLR 433, 28 OLR 635 (CA); Hunsinger v 
Town of Simcoe [1946] 2 DLR 632, [1946] OR 203, [1946] OWN 189 (CA), affirmed [1948] 3 DLR 224 (SCC); 
Foothills No 31 (Municipal District) v Stockwell (1985) 39 RPR 82 at p 84; [1986] 1 WWR 668; 41 Alta LR (2d) 184 
(Alberta Court of Appeal) citing Williams & Wilson v Toronto and Attorney-General of Ontario [1946] OR 309, 
[1946] 4 DLR 27; Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal); North 
Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v Sutherland Shire Council [1999] NSWCA 438 at para [99] 
235 [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
236 ibid at p 484. 
237 (1885) 10 App Cas 378 (House of Lords) at p 386 (Lord Blackburn). 
238 [1914] AC 338 at p 352 (Lord Kinnear), at pp 362-63 (Lord Atkinson). 
239 [1935] 1 KB 310 at p 331 (Talbot J). 
240 [1999] UKHL 28, [1999] 3 WLR 160 at p 168 (Lord Hoffmann).  Lord Hoffmann said: “The presumption 
arises, as Fry J said of prescription generally in Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740, 773, from acquiescence.” 
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The courts and the Judges have had recourse to various expedients for 
quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have 
not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in 
all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the 
principle upon which these expedients rest.”241 
 
There are many cases where judges have shown willingness to imply dedication of a right 
from long uninterrupted use.  In Attorney-General and Newton and Abbot RDC v Dyer, adopting 
the view of Justice Cardozo that “property like other social institutions has a social function 
to fulfil” (BN Cardozo The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press New Haven 
1922) at p 87), Evershed J stated that where public use of a footpath has its origin in “the 
toleration and neighbourliness” of the previous landholders, “it may be no bad thing that the 
good nature of earlier generations should have a permanent memorial.”242 
 
At common law use alone is simply evidence of an implied dedication.  There is no fixed 
period during which public use must continue in order to constitute evidence that a 
landowner has dedicated land to the public for public use.  Use for a period of 18 months 
has been held sufficient to justify an inference of dedication.243  Other presumptions of 
dedication rest on use for 3 years,244 7 years,245 40 years,246 and 100 years.247  In England, use 
of land for 20 years is generally considered the appropriate gauge for the establishment of 
public rights in respect of land in conformity with the statutory requirements in section 2 of 
the Prescription Act 1832 (Eng) and section 22(1) of the Commons Registration Act 1965 
(Eng) for the establishment of village greens and commons by use as of right.248 
 
                                                
241 (1881) 6 App Cas 740 at p 773 (Fry J) followed also in R v Sunderland City Council ex parte Beresford [2003] 
UKHL 60 at paras [76] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe), [2004] 1 AC 889, [2003] 3 WLR 1306. 
242 [1947] Ch 67 at pp 85-86. 
243 North London Railway Co v Vestry of St Mary, Islington (1872) 27 LT 672. 
244 Rowley v Tottenham UDC [1914] AC 95. 
245 R v Petrie (1855) 4 B & El 737, 119 ER 272. 
246 Turner v Walsh (1881) 6 App Cas 636 (Privy Council) 
247 Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
248 See R v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335. 
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In Regina v Inhabitants of East Mark,249 Lord Denman CJ said: ‘If a road has been used by the 
public between forty and fifty years without objection, am I not to use it, unless I knew who 
has been the owner of it?  The Crown certainly may dedicate a road to the public, and be 
bound by long acquiescence in public user.  I think the public are not bound to inquire 
whether this or that owner would be more likely to know his rights and to assert them; and 
that we have gone quite wrong in entering upon such inquiries.  Enjoyment for a great 
length of time ought to be sufficient evidence of dedication, unless the state of the property 
has been such as to make dedication impossible.” 
 
And in Turner v Walsh,250 it was held that dedication from the Crown or private owner, as the 
case may be, may and ought to be presumed from long-continued user of a way by the 
public in the absence of anything to rebut the presumption; and the same presumption 
should be made in the case of Crown lands in the then Colony of New South Wales, 
although the nature of the user and the weight to be given to it may vary in each particular 
case.  In the Turner case, the land was purchased from the Crown in 1879, under an Act 
passed in 1861.  It appeared that for forty years before the commencement of the action 
there had been a road over and across the piece of land granted to the plaintiff which had 
been used by the public with carriages and on foot, and was the main road between two 
places.  The mail coaches travelled the road, and teamsters conveying the produce of the 
country used it; and, in fact, it had been used by the public for all purposes, during this 
period, without interruption.  The Privy Council held that upon such evidence the Judge 
would be right, unless there was some positive restriction on the power of the Crown, in 
directing the jury that they might presume a dedication of the road by the Crown to the 
public.  The presumption of dedication may be made where the land belongs to the Crown 
or to a private owner, as the case may be, and, in the absence of anything to rebut the 
presumption, may and indeed ought to be presumed.251 
 
And the caselaw is not limited to factual circumstances in respect of roads and public rights 
of way.  Dedication may be presumed in cases where the public have used a park and beach 
                                                
249 (1848) 11 QB 877 at p 882. 
250 (1881) 6 App Cas 636 (Privy Council) at p 642. 
251 [1913] 13 DLR 649 (Ontario Supreme Court, Appellate Division) at p 654-655 
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for swimming and recreation: this was the factual circumstance of Gibbs v Village of Grand 
Bend,252 cited above.  Indeed, argument was made before the court in Gibbs that there might 
be some divergence in the application of the common law relating to the establishment of 
public rights at public places such as beaches and parks, as opposed to the establishment of 
public rights of passage on public roads.  In responding to this argument Justice Brooke 
disapproved the opinion of the trial judge stating, at page 482,  
“In [the trial judge’s] reasons, he accepted the respondents’ submission 
that public use and dedication generally involve rights of passage and 
that the courts have been reluctant to extend the doctrine of dedication 
to cases in which the use is not for public necessity.  The trial judge then 
indicated that the use of land for recreational purposes cannot, in law, 
give rise by itself to an inference of dedication.  Perhaps such a 
proposition was tenable in other days, but today’s attitude favouring 
playgrounds, greenbelts, parks and the requirement in modern planning 
that land be set aside, or dedicated, for such recreational purposes is 
because facilitating public recreation is a matter of public necessity. 
 
“Furthermore, the authorities do not entirely support the trial judge’s 
conclusions.  In Wright and Maginnis v Village of Long Branch (1959) 18 
DLR (2d) 1, [1959] SCR 418, the court was concerned with a claim that 
land had been dedicated for the purpose of the erection and 
maintenance of a war memorial.  There was a question about the effect 
of this dedication on the title of the owner and whether the owner, 
having dedicated the land to the public for a particular use, retained the 
title subject to the public’s right to use the property for such use.  Rand J 
answered that question in the affirmative.  In delivering the judgment, 
Rand J adopted what had been said by Clute JA in Re Lorne Park (1914) 
33 OLR 51 at pp 59-60, 22 DLR 350 (abridged) (SCAD), where he 
referred to 13 Cyc 444 (IV A): 
‘The doctrine expounded in the early English cases was applied 
to highways, but was gradually extended to all kinds of public 
                                                
252 [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
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easement, such as squares, parks, wharves etc….  The full 
applicability of the doctrine of dedication to parks and public 
squares and commons is now generally recognised, and where 
land is dedicated for a public square without any specific 
designation of the uses to which it can be put, it will be 
presumed to have been dedicated to such appropriate uses as 
would under user and custom be deemed to have been fairly in 
contemplation at the time of the dedication.’” 
 
Thus, it is not incorrect to argue that a public right to recreation exists at all public places 
which are dedicated to public use and which it is reasonable to contemplate would be used 
for recreative activities by members of the public at the time when they were so dedicated. 
 
 
8. Use as of right 
 
The long use of a place by the public for a particular purpose, whether that be for passage, 
recreation, or swimming, etc, is a factual circumstance supporting not only the implied 
dedication of land to the public for public use but also supporting a finding by the courts as 
to the creation or existence of a public right.  Courts have declared that public rights can 
arise either at common law or under statute as of right, concomitant with the use of land 
and a presumption that land is dedicated to the public for public use.  In this sense, the 
public, by virtue of their long uninterrupted use of land, create their own public right in 
respect of the land in question.  Their use of land must not be secret, by force or under 
license: nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.253 As Tomlin J observed in Hue v Whiteley,254 members of 
                                                
253 R v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335 at pp 350, 
351, and 353-354, following Earl de la Warr v Miles (1881) 17 Ch D 535 at p 596 (Cotton LJ) and Gardner v 
Hodgson’s Kingston Brewery Co Ltd [1903] AC 229 at p 239 where Lord Lindley said that the words ‘as of right’ 
were intended “to have the same meaning as the older expression nec vi nec clam nec precario.”  Sunningwell 
was followed by the House of Lords in R v Sunderland City Council ex parte Beresford [2003] UKHL 60 at para [3] 
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill), and at para [16] Lord Scott), [2004] 1 AC 889, [2003] 3 WLR 1306.  Also, Merstham 
Manor Ltd v Coulson and Purley UDC [1937] 2 KB 77 at pp 82-84 (Hilbery J); Jones v Bates [1938] 2 All ER 237 at p 
245 (Scott LJ).  See further T Bonyhady The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public (Professional Books 
Abingdon 1987) at pp 29-38. 
254 [1929] 1 Ch 440 at p 445 cited with approval in Jones v Bates [1938] 2 All ER 237 at p 241 (Slesser LJ), at p 
245 (Scott LJ); Attorney-General and Newton Abbot RDC v Dyer [1947] Ch 67 at p 85. 
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the public must merely “believe themselves to be exercising a public right…” to justify an 
implied dedication.  In Alfred F Beckett Ltd v Lyons, Harman LJ that the phrase ‘as of right’ 
was commensurate with a belief of a public right: “The authorities seem to show that when 
the law talks of something being done as of right it means that the person doing it believes 
himself to be exercising a public right: Jones v Bates [1938] 2 All ER 237.”255 
 
In Hue v Whitely, the dispute was over the existence of a public footpath on Box Hill and the 
judge found that for 60 years people had “used the track to get to the highway and to the 
public bridle road as of right, on the footing that they were using a public way.”256  Counsel 
for the landowner, relying on Attorney-General v Antrobus [1905] 2 Ch 188 (which concerned 
the tracks around Stonehenge), argued that the user should be disregarded because people 
used the path merely for ‘recreation’ in walking on Box Hill.  Tomlin J said, at page 445, that 
this made no difference: “A man passes from one point to another believing himself to be 
using a public road, and the state of his mind as to his motive in passing is irrelevant.  If 
there is evidence, as there is here, of continuous user by persons as of right (ie, believing 
themselves to be exercising a public right to pass from one highway to another), there is no 
question such as that which arose in Attorney-General v Antrobus.”  Lord Hoffmann, giving 
judgment for the House of Lords in Sunningwell followed Earl de la Warr v Miles,257 Jones v 
Bates,258 and Hue v Whitely,259 stating: “[T]he whole English theory of prescription… as I hope 
I have demonstrated, depends upon evidence of acquiescence by the landowner giving rise 
to an inference or presumption of a prior grant or dedication.  For this purpose, the actual 
state of mind of the road user is plainly irrelevant.” 
 
In Earl de la Warr v Miles, Cotton LJ discussed the meaning of the term ‘as of right’ in the 
Prescription Act of 1832 stating that use as of right was use, “not secretly, not as acts of 
violence, not under permission from time to time given by the person on whose soil the acts 
were done.”260  Lord Hoffman approved of these words in Sunningwell, stating further: “The 
unifying element in these three vitiating circumstances was that each constituted a reason 
                                                
255 [1967] Ch 449 at p 469. 
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258 [1938] 2 All ER 237 at p 245 (Scott LJ). 
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why it would not have been reasonable to expect the owner to resist the exercise of the right 
– in the first case, because rights should not be acquired by the use of force, in the second, 
because the owner would not have known of the user and in the third, because he had 
consented to the user, but for a limited period.”261  Adopting the expression ‘nec vi, nec 
clam, nec precario’, Lord Hoffmann interpreted and translated the phrase as ‘not by force, 
nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner’.262  The theory of implied prescription is concerned 
only with how the matter would have appeared to the owner of the land, and not with the 
state of mind of individual users of land.  Use of land by the public, which is apparently as of 
right, cannot be discounted merely because, as may often be the case, many of the users over 
a long period were subjectively indifferent as to whether a right existed, or even had private 
knowledge that it did not.263  Citing Parke B in Bright v Walker,264 Lord Hoffmann concluded 
that use must merely be had “openly and in the manner that a person rightfully entitled 
would have used it…”265 
 
The decision in Blundell v Catterall, which has been regarded as precedent that there is no 
public right of recreation of the seashore, is perhaps deficient for not considering whether 
the recreation of swimming claimed as a public right in that case might arise from long 
uninterrupted use as of right.  Recent decisions have confirmed that public rights to use of 
public spaces for recreation can exist as of right. 
 
In North Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v Sutherland Shire Council, Sheller JA declared that the 
acquisition of rights of way by use may be established simply by long user: “In the context of 
the acquisition of rights of way by use, the expression ‘as of right’ has been employed to 
denote a use of land without force or stealth or licence (nec per vim, nec clam, nec precario).  The 
claimants used the land as though they had a right to do so and in ways that to a reasonable 
landowner would indicate that they believed they were exercising such a right.  Such use 
could be evidence either of an intention by the owner to dedicate the land to that use or that 
                                                
261 [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335 at p 350, [1999] 3 WLR 160 at p 168 (Lord Hoffmann). 
262 [2000] 1 AC 335 at p 350 (Lord Hoffmann), following Gardner v Hodgson’s Kingston Brewery Co Ltd [1903] AC 
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263 [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335 at pp 353-354, [1999] 3 WLR 160 at p 171 (Lord Hoffmann). 
264 (1834) I C M & R 211 at p 219, 149 ER 1057 at p 1060. 
265 [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335 at p 350, [1999] 3 WLR 160 at p 168 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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there had in fact been such a dedication.”266  In North Cronulla Precinct Committee the Court of 
Appeal of New South Wales held that land vested in the Sutherland Shire Council pursuant 
to the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) was a public park owing to the use of the land by 
members of the public for a period of 8 years as a park for recreation. With the acquiescence 
of the respondent Council, who did not use the land for any purpose, the public came and 
went on the land in a way which could only suggest that they believed that they had the right 
to use the land as a park.  The Council was estopped from reclassifying the land. 
 
In R v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Braim,267 McCullough J held that a public 
right of recreation can be created at common law based on long use.  The applicant, Mr 
Braim, applied by way of judicial review for a declaration that an area of land known as 
Doncaster Common which was owned by the Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council 
constituted an ‘open space’ within the meaning of section 123(2A) of the Local Government 
Act 1972.  His application was prompted because of the corporation’s intention to grant a 
lease giving exclusive possession of part of the land to the Town Moore Golf Club whose 
intention was to erect a new clubhouse thereon.  One part of the common was a race course 
upon which the St Leger was run, racing having taken place there since about 1600.  Another 
part of the common had been used since 1894 for playing golf.  Evidence showed that 
people had been walking over the common for many years, and that now it was used also for 
jogging, flying kites and model aeroplanes, and picnicking, and that children kicked balls 
about and played tennis, french cricket and the like.268   
 
Argument was made that any public right to use the land must derive from section 193 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925 (UK) and that, if any public right existed, such was 
extinguished because the land in question had not been registered under the Commons 
Registration Act 1965 (UK), and there was no evidence of any grant or dedication since then.  
His Lordship concluded, however, that prior to 1926 the rights of user of the common by 
the public did not depend upon tolerance or permission of Doncaster Corporation; that at 
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no stage was there anything to suggest the public’s use was on sufferance only, and that there 
had been no assertion of any right to end such use before the present dispute arose.  The 
only reasonable factual inference to be drawn was that from some date prior to 1860 the 
public had used the common for recreation as of right.  The fact that the common had not 
been registered under the Commons Registration Act 1965 (UK) could not detract from 
those pre-exisiting rights.  Further, it was a right of use which was neither an easement nor 
based on custom such as local inhabitants might enjoy over a town or village green.  His 
Lordship considered In re Ellenborough Park ((1956) 1 Ch 131), Tyne Improvement Commissioners v 
Imrie ((1899) 81 LT 174), Goodman v Mayor of Saltash ((1882) 7 App Cas 633) and Attorney-
General v Antrobus ((1905) 2 Ch 188) and found that the law allowed the court to presume 
that at some time prior to 1860 a public right of recreation over the common was validly 
granted.  The public’s use of Doncaster Common for purposes of recreation was not only 
lawful but as of right. 
 
In Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend,269 it was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal that open and 
unobstructed use of land by members of the public for recreational purposes, for a 
substantial period of time, can give rise by itself to the creation of a public right.  The 
existence of a public right is not dependent on ownership of the land, but rather arises in 
consequence to the use which the public make of the land.  Whilst the court on one hand 
found that public’s use of the land leads to an inference that the land has been dedicated to 
the public for recreational purposes, irrespective of who owns the land,270 respecting public 
rights, Brooke JA said: “…[T]he public rights are separate from ownership by the Crown or 
the municipality…”  Even a denial by a municipal authority that the public has a right to the 
use of land, whether that land be a beach for their recreation, or a road for their travel, will 
not extinguish the existence of the public right.271  The sole criteria for the existence of a 
public right in respect of a public place, whether it be a right to travel, to free passage, or to 
use of a place for recreation or physical exercise, is the uninhibited exercise of that right.  In 
Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend, the public made use of a private lakeside beach for recreational 
                                                
269 [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
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271 Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 at p 481 (Brooke JA), citing, with approval, Foothills 
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purposes over a period of 100 years.  There was no evidence of dedication of the fee simple 
pertaining to the beach to the public for public use; yet the court found that a dedication of 
the land to use by the public for recreational purposes could be inferred.  Brooke JA was of 
the opinion that an inference could clearly be drawn that the beach was dedicated to the 
public for their recreation, since the evidence showed that the beach had been habitually 
used for recreational purposes since before the turn of the nineteenth century and the 
successive owners did not prevent, but encouraged such use.  Accordingly, the public could 
continue to use the beach for recreational purposes.272  
 
Regarding public rights to use of beaches for their recreation, Brooke JA said at page 483:  
“Dedication of the use of beaches to the public for recreational purposes 
has been the subject of but one reported case in this country to which 
we were referred: see Carpenter v Smith [[1951] 2 DLR 609 (Ont Co Ct)].  
It is, however, an area in which there have been a number of decisions in 
the United States of America.  An American body of case law has 
developed concerning the dedication of beaches and shoreline of public 
waterways to the public for recreational purposes.  In many of these 
cases, the claim for such a declaration has succeeded.  Of course, in 
considering those cases, care must be taken to discern the possible 
significance of the relevant state constitution or other statute.  However, 
the same common law principles applicable in cases of dedication in the 
American cases are generally applicable here.  In an article entitled 
‘Coastal Recreation: Legal Methods For Securing Public Rights In The 
Sea Shore’, found in 33 Me L Rev 69, the author, J Curtis states at p 84:   
‘In recognition of a long continued public usage of the dry shore, 
courts in California, Florida, New York, Oregon, and Texas have 
recently applied the doctrines of prescription, dedication and 
custom to establish public rights in coastal beaches above the 
high water mark.  Refer to, Gion v City of Santa Cruz, Dietz v King 2 
Cal 3d 29, 465 P 50 (California Supreme Court, 1970); Seaway Co 
v Attorney General 375 SW 2d 923 (Tex Civ App Ct 1964).’” 
                                                
272 ibid at pp 481-82 (Brooke JA), at pp 478-479 (Finlayson JA). 
 94 
 
Public rights may arise wherever members of the public make habitual use of land 
uninhibited by the owner of that land.  If the public make use of a public place such as a 
public beach or a public park for their recreation and enjoyment uninterrupted by the owner 
of the land, and for a substantial period of time, then a public right will arise.  Thus, if the 
people use a beach for their recreation, uninhibited and for a substantial period of time, then 
the people have a public right to use the beach for recreation.  If the people use the foreshore for 
swimming or bathing, uninhibited and for a substantial period of time, then the people have 
a public right to use of the foreshore for swimming and bathing.  If the people use a park for recreation 
or leisure, uninhibited and for a substantial period of time, then the people have a public right 
to use of the park recreation and leisure.  Courts have recognised a public right to recreation at 
beaches, encompassing rights to swim at the foreshore and walk on the beach;273 at 
commons, encompassing rights to walk, jog, picnic, fly kites, play ball games and french 
cricket;274 and at public parks.275  This public right to use of public places for recreation and 
enjoyment is a public right capable of juxtaposition with a publicly exhibited sporting event.  
A publicly exhibited sporting event may create a public nuisance at a public beach, public 
park or common, if such sporting event obstructs, interferes with or causes discomfort or 
annoyance to the public in the exercise of their public right to recreation.276  It is the public 
right to use of the public space for recreation which can be impinged upon in such instances. 
 
 
9. The village green cases 
 
A series of litigations concerning the registration of land as village greens and the rights of 
the public arising in respect of such registration in England has been considered by the 
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House of Lords.  Three cases are useful to this thesis and support the legal principle that use 
of land as of right creates public rights of recreation – R v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte 
Sunningwell Parish Council,277 R v Sunderland City Council ex parte Beresford,278 Oxfordshire County 
Council v Oxfordshire City Council.279  The House of Lords dicta arose following judicial review 
of local government decisions refusing registration of land as a village green pursuant to 
section 22 of the Commons Registration Act 1965 (UK).  These judgments address the 
meaning of ‘use as of right’ under the statute and at common law, and the creation of public 
rights from ‘use as of right’ instances.  These dicta are useful for our understanding how 
public rights can arise in respect of the use of land, and of what is the legal effect of such 
public rights once established. 
 
In R v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council,280 the House of Lords 
ordered the Oxfordshire County Council to register a glebe which had been used by 
members of the public for “such outdoor pursuits as walking their dogs, playing family and 
childrens’ games, flying kites, picking blackberries, fishing in the stream and tobogganing 
down the slope when snow falls” as a village green on the basis that the public’s use of the 
glebe gave rise to a public right to use of the glebe.  Pursuant to section 22(1) of the 
Commons Registration Act 1965 (UK) the parish council had applied to the County Council 
to register the glebe as a village green in order to forestall a council plan to build two houses 
on the glebe which the parish very much opposed.  The principal issue in the Sunningwell case 
was whether the public, whose use of the land for sports and pastimes was relied on as 
constituting the requisite use ‘as of right’, had to use the land in the belief that they had the 
right to do so.  The House held that they did not have to have a personal belief in their right 
to use the land.  It was sufficient that their use of the land, objectively evaluated, appeared to 
be a use as of right.   
 
Lord Hoffmann’s dicta addressing the meaning of the term ‘use as of right’ within the Act, 
and rejecting the requirement of a subjective state of mind by people using the land in 
accordance with the common law, has been assessed above.  But Lord Hoffmann also 
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discussed the effect of ‘use as of right’ and, in particular, whether such use created a public 
right to recreation.  The County Council objected to the registration of the land in question 
as a village green because the use of the land was for solitary or family activities such as the 
walking of dogs and playing children’s games, such activities not being “sports and pastimes” 
as required under the Act.  His Lordship rejected this argument, holding that use of land for 
solitary and family pastimes included use of land for recreation and sport.  His Lordship also 
stated that even sporadic and trivial use of land might give rise to a right to use land for 
recreation.  Lord Hoffmann stated: “I agree with Carnwath J in Reg v Suffolk County Council, 
Ex parte Steed (1995) 70 P & CR 487, 503, when he said that dog walking and playing with 
children were, in modern life, the kind of informal recreation which may be the main 
function of a village green.  It may be, of course, that the user is so trivial and sporadic as not 
to carry the outward appearance of user as of right.”  The effect of this dicta is that, where 
the public make use of land for personal sedentary purposes, even in a minimal intermittent 
manner, the law will regard that use as inclusive of all types of recreation, sports, pastimes 
and activities, and not only those of a minimal intermittent or sedentary nature.  This issue 
would be revisited in the Oxford County Council 2006 case. 
 
A further argument raised by the County Council in Sunningwell was that the use of the land 
by members of the public had been tolerated by the Council and that this toleration was 
inconsistent with the user having been as of right.  This argument would be revisited in ex 
parte Beresford, discussed further below, but Lord Hoffmann dealt with this argument by 
simply stating: “In my view, that proposition is fallacious.  As one can see from the law of 
public rights of way before 1932, toleration is not inconsistent with user as of right.”281 
 
In R v Sunderland City Council ex parte Beresford,282 the question which the House of Lords 
considered was whether use as of right could be claimed where the public’s use of land for 
sports and recreation was actually tolerated and encouraged by the landowner.  Could the 
court infer an implied licence by the landowner sufficient to quash a claim of use by right?  It 
was not suggested that the Council had expressly licensed the public’s use of the land, either 
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in writing or orally.  The argument was accordingly directed to whether it was ever possible 
to imply a licence by a landowner to use land in the manner prescribed, and, if so, whether 
the facts could properly be held to give rise to such an implication.  On the facts, the public 
made use of an area called the ‘Sports Arena’ close to the centre of the town of Washington, 
Tyne and Wear.  The Council had mown the grass and had installed many years previously a 
double row of wooden benches, sufficient to accommodate 1100 people.  Also, a non-turf 
cricket wicket was laid down in 1979.  The Sports Arena has been used for various 
recreational activities, ranging from team games to the walking of dogs.  In 1998 the Council 
granted planning permission for the erection of a college of further education on land which 
included the Sports Arena.  This proposal was opposed by a number of local residents who 
have been accustomed to use the Sports Arena for recreational activities and who desired to 
go on doing so.  They made an application in 1999 for the Sports Arena to be registered 
under the 1965 Act as a town or village green. 
 
The House followed Lord Hoffmann’s dictum that use ‘as of right’ meant use ‘nec vi, nec 
clam, nec precario’.283  The House then turned to consider the effect of the term ‘nec 
precario’, without licence.  Some members viewed the Council’s actions as not capable of 
amounting to licence because those actions were equivocal and could in no way indicate that 
the public had no legal right to use the land and did so only by virtue of the council’s 
licence.284  Other members accepted that the Council encouraged the public to use the land 
and that the Council gave implied consent to the recreational use of the land by the public,285 
but nonetheless held that even encouragement or express or implied consent could defeat a 
use ‘as of right’.  Lord Scott concluded:  
“It is clear enough that merely standing by, with knowledge of the use, 
and doing nothing about it, ie toleration or acquiescence, is consistent 
with the use being ‘as of right’…  But I am unable to accept either that 
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an implied permission is necessarily in the same state as mere 
acquiescence or toleration or that an implied permission is necessarily 
inconsistent with the use being as of right.  Indeed, I do not, for the 
reasons I have given, accept that even an express permission is 
necessarily inconsistent with use as of right.”286   
 
Neither encouragement of the public’s activities, nor tolerance, amounts to a licence.  What 
was required by a landowner to defeat a claim to use of land ‘as of right’ for purposes of 
recreation or sedentary leisure was the exercise of the revocable will of the landowner.  Such 
revocable will was to be evidenced by some overt act indicating that the public’s use of the 
land is temporary and not permanent and subject to the will of the landowner.  Overt acts 
can be express acts, as Lord Roger highlighted: “Prudent landowners will often indicate 
expressly, by a notice in appropriate terms or in some other way, when they are licensing or 
permitting the public to use their land during their pleasure only.”287  Or overt acts could be 
implied from the facts in a manner suggested by Lord Walker: “[I]mplied permission could 
defeat a claim to user as of right… provided that the permission is implied by (or inferred 
from) overt conduct of the landowner, such as making a charge for admission, or asserting 
his title by the occasional closure of the land to all-comers. Such actions have an impact on 
members of the public and demonstrate that their access to the land, when they do have 
access, depends on the landowner’s permission.”288  Unless an overt act exists which is 
capable of evidencing the landowner’s belief that he licenses that public’s use of his land for 
recreation during his pleasure only, the public will have claimed a right of recreation by long 
use as of right. 
 
In Oxfordshire County Council v Oxfordshire City Council,289 the House of Lords again considered 
the effect of a registration of land as a village green.  The issue that the House addressed on 
this occasion was whether rights of recreation arising consequent to use of land as of right, 
and the registration of that land as a village green, were substantive rights.  Lord Hoffmann 
highlighted the visceral concerns raised by the competing interests of the Council and the 
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local inhabitants of Oxford: “[T]he interest of the city council in these questions is concrete 
in the most literal sense.  They wish to build houses on the land.  If registration creates no 
rights and the land does not fall within the Victorian statutes, they will be able to do so.  If it 
does create rights or fall within the statutes, they will not be able to use the land in a way 
which wholly excludes the local inhabitants from using it for any sports or pastimes 
whatever.”290   
 
Their Lordships, by majority, held that use of land as of right (such use leading to 
registration of land as a village green pursuant to section 22(1) of the Commons Registration 
Act 1965 (Eng) on the facts) entitled the public to substantive recreative rights of user over 
it.291  Speaking of sections 10 and 22(1) of the Commons Registration Act 1965 (Eng), Lord 
Hoffmann stated:  
“Although the Act provides for the registration of rights of common, it 
makes no provision for the registration of rights of recreation.  One 
cannot tell from the register whether the village green was registered on 
the basis of an annual bonfire, a weekly cricket match or daily football 
and rounders.  So the establishment of an actual right to use a village 
green would require the inhabitants to go behind the registration and 
prove whatever had once satisfied the Commons Commissioner that the 
land should be registered.”   
 
This possible outcome, however, proved to be unacceptable to the House, which held that 
land registered as a town or village green can be used generally for sports and pastimes.  
Lord Hoffmann concluded his analysis of the law by stating:  
“It seems to me that Parliament must have thought that if the land had 
to be kept available for one form of recreation, it would not matter a 
great deal to the owner whether it was used for others as well.  This 
would be in accordance with the common law, under which proof of a 
custom to play one kind of game gave rise to a right to use the land for 
other games: see the Sunningwell case [2000] 1 AC 335, 357.”   
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Referring to common law precedents Lord Hoffmann noted that in Mounsey v Ismay (1863) 1 
H & C 729 (horseracing on arable land on Kingsmoor, outside Carlisle), Virgo v Harford 
(unreported) 11 August 1892 (noted in Hunter, The Preservation of Open Spaces (1896) at pp 
181-182) (football, rounders and cricket on 65 acres of open land on a hill outside Walton-
in-Gordano in Somerset) and Lancashire v Hunt (1894) 10 TLR 310 (cricket and other games 
on 160 acres of Stockbridge Common Down) the courts upheld recreational customs on 
land which bore no resemblance to the village greens. 
 
The effect of their Lordships decisions is that the public may claim actual substantive rights 
of recreation in respect of land which they use uninterrupted for a period of 20 years 
pursuant to registration of that land as a village green.  Whilst the decisions may be limited in 
that they concern the establishment of recreational land under the Commons Registration 
Act 1965 (Eng), the dicta deals extensively with common law precedents and touches on 
common law rules.  Their Lordships judgments reflect a synchronicity between the Roman 
law, Scottish law, the common law, and legislation.  Lord Hoffmann’s dicta, particularly, 
evidences a determination to support and maintain a consistency in the principles underlying 
the method by which public rights of recreation might arise in respect of the use of land. 
 
 
10. Concluding remarks 
 
Publicly exhibited sporting events utilising public beaches, public parks, and public roads, 
such as triathlon events, surfing championships, Ironman sports, and beach volleyball, pose 
a fresh factual scenario for the common law offence of public nuisance.  Triathlon, in 
particular, is a new sport, having been devised some twenty years ago and becoming popular 
only in the past decade.  That public nuisance is extendable to cover such sports is logical.  
Where publicly exhibited sporting events are staged at beaches and parks, parts of the beach 
or park are invariably cordoned off by metal barriers bearing posters of sponsors of the 
sporting event; temporary stands are built for the exclusive use of the management of 
companies sponsoring the sporting event; and television crews often build temporary studios 
on the beach.  Beachgoers, and members of the public using parks where a race is staged are 
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told to move, are told that they cannot use the beach or the park for their own recreation 
and enjoyment, and members of the public walking along a street where a race is staged are 
prohibited from taking their usual route.  In all circumstances there is disregard of the 
public’s rights. 
 
Public rights arise in respect of the use of land consequent to either formal dedication of 
land to the public for public use or implied dedication of land by long uninterrupted use of 
land by the public.  Courts have long recognised a public right to navigation and a public 
right to fishing on the sea and seashore.  Courts in the United States have recognized a 
public right of swimming or bathing on the sea and seashore.  Courts have also now 
recognized a public right to recreation at public places reserved for public use such as 
beaches and parks.  Public rights of recreation will arise in respect of town or village greens 
or commons registered pursuant to statute, or at common law, from long uninterrupted use 
of land as of right. 
 
It is clear from the analysis of the caselaw herein, in concert with the analysis of public 
nuisance precedents in Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis, that the use of the beach, seashore, and 
the surf, at a particular location, and the appropriation of such a location, for the staging of 
public exhibitions of sports, by a private entity for profit or personal interest, is a public 
nuisance.  The same holds for other public places such as parks.  The caselaw holding that 
sporting events may create a public nuisance by obstructing or interfering with the public’s 
right of way on the highway are equally applied in respect of all public land.  In respect of 
beaches, parks, town or village greens, or commons, the public right which a publicly 
exhibited sporting event would obstruct or interfere with is the public right of recreation. 
 
The use of the beaches, the seashore, and the surf by beach and surf sporting events, 
prevents the public from exercising their right of free use along the beach for recreation, 
walking, running, or laying on the beach.  Such sporting events also disallow the public right 
to swim in the sea, surf the waves, fish, and enjoy the water.  A public nuisance is created in 
these circumstances because there is interference with or obstruction to members of the 
public in the exercise of their public right to use of the beach or park for their recreation or 
enjoyment.  There may also be interference with or obstruction to the public in the exercise 
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of the public right to navigation, the public right to fishing, or the public right of passage 
along the foreshore.  There is no question of balancing the public right against the interests 
of the individuals who desire to make use of a public place exclusive of the public for their 
personal profit.  Any hindrance of the public right at a public place may be a public nuisance 
at common law.  This is an important aspect of the law of public nuisance as applied to the 
human activity of sport.  The use of public beaches or parks for recreation is not a privilege 
bestowed by a municipal authority, despite the view of Abbott CJ in Blundell v Catterall that 
use of the foreshore for recreation is merely a privilege tolerated by the Crown and not a 
public right.  Such use is a right and such use can exist even if a municipal authority denies 
the existence of the public right as was held in Gibbs v Village of Grand Bend,292 and North 
Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v Sutherland Shire Council.293   
 
Publicly exhibited sporting events may create public nuisances not only because the athletes 
competing in them appropriate, for their own personal profit, a part of the beach or surf, 
thereby interfering with the public’s right to use of that part of the beach or surf for physical 
exercise of recreation, but also because the sporting events draw crowds to the public place, 
exacerbating the obstruction or interference of public rights.  There are thus two grounds 
upon which a publicly exhibited sporting event staged at a beach may create public 
nuisances: (1) on the ground that the use of the beach, sea or seashore obstructs, 
inconveniences or causes discomfort to the public in the exercise of their public right of 
navigation on the sea and seashore, or their public right of fishing, or their public right to use 
the beach, sea and seashore for recreation; and (2) on the ground that the staging of the 
sports draws together thousands of people to the beach and public roads near the beach, 
thereby obstructing, inconveniencing or causing discomfort to the public in the exercise of 
their public right of way along the highway, and to their public right to free use of the public 
beaches for their recreation.  Spectators often crowd the beach to watch the sports, 
preventing or obstructing or inconveniencing the public right to use of the beach.  The 
public’s right to recreation at these public places, comprising of activities such as sunbathing, 
laying on the beach, walking, jogging, or running on the beach, kite flying, and swimming 
and surfing on the sea and seashore, is either obstructed or interfered with.   
                                                
292 [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
293 [1999] NSWCA 438 (3 December 1999) (Court of Appeal for New South Wales). 
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The fact that there may be a wide expanse of beach and surf for the public to use, or there 
may be other areas in a park or common outside the area or location appropriate for a sports 
competition which the public could access during the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting 
event, is immaterial.  The public right to free use of all the beach, and all the sea and 
seashore, or a park or common, including the place where the public sporting event is taking 
place, is sacrosanct at all times at common law.  This public right is inviolable.  It matters not 
that there may be other beaches nearby to where the obstruction occurs to which the public 
may go.  A public nuisance is nonetheless created.294 
 
What is true for beaches and the foreshore, is also true for other public spaces such as parks, 
town or village greens, or commons, albeit that the public right which is obstructed or 
interfered with would not be a public right of navigation and, rather, a public right of way or 
a public right of recreation.  Only legislative intervention may extinguish the public right 
created by public use.  At beaches and parks, the public right to use of and enjoyment of the 
beach or park is paramount.  Any derogation or diminution of the public right, or any 
discomfort caused to the public in the exercise of their public right by using it in a manner 
inconsistent with its use by the public or by excluding the public from use of it by virtue of a 
commercial purpose, is a public nuisance. 
 
                                                
294 Note Schubert v Lee [1946] HCA 28, (1946) 71 CLR 589 at p 594, where Latham CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ, 
stated: “If a man deposits a load of stones in a highway there is no doubt that he obstructs the highway, even 
though the members of the public are able to walk round the stones and even though it is not proved that any 
member of the public actually endeavoured to use the highway while the stones were there. This is the view of 
the law which was adopted in Haywood v Mumford [1908] HCA 62, (1908) 7 CLR 133.” 
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Chapter 4 
 
Public Rights & Natural Rights in Sport & Recreation 
 
 
1. Natural rights 
 
Natural rights or inalienable rights are rights that are not dependant upon the laws, customs, or 
beliefs of a particular society or polity for their validity.  In contrast, legal rights (sometimes 
also called civil rights or statutory rights) are rights promoted by a particular polity, codified into 
legal statutes by some form of legislature, and as such are interconnected with local laws, 
customs, and beliefs.  Natural rights are universal.  Legal rights are culturally and politically 
relative.  Documents such as the United States Declaration of Independence and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrate the usefulness of recognizing natural 
rights because these documents ground otherwise aesthetic concepts in telluric form.  
Common law judgments may likewise ground these fragile rights. 
 
Physical activity, or physical exercise, the principal component of any sport or recreation, 
may be considered a natural right of man in his private life.  Whilst the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is sadly silent on the importance of sport and 
physical exercise to the human form, the Declaration mentions a right to leisure.295  
Presumably, leisure includes both sedentary and active leisurely pursuits. 
 
Thomas Hobbes describes a natural right, or a jus naturale, as:  
                                                
295 Article 24 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)).  Utilising the word ‘leisure’, Article 24 
may be indicative of a human right to recreation, sport or physical activity. 
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“the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for 
the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and 
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and 
reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”296 
 
Grotius, citing Cicero, writes: 
“Cicero in the third book of his Bounds of Good and Evil, and in other 
parts of his works, proves with great erudition from the writings of the 
Stoics, that there are certain first principles of nature, called by the 
Greeks the first natural impressions, which are succeeded by other 
principles of obligation superior even to the first impressions 
themselves.  He calls the care, which every animal, from the moment of 
its birth, feels for itself and the preservation of its condition, its 
abhorrence of destruction, and of every thing that threatens death, a 
principle of nature.  Hence, he says, it happens, that if left to his own 
choice, every man would prefer a sound and perfect to a mutilated and 
deformed body.  So that preserving ourselves in a natural state, and 
holding to every thing conformable, and averting every thing repugnant 
to nature is the first duty.”297 
 
Montesquieu uses the concepts droit naturel and loi naturel interchangeably,298 and provides a 
more complex view of natural rights than either Hobbes or Cicero.  He writes of four 
principal laws of nature; being peace, nourishment, sexuality, and the desire of living in 
society.299  Of these the first two are pertinent to our analysis here.  Montesquieu formulated 
                                                
296 Leviathan XIV 1; JCA Gaskin (ed) T Hobbes: Leviathan (OUP Oxford 1996) at p 86. 
297 H Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres Bk 1 ch 2 s 1: AC Campbell (tr) H Grotius: The Rights of War and Peace 
(M Walter Dunne London 1901) Bk 1 ch 2 s 1 at p 31.  See also FW Kelsey (tr) H Grotius: De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
Libri Tres (Carnegie Institution of Washington Washington DC 1925) vol 2, Bk 1 ch 2 s 1. 
298 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 26.  In book 26 of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu writes on how the 
laws in general ‘should’ be.  He lists nine ‘sorts’ of law from natural right and divine right down to civil and 
domestic right.  He uses droit naturel and loi naturel interchangeably here, suggesting that the true spirit of the 
laws transcends any Scholastic or esoteric distinction between classical natural right, medieval natural law, and 
modern natural rights: PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at p 79, citing R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu 
(Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 2, Bk 26. 
299 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 2: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 6; JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Montesquieu: The 
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his complex theory of natural rights based on the physio-psychological dispositions or 
conditions of mankind that he considered natural to mankind, rather than stressing natural 
rights to life, liberty, and property, or the pursuit of happiness, as was common in the 
Enlightenment era.300  He thus provides a very modern, somewhat scientific, theory of 
natural rights.  Of humans, Montesquieu says: “Man as a physical being, is like other bodies 
governed by invariable laws…”301  These laws are the laws of nature which,  
“…derive uniquely from the constitution of our being.  To know them 
well, one must consider a man before the establishment of societies.  
The laws he would receive in such a state will be the laws of nature…   
 
A man in the state of nature would have the faculty of knowing rather 
than knowledge.  It is clear that his first ideas would not be speculative 
ones; he would think of the preservation of his being before seeking the 
origin of his being.  Such a man would at first feel only his weakness; his 
timidity would be extreme: and as for evidence, if it is needed on this 
point, savages have been found in forests; everything makes them 
tremble, everything makes them flee…  In this state, each feels himself 
                                                
Spirit of Laws (G Bell and Sons London 1878) at pp 4-5; J Brethe de la Gressaye (ed) Montesquieu: De l’Esprit des 
lois (Société Les Belles Lettres Paris 1950) at pp 22-24; G Truc (ed) Montesquieu: De L’Esprit des Lois (Garnier 
Frères Paris 1949) at pp 7-9.  And see PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of 
Judicial Activism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at pp 20 and 77, citing R Caillois (ed) Pléiade 
edition Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 2, Bk 23 chs 1, 7, 20 and 21; Bk 1 ch 2; Bk 
3 ch 10; and Bk 6 ch 13. 
300 J Brethe de la Gressaye, talking of Book 26 of the Esprit des lois, says: ‘Les exemples choisis par Montesquieu 
révèlent sa conception – un peu étroite – du Droit naturel. Pour lui, les principes de Droit naturel découlent de 
réflexes élémentaires…  Ce qui est Droit nature l’est intinctif, procédant de la biologie humaine ou d’une 
psychologie primitive.’ [The examples chosen by Montesquieu reveal his idea - slightly narrow – of natural 
rights.  For him, the principles of natural rights follow from elementary reflexes… What is a natural right is 
instinctive, proceeding from human biology or a primitive psychology] (MH Waddicor Montesquieu and the 
Philosophy of Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1970) at p 46, citing Brethe de la Gressaye).  Further, 
Montesquieu implies in Book 26 chapter 6 that natural law should not be understood in terms of Christian 
precepts: see TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 
265. 
301 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 1: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 5; JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Montesquieu: The 
Spirit of Laws (G Bell and Sons London 1878) at p 3; J Brethe de la Gressaye (ed) Montesquieu: De l’Esprit des lois 
(Société Les Belles Lettres Paris 1950) at p 22 G Truc (ed) Montesquieu: De L’Esprit des Lois (Garnier Frères Paris 
1949) at p 7. 
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inferior; he scarcely feels himself an equal.  Such men would not seek to 
attack one another, and peace would be the first natural law.”302 
 
Although Montesquieu believes that peace is the first law of nature, based on man’s 
sensitivity of his weakness, “Man would add the feeling of his needs to the feeling of his 
weakness.  Thus another natural law would be the one inspiring him to seek nourishment.”303  
Montesquieu does not define ‘nourishment’, but we might safely conclude that this natural 
law comprises of all activities which aid the preservation of the human form and promote 
man’s life, ability, and strength to function in nature.  Yet Montesquieu goes somewhat 
further in his analysis of natural rights and incorporates genteel humane qualities within the 
concept of natural right.  These humane elements include a respect for one’s own health:  
“…Montesquieu affirms his new conception of natural right, [by] 
tempering the Hobbesian and Lockean emphasis on self-preservation 
and natural liberty.  These [elements of self-preservation and natural 
liberty] are legitimate in themselves, but they should also be means for 
securing ‘natural feelings’ such as ‘respect for a father, tenderness for 
one’s children and women, laws of honour, or the state of one’s health.’  
Such a natural right is neither as base and harsh as that of Hobbes, nor 
as high and rational as that of classical and medieval political philosophy.  
It concerns the propriety of providing for our basic passions and 
interests – neither our lowest nor highest, but rather our humane, 
middling ones – in as mutually beneficial a manner as possible.”304   
 
                                                
302 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 2: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 6.  Note also JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) 
Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws (G Bell and Sons London 1878) at pp 4-5.  See also DW Carrithers ‘Introduction: 
Montesquieu and the Spirit of Modernity’ in DW Carrithers and P Coleman (ed) Montesquieu and the Spirit of 
Modernity (Voltaire Foundation Oxford 2002) at p 26. 
303 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 2: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 6; Another rendering of this passage is phrased: 
“Next to a sense of his weakness man would soon find that of his wants. Hence another law of nature would 
prompt him to seek for nourishment.” (JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws (G Bell 
and Sons London 1878) Bk 1, ch 2 at p 5).  In French thus: “Au sentiment de sa faiblesse, l’homme joindrait le 
sentiment de ses besoins.  Ainsi une autre loi naturelle serait celle qui lui inspirerait de chercher à se nourrir.” 
(G Truc (ed) Montesquieu: De L’Esprit des Lois (Garnier Frères Paris 1949) at p 8). 
304 PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism (University of Chicago 
Press Chicago 2003) at pp 33-34, citing R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade 
edn Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 2, Bk 3 ch 10 at p 260. 
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Our basic need of wellbeing – encompassing peace, nourishment, the preservation of our 
being, and familial feeling – is thus our natural right. 
 
That sport may be a natural right, adopting the definitions of natural right provided by 
Hobbes, Cicero, and Montesquieu, is supported by contemporary scientific and medical 
research.  Sports, comprising of physical activity, are healthful, and physiologically and 
psychologically beneficial for human beings.  There is now abundant scientific evidence to 
support the contention that physiological and psychological advantages are gained by a 
human being who engages in physical activity over and above a fellow human being not 
participating in any sport or recreation.  Two major government sponsored reports in the 
United States (the US Surgeon General’s Report 1996)305 and in Australia (the Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare Report 2000)306 report on the many epidemiological scientific studies that 
have revealed the essential need of man for physical exercise.  “Physical activity reduces the 
risk of premature mortality in general, and of coronary heart disease, hypertension, colon 
cancer, and diabetes mellitus in particular.  Physical activity also improves mental health and 
is important for the health of muscles, bones, and joints.”307  The Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare Report 2000 notes that:  
“There is growing understanding of how physical activity affects 
physiologic function.  The body responds to physical activity in ways 
that have important positive effects on musculoskeletal, cardiovascular, 
respiratory, and endocrine systems.  These changes are consistent with a 
number of health benefits, including a reduced risk of premature 
mortality and reduced risks of coronary heart disease, hypertension, 
colon cancer, and diabetes mellitus.  Regular participation in physical 
activity also appears to reduce depression and anxiety, improve mood, 
and enhance ability to perform daily tasks throughout the life span.”308 
                                                
305 United States Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) Physical Activity and Health: a report 
of the Surgeon General (US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion Atlanta GA 1996) 
<http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/sgr/pdf/sgrfull.pdf> (10 June 2004). 
306 T Armstrong, A Bauman and J Davies Physical Activity Patterns of Australian Adults, Results of the 1999 
National Physical Activity Survey (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Canberra 2000) 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/health/papaa/papaa.pdf> (10 June 2004). 
307 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p 4. 
308 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 5. 
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Participation in physical activity throughout the lifespan can increase, maintain or reduce the 
decline of musculoskeletal health that generally occurs with aging in sedentary people.  And 
participation by older adults can help maintain strength and flexibility, resulting in an ability 
to continue to perform daily activities.309  People who partake of moderate to vigorous levels 
of physical activity and/or have high levels of cardiorespiratory fitness have a lower mortality 
rate than those with a sedentary lifestyle or low cardiorespiratory fitness.   
 
The effects of physical activity on reducing mortality are strong and consistent across all 
studies and populations.310 A study of men between 1958 and 1985 indicated that both 
moderate and intense levels of activity reduced overall risk of death even late in life.  Both 
moderate and vigorous levels of activity were equally protective at age 50 years.  The 
protective effect of high levels of activity lasted only until age 70, but the protective effect 
for moderate activity lasted beyond age 80.311  Moderately intense sports activity can result in 
                                                
309 See Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 8. 
310 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 3, citing SN Blair and others ‘Influences of 
cardiorespiratory fitness and other precursors on cardiovascular disease and all-cause mortality in men and 
women’ (1996) 276(3) The Journal of the American Medical Association at pp 205–210; I Lee and R 
Paffenbarger ‘Physical activity, fitness and longevity’ (1997) 9 Ageing at pp 2–11; PJ Villeneuve and others 
‘Physical activity, physical fitness and risk of dying’ (1998) 9 Epidemiology at pp 626–631; I Lee and R 
Paffenbarger ‘Associations of light, moderate, and vigorous intensity physical activity with longevity’ (2000) 
151(3) American Journal of Epidemiology at pp 293–299.  See also United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (USDHHS) Physical Activity and Health: a report of the Surgeon General (US Department of 
Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease 
Prevention and Health Promotion Atlanta GA 1996) <http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/sgr/pdf/sgrfull.pdf> 
(10 June 2004) at pp 85-86, citing ML Slattery and DR Jacobs Jr ‘Physical fitness and cardiovascular disease 
mortality: the U.S. Railroad Study’ (1988) 127 American Journal of Epidemiology at pp 571–580; ML Slattery 
DR Jocobs Jr and MZ Nichaman ‘Leisure-time physical activity and coronary heart disease death: the U.S. 
Railroad Study’ (1989) 79 Circulation at pp 304–311; L Sandvik and others ‘Physical fitness as a predictor of 
mortality among healthy, middle-aged Norwegian men’ (1993) 328 New England Journal of Medicine at pp 
533–537; AS Leon and J Connett ‘Physical activity and 10.5 year mortality in the Multiple Risk Factor 
Intervention Trial (MRFIT)’ (1991) 20 International Journal of Epidemiology at pp 690–697; J Chang-Claude 
and R Frentzel-Beyme ‘Dietary and lifestyle determinants of mortality among German vegetarians’ (1993) 22 
International Journal of Epidemiology at pp 228–236; GA Kaplan and others ‘Mortality among the elderly in 
the Alameda County Study: behavioral and demographic risk factors’ (1987) 77 American Journal of Public 
Health at pp 307–312; GA Arraiz DT Wigle and Y Mao ‘Risk assessment of physical activity and physical 
fitness in the Canada Health Survey Mortality Follow-up Study’ (1992) 45 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology at 
pp 419–428. 
311 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p 86, citing KD Lindsted S Tonstad and JW Kuzma ‘Self-report 
of physical activity and patterns of mortality in Seventh-day Adventist men’ (1991) 44 Journal of Clinical 
Epidemiology at pp 355–364. 
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a 23 percent lower death rate than those who remained sedentary.312  Seven major cohort 
studies together indicate that low levels of physical activity or cardiorespiratory fitness 
increase risk of cardiovascular disease mortality.313 
 
The strongest evidence of the benefits of physical activity is the reduced risk of mortality and 
morbidity from cardiovascular disease (CVD) in those people who participate in physical 
activity.  Compared with those that are at least moderately physically active, people who are 
sedentary have a one-and-a-half to twofold increase in the risk of a fatal or non-fatal 
cardiovascular event such as coronary heart disease or acute myocardial infarction.  These 
associations are strong and are independent of the definition of physical activity or 
cardiorespiratory fitness used.314  If a natural right is connected with the preservation of the 
physical condition, as both Hobbes and Grotius suggest it is, then there is no clearer 
evidence of a natural right than a right to physical activity or a right to recreation. 
 
Studies have found that even a single episode of physical activity can result in an improved 
blood lipid profile that persists for several days.315  Regular participation in physical activity 
as well as a single exercise session can positively alter cholesterol metabolism.316  An episode 
of physical activity has the immediate and temporary effect of lowering blood pressure 
                                                
312 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (ibid) at p 86, citing Paffenbarger and others ‘The association of changes in 
physical activity level and other lifestyle characteristics with mortality among men’ (1993) 328 New England 
Journal of Medicine at pp 538–545. 
313 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (ibid) at p 87, citing WB Kannel and P Sorlie ‘Some health benefits of 
physical activity: the Framingham study’ (1979) 139 Archives of Internal Medicine at pp 857–861; RS 
Paffenbarger and others ‘A natural history of athleticism and cardiovascular health’ (1984) 252 Journal of the 
American Medical Association at pp 491–495; WB Kannel and others ‘Physical activity and physical demand on 
the job and risk of cardiovascular disease and death: the Framingham study’ (1986) 112 American Heart Journal 
at pp 820–825; KD Lindsted S Tonstad and JW Kuzma ‘Self-report of physical activity and patterns of 
mortality in Seventh-day Adventist men’ (1991) 44 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology at pp 355–364; GA Arraiz 
DT Wigle and Y Mao ‘Risk assessment of physical activity and physical fitness in the Canada Health Survey 
Mortality Follow-up Study’ (1992) 45 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology at pp 419–428; AZ LaCroix and others 
‘Does walking decrease the risk of cardiovascular disease hospitalizations and death in older adults?’ (1996) 44 
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society at pp 113–120. 
314 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 4, citing JA Berlin and GA Colditz ‘The meta-
analysis of physical activity in the prevention of coronary heart disease’ (1990) 132(4) American Journal of 
Epidemiology at pp 612–627; A Bauman and N Owen ‘Physical activity of adult Australians: epidemiological 
evidence and potential strategies for health gain’ (1999) 2(1) Journal of Science, Medicine and Sport at pp 30–
41. 
315 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p 111, citing AD Tsopanakis and others ‘Lipids and lipoprotein 
profiles in a 4-hour endurance test on a recumbent cycloergometer’ (1989) 49 American Journal of Clinical 
Nutrition at pp 980–984; and JL Durstine and WL Haskell ‘Effects of exercise training on plasma lipids and 
lipoproteins’ (1994) 22 Exercise and Sport Sciences Reviews at pp 477–521. 
316 ibid. 
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through dilating the peripheral blood vessels, and exercise training has the ongoing effect of 
lowering blood pressure by attenuating sympathetic nervous system activity.317 
 
Evidence from epidemiologic studies shows that a physically active lifestyle reduces the risk 
of sudden cardiac death.  And a meta-analysis of studies that examined use of physical 
activity for cardiac rehabilitation showed that endurance exercise training reduced the overall 
risk of sudden cardiac death even among persons with advanced coronary atherosclerosis.318 
 
Physical activity has also been shown to have a role to play in the prevention, maintenance, 
and treatment of obesity, although more prolonged activity is required for weight loss.319  
Research shows the benefits of physical activity in the prevention and treatment of type 2 
diabetes.320  The epidemiologic literature strongly supports a protective effect of physical 
activity on the likelihood of developing type 2 diabetes.321 
 
The US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 reports on the relative consistency of findings in 
epidemiologic studies indicating that physical activity is associated with a reduced risk of 
                                                
317 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p 111, citing AS Leon ‘Effects of exercise conditioning on 
physiologic precursors of coronary heart disease’ (1991) 11 Journal of Cardiopulmonary Rehabilitation at pp 
46–57; American College of Sports Medicine ‘Position stand: physical activity, physical fitness, and 
hypertension’ (1993) 25 Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise at pp i–x; and R Fagard and others 
‘Physical exercise in hypertension’ in JH Laragh and BM Brenner (ed) Hypertension: pathophysiology, diagnosis, and 
management (Raven Press New York 1990) vol 2, at pp 1985–1998.  
318 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p112, citing AS Leon and others ‘Leisuretime physical activity 
levels and risk of coronary heart disease and death: the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial’ (1987) 258 
Journal of the American Medical Association at pp 2388–2395; and GT O’Connor and others ‘An overview of 
randomized trials of rehabilitation with exercise after myocardial infarction’ (1989) 80 Circulation at pp 234–
244. 
319 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 5, citing SM Grundy and others ‘Assessment 
of cardiovascular risk by use of multiple-risk-factor assessment equations: a statement for health-care 
professionals from the American Heart Association and the American College of Cardiology’ (1999) 100 
Circulation at pp 1481–1492.  See also US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at pp 133-135. 
320 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 6, citing J Ivy and others ‘Prevention and 
treatment of non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus’ in J Holloszy (ed) Exercise and sport sciences reviews 
(Lippincott Williams and Wilkins Philadelphia 1999) vol 17 at pp 1-36; J Manson and A Spelsberg ‘Primary 
prevention of non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus’ (1994) 10(3) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 
at pp 172–184; FB Hu and others ‘Walking compared with vigorous physical activity and risk of type 2 diabetes 
in women’ (1999) 282(15) The Journal of the American Medical Association at pp 1433–1439.  See also US 
Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at pp 125-129. 
321 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p 128, citing H King and AM Kriska ‘Prevention of type II 
diabetes by physical training: epidemiology considerations and study methods’ (1992) 15 Diabetes Care at pp 
1794–1799; AM Kriska and PH Bennett ‘An epidemiological perspective of the relationship between physical 
activity and NIDDM: from activity assessment to intervention’ (1992) 8 Diabetes/Metabolism Reviews at pp 
355–372; and others. 
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colon cancer.  Eleven studies assessed the association between leisure-time or total physical 
activity and colon cancer risk in 13 different study populations.322  Numerous studies show 
the protective effect of physical activity on risk of colon cancer, and on the prevention of 
precancerous polyps in the large bowel.  Studies of physical activity report a reduction in the 
risk of breast cancer among physically active women.323 
 
Physical activity also has great influence on and benefits for mental health.  The US Surgeon 
General’s Report 1996 also highlights that epidemiologic research among men and women 
suggests that physical activity may be associated with reduced symptoms of depression, 
clinical depression, symptoms of anxiety, and improvements in positive affect and general 
well-being.  In general, persons who are inactive are twice as likely to have symptoms of 
depression than are more active persons.324  Studies consistently show that participation in 
physical activity reduces symptoms of stress, anxiety and depression.325  In one study in 1999, 
the conclusions demonstrated that exercise aided the depressed both on short-term and 
long-term scales.  The experiment was such that 111 healthy adults, none suffering from 
clinical depression, were randomly assigned to two groups. One group was to use bicycle 
ergometers twenty-four minutes a session, four times a week for twelve weeks. The other 
group was to do the same exercise but forty-eight minutes a session, four times a week for 
twelve weeks. And to make the experiment complete, there was a group assigned to a 
“waiting list” to serve as the experiment’s control. By the end of the twelve weeks, the 
                                                
322 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at pp 112-124; and at Table 4-5, pp 114-115. 
323 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 7, citing G Colditz and others ‘Physical 
activity and reduced risk of colon cancer: implications for prevention’ (1997) 8 Cancer Causes and Control at 
pp 649–667; A Neugut and others ‘Leisure and occupational physical activity and risk of colorectal 
adenomatous polyps’ (1996) 68 International Journal of Cancer at pp 744–748; M Slattery and others ‘Energy 
balance and colon cancer—beyond physical activity’ (1997) 57 Cancer Research at pp 75–80; MD Gammon 
EM John and JA Britton ‘Recreational and occupational physical activities and risk of breast cancer’ (1998) 
90(2) Journal of the National Cancer Institute at pp 100–117; P Latikka and others ‘Relationship between the 
risk of breast cancer and physical activity’ (1998) 26(3) Sports Medicine at pp 133–143; and J Verloop and 
others ‘Physical activity and breast cancer risk in women aged 20–54 years’ (2000) 92(2) Journal of the National 
Cancer Institute at pp 128–135. 
324 US Surgeon General’s Report 1996 (n 305) at p 136, citing CE Ross and D Hayes ‘Exercise and psychologic 
well-being in the community’ (1988) 127 American Journal of Epidemiology at pp 762–771; T Stephens 
‘Physical activity and mental health in the United States and Canada: evidence from four population surveys’ 
(1988) 17 Preventive Medicine at pp 35–47; and T Stephens and CL Craig The well-being of Canadians: highlights of 
the 1988 Campbell’s Survey (Canadian Fitness and Lifestyle Research Institute Ottawa 1990); amongst others. 
325 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare Report 2000 (n 306) at p 9, citing D Glenister ‘Exercise and mental 
health: a review’ (1996) 116(1) Journal of the Royal Society of Health at pp 7–13; and P Hassmén and others 
‘Physical exercise and psychological well-being: a population study in Finland’ (2000) 30 Preventive Medicine at 
pp 17–25; amongst others. 
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authors were able to conclude that not only had physiological benefits occurred, such as a 
stronger heart, but also psychological improvements were made, specifically with 
depression.326 
 
The epidemiological research thus demonstrates the essentialness of physical activity for the 
human form.  Physical activity, the chief component of recreation, assists in the preservation 
of life and of the human condition, enhancing feelings of wellbeing.  Physical activity may be 
a natural right since, by engaging in physical activity, we seek to maximize our wellbeing and 
preserve our (human) nature. 
 
 
2. The interplay between public rights and natural rights 
 
In developing his theory of law, Montesquieu showed concern for the extent to which man’s 
life is determined by the condition and behaviour of his body.   The passions, the spirit, the 
character, imagination, taste, sensibility, sadness and happiness, all are said to be determined 
by the state of the body.327  And so too, laws.  Montesquieu saw the passions, spirit, and 
sensibilities of man in his natural condition as an intrinsic aspect of natural justice.  Natural 
justice is recognizable in man’s sociability, his kindness, his gratitude, and in feelings of 
equitability.328  Montesquieu wrote of man as a physical being alike that of other animals on 
Earth; possessing of natural laws because he is united by feeling and the ability to attract 
pleasure to preserve their being.329 
 
Man in his prepolitical natural existence functions intuitively, in accord with “relations of 
fairness prior to the positive law that establishes them.”330   Yet man’s nature, his quest for 
wellbeing, also propels him toward civil society.  It is through a conjunction of separate wills 
                                                
326 TM DiLorenzo and others ‘Long-term effects of aerobic exercise on psychological outcomes’ (1999) 28(1) 
Prev Med at pp 75-85. 
327 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 14 chs 2, 3, 4.  See TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 165. 
328 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 1: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 4. 
329 ibid. 
330 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 1: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 4. 
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that society is formed;331 the desire to secure wellbeing in more palpable and enduring form 
being the context of that will.  “[C]ivil society is man’s way of attempting to go beyond the 
bare self-preservation, the constant insecurity, of the natural state.  Through civil society 
man tries to gain a secure self-preservation, a lasting peace and a protection for material goods 
that will insure lasting satisfaction of the body’s needs.”332 
 
Law and government become of critical importance to man when he forms society with his 
fellow men because on forming in society man is immediately susceptible to conflict with his 
fellow man, each individual seeking advantage and profit to himself in conflict with his 
fellow citizens.333  The need and use of law is to manage this conflict.  Law, for Montesquieu, 
is not the will of a sovereign power, but rather a much more complex concept.  Laws arise 
consequent to the relations of citizens upon forming in society.  Legislative action alone did 
not define law in Montesquieu’s view: “Montesquieu spoke of law as a relation precisely 
because, unlike Hobbes and Pufendorf, he did not regard it as the command of a superior or 
the will of the sovereign.”334  Laws are relations in themselves; they are a connection between 
the citizens, a connection between the citizen and his government, a connection between the 
citizen in society and his natural state prior to society, a connection between man and his 
sentiments, a connection between man and his manners, morals and mores.   
 
Montesquieu sees positive law as a complex structure which respects the underlying order of 
nature, other positive laws, the nature of government, the nature of man, natural rights, 
man’s passions and inclinations, his commerce, customs and manners: Book 1, chapter 3.335  
Laws “have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and 
to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they 
                                                
331 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 3: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 8. 
332 TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 34. 
333 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 3: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at pp 7-8; and Bk 19 ch 27; J Brethe de la Gressaye 
(ed) Montesquieu: De l’Esprit des lois (Société Les Belles Lettres Paris 1950) at pp 25-26; G Truc Montesquieu: De 
L’Esprit des Lois (Garnier Frères Paris 1949) vol 1, at pp 9-11.  See also TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of 
Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at pp 32-33 citing R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de 
Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1, at p 236. 
334 JN Shklar Montesquieu (Oxford University Press Oxford 1987) at p 71. 
335 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 3: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at pp 7-8. 
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ought to be considered.”336  In book 26 of The Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu lists nine 
“sorts” of law, from natural right and divine right down to civil and domestic right, and 
shows how laws should relate to the entire “order of things upon which they are to interact.”   
 
Montesquieu also sees a dualism in the natural human condition – man both as a ‘physical 
being’ and as ‘intelligent being’ (Book 1, chapter 1) – which dualism contributes to, subsists 
in conjunction with, and is enhanced by, society.  This dualism also instinctively prompts the 
promulgation of law that reflects the laws of nature back to man.  As a physical being, man is 
like other bodies – wholly lawful (that is, of his nature and in a state of nature possessing 
natural rights).  As intelligent being, however, man is free to violate his natural laws 
interminably.  Montesquieu sees ‘intelligent beings’ as sabotaging the law of nature: 
“…[T]hough the intelligent world also has laws that are invariable by their nature, unlike the 
physical world, it does not follow its laws consistently.  The reason for this is that particular 
intelligent beings are limited by their nature and are consequently subject to error; 
furthermore, it is in their nature to act by themselves.  Therefore, they do not consistently 
follow their primitive laws or even follow the laws they give themselves.”337  The primary 
purpose of positive law in society, therefore, is to ground and enforce between the citizens 
those essential laws of nature; being peace, nourishment and sociability, particularly:  
“Man, as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws like other 
bodies.  As an intelligent being, he constantly… changes those [laws] he 
himself establishes; he must guide himself, and yet he is a limited being; 
he is subject to ignorance and error, as are all finite intelligences…  As a 
feeling creature, he falls subject to a thousand passions… Such a being 
could at any moment forget himself; philosophers have reminded him of 
himself by the laws of morality.  Made for living in society, he could 
                                                
336 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 3: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at pp 7-8; and Bk 19, ch 27; J Brethe de la Gressaye 
(ed) Montesquieu: De l’Esprit des lois (Société Les Belles Lettres Paris 1950) at pp 25-26; G Truc Montesquieu: De 
L’Esprit des Lois (Garnier Frères Paris 1949) vol 1, at pp 9-11. 
337 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 1: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 4. 
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forget his fellows; legislators have returned him to his duties by political 
and civil laws.”338 
 
The law of nature is subsumed within positive law.  Positive law should thus be a practical 
expression of the natural law.  The egotistic ‘intelligent’ being, who conflicts with his fellow 
egotistic ‘intelligent’ humans in society, is commanded to remember his natural tranquillity 
and natural sociability.  The general purpose of the civil law is to enforce the natural law of 
sociability.339  “This complex view of human nature informs [Montesquieu’s] conceptions of 
politics and judging, since our natural passions or sentiments, which orient us toward 
peaceful, tranquil sociability, define us more fundamentally than our reason or any higher 
ambitions.  We are neither as naturally sociable nor as naturally selfish as either Aristotle or 
Hobbes would have it, nor are we as radically historical or malleable as Rousseau later 
suggests.  The genius of a moderate politics – of the spirit of laws properly conceived – is to 
grasp our nature in all its complexity and constitute laws and institutions that will preserve all 
its dimensions.”340  
 
Law becomes the essential safeguard of the natural rights of man not through an overt 
process involving the declaration of those rights in a constitution or by juridical 
pronouncement, but, rather, by virtue of its natural connection with natural justice in 
prepolitical nature.  Natural rights are absorbed by positive law.  Relations of fairness exist 
prior to the positive law that establishes them.  Absolutes, traceable to nature, provided the 
foundation for Montesquieu’s definition of justice.  Take the concept of nature away from 
Montesquieu and his thoughts would no longer be intelligible.  He teaches that the 
promulgation of law requires the legislator to “follow the ‘natural genius’, the passions and 
inclinations, of a people.”341  In all times and places human law must obey natural law or 
                                                
338 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 1: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 5. 
339 MH Waddicor Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1970) at p 43, citing 
Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 1: ‘Fait pour vivre dans la société, [l’homme] y pouvait oublier les autres; 
les législateurs l’ont rendu à ses devoirs par les lois politiques et civiles.’ [Made for living in society, he could 
forget his fellows; legislators have returned him to his duties by political and civil laws.] (R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres 
completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1, at p 236). 
340 PO Carrese The cloaking of power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the rise of judicial activism (University of Chicago 
Press Chicago 2003) at p 20. 
341 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 19 chs 16-26.  See TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 197. 
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contradict and eventually destroy itself.342  Positive law thus has no end other than to provide 
structure to the laws of nature.  The only way to prevent the state of conflict that 
accompanies the establishment of societies is to institute positive laws in conformity with 
natural rights. Montesquieu noted that:  
“L’autorité des princes et magistrates n’est pas seulement fondée sur le 
droit civil, elle l’est encore sur le droit naturel: car, comme l’anarchie est 
contraire au droit naturel, le genre humain ne pouvant subsister par elle, 
il faut bien que l’autorité des magistrates, qui est opposée á l’anarchie, y 
soit conforme.” [The authority of princes and magistrates is not only 
founded on the civil law, it is it also founded on natural rights: because, 
as anarchy is contrary to natural rights, mankind not being able to 
survive from it, it is necessary that the authority of magistrates, which is 
opposite to anarchy, is in keeping with natural rights].”343 
 
Whereas Montesquieu viewed law, properly conceived, as instinctively encompassing natural 
rights, Blackstone viewed natural rights as valid even in the face of positive law: “Those 
rights then which God and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, 
such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in 
every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength when declared by 
the municipal laws to be inviolable.  On the contrary, no human legislature has power to 
abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a 
forfeiture.”344  For both Montesquieu and Blackstone, the idea that a norm which does not 
conform to the natural law cannot be legally valid is the definitive concept of their 
naturalism.   
 
If we accept that the right of man to preserve his human form is a natural right, as 
Montesquieu, Hobbes and Cicero encourage us to so do, then this understanding can guide 
us in developing and applying substantive legal rights.  A public right to recreation at public 
                                                
342 TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 263. 
343 Pensée 883 recorded in MH Waddicor Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff The 
Hague 1970) at pp 39-40, citing R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn 
Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1, at p 1441.  The Pensée are personal reflections of Montesquieu included in the 
complete works editions of his writings and jurisprudence. 
344 Sir W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press Oxford 1765-1769) vol i, s 2, at p 54. 
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places such as beaches, parks, commons, and even on the public highway itself (provided 
that such recreation comprises of physical activity consistent with the purposes of the 
highway and not obstructive of those purposes) finds endorsement from natural law.  Public 
rights, as established and protected through public nuisance suits at common law, obtain 
validity not only by virtue of their being recorded in law reports but by virtue of their 
conformity to natural rights.  Man’s natural rights are those that support his essential nature, 
his physicality, his sentiments, and his sociability.  Failure on the part of either the Executive 
or the Judiciary to confirm the validity of man’s natural rights in the context of a conflict 
between citizens, or between the citizen and the state, is, following Montesquieu’s teachings, 
a sabotage of society and a sabotage of the nature and purpose of man.  A public right to 
recreation, confirmed by the Judiciary, and finding validity in conformity with a natural right 
to self-preservation, can come into direct conflict with the commercial motivations of a 
sports association conducting a publicly exhibited sporting event at a public place.  The 
lawfulness of a publicly exhibited sporting event rests entirely on due consideration being 
given to public rights at public places.  Given the need of man for physical activity and 
recreation, in order that he might better preserve his physiological and psychological health, 
the law properly encourages public rights through public nuisance litigation.  The law reflects 
the scientific knowledge we now possess on the benefits of physical activity.  Public rights at 
public places, recognised as positive law by courts, solidify the aesthetic natural rights of 
physical activity and recreation. 
 
The conflict that arises between the citizen engaged in recreation and the citizen wanting to 
pursue a commercial activity of a publicly exhibited sporting event at a public place describes 
the relations between these two entities.  The law, which would resolve this conflict, also 
describes the relations between these two entities.  The law will decide between public rights 
on the one hand, and commercial liberty on the other.  What is the law which we ought to 
apply to resolve this conflict?  If we follow Montesquieu’s teachings, the correct answer lies 
in the legal result that most closely endorses the laws of nature.  Man’s natural right to 
preserve his being coupled with his natural right to sociability suggest that the correct legal 
answer is the one which validates his substantive public rights at common law in preference 
to any commercial liberty which would diminish those public rights. 
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From early in the development of the common law it was reasoned that games and sports 
were not malum in se but rather malum prohibita.345  What this means is that sports are lawful 
unless and until they impinge upon proscriptions at common law or under legislation.346  The 
individual liberty to engage in physical activity is thus universal and natural until there is 
conflict between fellow citizens.  A conflict between citizens can arise when one citizen 
endeavours to obtain advantage and profit to himself by promoting or participating in a 
commercialized sporting endeavour to the detriment of another citizen who is peaceably 
exercising a natural right to recreation.  The corollary of the notion that sport is a natural 
right of human beings, which liberty is enforceable as a public right, and which is susceptible 
to impingement by commercial interests, is that public exhibitions of sporting events, played 
in such fashion as to create or threaten a public nuisance by impinging on the public’s 
natural and public rights, is a special category of human activity that depends for legitimacy on 
sanction from Parliament in order to forestall interdiction at common law.  Publicly 
exhibited sporting events, staged for pecuniary purposes, are not supported by natural law 
because they are a commercial construct arising consequent to the formation of society 
whereby individuals seek advantage and profit in conflict with their fellow citizens.  Such 
events are not natural in the manner of being essential to the conservation of the human 
condition. 
 
                                                
345 Bell v The Bishop of Norwich (1566) 3 Dyer 254b. 
346 See Bell v The Bishop of Norwich (1566) 3 Dyer 254b; Case of Monopolies (1602) 11 Co Rep 84b; Sherbon v Colebach 
(1690) 2 Vent 175 (CB); Goodburn v Marley (1742) 2 Str 1159 (BR); Holmes v Bagge and Fletcher (1853) 1 El & Bl 
782; R v Young (1866) 10 Cox CC 371; Swigart v People of the State of Illinois 50 Ill App 181 (1892), 154 Ill 284, 40 
NE 432 (1895); Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No. 1) [1976] VR 331; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] 
2 All ER 1057 (Court of Appeal); R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (House of Lords).  And see also Hawk P C, Bk 1 
ch 75 s 6: W Hawkins Pleas of the Crown (Professional Books London 1973); and Lambard Eirenarcha (1581): PR 
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Part 2 The Nature of Public Nuisance
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Chapter 5 
 
The inherent features of the common law offence of public nuisance 
 
 
1. The distinction between the common law crime of public nuisance, the tort 
of public nuisance, and private nuisance 
 
On public nuisance, Lord Justice Denning, as he then was, commented, “The term ‘public 
nuisance’ covers a multitude of sins, great and small.”347  A public nuisance is a common law 
offence for which the Crown can institute criminal proceedings by way of prosecution or 
civil proceedings by way of relator action or ex officio suit to obtain an injunction to abate the 
public nuisance.  A public nuisance may also incur tortious liability for which a plaintiff may 
obtain damages at common law, but only if such public nuisance causes special and peculiar 
damage.  It is not correct to state, as some writers do,348 that public nuisance is a tort, per 
se.349  “A public nuisance falls within the law of torts only in so far as it may in the particular 
case constitute some form of tort also.  Thus the obstruction of a highway is a public 
nuisance; but if it causes any special and peculiar damage to an individual, it is also a tort 
actionable at his suit.”350  Whilst the nuisance the cause of such a private suit remains a 
crime, a remedy is available to an individual person, where a plaintiff can prove a further 
aspect to the particular circumstances of the case, namely special and peculiar damage to 
himself.  It is only in this special circumstance where an individual person might have 
                                                
347 Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182 at p 196 (Denning LJ) 
348 See eg the commentary of Bronitt and McSherry in S Bronitt & B McSherry Principles of Criminal Law (LBC 
Information Services Sydney 2001) at p 782. 
349 See RVF Heuston & RA Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 
1992) at pp 58-59. Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts specifically notes at p 58 that: “A public or common 
nuisance is a criminal offence.” 
350 ibid at p 59, emphasis added. 
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sufficient standing to institute a civil suit for damages.  In all cases of the common law crime 
of public nuisance only the Executive has standing.  In this light it is more accurate to 
describe public nuisance as a crime only.  An appropriate phrase for the tortious action in 
public nuisance is the more elongated phrase public nuisance causing special and peculiar damage to 
an individual.  Whilst there is a distinction between the common law criminal offence and the 
tortious proceeding for public nuisances, this thesis assesses the case law from both spheres, 
where there have been prosecutions for committing a public nuisance (R v Shorrock [1993] 3 
WLR 698 (Court of Appeal); R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, 
[2005] 3 WLR 982); where there have been civil proceedings by the Crown to seek to obtain 
an abatement of a common law public nuisance (Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 
71 JP 478; Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 
192 (2003)); where there have been relator actions by members of the public acting together 
to enforce their rights (Attorney-General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346); 
and where there have been tortious suits seeking damages for, or an injunction against, a 
nuisance (Matheson v Northcote College Board of Governors [1975] 2 NZLR 106). 
 
A public nuisance is different from a private nuisance in that it is a nuisance which affects 
the people generally, as opposed to one person.  A private nuisance is a matter of private law 
for private redress between private persons.  A public nuisance is a matter of public law for 
redress at the suit of the Crown, on behalf of the people, to cease or prevent individuals 
engaging in conduct that is odious or disturbing to the people generally.  In Russell on Crime 
the delimitation between public and private nuisance is worded thus:   
“Nuisance (nocumentum), or annoyance, means anything which works 
hurt, inconvenience or damage.  Nuisances are of two kinds: public or 
common nuisance, which materially affects the public, and is a 
substantial annoyance to all the King’s subjects; and private nuisance, 
which may be defined as anything which causes material discomfort and 
annoyance, for the ordinary purposes of life, to a man’s house or his 
property.  Public or common nuisances, as they affect the whole 
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community in general, and not merely an individual, form the subject of 
public remedies and do not give a cause for private suit…”351   
 
In Brodie v Singleton Shire Council, a case on tort law, Justice Hayne in the High Court of 
Australia explained that: “Despite the radical difference between criminal proceedings to 
punish an act or omission which was a matter of public concern, and civil proceedings to 
recover damages for private loss, the language of nuisance was used in both contexts.  It is, 
nevertheless, important to recall that the crime of common or public nuisance and the tort 
of nuisance were and are distinct.  There can be no automatic transposition of the learning in 
one area to the other…”352  In the course of his judgement in Copart Industries Inc v 
Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc, 353 in the Court of Appeals of New York, Justice 
Cooke, speaking for the court, sought to define the parameters of nuisance and to 
distinguish public nuisance from private nuisance.  Quoting Prosser on Torts, His Honour 
commenced his judgement with the words: “‘There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle 
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance’.  It has meant all things to all 
men’ (Prosser, Torts [4th ed], p. 571).  From a point someplace within this oft-noted thicket 
envisioned by Professor Prosser, this appeal emerges.”354  His Honour continued, at page 
567:  
“Much of the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the use of the term 
nuisance, which in itself means no more than harm, injury, 
inconvenience, or annoyance (see Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, p. 571; American Heritage Dictionary, p. 900), arises from a series 
of historical accidents covering the invasion of different kinds of 
                                                
351 JW Cecil Turner (ed) Russell on Crimes (10th edn Stevens & Sons London 1950) vol I, at p 1669. 
352 [2001] HCA 29 at para [257].  Justice Hayne does not provide us with his definition of public nuisance in his 
judgment, unfortunately, other than to state that: “…by the late nineteenth century it was accepted that, 
because it was a common or public nuisance unreasonably to obstruct or hinder free passage along the 
highway, a private individual has a right of action in respect if that nuisance upon proof of particular damage 
beyond the general inconvenience and injury suffered by the public.” [at para 259]. 
353 41 NY 2d 564, at p 568, 394 NYS 2d 169, 362 NE 2d 968 (1977).  In this case, the plaintiff operated a new 
car preparation business next to defendant’s plant.  The plaintiff claimed that it was forced to close its business 
because the emissions from defendant’s plant damaged the exteriors of the cars the plaintiff had on its 
property.  The plaintiff sought damages for loss of investment and loss of profit under three causes of action 
alleging nuisance, wrongful and unlawful trespass, and violations of air pollution laws.  Judgment was entered in 
favour of defendant.  An intermediate appellate court affirmed.  The court of appeals affirmed the lower 
courts’ decisions because the jury had been properly instructed that plaintiff was required to prove that 
defendant’s actions were either intentional or negligent in order to recover on a claim for nuisance. 
354 ibid at p 565. 
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interests and referring to various kinds of conduct on the part of 
defendants (Prosser, Torts [4th ed], pp. 571-572).  The word surfaced as 
early as the twelfth century in the assize of nuisance, which provided 
redress where the injury was not a disseisin but rather an indirect damage 
to the land or an interference with its use and enjoyment.  Three 
centuries later the remedy was replaced by the common-law action on 
the case for nuisance, invoked only for damages upon the invasion of 
interests in the use and enjoyment of land, as well as of easements and 
profits.  If abatement by judicial process was desired, resort to equity was 
required.  Along with the civil remedy protecting rights in land, there 
developed a separate principle that an infringement of the right of the 
crown, or of the general public, was a crime and, in time, this class of 
offence was so enlarged as to include any ‘act not warranted by law, or 
omission to discharge a legal duty, which inconveniences the public in 
the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects’ (Stephen, 
General View of Criminal Law of England [1890], p. 105)… 
 
As observed by Professor Prosser, public and private nuisances ‘have 
almost nothing in common, except that each causes inconvenience to 
someone, and it would have been fortunate if they had been called from 
the beginning by different names’ (Prosser, Torts [4th ed], p 573).” 
 
Early in common law history, Bracton describes a public nuisance as, “nocumentum iniuriosum 
propter communem et publicam utilitatem”; a legal nuisance by reason of the common and public 
welfare.  According to Bracton, public nuisances can be removed for the benefit of the 
general public albeit no adjoining occupier is personally adversely affected.355  In Hawkins it 
is written that: “a Common Nusance may be defined to be an Offence against the Publick, 
either by doing a Thing which tends to the Annoyance of all the King’s Subjects, or by 
                                                
355 Bracton: De Legibus et Consuetudenibus Angliae f 232b: SE Thorne (tr) and GE Woodbine (ed) The Laws and 
customs of England vols 3 and 4 (Belknap Press Cambridge 1977) vol 3, at p 90.  See JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – 
A Critical Examination’ (1989) CLJ 55 at p 58. 
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neglecting to do a Thing which the common Good requires.”356  Hawkins also lays it down 
that acting against the Crown’s interests may be a public nuisance: “Also it is said, That the 
Law hath so tender a Regard for the Interests of the King and of Religion, That an 
Indictment for doing a Thing which plainly appears immediately to tend to the Prejudice of 
either of them, is good, though it do not expressly complain of it as a common 
Grievance.”357  Every public nuisance is a malum in se.358 
 
Hawkins was cited in the leading United Kingdom case on public nuisance: R v Rimmington, R 
v Goldstein.359  Lord Bingham of Cornhill, giving the principal judgment of the United 
Kingdom House of Lords, noted the following distinguishing features of the tort and crime 
of public nuisance: 
“By the 15th century an action on the case for private nuisance was 
recognized. Thus the action for private nuisance was developed to 
protect the right of an occupier of land to enjoy it without substantial 
and unreasonable interference.  This has remained the cardinal feature of 
the tort, as recently affirmed by the House in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd 
[1977] AC 655.  The interference complained of may take any one of 
many different forms.  What gives the tort its unifying feature (see 
Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed, (1998), p 457) is the general type of 
harm caused, interference with the beneficial occupation and enjoyment 
of land, not the particular conduct causing it. 
 
                                                
356 1 Hawk PC ch 75, s 1: W Hawkins Pleas of the Crown (Professional Books London 1973).  A ‘common 
nuisance’ is interchangeable with ‘public nuisance’; case law and commentary on the common law use the 
words common and public interchangeably when describing a public nuisance.  The term ‘common nuisance’ 
has given way to the term ‘public nuisance’ owing to the etymological fact that the word common has changed 
in meaning to connote ‘ordinary’ rather than ‘of the community’.  See further the discussion in JR Spencer 
‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) CLJ 55 at p 58 fn 10.  Spencer criticises Hawkins’ 
description thus: “This definition is so wide that it can scarcely be called a definition at all, and it is amazing 
that anyone should assume that Hawkins was describing a single offence, rather than making a residual category 
of offences which did not fit anywhere else in his scheme…Nevertheless, Hawkins’ words have been so 
interpreted, and his ‘definition’ is the basis of the definition for a single offence of public nuisance which 
appears in almost every book on tort or criminal law today.”: (1989) CLJ 55 at p 66. 
357 1 Hawk PC ch 75, s 4. 
358 1 Hawk PC ch 75, s 8. 
359 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [8], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982. 
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It became clear over time that there were some acts and omissions which 
were socially objectionable but could not found an action in private 
nuisance because the injury was suffered by the local community as a 
whole rather than by individual victims and because members of the 
public suffered injury to their rights as such rather than as private 
owners or occupiers of land.  Interference with the use of a public 
highway or a public navigable river provides the best and most typical 
example.  Conduct of this kind came to be treated as criminal and 
punishable as such.  In an unpoliced and unregulated society, in which 
local government was  rudimentary or non-existent, common nuisance, 
as the offence was known, came to be (in the words of J R Spencer, 
‘Public Nuisance - A Critical Examination’ [1989] CLJ 55, 59) ‘a rag-bag 
of odds and ends which we should nowadays call “public welfare 
offences”.’  But central to the content of the crime was the suffering of 
common injury by members of the public by interference with rights 
enjoyed by them as such.”360 
 
Blackstone was also cited with approval by the House of Lords in Rimmington; the House 
noting that: “In his Commentaries on the Laws of England (Book III, 1768, Chapter 13, p 216) 
Blackstone distinguished between public or common nuisances, ‘which affect the public, and 
are an annoyance to all the king’s subjects’ and private nuisances, which he defined as ‘any 
thing done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another’. 
In Book IV (1769, Chapter 13, p 167) he explained further: 
  ‘... common nuisances are such inconvenient or troublesome offences, as 
  annoy the whole community in general, and not merely some particular 
  person; and therefore are indictable only, and not actionable; as it would 
  be unreasonable to multiply suits, by giving every man a separate right of 
  action, for what damnifies him in common only with the rest of his  
  fellow subjects.’” 
 
                                                
360 [2005] UKHL 63 at paras [5]-[6], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
 127 
The key determinant factor then, between the common law offence of public nuisance and 
the torts of private nuisance and public nuisance causing special and peculiar damage to an 
individual, is the requirement of common injury in the former cause.361 
 
 
2. The definition of public nuisance 
 
“Common law has long recognised the crime of causing a public nuisance.”362  Public 
nuisance is a broad offence which criminalizes conduct that poses danger to the community 
at large.  The judicially accepted definition is that provided in Archbold.363  The current 
definition of the offence in Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice reads:  
“Public nuisance is an offence at common law. A person is guilty of a 
public nuisance (also known as a common nuisance), who (a) does an act 
not warranted by law, or (b) omits to discharge a legal duty, if the effect 
of the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, morals, or 
comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or 
enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects…”364 
 
The Archbold definition is taken from Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law which defined the 
offence in the following terms: 
“A common nuisance is an act not warranted by law or an omission to 
discharge a legal duty, which act or omission obstructs or causes 
inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common 
to all His Majesty’s subjects.”365 
 
                                                
361 ibid at para [12]. 
362 R v Goldstein, R v R [2003] EWCA Crim 3450 at para [3], [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 2880 (Latham LJ). 
363 Applied in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [36], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 
(House of Lords); R v Goldstein, R v R [2003] EWCA Crim 3450 at para [3], [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 2880 
(Court of Appeal); R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698 (Court of Appeal).  In R v Goldstein, R v R, 
Lord Justice Latham used the express words that the Archbold definition was the accepted definition: ibid. 
364 JF Archbold Archbold’s Criminal Pleading and Practice (44th edn Sweet and Maxwell London 1992) vol 2, p 3374, 
paras [31]-[40]; (Sweet & Maxwell London 2003) at p 2550, paras [31]-[40]. 
365 (8th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1947) at p 184; (9th edn Sweet & Maxwell 1950) at p 179. 
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This latter definition is the one adopted in Smith and Hogan Criminal Law. 366  And Stephen’s 
definition was relied upon by the Court of Appeal for England and Wales in Attorney General 
v PYA Quarries Ltd,367 which was a relator action for an injunction to restrain a public 
nuisance caused by dust and vibration in a quarry.  In Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd, 
Lord Justice Romer noted that a public nuisance is one which materially affects the 
reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of the public.  “It is not necessary to 
prove that every member of the class has been injuriously affected;…” he states, “it is 
sufficient to show that a representative cross-section of the class has been so affected for an 
injunction to issue.”368 
 
The United Kingdom House of Lords has recently approved of the definition in Stephen and 
Archbold in their decision in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein,369 with two significant qualifications.  
The appeals in Rimmington raised important and difficult questions concerning the definition 
and ingredients, today, of the common law crime of causing a public nuisance.  The 
appellants contended that, as applied in their cases, the offence is too imprecisely defined, 
and the courts’ interpretation of it too uncertain and unpredictable, to satisfy the 
requirements either of the common law or of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.370  The appeals were against convictions for public nuisance offences; in the case of 
Rimmington, for mailing obscene letters and packages to hundreds of people;371 and in the 
                                                
366 Sir John Smith (ed) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (10th edn Butterworths London 2002) at p 772; (8th edn 
Butterworths London 1996) at p 772. 
367 [1957] 2 QB 169 at p 181, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 899. 
368 [1957] 2 QB 169 at p 184.  Lord Justice Romer’s observations were applied in Victoria v Second Comet Pty Ltd 
(Supreme Court of Victoria, 21 December 1994) BC9405877 at [24].   See also Wallace v Powell [2000] NSWSC 
406, where Chief Justice Hodgson utilised the following definition of public nuisance, without citing authority, 
“A public nuisance is an act or omission which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of 
the life of a class of the public.” 
369 [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982. 
370 ibid at para [1]. 
371 Mr Rimmington sent 538 packages to the identified recipients, some of them prominent public figures. The 
communications were strongly racist in content, crude, coarse, insulting and in some instances threatening and 
arguably obscene. When arrested in June 2001 Mr Rimmington suggested that his campaign had been 
prompted by a racially-motivated assault upon him by a black male in 1992: he had decided to retaliate by 
causing ‘them’ mental anguish. The indictment preferred against him was challenged at the Central Criminal 
Court before Leveson J, who held a preparatory hearing under section 29 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 to resolve the issues of law raised by the defence.  He ruled that the indictment charged 
Mr Rimmington with an offence known to the law and that the prosecution was not an abuse of process 
because brought inconsistently with articles 7, 8 or 10 of the European Convention.  Mr Rimmington’s appeal 
to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) against that decision was heard by Latham LJ, Moses J and Sir 
Edwin Jowitt with that of Mr Goldstein, and was dismissed: [2003] EWCA Crim 3450, [2004] 1 WLR 2878.  
Lord Bingham of Cornhill sets out the facts of the cases on appeal at, ibid, paras [2]-[4] of the record. 
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case of Goldstein, for sending a letter containing salt which spilt in the postal service sorting 
office resulting in the evacuation of 110 postal employees owing to a fear that the substance 
spilt was the deadly anthrax chemical.372  Both convictions were quashed; Rimmington’s on 
the ground that the facts did not disclose an offence of public nuisance because he did not 
cause common injury to a section of the public and so lacked the essential ingredient of 
common nuisance; Goldstein’s on the ground that he lacked the requisite mens rea to commit 
an offence of public nuisance because it could not proved against Mr Goldstein that he knew 
or reasonably should have known (because the means of knowledge were available to him) 
that the salt would escape in the sorting office or in the course of post. 
 
The two qualifications imposed by the House of Lords were, first, that endangerment to 
morals was not part of the definition of public nuisance, and, secondly, that public nuisance 
could not be extended to apply to factual circumstances where there were individually 
harmed victims of a perpetrator’s actions, even though there may be hundreds of victims of 
a perpetrator’s actions.  The House of Lords endeavoured to refine and clarify the common 
law offence of public nuisance, conscious of the fact that the offence had become mired in 
cases to which it had no application and conscious of the fact that the offence of public 
nuisance lacked the clarity and precision which the law requires.373 
 
 
                                                
372 Mr Goldstein, an ultra-orthodox Jew, is a supplier of kosher foods in Manchester.  He bought supplies from 
the company of an old friend in London, Mr Abraham Ehrlich, with whom he had a bantering relationship.  
Mr Goldstein owed Mr Ehrlich a significant sum of money, which the latter had pressed him to pay.  Mr 
Goldstein accordingly put the cheque in an envelope (addressed to Ibrahim Ehrlich) and included in the 
envelope a small quantity of salt.  This was done in recognition of the age of the debt, salt being commonly 
used to preserve kosher food, and by way of reference to the very serious anthrax scare in New York following 
the events of 11 September 2001, which both men had discussed on the telephone shortly before.  The 
inclusion of the salt was intended to be humorous, and Mr Ehrlich gave unchallenged evidence at trial that had 
he received the envelope he would have recognised it as a joke.  But the envelope did not reach him.  In the 
course of sorting at the Wembley Sorting Office some of the salt leaked onto the hands of a postal worker who 
understandably feared it might be anthrax and raised the alarm.  The building, in which some 110 people 
worked, was evacuated for about an hour, the second delivery for that day was cancelled and the police were 
called.  On inspecting the envelope the police were satisfied that the substance was salt.  Mr Goldstein pleaded 
not guilty before a judge (His Honour Judge Fingret) and jury in the Crown Court at Southwark but on 3 
October 2002 he was convicted.  He was sentenced to a Community Punishment Order of 140 hours, and 
ordered to pay £500 compensation and £1850 towards the costs of the prosecution.  His appeal against 
conviction was heard and dismissed with that of Mr Rimmington.  Lord Bingham of Cornhill sets out the facts 
of the cases on appeal at, ibid, paras [2]-[4] of the record. 
373 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [37] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), [2006] 1 AC 459, 
[2005] 3 WLR 982 (House of Lords). 
 130 
a. Public nuisance and public morals 
 
In reference to morals, The House of Lords declared that the definition of public nuisance 
was that definition that had been consistently applied in the case law, defined in 
Commonwealth Codes, and defined in as Archbold and Stephen, save for the reference to 
morals in the last two instances.374   The House appears to suggest that the case law wherein 
public nuisances are adjudged do not reference endangerment to public morals as an 
ingredient of the common law offence of public nuisance, though the House does not 
expressly so state.  The Criminal Code provisions cited in the judgment – the Criminal Code 
of Canada and the Criminal Code of Queensland – wherein the offence of public nuisance is 
codified does not reference endangerment to morals.375   
 
However, there are cogent arguments against their Lordships decision to exclude 
endangerment to public morals as a ground for upholding a public nuisance offence.  First, 
the dicta of their Lordships may be considered as obiter because the facts of the appeals did 
not concern acts of omissions endangering public morals.  Further, there are United 
Kingdom precedents not cited by the House of Lords in Rimmington where public nuisances 
have been upheld on the basis of harm to public morals.376  These precedents were not 
specifically overruled by their Lordships judgment.  Thirdly, the definition in Rimmington is 
not preferred by the Supreme Court of Illinois,377 nor by the Supreme Court of New York,378 
which both include reference to endangerment to morals as an element of the definition of 
public nuisance.  Forth, codified definitions of public nuisance in states like Florida and 
                                                
374 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at paras [10], [36] and [45], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 
982 (House of Lords). 
375 See nn 284 and 285, below, and accompanying text. 
376 See R v Howell (1675) 3 Keble 465, 84 ER 826; R v Medlor (1679) 2 Show KB 36; and Squires v Whisken (1811) 
3 Camp 140, where the King’s Bench adjudged exhibitions of cock-fighting public nuisances. 
377 City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corp 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004). 
378 Copart Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc 41 NY 2d 564 at p 568, 394 NYS 2d 169, 362 NE 
2d 968 (1977) (Cooke J citing New York Trap Rock Corp v Town of Clarkston 299 NY 77 at p 80 (1948); Melker v 
City of New York 190 NY 481 at p 488 (1908); Restatement, Torts, nn preceding s 822, p 217).  The definition 
proffered in Copart Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc was applied in Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 
2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995) at p 840 of the former report; Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co 
Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003); and Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Racing Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 
2d 763 (2003) at p 792 of the former report; and City of New York v Beretta USA Corp, 315 F Supp 2d 256 (2004) 
at p 276. 
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California, for example, include harm to public morals as an element of public nuisance.379  
Their Lordships preference for the criminal codes of Canada and Queensland and not for 
those of Florida and California in supporting their view that the definition of public nuisance 
ought not include acts or omissions harming public morals is unconvincing. 
 
The dicta of their Lordships in Rimmington, whereby they exclude from their definition of 
public nuisance reference to public morals, may also fail to take account of the ways in which 
acts can very seriously harm the peaceableness of a peoples.  The guidance of the Supreme 
Courts of Illinois and New York may be preferred.  In Wood on Nuisances, the author states, 
further to the accepted definition of public nuisance: ‘A public exhibition of any kind that 
tends to the corruption of morals, or to a disturbance of the peace or of the general good 
order or welfare of society, is a public nuisance.”380   
 
Yet there are weighty practical matters which may make it difficult, if not impossible, for a 
court to assess what the public’s morals are at any given time which might be capable of 
being endangered.  A standard applying to a determination as to whether a publicly exhibited 
sport offends public morals might be that standard expressed by Bruce-Knight VC in Walter 
v Selfe:  It is the public morals in accord with the plain and sober and simple notions of the 
                                                
379 Fla Stat § 823.01 provides:  
“Nuisances; penalty — All nuisances that tend to annoy the community, injure the health of the citizens in 
general, or corrupt the public morals are misdemeanors of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.083, except that a violation of s. 823.10 [Place where controlled substances are illegally kept, sold, or used 
declared a public nuisance] is a felony of the third degree.” And  
Fla Stat § 823.05 provides:  
“Places declared a nuisance; may be abated and enjoined -- Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, or 
maintain, own or lease any building, booth, tent or place which tends to annoy the community or injure the 
health of the community, or become manifestly injurious to the morals or manners of the people as described 
in s. 823.01,… shall be deemed guilty of maintaining a nuisance, and the building, erection, place, tent or booth 
and the furniture, fixtures and contents are declared a nuisance.  All such places or persons shall be abated or 
enjoined as provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06.” 
California uses the word ‘indecent’ in referencing morals: Cal Pen Code § 370 provides:  
“Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free 
use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community 
or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in 
the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, 
street, or highway, is a public nuisance.” 
380 HG Wood A Practical Treatise on the law of Nuisances in their various forms, including Remedies therefor at law and in 
equity (3rd edn Bancroft-Whitney San Francisco 1893) at s 68; applied in Commonwealth v McGovern 116 Ky 212, 
75 SW 261 (1903) at p 235. 
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people.381  However, the character of the locality where the sporting event takes place, or is 
proposed to take place, is also important in determining the standard of comfort claimed: 
“The law makes it clear that the character of the locality in question is of importance in 
determining the standard of comfort which may reasonably be claimed by an occupier of 
land.  ‘What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in 
Bermondsey’: Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch 852 at p 865.”382  Such a divergent moral 
standard may have a cumbersome application, which in effect makes lawful a singular 
sporting activity in one location unlawful if played in another location, on moral grounds.  
Few publicly exhibited sporting activities may be said to corrupt morals; though sports 
which may create public nuisances because they offend public morals could include such like 
dwarf-throwing, or the tossing of phocomelus persons, cock-fighting, bullfighting, boxing, 
and other violent sports.  Pseudo-combat pastimes such as paintball shooting ranges may 
likewise be considered to create a public nuisance by offending public morals.  But such 
activities may not be inimical to all persons, or even to a person of plain and sober and 
simple notions. 
 
By their judgment, the House of Lords effectively forestall such impracticable considerations 
from public nuisance cases in their attempt to refine and clarify the offence for use in future 
cases, though their opinion might have been more thoroughly expounded if they had 
considered those precedents such as R v Howell,383 R v Medlor,384 and Squires v Whisken,385 
wherein endangerment to public morals was regarded as one of the constituent elements of 
the offence of public nuisance. 
                                                
381 (1851) 4 De G and Sm 315 at p 322, 64 ER 849 at p 852 (Knight-Bruce VC).  Vice Chancellor Bruce-
Knight’s dictum in Walter v Selfe was referred to with approval in Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR 
482 at p 486 (Jordan CJ), and followed in Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 
ACWS (3d) 776 at para [41].  See also Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR 
(2d) 48 (BCSC) at p 52 (Brown J), referring to Goltan v De Held 21 LJ Ch 167. 
382 Walker v Pioneer Construction Co Ltd (1967) 56 DLR (3d) 677 at p 680 (Morden J), followed in Laing v St 
Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 776 at para [38]. 
383 (1675) 3 Keble 465, 84 ER 826. 
384 (1679) 2 Show KB 36. 
385 (1811) 3 Camp 140. 
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b. The requirement of common injury in a public nuisance offence 
 
The second significant qualification the House of Lords made in their endeavour to clarify 
and make precise the definition of public nuisance was to draw a clear distinction between 
offences which affect the public generally – where injury is suffered by the community or a 
significant section of it as a whole – which are classifiable as public nuisances; and offences 
which affect separate individuals.  A line of authority upholding prosecutions of accused 
persons for making numerous obscene or noisome telephone calls – the telephone call cases – 
was disapproved.   
 
In approving the definition of public nuisance in Archbold, Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated 
at paragraph [36]:  
“I would for my part accept that the offence as defined by Stephen, as 
defined in Archbold (save for the reference to morals), as enacted in the 
Commonwealth codes  quoted above and as applied in the cases (other 
than R v Soul 70 Cr App R 295) referred to in paras 13 to 22 above [eg R 
v Moore (1832) 3 B & Ad 184; R v Medley (1834) 6 C & P 292; R v Stephens 
(1866) LR 1 QB 702; Attorney General v PYA Quarries  Ltd [1957] 2 QB 
169; R v Ruffell (1991) 13 Cr App R (S) 204; R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279; 
and R v Ong [2001] 1 Cr App R(S) 404] is clear, precise, adequately 
defined and based on a discernible rational principle.  A legal adviser 
asked to give his opinion in advance would ascertain whether the act or 
omission contemplated was likely to inflict significant injury on a 
substantial section of the public exercising their ordinary rights as such: 
if so, an obvious risk of causing a public nuisance would be apparent; if 
not, not.”386 
 
                                                
386 Lord Roger of Earlsferry concurred with Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s definition of public nuisance stating at 
para [46]: “For present purposes I would be content to adopt the definition in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, 
Evidence and Practice 2005, para 31-40, under deletion of the reference to morals.” 
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The hallmark feature of the common law offence of public nuisance is that of common injury: 
“central to the content of the crime was the suffering of common injury by members of the 
public by interference with rights enjoyed by them as such.”387  All authorities “treat the 
requirement of common injury as a, perhaps the, distinguishing feature of this offence.”388  
The House of Lords blatantly disapproved of a line of recent authority confirming the 
applicability of the common law offence of public nuisance to the telephone call cases.  The 
crime of public nuisance does not extend to separate and individual telephone calls, however 
persistent and vexatious, and an extension of the crime to cover postal communications 
would be a further illegitimate extension.389  Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated, at paragraph 
[37]: 
I cannot, however, accept that R v Norbury [1978] Crim LR 435 and R v 
Johnson  (Anthony) [1997] 1 WLR 367 were correctly decided or that the 
convictions discussed  in paras 23 to 27 above [R v Millward (1986) 8 Cr 
App R(S) 209; R v Eskdale [2001] EWCA Crim 1159, [2002] 1 Cr App 
R(S) 118; R v Harley [2002] EWCA Crim 2650, [2003] 2 Cr App R(S) 16; 
R v Holliday and Leboutillier [2004] EWCA Crim 1847, [2005] 1 Cr App 
R(S) 349; and R v Lowrie [2004] EWCA Crim 2325, [2005] 1 Cr App R(S) 
530] were soundly based (which is not, of course, to say that the 
defendants’ conduct was other than highly reprehensible or that there 
were not other charges to which the defendants would have had no 
answer). To permit a conviction of causing a public nuisance to rest on 
an injury caused to separate individuals rather than on an injury suffered 
by the community or a significant section of it as a whole was to 
contradict the rationale of the offence and pervert its nature, in 
Convention terms to change the essential constituent elements of the 
offence to the detriment of the accused.  The  offence was cut adrift 
from its intellectual moorings…” 
 
                                                
387 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [6], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
388 ibid at para [12] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
389 ibid at para [38] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
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With these two modifications to the long catena of authority in public nuisance suits, the 
House of Lords has refined and clarified the definition of public nuisance.  The decision 
declares that the common law offence of public nuisance is clear, precise, adequately defined 
and based on a discernible rational principle.390 
 
Definitions of public nuisance in recent appellate decisions in the United States, though they 
have not limited the definition of public nuisance by excluding endangerment to public 
morals as the House of Lords has done, also confirm the salient feature of public nuisance is 
the requirement of common injury.  Public nuisance is defined at common law in New York 
as “conduct or omissions which offend, interfere with or cause damage to the public in the 
exercise of rights common to all ... in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere 
with use by the public of a public place or endanger or injure the property, health, safety or 
comfort of a considerable number of persons.”391 
 
 
3. Common injury and public rights in public nuisance offences 
 
The requirement of common injury in public nuisance is intimately connected with public 
rights, for it is only by injury to a right common to people that a public nuisance will be 
found to have been committed.  The definition of public nuisance requires that a public right 
be impinged upon – that the people be obstructed or inconvenienced in the exercise or 
enjoyment of their rights.  In City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation,392 in 2004, Justice 
Garman giving judgement of the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, at page 369:  
                                                
390 ibid at para [36] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
391 Copart Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc 41 NY 2d 564 at p 568, 394 NYS 2d 169, 362 NE 
2d 968 (1977) (Cooke J citing New York Trap Rock Corp v Town of Clarkston 299 NY 77 (1948) at p 80; Melker v 
City of New York 190 NY 481 (1908) at p 488; Restatement, Torts, nn preceding s 822, p 217).  The definition 
proffered in Copart Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc was applied in Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 
2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995) at p 840 of the former report; Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co 
Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003); and Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Racing Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 
2d 763 (2003) at p 792 of the former report; and City of New York v Beretta USA Corporation 315 F Supp 2d 256 
(2004) at p 276. 
392 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004).  The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appeal court’s ruling 
and affirmed the trial court’s finding that the city and county did not state a claim for public nuisance because it 
could not be established that the defendants conduct created the harm complained of.  The plaintiffs advocated 
the expansion of the common law of public nuisance to encompass nuisance liability in gun production and 
distribution – an area highly regulated by both state and federal law.  The plaintiffs urged that it is not only 
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“A sufficient pleading in a public nuisance cause of action will allege a 
right common to the general public, the transgression of that right by the 
defendant, and resulting injury.  Feder v Perry Coal Co, 279 Ill App 314, 
318 (1935)…”   
 
Justice Garman continued, at page 370:  
“A public nuisance has been defined as ‘the doing of or the failure to do 
something that injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the 
public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to 
the public.’  Village of Wilsonville v SCA Services Inc, 86 Ill 2d 1, 21-22, 426 
NE2d 824, 55 Ill Dec 499 (1981), quoting W Prosser, Torts § 88, at 583 n 
29 (4th edn 1971).  Thus, the first element that must be alleged to 
state a claim for public nuisance is the existence of a right 
common to the general public.  Such rights include the rights of 
public health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and 
public convenience…”393 
 
So what are public rights?  Public rights are common law rights which have been consistently 
enumerated in public nuisance cases over several hundred years and include:  
• a public right of way on the highway (see, for example, R v Moore394); 
• a public right of fishing at the foreshore (see, for example, Lord Fitzhardinge v 
Purcell;395 Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada;396 and 
Arnhemland Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (Northern Territory)397);  
                                                
within the inherent authority of the Courts, but it is also within their duty, to construe the common law to aid a 
local government’s effort to protect its citizens from gun violence.  The Supreme Court concluded that 
granting that a public right has been infringed, the allegations of intentional conduct on the part of the 
defendants were insufficient for public nuisance liability as a matter of law.  In addition, proximate cause 
cannot be established as to the dealer defendants because the claimed harm was the aggregate result of 
numerous unforeseeable intervening criminal acts by third parties not under defendants’ control. (at p 432). 
393 Note also in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted as correct the proposition that “any activity 
which unreasonably interferes with the public’s interest in questions of health, safety, morality, comfort or 
convenience” is capable of constituting a public nuisance: Ryan v Victoria (City) [1999] SCC 706 at para [52], 
[1999] 1 SCR 201, followed in British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at para [66], [2004] 2 
SCR 74, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 1. 
394 (1832) 3 B&Ad 184. 
395 [1908] 2 Ch 139 at 166-7, followed in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 314 at 
pp 329-30 (Brennan J). 
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• a public right of navigation in the sea (see, for example, Orr-Ewing v Colquhoun398);  
• a public right to use of a public place for recreation; (see, for example, R v Doncaster 
Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Braim;399 North Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v 
Sutherland Shire Council400);  
• a public right to quietude or a public right to comfort and peaceableness in ones own 
home (see, for example, Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co;401 and Attorney-
General of Ontario v Dieleman402);  
• a public right to health (see, for example, Attorney-General v Luton Board of Health;403 
Attorney-General v Birmingham Corporation404); and  
• a public right to safety (see, for example, Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc,405 Castle v St 
Augustine’s Links Limited406).   
 
These rights are common law rights because they are enforceable, where they are impinged 
upon by an act or omission, at common law in public nuisance prosecutions or abatement 
proceedings instituted by the Crown on behalf of the people whose rights are affected.  
Some of these rights, such as the public right of fishing, are referenced in Magna Carta.407  
                                                
396 [1914] AC 153 at p 171 (Viscount Haldane) (adopted by Brennan J in the course of his Honour’s reasons in 
Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47; (1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 329-30 (Brennan J) ) 
397 [2000] FCA 165 (the question for consideration was whether the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) excluded or 
extinguished the public right to fish).  See also Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47, (1989) 168 CLR 
314 at pp 329-30 (Brennan J), following Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada [1914] 
AC 153 at 170-71 (Viscount Haldane). 
398 (1877) 2 App Cas 839.  And, see, Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd v Anson [1911] 1 KB 171 at pp 198-9 
(Fletcher Moulton J); Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable [1865] 11 HL Cas 192 at pp 207-08 (Lord Westbury); Iveagh 
v Martin [1961] 1 QB 232 at 272; and The Swift [1901] P 168; Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr [1999] FCA 
1668 at para [548]; The Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56 at paras [96]-]98], (2001) 75 ALJR 1582 at p 
1604. 
399 The Times, 11 October 1986.  In Doncaster, McCullough J held that a public right of recreation can be 
created at common law based on long user, in the instant case being use of a common over many years for 
recreative activities such as walking, jogging, flying kites and model aeroplanes, picnicking and ball games and 
French cricket. 
400 [1999] NSWCA 438 at para [4] citing with approval Brodie v Mann [1885] 10 App Cas 378, Poole v Huskinson 
(1843) 11 M & W 830, 152 ER 1039, and R v Oxfordshire County Council; ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council [1999] 
UKHL 28, [1999] 3 WLR 160. 
401 [1899] 1 IR 345. 
402 [1994] CanLII 7509 (Ontario Supreme Court). 
403 (1856) 2 Jur NS 180. 
404 (1858) 4 K & J 528, 70 ER 220. 
405 148 Misc 246, 265 NYS 886 (1933). 
406 (1922) 38 TLR 615. 
407 Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada [1914] AC 153 at p 171 (Viscount Haldane) 
(adopted by Brennan J in the course of his Honour’s reasons in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries [1989] HCA 47; 
(1989) 168 CLR 314 at pp 329-30 (Brennan J). 
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And these rights may find their source in natural law and in jurisprudential thought, which is 
discussed in Part 1 of this thesis, and may be considered as necessary rights in civic society, 
with respect to which, as Montesquie writes, there are four principal laws of nature; being 
peace, nourishment, sexuality, and the desire of living in society.408 
 
The juridical pronouncements explicate that a public nuisance arises when any annoying, or 
inconvenient, or dangerous act takes place which affects the public generally.  In considering 
the application of the common law of public nuisance to the human activity of sport, which 
is surveyed below, it is important to bear in mind the extensiveness of the definition of 
public nuisance.  Any sporting activity, or any activity associated with or concomitant with 
the playing of sport, which is an annoyance or inconvenience or obstruction to the public in 
the enjoyment or exercise of one of their enumerated rights, or which is an endangerment to 
public health or public safety, may be proscribed as a public nuisance. 
 
 
4. Is a public nuisance a single act or a continuing offence? 
 
A public nuisance is indictable however long it has existed,409 and may comprise a single, 
isolated event,410 or a continuing state of affairs.411  Lord Justice Denning, as he then was, 
                                                
408 Montesquieu De l’Esprit des lois Bk 1 ch 2: AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr)(ed) Montesquieu: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 6; JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Montesquieu: The 
Spirit of Laws (G Bell and Sons London 1878) at pp 4-5; J Brethe de la Gressaye (ed) Montesquieu: De l’Esprit des 
lois (Société Les Belles Lettres Paris 1950) at pp 22-24; G Truc (ed) Montesquieu: De L’Esprit des Lois (Garnier 
Frères Paris 1949) at pp 7-9.  And see PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of 
Judicial Activism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at pp 20 and 77, citing R Caillois (ed) Pléiade 
edition Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 2, Bk 23 chs 1, 7, 20 and 21; Bk 1 ch 2; Bk 
3 ch 10; and Bk 6 ch 13. 
409 See R v Cross (1812) 3 Camp 224, where Lord Ellenborough CJ said at p 226: “It is immaterial how long the 
practice may have prevailed, for no length of time will legitimate a nuisance…”  See also Weld v Hornby (1806) 7 
East 195, where Lord Ellenborough CJ stated: “…twenty years acquiescence may bind parties whose private 
rights only are affected, yet the public have an interest in the suppression of public nuisances, though of longer 
standing.” See Fowler v Sanders (1617) Cro Jac 446, 79 ER 382.  In Dewell v Sanders (1619) Cro Jac 490, 79 ER 
419, the court referred to this case as deciding that ‘none can prescribe to make a common nuisance, for it 
cannot have a lawful beginning by license or otherwise, being an offence at common law’; and per Montague 
CJ: ‘Neither the King nor the lord of the manor can give any liberty to erect a common nuisance.’ 
410 In Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906) the holding of a single motorcar race on a single 
occasion was opined to be a nuisance per se by the Court of Appeals of New York: at p 146. See further 
Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] OR 595, [1952] 4 DLR 93, [1952] OWN 516, where the Ontario High Court held 
that a single occurrence of a motor car crashing through the barrier of a race track into a public park was 
capable of amounting to a nuisance.  See also Matheson v Northcote College Board of Governors [1975] 2 NZLR 106.  
 139 
noted in Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd: “…a private nuisance always involves some 
degree of repetition or continuance.  An isolated act which is over and done with, once and 
for all, may give rise to an action for negligence or an action under the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher, but not an action for nuisance…  But an isolated act may amount to a public 
nuisance if it is done under such circumstances that the public right to condemn it should be 
vindicated.”412  In Johnson v City of New York,413 the holding of a single event of motorcar races 
on a single occasion was opined to be a nuisance per se by the Court of Appeals of New 
York.  Yet, in Stone v Bolton,414 the Court of Appeal for England and Wales held that the 
isolated event of a cricket ball being hit out of a cricket ground on to the head of a woman 
standing outside her house on a local road was not capable of amounting to a public 
nuisance.415  Lord Justice Jenkins noted, in that case, at page 209:  
“I do not think a single isolated act causing direct damage such as the 
striking of a person on the highway by a cricket ball hit from adjacent 
premises can properly be brought under the head of nuisance on a 
highway.  The gist of such a nuisance as it seems to me is the causing or 
permitting of a state of affairs from which damage is likely to result… 
[T]he plaintiff could only succeed in nuisance on the footing that the 
playing of cricket on the Cheetham Club’s ground amounted to a 
nuisance which resulted in damage to herself in the shape of the blow 
she received from the errant ball…  I am satisfied that it cannot succeed 
                                                
See also Holling v Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 662 (Court of Appeal), and Dollman v Hillman 
Ltd [1941] 1 All ER 355 (Court of Appeal).   
411 See Castle v St Augustine’s Links Limited (1922) 38 TLR 615 were the evidence was to the effect that golf balls 
were very frequently sliced on to or over the public highway from the 13th tee.  There was evidence of 
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the road.  See also Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd 
[1957] 2 QB 169 at p 182, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 900; and Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 
478, where a local authority was restrained from using “The Parade”, a promenade for foot-passengers at 
Blackpool, for the purposes of motorcar races. 
412 [1957] 2 QB 169 at p 191, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 908 (Court of Appeal). 
413 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906), at p 146 of the former report. 
414 [1950] 1 KB 201, [1949] 2 All ER 851. 
415 The further appeal to the House of Lords was predominated by the case of the tort of negligence.  The case 
of public nuisance, whilst argued on further appeal to the House of Lords, was not explored further in their 
Lordships judgments, “since it [was] admitted on behalf of the respondent that in the circumstances of this case 
nuisance cannot be established unless negligence is proved.” (Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 at p 860 (Lord 
Porter)).  For this reason, the Court of Appeal judgment is the authoritative dicta on public nuisance.  The only 
comments made in their Lordships House was to reiterate what the Court of Appeal found and to distinguish 
to the case of Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd.  Lord Oaksey commented at p 863: “The case of Castle v St 
Augustine’s Links Ltd is obviously distinguishable on the facts and there is nothing in the judgment to suggest 
that a nuisance was created by the first ball that fell on the road there in question.” 
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on the facts, which clearly establish that balls have been hit out of the 
ground only on rare occasions, and, accordingly, that the use of the 
ground for cricket with the fences as they are, and pitch sited as it is, 
cannot in itself be said to constitute a continuing source of danger to the 
neighbourhood or the public.”   
 
Lord Justice Somervell opined the inapplicability of public nuisance to the facts before him, 
at page 212, in the following manner:  
“The case for the plaintiff before us was put, first, on the ground of 
public nuisance to a highway…  I do not think that the striking of a 
cricket ball by an individual batsman, whether he was, as here, a visitor 
or whether he had been one of the joint occupiers, could be an 
indictable misdemeanour by all the occupiers… The question… is 
whether the fact that once every three or four years a very exceptional 
hit takes a ball into this highway constitutes a public nuisance.”     
 
Lord Justice Somervell distinguished the case before him, involving the game of Cricket, 
from an analogous case involving the game of Golf, at page 212 of the report: 
“I have derived assistance from the reasoning of Sankey J in the 
somewhat analogous case of Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd.  In that case 
the plaintiff on a highway was injured by a sliced golf ball driven from a 
tee.  Sankey J found that the tee and lay-out of the hole constituted a 
public nuisance for which the club was responsible.  He found that the 
hole was so laid out that balls were frequently landed in the highway and 
that the directors knew or ought to have known this.  He found that the 
highway was much frequented by motors and taxicabs and that on 
previous occasions balls had struck vehicles passing along the highway.  
If counsel for the plaintiff is right, it would have been sufficient if on 
very rare occasions an altogether exceptional shot had reached the 
highway.  Sankey J was, of course, dealing with the facts of that case and 
with golf, not cricket, but, in considering the number of occasions and 
the amount of traffic on the road – in other words the degree of risk – 
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he was, I think, applying the law correctly in dealing with this class of 
problem, namely, games near highways.  Applying this test, namely, one 
of degree, to the question whether the lay-out of this cricket field was 
such as to render the highway dangerous in a way that amounted to a 
public nuisance, I think that it was not.” 
 
The gist of the offence of public nuisance is not the isolated act of hitting a ball on to the 
highway or neighbouring land, but the organising or carrying on of a game on property 
adjacent to the highway or neighbouring land whereby the use of that highway or land is 
rendered dangerous.416  The decision in Stone v Bolton does not suggest that an isolated act 
cannot amount to a public nuisance in all cases.  The cases of Holling v Yorkshire Traction 
Company Ltd,417 and Dollman v Hillman Ltd,418 were not cited in judgment.  Both cases 
concerned liability for a public nuisance from an isolated event.419  The question is one of 
fact; as noted by Lord Justice Somervell.  An injury to the use or enjoyment of land, or to 
the public highway, or to the public peace, may be caused by an isolated act or a state of 
affairs provided that that isolated act or state of affairs is one which, as a matter of fact, is an 
inconvenience or annoyance to the public, or endangering of the public peace.  Occasional 
cricket balls being hit from the cricket ground in the case of Stone v Bolton do not constitute 
injury to the public use or enjoyment of the highway because, as decided by the Court of 
Appeal for England and Wales, such an act is not an obstruction or an inconvenience to the 
public warranting proscription or remedy as a public nuisance.   
 
Miss Stone’s claim for special damages for a public nuisance arising from being hit on the 
head by a solitary cricket ball failed;420 but were the number of cricket balls being hit out of 
                                                
416 RFV Heuston & RA Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1992) 
at p 59. 
417 [1948] 2 All ER 662 (Court of Appeal). 
418 [1941] 1 All ER 355 (Court of Appeal). 
419 In Holling the Court held that the discharge of smoke and steam from the defendants coke ovens across a 
highway was a nuisance, albeit that the blanketing of the highway in smoke and steam was very much 
dependant on the weather and the direction of the wind, and was thus a relatively isolated and unpredictable 
event.  Holling was not cited in argument or in the judgments of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in 
Bolton v Stone.  In Dollman a single isolated event saw the plaintiff trip on a piece of fat left on the pavement by 
the defendants butcher’s shop.  Dollman was cited in argument, but not referred to in judgment. 
420 In the House of Lords, Miss Stone’s claim in negligence, as well as that in nuisance failed; their Lordships 
holding that the members of the cricket club were not liable in damages to the injured person in negligence or 
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the defendant’s cricket ground frequent, as a matter of historical fact to the case, and thus a 
cause of public inconvenience, annoyance, or danger, public nuisance might have been 
proved.  This opinion is supported by the judgment in Castle v St Augustine’s Links Limited.421  
In that case, Sankey J in the King’s Bench Division in England, gave judgment against St 
Augustine’s Links Limited and the golfer for the loss of an eye resulting from a golf ball 
striking the windshield of a taxi cab driven by the plaintiff.  Justice Sankey said the user of 
the thirteenth green was a danger to the public passing along the highway.  The evidence 
satisfied him that many a ball had been sliced onto the public road, because of the design of 
the hole in question.  He did not think that the occurrence of sliced golf balls could be said 
to be the result of careless play.  He held that the directors of the club knew, or they ought 
to have known, that balls driven from the thirteenth tee frequently landed in the road, 
thereby creating a public nuisance.  Both the House of Lords, per Lord Porter,422 as well the 
Court of Appeal, in Bolton v Stone, were careful to distinguish the facts in Castle from those in 
the case with which they were concerned. 
 
Concomitant with the judgment in Stone v Bolton, it may be appropriately argued that the 
holding of any sporting event on an occasional isolated occurrence, or an act taking place in 
a sporting event or associated with a sporting event, might not be a public nuisance because 
it does not create an inconvenience or annoyance to the public, or an endangerment to the 
public peace.  But such an argument is not conclusive of the law.  There are other cases 
where the courts have held isolated acts, particularly isolated sporting events, and isolated 
acts at sporting events, to be public nuisances.  In Commonwealth v McGovern,423 a sole isolated 
public boxing match to be staged in the Auditorium in Louisville, Kentucky, on 22nd 
September, 1902, was held to amount to a public nuisance because it endangered the public 
morals and the public peace.424  The Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted:  
                                                
nuisance since the likelihood of injury was so remote that a reasonable person would not have anticipated it: 
[1951] AC 850. 
421 (1922) 38 TLR 615. 
422 [1951] AC 850 at p 860.  See also p 863 (Lord Oaksey). 
423 116 Ky 212, 75 SW 261 (1903). 
424 The Court noted at p 236, in reference to the public boxing match to be staged, that: “…Such an assembly 
could easily be led into a riot, or other unlawful disturbance of the public peace.  In addition to the evils 
suggested, there would be the contaminating effect of such a meeting upon the youth of the city and State, 
which might prove of incalculable injury to their morals and future welfare.  Such a gathering, too, would 
demand increased vigilance in the protection of the property of the city and its inhabitants, be a menace to 
good order, and disturb the peaceful pursuits and happiness of citizens who would be unwilling to patronize 
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“In order to constitute a public nuisance, in the meaning of the law, it is 
not always necessary that the acts charged should have been habitual or 
periodical.  Where a single act produces a continuing result, the offence 
may be complete, without a recurrence of the act… To constitute the 
offence denounced by the statute as a prize-fight, or prize-fighting, it is 
not necessary that a number of such combats or that more than one 
combat should take place.  We think one such offence at a given place 
would constitute a public nuisance, and it is the province of a court of 
equity to prevent nuisances that are threatened, and before irreparable 
mischief ensues, as well as to arrest or abate those in progress, and by 
perpetual injunction protect the public against them in the future.”425 
 
In Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Club Inc, it was held by the Municipal Court of New York that a sole 
isolated act of a golf ball hit from a golf fairway and on to a plaintiff driving her car on the 
adjacent public highway could constitute a public nuisance.  The court noted and followed 
Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd, albeit noting that there was evidence that played-at golf balls 
fell frequently upon the roadway in that case, as opposed to the fact that there was but one 
single occasion of a golf ball being hit into the roadway in the case at bar.426  The court in 
Gleason was of the opinion that liability for public nuisance was an absolute liability.427  A 
nuisance does not rest upon the degree of care used, but on the degree of danger existing 
even with the best of care.  The court noted authorities wherein liability for public nuisance 
was created when buildings or parts of building injured travellers in the street, and stated:  
“Applying the principles enunciated by the above authorities, no 
reasonable distinction can be apprehended between the case of a 
traveller upon a public street being struck by a falling building, or falling 
                                                
such an enterprise.  We conclude, therefore, that while a court of equity may not grant an injunction against the 
principals who were expected to engage in the fight in question, nor those connected with them as managers, 
trainers, etc., because the process of the criminal courts and the powers of conservators of the peace in the city 
of Louisville are, or ought to be, adequate to the prevention of the prize-fight, by the arrest and prosecution of 
the parties concerned, yet it was proper for the lower court to enjoin the owner, proprietor and managers of 
the Auditorium theatre from permitting the holding of a prize-fight therein, and from allowing therein any 
future exhibitions of the same character, upon the ground that such a use of the building would constitute a 
public nuisance, dangerous to the public morals and safety.” 
425 116 Ky 212 (1903) at pp 239-240. 
426 148 Misc 246, 265 NYS 886 (1933) at p 253 of the former report. 
427 148 Misc 246 (1933) at pp 253-254. 
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into an excavation adjoining the roadway upon private property, or being 
injured by a missile set in motion from private adjacent premises.  And if 
the owner of land contiguous to the highway is liable to a traveller who 
falls into an excavation on the land, upon the ground that the owner has 
not provided a means whereby harm might be reasonably averted to one 
having no cause to expect danger, then by analogous reasoning, the 
converse situation must also determine liability – that the owner of such 
premises who creates a condition upon his land, or who maintains such a 
condition in a manner imputing presumptive knowledge thereof, 
whereby an object from the land injures a lawful traveller upon the 
roadway, is in duty bound to take appropriate means to ward off the 
danger.”428   
 
Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc was not cited in argument or in judgment in Stone v Bolton.  
Stone v Bolton may be wrong in point of law.  The Court of Appeal of England and Wales may 
have viewed the circumstances of the case with sentimental attitude toward the sport of 
cricket.429  It is suggested that Stone v Bolton be revisited, and overruled, in subsequent case 
law. 
 
Further support for this proposition can be found in the judgment of Justice Spence, in the 
Ontario High Court, in Aldridge v Van Patter.430  Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd, and Dollman v 
Hillman Ltd, were applied in this case; Stone v Bolton was not followed.  In Aldridge v Van Patter 
the plaintiffs sued variously in nuisance, negligence and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.  A 
stock car, racing in a car race on a track adjacent to a public park, crashed through a frail 
fence surrounding the track and injured the plaintiffs who were walking in the park.  The act 
of the racecar crashing through the barrier to a racetrack and into a park was an isolated 
occurrence.  The plaintiffs were not standing against the fence but, rather, walking in the 
                                                
428 ibid at p 255. 
429 Stone v Bolton, along with Lord Denning’s comments in Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966 at p 976, [1977] 3 All 
ER 338 at p 340, where he states that, “In summertime village cricket is the delight of everyone”, have 
prompted a judicial suggestion that they represent “a concession to cricket as a national sport of England” 
rather than a principled application of the law: Wilkinson v Joyceman [1985] 1 Qd R 567 at p 590 (McPherson J), 
cited in Woods v Mulit-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 9, (2002) 186 ALR 145 at fn 44 (Kirby J). 
430 [1952] OR 595, [1952] 4 DLR 93, [1952] OWN 516. 
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park and proceeding to the entrance to the track to buy tickets to enter and witness the 
sporting event.  The Ontario High Court held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
found a claim in nuisance, notwithstanding that there was but the single instance of crashing 
of a racing car into the public park.  Liability under nuisance did not rest on the driver but it 
did rest on the licensee of the track and also on the licensor.  The possibility of a car 
plunging through the fence during a race was in the immediate contemplation of these 
parties when they executed their licence agreement. 
 
In Aldridge v Van Patter, the defendants questioned whether a claim in nuisance could be 
based on a single sudden emission from the defendant’s lands of something which damaged 
the plaintiff.  Justice Spence, quoting Salmon on Torts, observed:  
“Nuisance is commonly a continuing wrong – that is to say, it commonly 
consists in the establishment or maintenance of some state of things 
which continuously or repeatedly causes the escape of noxious things on 
to the plaintiff’s land (e.g., a stream of foul water, or the constant noise 
or smell of a factory).  An escape of something on a single occasion, 
however harmful and wrongful (e.g., the escape of water from the 
bursting of a reservoir), would not in common speech be termed a 
nuisance.  This distinction, however, is not one which admits or requires 
any legal recognition for the purposes of the law of nuisance.  All 
wrongful escapes of deleterious things, whether continuous, 
intermittent, or isolated, are equally to be classed as nuisances in 
law; for they are all governed by the same principles.”431 
 
His Honour cited Stone v Bolton noting that in that action a plaintiff was struck by a cricket 
ball which passed over a seven foot fence out of the grounds of a cricket club, having been 
driven from a point about 100 yards away from the plaintiff, in an isolated and rare 
occurrence; facts similar to the facts in the case before him.  Justice Spence commented:  
“In my opinion the judgment of the Court of Appeal must be 
interpreted on the basis of the particular evidence in that case.  In fact 
the members of the court distinguished Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd…  
                                                
431 [1952] OR 595 at p 610 (emphasis added). 
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The evidence in the present case shows conclusively that the defendant 
the Western Fair Association through its officers, particularly Jackson, 
the general manager, and Saunders, the grounds superintendent, and also 
the defendant Martin, knew that there was grave and constant danger of 
competing drivers going through the fence into this public park and in 
fact on that very afternoon one competitor already had struck and torn 
down the fence near which the accident occurred, although by chance 
the vehicle did not proceed beyond the fence.  In the circumstances of 
this case, I find that Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd and not Bolton v Stone 
applies.”432 
 
Sir John Smith notes in his work Criminal Law, quoting Lord Justice Denning that: “Whereas 
private nuisance always involves some degree of repetition or continuance, ‘an isolated act 
may amount to a public nuisance if it is done under such circumstances that the public right 
to condemn it should be vindicated.’”433  Whether the act constituting a public nuisance is an 
isolated act or a state of affairs, a continuing series of acts, is not the determinative factor.  
Rather, an isolated act or a state of affairs may amount to a public nuisance because the 
nature of the act or acts is such that it amounts to an inconvenience or annoyance to the 
public, or a danger to the public, or an act endangering the public morals or the public peace.  
Single acts may amount to an inconvenience or annoyance to the public, or a danger to the 
public, or an act endangering public morals or the public peace in some cases, but not in 
others.  The same for continuing acts. 
 
Whether particular conduct, whether an isolated event, or a continuing state of affairs, 
amounts to a public nuisance at common law is a question of fact.  Whether conduct 
“constitutes a public nuisance must be determined as a question of fact under all the 
circumstances.”434  This point is clear upon survey of Stone v Bolton, Castle v St Augustine’s 
                                                
432 ibid at pp 611-612. 
433 Sir John Smith Criminal Law (8th edn Butterworths London 1996) at p 773, quoting [1957] 2 QB at p 192 
(Denning LJ) 
434 New York Trap Rock Corp 85 NE 2d (1948) at p 875.  See also Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839 (1995) where 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed the trial court’s finding that the operation 
of a racetrack for motorcars was a public nuisance.  At p 840 the Court noted: “Whether a nuisance exists, 
however, depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case.” 
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Links Ltd, and Aldridge v Van Patter, discussed above.  In Johnson v City of New York,435 where 
the Court of Appeals of New York opined that a car race about the city streets was a public 
nuisance per se,436 the court nonetheless held that the question whether an act amounted to a 
public nuisance was a question of fact.  Chief Justice Cullen, speaking for the court, stated, at 
page 151:  
“The learned counsel for the respondent has argued at length that the 
character of the road, the curve in it, the nature of its pavement and 
similar matters rendered it dangerous and improper to conduct a contest 
by automobiles, and that considering the number of persons naturally 
attracted to such a spectacle the contest was so dangerous as to 
constitute a public nuisance within the definition of the Penal Code 
(Penal Code, s. 385, sub. 4.)  Whether the contest as conducted was in 
fact a nuisance, whether the defendants, or any of them, were guilty of 
negligence in the management of the race and the contributory 
negligence, if any, on the part of the plaintiff, were all questions of fact 
which the trial court should have submitted to the jury for 
determination.” 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
A public nuisance occurs when a single act (or omission) or continuing actions (or 
omissions) obstructs, interferes with, or endangers the public in the exercise of their 
common rights in a manner which obstructs or interferes with the use by the public of a 
public place, or endangers the life, health, property, safety, or comfort of the public.  The 
first element that must be alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the existence of a 
right common to the general public.  Such rights, as enumerated by judgments in public 
nuisance cases, include the rights of public health, public safety, public peace, public 
                                                
435 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906) (Court of Appeals of New York) 
436 The Courts actual words were: “The occupation of the highway was to be exclusive in the parties to whom 
the permission [to hold the race] was granted.  Therefore, the race or speed contest held by the defendants was 
an unlawful obstruction of the highway and per se a nuisance.” (at p 146). 
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comfort, public convenience, and public use of public places.  The act of staging a publicly 
exhibited sport event is no exception to this common law rule. 
 
In R v Shorrock437 a case of prosecution of a public nuisance, the Court of Appeal for England 
and Wales explained that a public nuisance gives rise to a liability both in criminal and civil 
law.  It can attract the sanction of a criminal charge, either at common law or under statute 
in those jurisdictions where public nuisance offences are codified, or civil liability pursuant to 
a relator action or a claim for damages.  Whichever proceeding is pursued, the definition of a 
public nuisance is the same.438  The reason for this is because a public nuisance remains a 
public wrong whether criminal or civil proceedings are instigated. 
                                                
437 [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698 (Court of Appeal).  R v Shorrock was approved by the House of Lords in 
R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [56], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2006] 2 All ER 257.   
438 In R v Shorrock, ibid at pp 701-702, Justice Rattee, speaking for the Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 
applied the definition of public nuisance provided by Archbold and Stephen, as well as the dicta of Romer and 
Denning, LJJ, in Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd ([1957] 2 QB 169, [1957] 1 All ER 894) concluding with 
the remarks: “Not surprisingly the appellant accepts that the activities carried on on his field constituted a 
public nuisance within the above definitions, and that anyone properly found to have been responsible for such 
nuisance could be convicted on indictment of the common law offence of public nuisance.”  In R v Shorrock, 
ibid, the defendant parted with possession or occupation of his land knowing that there was a real risk that the 
activities (an ‘acid house’ dance music concert) that were going to be conducted on his land by others would 
constitute a nuisance.  He was convicted of the misdemeanour of public nuisance and his conviction was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal.  See also R v Goldstein, R v R [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 2882 (Lord Justice 
Latham). 
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Chapter 6 
 
The meaning of ‘public’ in public nuisance 
 
 
1. How many people must an act affect so as to amount to a public nuisance? 
 
A public nuisance is an offence which, as defined by the authorities cited above, must affect 
the public.  How have the courts defined the degree to which the public must be affected?  
How many people comprise ‘the public’ for the purposes of a conviction for the offence or 
abatement of the nuisance by relator action? 
 
Whether an annoyance or injury is sufficiently widespread so as to amount to a public 
nuisance, rather than a private nuisance, is a question of fact.  In R v White and Ward,439 the 
defendants had been found guilty of a public nuisance on an indictment which charged that 
“at the parish of Twickenham, etc., near the King’s Common highway there, and near the 
dwelling-houses, of several of the inhabitants, the defendants erected twenty buildings for 
making noisome, stinking and offensive liquors.”  Objection was made that the indictment 
was only laid generally “in the parish of Twickenham.”  Lord Mansfield rejected the 
objection, saying: “It is sufficiently laid, and in the accustomed manner.  The very existence 
of the nuisance depends upon the number of houses and concourse of people: and this is a 
matter of fact, to be judged by the jury.”440 
 
Blackstone says that a public nuisance must be an annoyance to all the King’s subjects.441  
But this is obviously too wide, for if it were so, no public nuisance could ever have been 
proved.  In the leading case of Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd, Lord Justice Romer 
                                                
439 (1757) 1 Burr 333, 97 ER 338. 
440 ibid at p 337. 
441 Sir W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press Oxford 1765-1769) vol iii, at p 216. 
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commented that: “It is difficult to ascertain with any precision from these citations how 
widely spread the effect of a nuisance must be for it to qualify as a public nuisance and to 
become the subject of a criminal prosecution or of a relator action by the Attorney-General.  
It is obvious, notwithstanding Blackstone’s definition, that it is not a prerequisite of a public 
nuisance that all of Her Majesty’s subjects should be affected by it; for otherwise no public 
nuisance could ever be established at all.”442 
 
In Soltau v De Held,443 Kindersley VC said: “I conceive that, to constitute a public nuisance, 
the thing must be such as, in its nature or its consequences, is a nuisance – an injury or a 
damage, to all persons who come within the sphere of its operation, though it may be so in 
a greater degree to some than it is to others.”  Romer LJ noted in Attorney-General v PYA 
Quarries Ltd that several cases had dealt with the quandary of defining the nature of the term 
‘public’ for the purposes of sustaining a conviction or an injunction for a public nuisance.444  
His Lordship referred to R v Price,445 wherein a question arose as to whether the burning of a 
dead body, instead of burying it, amounted to a public nuisance.  In the course of his charge 
to the jury in R v Price Stephen J commented: “The depositions in this case do not state very 
distinctly the nature and situation of the place where this act was done, but if you think upon 
inquiry that there is evidence of its having been done in such a situation and manner as to be 
offensive to any considerable number of persons, you should find a true bill.”446 
 
In Attorney-General v Keymer Brick and Tile Co Ltd,447 a further case on public nuisance noted by 
Lord Justice Romer, Joyce J stated: “The only question I have to decide is purely one of fact, 
namely, whether or not what the defendants have done has created or occasioned a public 
nuisance within the neighbourhood of their brickfields.  Now, in law a public nuisance 
need not be injurious to health.  It is not necessary to show that people have been made ill 
by what had been done.  It is sufficient to show that there has been what is called injury to 
their comfort, a material interference with the comfort and convenience of life of the 
persons residing in or coming within the sphere of the influence of that which has been 
                                                
442 [1957] 2 QB 169 at p 182; [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 900. 
443 (1851) 2 Sim NS 133 at p 142 (italics mine). 
444 [1957] 2 QB 169 at pp 182-184, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at pp 900-902. 
445 (1884) 12 QBD 247. 
446 ibid at p 256 (emphasis added). 
447 (1903) 67 JP 434. 
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done by the defendants on their works…”448  The form of injunction granted in that case 
was (so far as relevant) to restrain the defendants from performing specified acts “so as by 
noxious or offensive odours or vapours arising therefrom or otherwise to be or occasion a 
nuisance to the annoyance of persons in the neighbourhood of the defendants’ brickfields 
and lands, or so as to be or become injurious to the public health.” 
 
In Ganim v Smith & Wesson Corp,449 the Supreme Court of Connecticut resolved a case on the 
threshold question of whether the plaintiff mayor and city had standing to assert a claim of 
public nuisance.450  The Connecticut Court in the course of their judgment commented on 
the ambit of a nuisance amounting to a public nuisance at common law:  
“Nuisances are public where they violate public rights, and produce a 
common injury, and where they constitute an obstruction to public 
rights, that is, the rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public…  If 
the annoyance is one that is common to the public generally, then it is a 
public nuisance…  The test is not the number of persons annoyed, but 
the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights.  A 
public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may be 
so circumstanced as to come within its influence.”451 
 
Thus, the case law demonstrates that the term public, for the purposes of sustaining an 
action for a public nuisance, connotes a sphere of operation, a considerable number of 
persons affected, a neighbourhood affected, or citizens generally circumstanced 
within the influence of a public nuisance.  A sporting activity satisfying the first element 
of the offence of public nuisance, namely an interference or endangerment of a public right, 
need not affect everybody, and only needs to impact upon a relatively small number of 
persons to amount to a public nuisance. 
 
                                                
448 Emphasis added. 
449 258 Conn 313, 780 A2d 98 (2001). 
450 ibid at pp 343-344 of the former report. 
451 258 Conn 313 at p 369, quoting Higgins v Connecticut Light & Power Co 129 Conn 606 at p 611, 30 A2d 388 at 
p 391 (1943) (emphasis added). 
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In the case of Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd., Romer LJ was of the view that the 
expression ‘the neighbourhood’ had been regarded as sufficiently defining the area affected 
by a public nuisance.  In support of this he cited Attorney-General v Stone,452 Attorney-General v 
Cole,453 and Attorney-General v Corke.454  His Lordship observed:  
“… [A]ny nuisance is ‘public’ which materially affects the reasonable 
comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects.  
The sphere of the nuisance may be described generally as ‘the 
neighbourhood’; but the question whether the local community within 
that sphere comprises a sufficient number of persons to constitute a 
class of the public is a question of fact in every case.  It is not necessary, 
in my judgment, to prove that every member of the class has been 
injuriously affected; it is sufficient to show that a representative cross-
section of the class has so been affected for an injunction to issue.”455 
 
Lord Justice Denning, as he then was, in concurrence with Romer LJ stated: 
“The question: when do a number of individuals become Her Majesty’s 
subjects generally? is as difficult to answer as the question: when does a 
group of people become a crowd?  Everyone has his own views.  Even 
the answer ‘Two’s company, three’s a crowd’ will not command the 
assent of those present unless they first agree on ‘which two’.  So here I 
decline to answer the question how many people are necessary to make 
up Her Majesty’s subjects generally.  I prefer to look to the reason of the 
thing and to say that a public nuisance is a nuisance which is so 
widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not 
be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own 
responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the 
responsibility of the community at large.”456 
 
                                                
452 (1895) 12 TLR 76. 
453 [1901] 1 Ch 205. 
454 [1933] Ch 89, 48 TLR 650. 
455 [1957] 2 QB 169 at p 184, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 902. 
456 [1957] 2 QB 169 at pp 190-191, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 908. 
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Similar reasoning was adopted by the Supreme Court of New York in State of New York v 
Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc.  In this case, the State brought an action against the defendant 
operators of a motorcar racetrack for abatement of a public nuisance.  In the course of their 
judgment, the court noted: “‘[The] number of persons affected need not be shown to be 
‘very great’…  Enough that so many are touched by the offence and in ways so 
indiscriminate and general that the multiplied annoyance may not unreasonably be classified 
as a wrong to the community.’  ‘[It is a public nuisance] where the location at which and the 
manner in which the [particular operation] is conducted is such that it causes substantial 
annoyance and discomfort indiscriminately to many and diverse persons who are continually 
or may from time to time be in the vicinity.”457 
 
In Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd the nuisance was held to be sufficiently public where 
the inhabitants of about 30 houses (only a limited number of the residents living in the 
community concerned with the nuisance), as well as portions of two public highways, were 
affected by dust and vibration.  The local authority, on relator action, obtained an injunction 
to prevent quarry owners committing a public nuisance by blasting operations that deluged a 
village with dust and stones.  The Court of Appeal held that the question whether the local 
community within the sphere comprised a sufficient number of persons to constitute a class 
of the public was a question of fact in every case, and confirmed that the judge, having 
determined that question against the defendants, had rightly granted the injunction. 
 
What is important to note from the case law cited on this point is that a nuisance does not 
have to affect all the public or even a majority of the public.  All that is required to sustain 
proceedings for a public nuisance is that the offensive or disturbing act, comprising the 
nuisance, is one which indiscriminate in its affects, affecting a neighbourhood or a group of 
people spectating at a sporting event, for example, or a community living in proximity to a 
sports stadium or arena, or any persons who may be exercising a public right within the 
sphere of influence of the purported nuisance.  In such circumstances the common law 
                                                
457 96 Misc 2 d 350 (1978) at p 356 (Conway J), citing People v Rubenfeld 254 NY 245 (1930) at p 247 (Cardozo 
CJ), and Town of Mount Pleasant v Van Tassell 7 Misc 2d 643, 645, aff’d 6 AD 2d 880; People v HST Meth 74 Misc 
2d 920.  See also Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995) where the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York noted likewise (at p 840 of the former report, citing People v Rubenfeld 254 NY 245 
(1930) at p 247). 
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does not require the individuals affected by the nuisance to instigate their own expensive 
litigation to abate or prosecute the nuisance, but, rather, charges the Executive Government 
with the responsibility to prosecute or seek an abatement of the nuisance on their behalf.  In 
Stein v Gonzales,458 at page 265, in dealing with an application by a group of private property 
owners to restrain prostitution activity in their neighbourhood, McLachlin J. stated: “As long 
as the suffering or inconvenience is general, there is no place for independent intervention 
by private citizens.  This rule, which prevents individuals from taking upon themselves the 
role of champions of the public interest, has been said to be established ‘for the purpose of 
preventing oppression by means of a multiplicity of civil actions for the same cause’…”  The 
same result was reached in Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corporation.459   
 
In the case of R v Shorrock,460 where the Crown succeeded in the criminal prosecution of a 
public nuisance, Justice Rattee adopted the comments of Lord Denning and Lord Justice 
Romer in Attorney General v PYA Quarries.  In this case the appellant accepted, as a matter of 
law, that an electronic dance music rave concert carried on on his field, of which he had no 
knowledge, constituted a public nuisance within the definition provided by Romer and 
Denning, LJJ, and that anyone properly found to have been responsible for such nuisance 
could be convicted on indictment of the common law offence of public nuisance.461  The 
judgments of Romer and Denning, LJJ, in Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd, have been 
applied in judgments from various common law countries: R v Madden,462 R v Johnson,463 R v 
                                                
458 (1984) 14 DLR (4th) 263 (British Columbia Supreme Court), citing Sir John W Salmond Salmond & Heuston 
on the Law of Torts (18th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1981) at p 83. 
459 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003).  In that case, the plaintiffs were residents located within 
approximately two miles of a racetrack operated by the defendants.  In the Supreme Court, an order was 
granted prohibiting races, certain preparatory activities and other events from taking place at the speedway on 
Mondays, Tuesdays or Thursdays and directing that noise from all racing related activities not begin prior to 
10:00 a.m. or end later than 11:00 p.m. on the days when racing is permitted.  On appeal, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of New York found that owing to the fact that all persons in the affected 
community would be ‘similarly impacted’ by exposure to ‘unacceptable’ noise levels during the Speedway’s 
activities and owing also to the absence of proof of special injury, the trial court erred in allowing the residents 
to prosecute the action as one to enjoin a public nuisance. 
460 [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698, [1993] 3 All ER 917 (Court of Appeal). 
461 [1993] 3 WLR 698 at p 702. 
462 [1975] 1 WLR 1379, [1975] 3 All ER 155 (Court of Appeal).  The Court held that it was an offence to 
commit a public nuisance by making a bogus telephone call falsely giving information concerning the presence 
of explosives. 
463 [1996] 2 Cr App R 434 (Court of Appeal).  The Court dismissed the appellants appeal against conviction.  
The appellant was rightly convicted of a public nuisance by making numerous telephone calls to numerous 
women on numerous occasions over a six year period.  It was a nuisance because the Court was satisfied that 
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Shorrock,464 R v Goldstein, R v R.,465 and R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein,466 in Bathurst City Council v 
Saban (No 2),467 Vincent v Peacock,468 and in Attorney-General for Ontario v Orange Productions 
Ltd.469  In British Columbia (Attorney General) v Haney Speedways Ltd.,470 the dicta of Romer and 
Denning LJJ was applied and the operation of a speedway on which the sport of motorcar 
racing was conducted on a Sunday was held to be a public nuisance entitling permanent 
injunction.  Seven neighbouring families gave evidence that their Sundays were made 
hideous by the operation of the speedway.471  The British Columbia Supreme Court held that 
these seven families comprised a sufficient number of persons to constitute a class of the 
public, and the Attorney-General was entitled to an injunction against operation of the 
speedway as being a public nuisance in that there was “an inconvenience materially 
interfering with the ordinary physical comfort of human existence, according to plain and 
sober and simple notions obtaining among the people of this Province.”472 
 
 
 
 
                                                
the telephone calls had been so widespread in their range that it would not have been reasonable to expect one 
person to take proceedings on her own behalf. 
464 [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698, [1993] 3 All ER 917 (Court of Appeal). 
465 [2003] EWCA Crim 3450 at paras [5]-[6], [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 2881. 
466 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [18] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982. 
467 (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (Supreme Court of New South Wales Equity Division) BC8601183 at 5.  The Court 
held that excess rubbish on private land was a public nuisance for which an injunction ought to be granted.  
Justice Young stated, at BC8601183 at 6: “In my view, if there is a private nuisance involved, that private 
nuisance would be so wide-spread as to be actionable as a public nuisance.  The evidence clearly shows that not 
only are a whole block of approximately 16 houses affected by the defendants’ activities, but that the range is 
wider than that so that there is a site within five blocks of Bathurst City Centre which is passed by a great 
number of Her Majesty’s subjects and which, according to the evidence, has become an objectionable eyesore 
and talking-point.  Furthermore, it is quite clear from the evidence, whether justified or not, the neighbours are 
frightened of the defendants and have the view that were they to speak to him about the matter or take action 
against him individually, there might be adverse repercussions. The reasonableness of this apprehension is 
reinforced by the fact that there is evidence that threats have been made to Council officers of physical violence 
when they have entered the defendants’ land.” 
468 [1973] 1 NSWLR 466 (New South Wales Court of Appeal). 
469 [1971] 21 DLR (3d) 257 (Ontario High Court).  The Court granted an injunction to restrain the holding of 
an outdoor rock concert at which some 30,000 people attended causing trespass to private property, excessive 
noise and dust and traffic congestion affecting a small community.  Chief Justice Wells commented, at p 269: 
“In my opinion, the whole festival with the weight of numbers and the noise and the dust, was a painful and 
troublesome experience for all those living in the neighbourhood and was, in fact, a social disaster to those who 
normally live there.” 
470 [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme Court). 
471 ibid at p 54. 
472 ibid. 
 156 
2. Summary 
 
It is not the number of people affected by a public nuisance which makes a public nuisance 
offence.  Rather, a public nuisance is made out if a public right – such as those public rights 
enumerated in public nuisance judgments, the public right to use of public places for 
recreation,473 or the public right to quietude474 – is impinged upon.  R v Rimmington, R v 
Goldstein475 refers to the need for common injury.  City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation476 
refers to transgression of a right common to the general public, such as transgression of 
rights of public health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, or public convenience. 
 
A nuisance does not have to affect the entire public in order to amount to a public nuisance.  
It is sufficient, as a matter of law if the nuisance affects only seven families,477 or sixteen 
households,478 or thirty households.479  This is an important aspect of common law public 
nuisance caselaw, and is particularly relevant when considering the application of public 
nuisance to the human activity of sport.  A sport event which is staged on public beaches, or 
public roads, such as a triathlon race, a road cycling race, or a marathon, need only create an 
obstruction, inconvenience or annoyance to as few as seven households or to a small group 
of beachgoers.  It is sufficient if the nuisance is indiscriminate in its’ operation affecting a 
relatively small number of persons on whose behalf the Executive, as parens patriae, ought to 
institute proceedings to prosecute or abate it. 
                                                
473 See Hue v Whiteley [1929] I Ch 440 at p 445 cited with approval in Jones v Bates [1938] 2 All ER 237 at p 241 
(Slesser LJ), at p 245 (Scott LJ); Attorney-General and Newton Abbot RDC v Dyer [1947] Ch 67 at p 85.  And see R 
v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Braim The Times, 11 October 1986, where McCullough J held that 
a public right of recreation can be created at common law based on long user, in the instant case being use of a 
common over many years for recreative activities such as walking, jogging, flying kites and model aeroplanes, 
picnicking and ball games and French cricket.  And see, further, North Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v Sutherland 
Shire Council [1999] NSWCA 438 at para [4] citing with approval Brodie v Mann [1885] 10 App Cas 378, Poole v 
Huskinson (1843) 11 M & W 830, 152 ER 1039, and R v Oxfordshire County Council; ex parte Sunningwell Parish 
Council [1999] UKHL 28, [1999] 3 WLR 160 at p 168, cited at paras [5] and [6] in North Cronulla Precinct 
Committee (Sheller JA). 
474 See Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345; Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] 
CanLII 7509 (Ontario Supreme Court). 
475 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [12] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982. 
476 213 Ill 2d 351 (2004) at pp 369-70. 
477 Attorney General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme 
Court). 
478 Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity 
Division, 13 March 1986) BC8601183 at 5. 
479 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, [1957] 1 All ER 894. 
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At common law, sports ought to be conducted in such manner so as not to amount to an 
annoyance, disturbance, inconvenience or obstruction, or dangerous to the public peace, to a 
relatively small representative cross-section of the community.  Applying this aspect of the 
law of public nuisance to the occurrence of violent and riotous activity at a football game, 
such as that between South Melbourne and Preston on 17th April, 2005,480 for example, we 
may rightly conclude that the 9,000 or so spectators at the game comprise a number of 
people, a class of Her Majesty’s subjects, on whose behalf the Executive might take action.  
The riot, being caused by some of the fans of the football clubs who are brought together 
into a highly charged environment by the holding of the sport event, may be an act which is 
an endangerment to public safety.  The actions of participants in the riot or violent conduct, 
including the invasion of the sport pitch and the use of darts and bottles as weapons, may be 
correctly held to be widespread in its range and indiscriminate in its affect, to adopt the 
words of Lord Justice Denning in Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd.  The 9,000 or so 
spectators, no doubt comprising women and children, as well as hooligans, may constitute a 
class of the public.  But it is not the fact of whether it is 9,000 or nine spectators.  A public 
nuisance is made out if there is endangerment to a public right such as public safety.  The 
acts at the football stadium may be a public nuisance because they injure the public right to 
safety, because citizens generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within the riotous 
or violent influence may be harmed, whether such injury is connoted by physical injuries 
incurred by flying rockets and bottles, or by fear for one’s safety, or otherwise. 
 
In a different scenario, the long queues which have formed annually outside on Church 
Road, Wimbledon, outside the Wimbledon tennis compound where the Wimbledon 
Championship tennis tournament is staged, need only inconvenience or cause obstruction to 
as few as seven households.  It may well be that such a queue amounts to a public nuisance 
at common law, which public nuisance is correctly enjoined at the suit of the Attorney 
General.  The appropriation of the footpath by hopeful attendees to the tennis tournament, 
desirous of a ticket, with such persons camped on the footpath, and often sleeping 
overnight, or over a number of days, eating, and staking out their place in the queue, on the 
public footpath, over a considerable number of hours and days, may amount to a public 
                                                
480 See n 24, above, and the accompanying text. 
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nuisance being an obstruction to the highway or being an inconvenience to as few as seven 
households representative of the public.  And again a public nuisance might be made out not 
because the queue contains 9,000 or because 9,000 people are affected by the formation of 
the queue.  A public nuisance might be made out because a public right is impinged, namely 
a public right of way on the highway (including the pavement, sidewalk, or footpath), and 
this public right of way cannot be exercised by members of the public. 
 
And what of our beachgoing family – our family whose Sunday recreation is precipitately 
interrupted by a sports event promoter desiring to stage a triathlon, a surfing tournament, a 
beach cricket match, or a surf-lifesaving championship event on the beach?  This family, in 
conjunction with other individuals or families on the beach in question would satisfy the 
term “public” under the definition of public nuisance.  These families and individuals on the 
beach experience a “common injury” and come within the “sphere of influence” of the 
public sporting activity.  And again, it is not the number of people on the beach who are 
affected by the staging of the sport event on the beach which justifies a public nuisance suit.  
Rather, it is the fact that a public right to use of a public place is affected by such sport 
events which leads to a public nuisance being created.  Our beachgoing family is but a 
symbol or representation of the impingement of public rights.   They may obtain redress yet. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The mental element of the common law offence of public nuisance 
 
 
It is a presumption of the common law that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal 
offence except where Parliament has expressly provided to the contrary by clear and 
unambiguous language or where the presumption is excluded by necessary implication.481  
“The general rule as to mens rea is clear and plain.  It is a well established rule of the common 
law that an act is not criminal unless it is the product of a guilty mind.”482 
 
The common law principle as to mens rea has been stated by Sir Frederick Jordan in R v 
Turnbull,483 with whom Davidson and Street, JJ, concurred, and which was affirmed by 
Brennan, J, of the High Court of Australia in He Kaw The v R484: “…assuming his mind to be 
sufficiently normal for him to be capable of criminal responsibility, it is also necessary at 
common law for the prosecution to prove that he knew that he was doing the criminal act 
which is charged against him, that is, that he knew that all the facts constituting the 
ingredients necessary to make the act criminal were involved in what he was doing.”  
                                                
481 See Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (House of Lords); Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong 
[1985] 1 AC 1 (Privy Council); R v O’Connor (1980) 29 ALR 449 (High Court of Australia); He Kaw The v R 
(1985) 157 CLR 523 (High Court of Australia) (Gibbs CJ, Mason J, agreeing, and Brennan J).  In Bank of New 
South Wales v Piper [1897] AC 383 at pp 389-90, their Lordships said: “It was strongly urged by the respondent’s 
counsel that in order to the constitution of a crime, whether common law or statutory, there must be mens rea 
on the part of the accused, and that he may avoid conviction by showing that such mens did not exist.  That is 
a proposition which their Lordships do not desire to dispute…”  In R v O’Connor (1980) 29 ALR 449 at p 472, 
146 CLR 64 at pp 96-7, Justice Stephen stated the modern approach to mens rea: “As Stephen J pointed out in 
R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 187: ‘The full definition of every crime contains expressly or by implication a 
proposition as to a state of mind.  Therefore, if the mental element of any conduct alleged to be a crime is 
proved to have been absent in any given case, the crime so defined is not committed…’” 
482 R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108 at p 109 (Jordan CJ) 
483 (1943) 44 SR(NSW) 108 at p 109. 
484 (1985) 157 CLR 523 at p 572. 
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However, recklessness may be a sufficient mental element of some offences, and there is no 
single mental element that is common to all offences.485 
 
In the guiding case of Sherras v De Rutzen,486 applied in Sweet v Parsley,487 Gammon (Hong Kong) 
Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong,488 R v O’Connor,489 and He Kaw The v R,490 it was stated by 
Wright J that: “There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is 
liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the 
subject-matter with which it deals…”491  His Lordship, noting that there were other isolated 
and extreme cases, stated that the principal classes of exceptions to the rule that mens rea 
must be established in statutory as well as common law offences may be reduced to three: (1) 
where the acts were not criminal in any real sense, but were acts which in the public interest 
are prohibited under a penalty, e.g., statutes treating as prohibited the innocent possession of 
adulterated food or tobacco; (2) acts constituting public nuisances;492 and (3) where the 
proceeding though criminal in form, is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil 
right.493 
 
In Pregelj and Wurramura v Manison,494 Justice Nader, in the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory of Australia, in reference to Justice Wright’s summation that the common law 
offence of public nuisance might be an exception to the rule that mens rea applied to all 
criminal offences, commented, obiter, that: “It is to be noticed that Wright J did not assert 
unequivocally that mens rea did not apply to all public nuisance cases.  The cases referred to 
by Wright J are significant because they seem to have helped to propagate the learning that 
                                                
485 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (House of Lords) at p 162 (Lord Diplock). 
486 (1895) 1 QB 918. 
487 [1970] AC 132 (House of Lords). 
488 [1985] 1 AC 1 (Privy Council). 
489 (1980) 29 ALR 449 (High Court of Australia). 
490 (1985) 157 CLR 523 (High Court of Australia). 
491 (1895) 1 QB 918 at p 921. 
492 Justice Wright’s actual words in Sherras v De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918 at p 921, concerning the public nuisance 
cases were: “Another class comprehends some, and perhaps all, public nuisances.  In R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 
QB 702, 7 B & S 710, where the employer was held liable on indictment for a nuisance caused by workmen 
without his knowledge and contrary to his orders; and it was so in R v Medley (1834) 6 C & P 292 and Barnes v 
Akroyd (1872) LR 7 QB 474.” 
493 (1895) 1 QB 918 at p 921. 
494 [1987] NTSC 76 at para [31], (1987) 51 NTR 1. 
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public nuisance cases form one of the groups of cases in which mens rea is attenuated: see eg, 
Norley v Malthouse (1924) SASR 268 at 269-270; Normandale v Brassey (1970) SASR 177 at 
182…”  His Honour continued: “The policy reasons for prosecutions for public nuisance… 
were clearly intended to ensure that persons with the capacity in the course of their industrial 
or business undertakings to cause significant detriment to large numbers of the public should 
run their undertakings in peril of punishment if they failed to take proper precautions to 
prevent the detriment from occurring.” 
 
In the judgment of R v Shorrock, 495 the Court of Appeal for England and Wales dealt with the 
mental element in the common law offence of public nuisance expressly.  The court held 
that mens rea was a requirement of the offence of public nuisance; and that it is enough that 
the defendant knew or ought to have known that a nuisance would be caused.496  Sir John Smith 
notes, of this case, that, “in effect that the offence is one of negligence.”497  In R v Shorrock, 
the appellant granted a license for the weekend use of his field on which the licensees held 
an ‘acid house party’ music event attended by between 3,000 and 5,000 people, each paying 
£15 to attend the event.  The event was publicised on local radio and in posters.  Marquees 
were erected on the field; electricity generators and load speakers were placed about the field.  
Police became aware of the event and, fearing public disturbance, successfully obtained an 
                                                
495 [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698, [1993] 3 All ER 917 (Court of Appeal).  R v Shorrock was approved and 
followed by the United Kingdom  House of Lords in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at paras 
[21], [35] and [56] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill)(Lord Roger of Earlsferry), [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982.  
Lord Roger of Earlsferry stated in R v Rimmington: “Particularly having regard to the essentially regulatory nature 
of much of the law of public nuisance, it seems to me that, even if it is unusual, the mens rea described in 
Shorrock is apt in situations where the offence truly applies. I would accept the reasoning in Shorrock.” (at para 
[56]).  Subsequent to this case, the United Kingdom Parliament passed legislation to outlaw the activities the 
subject of this case: see, ss 61-71 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK). 
496 This holding was approved and followed in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [39] (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill) and at para [56] (Lord Roger of Earlsferry), [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982.  The 
decision is Shorrock is consistent with the decision of the Privy Council in Wagon Mound (No 2), Overseas Tankship 
(UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship [1967] 1 AC 617, [1966] 3 WLR 498.  That case concerned a suit for damages in 
nuisance and negligence.  The appellants had committed a public nuisance in discharging oil into Sydney 
Harbour.  The oil subsequently caught fire and caused extensive damage to the respondents’ vessels.  Lord Reid 
stated, at p 644 of the former report: “In the present case the evidence shows that the discharge of so much oil 
on to the water must have taken a considerable time, and a vigilant ship’s engineer would have noticed the 
discharge at an early stage.  The findings show that he ought to have known that it is possible to ignite this kind 
of oil on water, and that the ship’s engineer probably ought to have known that this had in fact happened 
before.  The most that can be said to justify inaction is that he would have known that this could only happen 
in very exceptional circumstances; but that does not mean that a reasonable man would dismiss such risk from 
his mind and do nothing when it was so easy to prevent it.  If it is clear that the reasonable man would have 
realised or foreseen and prevented the risk, then it must follow that the appellants are liable in damages.” 
(emphasis added). 
497 Sir John Smith (ed) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8th edn Butterworths London 1996) at p 775. 
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injunction from the High Court to restrain the holding of the event.  The police caused the 
injunction to be read aloud at the site, to little effect.  The appellant was not present 
during any part of the event held on his field.  The local police received 275 telephone 
complaints from residents who were disturbed by the noise generated by music played and 
by speech relayed over a public address system that was installed on the field. 
 
The appellant was charged with the common law offence of public nuisance.  The appellant 
accepted that a public nuisance had been caused, but denied that he had had the requisite 
knowledge to be criminally liable.  At trial the judge directed the jury that in order to convict 
the defendant they had to be sure that he either knew or ought to have known of the risk of a 
public nuisance being caused by his licensees.  The jury convicted the defendant.  He was 
fined £2,500.  On appeal to the Court of Appeal for England and Wales, the issue concerned 
the requisite mens rea, which the Crown had to prove to establish guilt.  Giving the judgment 
of a Court of Appeal which also included Simon Brown LJ and Popplewell J, Rattee J 
reviewed the authorities and concluded that the requisite mental element of the common law 
offence of public nuisance was that elucidated by the House in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan 
[1940] AC 880: the appellant was guilty of the offence charged, “if either he knew or he 
ought to have known, in the sense that the means of knowledge were available to him, that 
there was a real risk that the consequences of the licence granted by him in respect of his 
field would be to create the sort of nuisance that in fact occurred.”498 Actual knowledge of 
the nuisance need not be established to prove the offence.499 
 
In reaching their decision on the mens rea of public nuisance, the Court of Appeal in R v 
Shorrock applied R v Moore,500 a sporting case in which the defendant was indicted, and found 
guilty, of a public nuisance.  In R v Moore, the defendant maintained a rifle shooting range, at 
which people shot at fixed targets and at pigeons, on land abutting the public highway.  A 
large number of people congregated outside the defendant’s land on the public highway in 
order to shoot the pigeons which escaped from the guns on the defendant’s land.  The 
                                                
498 [1994] QB 279 at p 289; approved by the House of Lords in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at 
para [21] and [39] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and para [56] (Lord Roger of Earlsferry), [2006] 1 AC 459, 
[2005] 3 WLR 982. 
499 [1993] 3 WLR 698 at p 706. 
500 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184. 
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defendant was indicted for the resultant public nuisance.  Lord Tenterden CJ directed the 
jury in the sense that the defendant was responsible for the activities of the people gathering 
on the highway.  He gave leave, however, for the defendant to argue the point in the Court 
of Kings Bench.  In the course of his judgment in that court, Lord Tenterden CJ said at page 
188: “If a person collects together a crowd of people to the annoyance of his neighbours, 
that is a nuisance for which he is answerable.  And this is an old principle.”  Littledale J was 
of the opinion that a public nuisance is caused if the obstruction or interference with the 
rights of the public is the probable consequence of his act, though not actually intended: 
“It has been contended that to render the defendant liable, it must be his 
object to create a nuisance, or else that must be the necessary and 
inevitable result of his act.  No doubt it was not his object, but I do not 
agree with the other position; because if it be the probable consequence 
of his act, he is answerable as if it were his actual object.  If the 
experience of mankind must lead any one to expect the result, he will be 
answerable for it.”501 
 
The mental element of the common law offence of public nuisance is now settled, following 
the decision of the United Kingdom House of Lords in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein.  The 
House approved and followed Shorrock stating: “the correct test was that laid down by the 
Court of Appeal in R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279, 289, that the defendant is responsible for a 
nuisance which he knew, or ought to have known (because the means of knowledge were 
available to him), would be the consequence of what he did or omitted to do.”502 
 
In applying the mental element requirement of the offence of public nuisance to the human 
activity of sport it is clear, from the cited authorities, that a sports organisation, for example, 
or the directors of such sports organisation, or the proprietor of a sports arena, may be liable 
for a public nuisance offence where a sporting event creates or causes an interference with 
or obstruction to the public exercising their public rights such as a right of way on the 
highway (R v Moore) or a right to quietude (R v Shorrock; Dewar) or a right to safety (Gleeson).  
If a sports organisation or sports promoter fails to do something which they ought to have 
                                                
501 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184 at p 188. 
502 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [39], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982.  See also at para [56]. 
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done to protect public safety in staging, managing or conducting a public sporting event, 
they will be liable for a public nuisance offence.  Following Shorrock and Rimmington such 
persons are liable if they either know or ought to know (because the means of knowledge 
were available to them) that staging a particular sporting event, or staging a sporting event at 
a certain time or a certain place, or staging a sport event involving particular teams whose 
supporters are prone to violent acts, compromises public safety.  This reasoning justified the 
finding that the use of a golf hole on a golf course adjacent a public highway constituted a 
public nuisance when a golf ball was hit on to the highway, injuring a driver of a car.  It is 
not the intention of the purpetrator of a public nuisance which justifies a finding of public 
nuisance, but rather the effect of the purpetrators actions on the public, even when the 
perpetrator is being careful.  In Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc, the court stated : “A 
nuisance does not rest upon the degree of care used, but on the degree of danger existing 
even with the best of care.”503   
 
A sports organisation or sports promoter will be liable if their publicly exhibited sport event 
impinges on public rights of quietude, such as occurred in the case of Dewar.  They will be 
liable if their publicly exhibited sport event obstructs or causes inconvenience to the public 
exercising a public right of way on the highway, such as occurred in Johnson v City of New 
York.  Sports organisations, directors, promoters, administrators, and professional athletes 
do not have to intend to create a public nuisance, nor do they have to intend to obstruct or 
interfere with public rights.  It is sufficient that they ought to have known that their acts or 
omissions would impinge public rights. 
 
In a beach scenario, the sports organisation, sports promoter or professional athlete may be 
liable for a public nuisance offence if they either know or ought to know (because the means 
of knowledge are available to them) that staging their sport event on the beach impinges on 
the public’s right to use of that beach or the foreshore for their recreation. 
                                                
503 148 Misc 246 (1933) at p 254. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Remedies against a public nuisance 
 
 
1. Remedy at the plaint of the Crown 
 
The proper course in an action for a public nuisance was for an indictment to be preferred 
against the offender.504  Sir John Smith records in Criminal Law that: “Public nuisance is a 
misdemeanour at common law triable either way (citing Criminal Law Act 1977 (UK), s. 16 
and Sch 2.)”505  The person who commits a common law public nuisance, where such 
nuisance is not codified, incurs liability to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and 
unlimited fines.506  But criminal prosecution of common law public nuisances virtually died 
as a method for dealing with nuisances during the nineteenth century.507 
 
In addition to the criminal sanction, a person who commits a public nuisance can be ordered 
to stop it by an injunction, and made to pay damages in tort if it causes anyone loss.  From 
the mid-nineteenth century a unique procedure developed whereby a relator action or ex 
officio action in Chancery might be brought by the Attorney-General to secure an injunction.  
This procedure developed because of the inherent difficulties in prosecuting corporations 
for common law crimes.  The Attorney-General, or another Minister of the Crown, as a 
trustee of the public interest, brings such proceedings either on his own initiative or on the 
                                                
504 See Note (1465) YB Pas 5 Edw IV, f 2, pl 4 (Heydon), noted in JH Baker English Legal History (Butterworths 
London 1990) at p 493. 
505 Sir John Smith (ed) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8th edn Butterworths London 1996) at p 772; (10th edn 
Butterworths London 2002) at p 772. 
506 For a critical examination of the history and contemporary relevance of the crime of public nuisance, see 
further JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55 at pp 56-66 and 76-80. 
507 ibid, at p 71. 
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‘relation’ of persons affected.508  The more popular remedy for the crime of public nuisance, 
and the usual method of repressing it, is not prosecution in the criminal courts, but 
injunction issued in the civil courts.509  This makes the common law crime of public nuisance 
a unique remedy, at the insistence of the Executive branch of government, for acts or 
omissions odious or harmful to public rights.  It is a unique remedy for acts or omissions in 
sport, which may be odious or harmful to public rights. 
 
Russell on Crimes notes that the remedies for public nuisances are: 
(1) Indictment, or, in exceptional cases, criminal information, at the instance of the 
Attorney-General, or by leave of the High Court; 
(2) Action by the Attorney-General, where an injunction is desired to put an end to a 
public nuisance, whereby the proceeding is on behalf of the Crown or those who 
enjoy its prerogative or for a public wrong (citing Attorney-General v Logan [1891] 2 
QB 100; Attorney-General v Hanwell UDC [1900] 2 Ch 377; London County Council v 
Attorney-General [1902] AC 165).  The Attorney-General may sue ex officio or ex 
relatione, the relator being made co-plaintiff where practicable.  Such proceedings are 
usually taken in the Chancery Division, but occasionally in the King’s Bench 
Division of the High Court.510 
(3) Summary proceedings, where a statute defines the nuisance, or prescribes or 
allows a summary remedy.511 
 
Any Minister of the Crown – not only the Attorney-General – may sue for an abatement of a 
public nuisance.  This was the express holding in Victoria v Second Comet Pty Ltd.512  In 
contesting the claim for public nuisance the defendants argued that the State of Victoria, as 
                                                
508 For a chronicle of the relator action as an alternative to prosecution, see JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A 
Critical Examination’ (1989) CLJ 55 at pp 66-73.  Note, however, that any Minister or Agency of the Crown 
may maintain an action to abate a public nuisance.  This was the express holding in Victoria v Second Comet Pty 
Ltd (Supreme Court of Victoria, 7691 of 1992, 21 December 1994) BC9405877 at paras [25]-[26]. 
509 ibid at p 66. 
510 Attorney-General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346 is a modern example of a relator action 
brought in respect of a public nuisance constituted by excessive user of a public way in Queensland.  Attorney-
General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003) is a modern example of an 
ex officio action brought in respect of a public nuisance alleged to be constituted by the manufacture and 
distribution of firearms in New York. 
511 See JW Cecil Turner (ed) Russell on Crimes (10th edn Stevens & Sons London 1950) vol I, at pp 1670-1671. 
512 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 7691 of 1992, 21 December 1994) BC9405877 at paras [25]-[26]. 
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plaintiff had no standing to sue for public nuisance.  They relied upon the authority of 
Wallasey Local Board v Gracie,513 wherein Sterling J said at page 597: “It is well settled that no 
person can sue in respect of public nuisance, except either the Attorney-General, or a person 
suffering particular damage.”  The respective agency of the State of Victoria bringing the 
action was a Major Projects Unit of the Land Authority.  It was argued that Wallasey Local 
Board v Gracie was distinguishable because that case involved an attempt by a local authority 
to sue for abatement of a public nuisance.  In the instant case, the Crown itself was the 
litigant.  Justice Coldrey noted that: “In this State, pursuant to s 22 of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1958, the Crown could itself sue and be sued under the title ‘State of 
Victoria’.  In these circumstances it would be quite unnecessary and legally superfluous for 
there to be a requirement that the Attorney-General - an officer of the Crown - be a party to 
a suit at the relation of the Crown.  Indeed, it was asserted that the maxim maxis continet minus 
(the greater contains the lesser) applied.”  His Honour concluded: “Whilst I was referred to 
no specific Australian authority on this point I find the plaintiff’s submission to be 
persuasive.  If it were otherwise one might be faced with the extraordinary situation of an 
Attorney-General, as an officer of the Crown, refusing to consent to relator proceedings 
which the Crown sought to instigate.  Accordingly I regard the plaintiff as having the 
requisite standing to pursue its claim.” 
 
Injunctions and declarations are customarily sought in public law suits in order to enforce an 
obligation.  An injunction may be sought to enforce statute law – such as in restraining a 
public authority from acting ultra vires and in aid of rights conferred by that statute, which are 
unlikely to be proprietary rights – or to enforce common law obligations.514  Declarations 
may be sought together with injunctions in order to have a court state with finality the nature 
of the legal rights and obligations in dispute.515  The Executive of government has made use 
of both the civil remedy516 and criminal prosecution517 in recent years in remedying public 
nuisances. 
                                                
513 (1887) 36 Ch 593. 
514 D Maclean ‘Injunctions’ in P Parkinson (ed) Principles of Equity (LBC Sydney 1996) at pp 620, 632. 
515 J Stuckey-Clarke ‘Declarations’ in P Parkinson (ed) Principles of Equity (ibid) at p 843. 
516 Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003); Attorney-General 
(ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346; Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169 
(Court of Appeal). 
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2. Decision to sue is not reviewable 
 
The Crown – acting through their Attorney-General or another Minister – may make a 
determination to sue to abate a public nuisance in the affirmative or negative.  The decision 
of the Crown is not reviewable at common law.  In Little v State of Victoria,518 the Court of 
Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria noted, at paragraph [19]: 
“The decision of the Attorney-General whether or not to give consent to 
the initiation of a relator action resides exclusively in the Attorney-
General, and a refusal of consent is binding and not open to question in 
the courts: See London City Council v Attorney-General [1902] AC 165 at 
168-169 per the Earl of Halsbury, LC; and Gouriet at 478-9.  One of the 
justifications for this principle is that the decisions to be made as to the 
public interest are not such as courts are fitted or equipped to make and, 
since they are apt to attract political criticism and controversy, are 
outside the range of discretionary problems which the courts can 
resolve.” 
 
Similarly, the decision of the Attorney-General on whether to grant consent to a relator 
action is not reviewable.  The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held in Gouriet v Union 
of Post Office Workers, by a majority (Lawton and Ormrod LJJ) that the court had no power to 
review the decision of the Attorney-General in refusing consent to relator proceedings.519  
This principle was upheld on appeal, Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords stating:  
“For the proposition that [the Attorney-General’s] only concern is to 
‘filter out’ vexations and frivolous proceedings, there is no authority – 
indeed, there is no need for the Attorney-General to do what is well 
within the power of the court.  On the contrary he has the right, and the 
duty, to consider the public interest generally and widely.  It was this 
                                                
517 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982; R v Shorrock [1993] 3 
WLR 698; R v Ong [2001] 1 Cr App R(S) 404; R v Ruffell (1991) 13 Cr App R (S) 204. 
518 [1999] VSCA 113. 
519 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 474. 
 169 
consideration which led to the well known pronouncement of the Earl 
of Halsbury LC in 1902, for the suggestion was being made that the 
court could enquire whether, when the Attorney-General had consented 
to relator proceedings, the public had a material interest in the subject 
matter of the suit.  ‘…The initiation of the litigation, and the 
determination of the question whether it is a proper case for the 
Attorney-General to proceed in, is a matter entirely beyond the 
jurisdiction of this or any other court.  It is a question which the law of 
this country has made to reside exclusively in the Attorney-General’ 
(LCC v Attorney-General [1902] AC 165 at pp 168-69 per Earl of Halsbury 
LC, at p 170 per Lord Macnaghten).  To limit this passage to a case 
where the Attorney-General has given his consent (as opposed to a case 
where he refuses consent) goes beyond legitimate distinction: it ignores 
the force of the words ‘whether he ought to initiate litigation… or not’ 
(at p 168).  It is the decision on the public interest that is binding 
whichever direction that takes.  That a refusal is binding had never been 
contested; that it was so was explicitly decided in firm terms in relation 
to the fiat in Ex parte Newton (1855) 4 E & B 869, a case cited to but not 
noticed by the Court of Appeal.”520 
 
 
3. Only the Crown may sue to abate a public nuisance and protect public rights 
 
In Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers,521 an individual member of the public, complaining of 
a threatened breach of the criminal law, sought the consent of the Attorney-General for 
institution of relator action proceedings.  The Attorney-General refused his consent.  The 
question for the United Kingdom House of Lords was whether an individual was entitled to 
proceed in a claim for declaratory relief and interim injunction without asserting special 
interest or damage and in spite of the refusal of the Attorney-General to consent to the use 
                                                
520 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 478 (Lord Wilberforce). 
521 [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 (House of Lords), followed in Byrnes v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2002] 
NSWSC 658 at para [8]; followed in Little v State of Victoria [1999] VCSA 113 at para [18] (Supreme Court of 
Victoria Court of Appeal). 
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of his name in relator proceedings.  The House held that only the Attorney-General could 
sue on behalf of the public for the purpose of preventing public wrongs and that a private 
individual could not do so on behalf of the public; though he might be able to do so if he 
would sustain special and particular injury as a result of a public wrong.  The House held, 
further, that the court had jurisdiction to declare public rights but only at the suit of the 
Attorney-General, ex officio or ex relatione, since he was the only person recognised by public 
law as entitled to represent the public in a court.  In passing judgment, Lord Diplock 
referred to “the exclusive right of the Attorney-General to represent the public interest in 
litigation.”522  Lord Wilberforce declared that, “the exclusive right of the Attorney-General to 
represent the public interest” was not technical, procedural or fictional but “constitutional”, 
even where individuals “might be interested in a larger view of the matter.”523  Further, his 
Lordship stated:  
“A relator action – a type of action which has existed from the earliest 
times – is one in which the Attorney-General, on the relation of 
individuals (who may include local authorities or companies) brings an 
action to assert a public right.  It can properly be said to be a 
fundamental principle of English law that private rights can be asserted 
by individuals, but that public rights can only be asserted by the 
Attorney-General as representing the public.  In terms of constitutional 
law, the rights of the public are vested in the Crown, and the Attorney-
General enforces them as an officer of the Crown.  And just as the 
Attorney-General has in general no power to interfere with the assertion 
of private rights, so in general no private person has the right of 
representing the public in the assertion of public rights.”524   
 
Argument was also raised in Gouriet that the Attorney-General’s role in relator suits for 
abatement of public nuisances was fictitious, because the Attorney-General did not run such 
cases.  This argument was made to support the principle contention that the Attorney-
General’s refusal of consent to a relator action by Mr Gouriet was reviewable in the courts.  
                                                
522 [1978] AC 435 at p 500. 
523 ibid at p 481.  
524 ibid at p 477, followed in Little v State of Victoria [1999] VSCA 113, BC9904478. 
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To this Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords responded: “But the Attorney-General’s 
role has never been fictional.  His position in relator actions is the same as it is in actions 
brought without a relator (with the sole exception that the relator is liable for costs: AG v 
Lockermouth Local Board LR 18 Eq 172, 176, per Jessel MR).  He is entitled to see and approve 
the statement of claim, and any amendment in the pleadings, he is entitled to be consulted 
on discovery, the suit cannot be compromised without his approval; if the relator dies, the 
suit does not abate.”525  Lord Edmund-Davies stated similarly, albeit more emphatically:  
“In his seminal work (The Law Officers of the Crown, 1964, pp 286-295) 
Professor John Edwards discussed the ancestry of the modern relator 
action and the suggestion that it originated from the procedure whereby 
the Attorney-General, representing the Crown as parens patriae, would 
proceed by way of information to enforce rights of a charitable nature 
for the benefit of interested persons.  Nowadays, he says, at p 288: ‘In 
effect, a relator’s action in form is simply a suit brought by the Attorney-
General at the relation, or instance, of some other person.  Although the 
Attorney-General is the nominal plaintiff in the action, in reality the 
action is brought by the complainant.  Once the consent of the 
Attorney-General is obtained, the actual conduct of the proceedings is 
entirely in the hands of the relator, who is responsible for the costs of 
the action’.  These features led Ormrod LJ ([1977] 1 WLR 344D) to say 
that, ‘…there is a fictional element in these relator actions’.  But the 
reality is that having consented, the Attorney-General nevertheless 
remains dominus litis.  Contrary to certain observations in Attorney-General 
v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 3 De GM & G 304, the Attorney-
General not only can, but does, scrutinize and criticize draft pleadings, 
and directs what interlocutory steps should be taken.  And it is 
undoubted law that he can continue relator proceedings even though the 
relator has died, and that no compromise can be arrived at without his 
concurrence.  His role is, accordingly, far from purely fictional, and it is 
not easy to see why Ormrod LJ described the relator procedure as 
                                                
525 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 478 (Lord Wilberforce). 
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‘obsolete’.  On the contrary, it remains a well nurtured, vigorous and 
useful plant.”526 
 
The Attorney-General’s role in relator actions for public nuisance is indelibly clear.  A 
distinction should be heeded between the court’s jurisdiction in relation to the Attorney-
General’s special functions and powers when he is acting as parens patriae on behalf of the 
Crown and in the exercise of a prerogative power, and the court’s exercise of greater control 
over the executive through judicial review of administrative action, such as in Laker Airways 
Ltd v Department of Trade.527  If the individual, who can show no special interest in a public 
nuisance, could take over the Attorney-General’s constitutional role it would be an 
interference with his exercise of a prerogative power.  In Gouriet, in the Court of Appeal for 
England and Wales, the Attorney-General himself submitted: “The function of the Attorney 
General here in issue is one of many functions of a discretionary character exercised only by 
him, divorced from the collective responsibility of ministers in government.  Some are 
statutory, such as the grant or withholding of his fiat for certain types of prosecution; others 
are of ancient origin, such as his power to go to the court ex officio, his relator function, and 
his power to bring before the court matters which he asks the court to say are contempt of 
court.  The common factor in the exercise of those functions is his answerability to 
Parliament alone and not to the courts.”528 
 
The principle underscoring the judgments in Gouriet is that the Executive arm of government 
– whether acting through their Attorney-General or through some other Cabinet Minister or 
Secretary – performs a unique role in protecting public rights through ex officio or ex relatione 
proceedings.  This unique role is one founded on constitutional law principles, as Lord 
Wilberforce reminds us in Gouriet: “The Attorney-General’s right to seek, in the civil courts, 
anticipatory prevention of a breach of the law, is a part or aspect of his general power to 
enforce, in the public interest, public rights.  The distinction between public rights, which the 
Attorney-General can and the individual (absent special interest) cannot seek to enforce, and 
                                                
526 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 508 (Lord Edmund-Davies). 
527 [1977] QB 643. 
528 [1977] QB 729, at p 742; [1977] 1 All ER 696. 
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private rights, is fundamental in our law.   To break it, as the plaintiff’s counsel frankly 
invited us to do, is not a development of the law, but a destruction of one of its pillars.”529 
 
Other courts have similarly commented on the unique nature of the Attorney-General’s 
standing to sue for abatement of a public nuisance.  In Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, 
Ruger & Co Inc, Justice Rosenberger, in his dissentient judgment in the New York Court of 
                                                
529 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 482 (Lord Wilberforce).  cf 
Viscount Dilhorne’s comment at [1978] AC 435 at p 490 that, “anyone can if he wishes start a prosecution 
without obtaining anyone’s consent.”  There was a historical right, well recognized, whereby an individual 
wishing to see the law enforced could bring a private prosecution.  This historical right is preserved in modern 
law, albeit that it might be affected by statutory limitations.  In Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 
UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 477, Lord Wilberforce described this as an historical role “which goes right back 
to the earliest days of our legal system…” and “though rarely exercised in relation to indictable offences, and 
though ultimately liable to be controlled by the Attorney-General (by taking over the prosecution and, if he 
thinks fit, entering a nolle prosequi) remains a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on 
the part of authority.”  In Halsbury’s Laws of Australia [H Gibbs Halsbury’s laws of Australia (Butterworths 
Sydney 1991-) vol 9 paragraph 130-13225, under the heading ‘Who can prosecute’ the following entry appears: 
“Subject to the statutory provisions which create the offence, any person can commence a prosecution if the 
breach of law is of a public nature.  That right is not taken away except for express words of the legislation, and 
the fact that a person is specified as having a right to commence does not mean that no other person can.”  See 
also Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161 (HCA) where Fullagar J quoted from the judgment of Hood J (speaking 
for the court) in Steane v Whitchell (1906) VLR 704, where his Honour had said: “…[W]e may start with the 
proposition that, generally speaking, any person may be the informer, but sometimes the statute giving the 
penalty allows only particular persons to be informers…  The presumption thus being that any person may be 
the informant, we then look to the Statute imposing the penalty to see if there be any express or implied 
limitation.  There are three classes of Statutes in the construction of which questions of this kind have 
frequently arisen.  In the first class the fact the offence is of a public nature – Cole v Coulton (1980) 2 El & El 
695, 121 ER 261; Sargood v Veale (1891) 17 VLR 660; Lizars v Sabelberg (1905) VLR 608 – or that the Legislature 
has shown that it intended it to be dealt with as an offence of a public nature by providing that it be heard in 
the ordinary manner and before the ordinary tribunals (R v Stewart (1896) 65 LJ MC 83), has led the Court to 
the conclusion, in the absence of some fairly plain indication to the contrary, that any member of the public 
may prosecute.  In the second class the destination of the penalties or the nature and description of the offence, 
as one in which only certain persons or bodies, or certain classes of persons are interested, has resulted in a 
decision that the information must not be in the name of any person other than one of those indicated.  In 
these cases, if nothing more appears, the information must be laid or exhibited by, or must at least show on its 
face that it is laid at the instance and with the authority of the persons or one of the persons interested…  The 
third class differs from the second in that the Legislature has, by further or other provisions, shown an 
intention that an officer or employee, or it may be a person authorized for the purpose, may lay an information 
in his own name, though for the benefit of the person or persons interested.”  In Mensinga v DPP [2003] 
ACTCA 1 at para [39] the Court of Appeal observed: “It should be noted that the function of instituting 
proceedings is not exclusive to the Director [of Public Prosecutions].  Any person can commence a prosecution 
if the breach of the law is of a public nature and this right is not displaced except by clear words in a particular 
statute or statutory instrument: R v Thompson (1991) 58 A Crim R 81 at 84 per Priestley JA.”  And in A v New 
South Wales [2007] HCA 10 at para [49], (2007) 233 ALR 584, the High Court of Australian affirmed that: 
“criminal proceedings can be instituted by any member of the public. During the nineteenth century, there was 
much debate in England and Wales about who should control prosecutions.  It is not necessary to trace these 
controversies.  A private individual’s ability to institute criminal proceedings remained unaffected although the 
creation of public prosecuting authorities normally introduced provisions for them to take over, and sometimes 
to terminate, such proceedings.” [citing Cornish ‘Defects in Prosecuting – Professional Views in 1845’ in PR 
Glazebrook (ed) Reshaping the Criminal Law (Stevens London 1978) at p 305; Australia The Law Reform 
Commission Standing in Public Interest Litigation Report No 27 (1985) at pp 182-183, para [343]; and Gouriet v 
Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435  at p 477 (Lord Wilberforce).] 
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Appeal, drew attention to the fact that the nature of a civil suit for abatement of a public 
nuisance, at the behest of the sovereign power of a state, is very different both in its 
character and also in the nature of the remedy sought from other types of nuisance suits.530  
His Honour noted that: “the majority and the motion court fail to distinguish between a 
cause of action for abatement of a public nuisance by the State acting in parens patriae and 
other types of ‘nuisance’ actions,…”531  Differentiating public nuisance abatement causes of 
action by the state from private nuisance claims, which involve disturbance with an 
individual’s right in land, and public nuisance actions for damages brought by private 
plaintiffs, where special and particular injury to the private plaintiff must be shown, Justice 
Rosenberger viewed the role of the sovereign authority as intrinsic in the civil suit for 
abatement of a common law public nuisance.  This is manifest at page 111 of the record 
where His Honour states: “In contrast to private nuisance actions and public nuisance 
actions by private plaintiffs, both of which are brought primarily for monetary damages, 
public nuisance abatement actions are encompassed within a state’s traditional 
police powers, exercised to protect the health and well-being of the public by 
requiring the offending defendants to abate the actions that create or contribute to 
the public nuisance…”   
 
Justice Rosenberger’s dissenting judgment highlights the important constitutional function of 
the Executive of Government in redressing public nuisances even in a highly regulated and 
legislated environments.  What makes the civil action of the Attorney-General for abatement 
of a public nuisance germane in the modern era is the fact that it encompasses a broader 
public law aspect.  His Honour states at page 109: “Where the real party in interest is the 
‘People,’ that is, the populace of a sovereign state, the appropriate agency or official may 
properly institute an action for abatement ‘as parens patriae of those individuals who have 
been or will be injured by the alleged public nuisance’ (State of New York v Bridgehampton Road 
Races Corp 44 AD2d 725, 726, 354 NYS2d 717 (1974);…  The cause of action for public 
nuisance developed from the principle that an ‘infringement of the rights of the crown, or of 
the general public, was a crime’ (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 86, at 617 [5th edn])….”  Every 
person is responsible to the sovereign not to cause or to contribute to a public nuisance.  In 
                                                
530Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91 (2003) at pp 110-111. 
531 ibid at p 110. 
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suits brought by the Attorney-General, there is no issue of negligence, of the need to balance 
the interests of disputing parties, of the attribution of fault, or of compensation for damages.  
If a public nuisance exists it ought to be abated; period.   Justice Rosenberger states: 
“While private nuisance claims and public nuisance claims for damages 
incorporate traditional negligence notions of foreseeability, proximate 
cause and fault, state-initiated public nuisance abatement claims are 
founded on the theory that the State can obtain abatement of a 
condition that is injurious to the public.  As such they are not negligence 
actions, nor are they governed by negligence concepts (see New York v 
Shore Realty Corp, supra, 759 F2d at 1050-1051;…”   
 
…[A] public nuisance abatement action brought by the State as parens 
patriae begins with a determination that public nuisance – or harm to the 
public – exists, works backwards to identify the individuals or 
entities who are causing or contributing to the harm, and concludes with 
a determination of what actions, if any, those individuals or entities 
should be required to take to abate the nuisance.  Questions of 
pinpointed duty, foreseeability, remoteness, intent, or the ‘wrongfulness’ 
of defendant’s conduct are not at issue in public nuisance abatement 
actions brought by the State.  Every individual and entity is responsible 
to the State and the general population not to cause or contribute to a 
public nuisance and may be required to take ameliorative actions to 
diminish his, her, or its contribution to the nuisance, regardless of 
whether the creation of the nuisance was foreseeable or whether 
defendant’s conduct in creating or contributing to the nuisance was 
wrongful.”532 
 
What Justice Rosenberger underlines in his judgment in Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, 
Ruger & Co Inc is that the civil remedy for a common law offence of public nuisance is 
different in its character, and in the nature of the remedies available, from other suits 
because it is a public law offence and a public law remedy.  Public nuisance is an offence 
                                                
532 309 AD 2d 91 (2003) at pp 112-113. 
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intimately associated with the duty of every citizen, living in modern complex society, to 
refrain from creating nuisance or harm to fellow citizens.  The overseer of this public law 
offence is the Executive of Government who, as parens patriae, has responsibility to ensure 
that individuals abide by their duty to refrain from creating nuisance.  Law is directed to the 
minimisation of harm in public nuisance suits; not to retribution.  Nuisance is harm.  The act 
creating the harm may be a public nuisance in fact and may abated pronto without recourse 
to Parliament for legislative intervention.  This is an important principle, particularly where a 
newly devised sport may be practised which is inimical to the community wherein it is 
desired to practise it, and action against such a sport is desired quickly.  Note, for example, 
the recently devised sport of dwarf-throwing where dwarves are hurled by burly men across 
a room for a certain distance.   
 
The Toronto Star newspaper reported in June, 2003, that the Member of Parliament for 
Windsor West, in Ontario, Canada, on behalf of her constituents who were disgusted with 
the activity, had requested intervention from the Public Safety Minister to prevent an 
intended dwarf-throwing event to take place.  Legislation was introduced into Parliament at 
very short notice to attempt to ban the activity, but legal concerns were raised by lawyers for 
the Attorney-General.  The bill stalled.  Under the proposed bill those who engaged in 
dwarf-tossing could be fined by up to $5,000 or imprisoned for six months.533  The Member 
of Parliament who sought a remedy on behalf of her constituents was purportedly left 
without a remedy to prevent the activity occurring upon the erroneous assumption that only 
new legislation might provide a remedy.  Yet, had the Attorney-General for Ontario received 
appropriate legal advice on learning that the dwarf-throwing contest was to take place, rather 
than attempt to introduce legislation in Parliament at short notice the Attorney-General 
ought to have instituted an ex-officio suit to enjoin the contest as a public nuisance.  The 
Executive of Government could have obtained, without recourse to Parliament, in a very 
short space of time, an interim injunction, pending a perpetual injunction, to abate the 
proposed dwarf-throwing event.  Not only were issues of public morality of concern, but 
                                                
533 C Mallan ‘MPP Comes Up Short Trying to Stop Dwarf-tossing Contest’ Toronto Star (Toronto Canada, 13 
June 2003) News, at p A19.  Note, further, that dwarf-throwing is banned in Florida as well as in France.  See 
‘Judge Tosses Out Dwarf-throwing Lawsuit’ St Petersburg Times (Florida, 28 February 2002) at p 3B; S Nebehay 
‘Projectile Dwarf Case Thrown Out’ The Independent (London England, 28 September 2002) Foreign News at p 
17. 
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further there were issues of public safety for the dwarves because dwarves have brittle bones.  
Dwarf-throwing may have constituted a public nuisance on grounds of the need to protect 
public order and public morality.   
 
In a separate case before the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the Committee 
commented, in dismissing a complaint against the French proscription of the sport, that the 
ban “was necessary in order to protect public order, which brings into play considerations of 
human dignity,” and hence not in breach of Article 26 discrimination.534  A dwarf brought 
his case before the Committee consequent to an order on 27th October 1995 of the Council 
of State of France, which had overturned an earlier Versailles administrative court ruling.  
The Council of State was of the opinion first, that dwarf tossing was an attraction that 
affronted human dignity, respect for human dignity being part of public order and the 
authority vested in the municipal police being the means of ensuring it, and second, that 
respect for the principle of freedom of employment and trade was no impediment to the 
banning of an activity, licit or otherwise, in exercise of that authority if the activity was of a 
nature to disrupt public order.535  Such perspective is consistent with the jurisprudence of 
public nuisance.  A sport which may otherwise be lawful may be unlawful if such activity 
might disrupt public order, including consideration of human dignity.536  The protection of 
public order, including human dignity and public morality, is an underlying aspect of the 
constitutional prerogatives of the Executive of Government as parens patriae, as police power, 
and as administrator of the law. 
 
                                                
534 Case CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 Wackenheim [2002] UNHRC 29 
<http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/UNHRC/2002/29.html> (10 May 2005) para [7.4].  The ban on the 
sport was effected through the French Ministry of the Interior, which issued a circular on the policing of public 
events, and in particular dwarf tossing, instructing prefects to use their policing powers to direct mayors to 
keep a close eye on spectacles staged in their communes.  In the instant case the aggrieved dwarf was the 
subject of a mayoralty order of 25 October 1991 by the mayor of Morsang-sur-Orge.  The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee decided that France’s ban on the activity of dwarf throwing did not constitute 
discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  See 
also ⎯ ‘Dwarf Appeal Tossed’ Herald Sun (Melbourne Australia, 2 October 2002) News at p 9. 
535 ibid at paras [2.3]-[2.6] 
536 Note, also, the decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Commonwealth v McGovern 116 Ky 212 (1903) 
at p 236, were a boxing match was enjoined on the basis that it was disruptive of public order and a public 
nuisance.  Sports such as boxing and cockfighting have been held, in disparate cases, to amount to a public 
nuisance because they are morally reprehensible 
 178 
The fact that the Crown may act directly, at common law, for the redress of public 
grievances, for a public nuisance or for a purported public nuisance, is an intrinsic 
prerogative power and constitutional responsibility.  The Executive Government’s 
responsibility is separate from Parliament’s constitutional function, in this instance.  The 
Executive Government does not require Parliamentary intervention in an appropriate case of 
public nuisance.  It is the Crown alone who can proceed ex officio or ex relatione at 
common law to seek an expedited response to abate an act which is inimical to the public, 
and a public nuisance, per se.  The power of the Attorney-General, acting for the Crown, is a 
power vested in him as guardian of the public interest.  It is in this way the common law 
offence of public nuisance, encompassing the relator and ex officio suits for public nuisance, 
is one of constitutional significance, intimately associated with the Executive Government’s 
ancient pre-eminence. 
 
 
4. The right of the Crown to sue for damages for public nuisances 
 
The focus of this thesis is directed to the responsibilities of the Crown to seek abatement of 
a public nuisance.  Whilst it is not the focus of this thesis to detail the further actions which 
the Crown might take in regard to a public nuisance, note ought to be made of the Crown’s 
right to sue for damages for a public nuisance, as a matter of law, in addition to the powers 
to indict or to sue for abatement of a public nuisance.  See, for example, the recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd.537  In that 
case, a fire destroyed a forest.538  The Attorney General did not resort to statutory remedies 
(as under s. 161(1) of the Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 140 (now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157), for 
payment where timber is damaged or destroyed), but sought damages at common law.  The 
                                                
537 [2004] SCC 38 at para [66], [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 1. 
538 More particularly, a fire in the summer of 1992 near Stone Creek in the Prince George Forest District 
burned through 1,491 hectares of Crown forest land.  The appellant Canadian Forest Products Ltd. (Canfor), a 
major logging licensee, was largely responsible for the blaze.  The Crown suffered property damages and 
incurred expenses for activities undertaken to suppress the fire and restore the site.  It commenced an action 
against Canfor for compensation in three categories: (1) expenditures for suppression of the fire and restoration 
of the burned-over areas; (2) loss of stumpage revenue from trees that would have been harvested in the 
ordinary course and (3) loss of trees set aside for various environmental reasons in sensitive areas as established 
by the Crown.  The trial judge awarded the Crown $3,575,000 under the first heading (which was an agreed 
figure) but otherwise dismissed the claim on the basis the Crown had failed to prove a compensable loss with 
respect either to harvestable or non-harvestable trees.  The Crown appealed. 
 179 
appeal raised the Attorney General’s ability to recover damages for environmental loss as a 
public nuisance.  The Crown in right of British Columbia sued not only in its capacity as 
property owner of the forest but as the representative of the people of British Columbia, for 
whom the Crown sought to maintain an unspoiled environment.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada held, Justice Binnie speaking for the court, that there was no legal barrier to the 
Crown suing for compensation as well as injunctive relief in a proper case on account of 
public nuisance.539  Further, the Crown’s constitutional function as parens patriae afforded 
good reason for the existence of the right to sue private corporations for damages on behalf 
of the people.540  See, also, Department of Environmental Protection v Jersey Central Power and Light 
Co,541 where the parens patriae and ‘public trust’ doctrines led to a successful claim for 
monetary compensation in New Jersey, in the United States.542  This point is raised, insofar 
as it might be relevant to sports, to highlight that the Crown may also be able to sue for 
damages when publicly owned sporting facilities, or public property generally, are damaged 
in the course of a sporting event, provided such damage is resultant upon a public nuisance. 
 
In the context of publicly exhibited sports, where a public nuisance is committed on the 
basis of harm to the public right to safety, for example at a football match where violent or 
riotous behaviour occurs, there is no legal barrier to the Crown suing the sports association, 
administrator, or promoter of the public sport event for damages to recover compensation 
                                                
539 [2004] SCC 38 at para [66]-[72] and para [81]. 
540 ibid at paras [67]-[69] and [74]-[81]; and at para [158] (Bastarache, LeBel and Fish JJ dissenting).  See also The 
Queen v The Ship Sun Diamond [1984] 1 FC 3 where the federal Canadian Crown sought damages in relation to 
cleanup costs it had incurred to mitigate damage from an oil spill in the waters off Vancouver.  Damages were 
awarded for the cost of the water cleanup activities, in addition to costs to clean Crown-owned beach and 
foreshore property.  Walsh J commented, “what was done was reasonable and appears to be a good example of 
the parens patriae principle with the Crown ... acting as what is referred to in civil law as ‘bon pere de la 
famille’” (pp 31-32).  In Attorney General for Ontario v Fatehi [1984] 2 SCR 536, the Province sought damages in 
relation to the cost of cleaning up a public highway following an accident.  The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that Ontario was entitled to claim damages for harm to its property, like any other private property owner, and 
needed no statutory authority to bring such an action.  Moreover, Estey J, writing for the Court, went on to cite 
at p 546 the following passage of Lord Dunedin in Glasgow Corp v Barclay Curle & Co (1923) 93 LJPC 1, with 
apparent approval: “That a person, who, by his action, did something which made the highway impassable, and 
so destroyed the use of that highway by others, could be interdicted at the instance of a road authority I do not 
doubt ... and although suits for damages in respect of such action may be sought for in vain in the books, I do 
not doubt that they would lie.” 
541 336 A2d 750 (1975). 
542 In this case the State sued a power plant operator for killing fish in tidal waters, caused by negligent 
pumping that caused a temperature variation in the fish habitat.  The State sought compensatory damages for 
the damage to public resources.  The court concluded that the State had the “right and fiduciary duty to seek 
damages for the destruction of wildlife which are part of the public trust” in “compensation for any diminution 
in that [public] trust corpus” [336 A2d 750 (1975) at p 759]. 
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for damage to property owned by the State.  Such property might include the stadium where 
the public sport event was staged; traffic signs and street signs; public bins; public trees, 
flowers, and plants; or any other public property which is damaged by riotous crowds 
attending the public sporting event.  It is important to understand that it is not only the 
individuals who damage public property who are liable to prosecution.  The organiser of the 
public sporting event can be sued by the State to recover compensation for damage caused 
by individual persons who attend at the event as spectators.  The case of R v Shorrock clearly 
establishes that the owner of land where a public nuisance occurs, or organisers of events at 
which a public nuisance occurs, are liable for the actions of individual persons who attend 
the events where the public nuisance occurs.543   
 
The Crown may also sue administrators or promoters of public sporting events where any 
environmental damage has occurred consequent to the staging of the public sporting event.  
If a sporting event is held at a beach, for example, and the events draws tens of thousands of 
spectators, the Crown can sue the organisers and promoters of such sporting event for 
damages if any part of the beach is left damaged.  The types of damage to the beach could 
include littering, trampling of sand dunes, grasses and bushes in sand dune habitats, erosion, 
and any other type of harm to flora and fauna.  Applying the decisions of British Columbia v 
Canadian Forest Products Ltd,544 and R v Shorrock,545 the organisers and promoters of public 
sporting events would be liable to pay compensation in damages pursuant to a public 
nuisance suit brought by the Crown. 
 
 
5. The powers of local authorities to sue for public nuisance 
 
In addition to the powers of the Executive to abate public nuisances, exercisable by the 
Attorney-General or a Minister of the Crown, a local authority may have power to sue for a 
public nuisance in its own name, pursuant to statute.  The statutory power of a local 
authority to sue for abatement of a public nuisance is essentially a devolution of the 
                                                
543 [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698, [1993] 3 All ER 917 (Court of Appeal). 
544 [2004] SCCDJ 1942. 
545 [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698, [1993] 3 All ER 917 (Court of Appeal). 
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Attorney-General’s common law right, although the Crown retains their right to sue for 
abatement of a public nuisance as parens patriae.  Speaking of section 222 of the Local 
Government Act 1972 (UK) which grants powers to local authorities to sue for abatement 
of a public nuisance, Lord Templeman noted in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B&Q (Retail) Ltd: 
“Section 222 does not deprive the Attorney General of his power to enforce obedience to 
public law by proceedings ex officio or by relator action.  Section 222 confers an additional 
power on a local authority which is charged with the administration of an area…”546  Lord 
Templeman also drew attention to Viscount Dilhorne’s comments in Gouriet v Union of Post 
Office Workers: “Viscount Dilhorne made the reservation with which no one quarrelled that: 
‘it is the law, and long established law, that save and in so far as the Local Government Act 
1972, section 222, gives local authorities a limited power so to do, only the Attorney General 
can sue on behalf of the public for the purpose of preventing public wrongs…’”547  Pursuant 
to such statutory power a local authority may, in the place of the Crown, assert the public 
right.548  In England their powers exist pursuant to section 222 of the Local Government Act 
1972 (UK);549 see, Nottingham City Council v Z (a minor).550  In Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 
                                                
546 [1984] AC 754 at p 774 (House of Lords). 
547 ibid citing Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435 (House of Lords) at p 494 (Viscount Dilhorne). 
548 Note further eg the comments of Lord Justice Keene in Nottingham City Council v Z (a minor) [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1248, [2002] 1 WLR 607 where His Lordship stated at paras [26]-[27]: “Where there is evidence of a public 
nuisance, it was historically always the case that the Attorney General could seek an injunction to restrain the 
nuisance and, before the passing of the Local Government Act 1972, a local authority could likewise sue in 
such cases, so long as it obtained the Attorney General’s fiat: see Prestatyn UDC v Prestatyn Raceway Ltd [1969] 3 
All ER 1573, [1970] 1 WLR 33.  The effect of s 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 was to enable a local 
authority to sue in its own name in such cases where its local authority area was affected, without needing the 
consent of the Attorney General.  It is asserting a public right.  That was the conclusion reached, in my 
judgment rightly, by Oliver J, in Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council v Maxfern Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 127, [1977] 2 All 
ER 177 and approved in the Stoke-on-Trent Council case: [1984] 1 AC 754, [1984] 2 All ER 332 see p 773 H of 
the former report…  The position therefore is that where a local authority… seeks by injunction to restrain a 
public nuisance, it may do so in its own name so long as it ‘considers it expedient for the promotion or 
protection of the interests of the inhabitants’ of its area (s. 222(1))…  Whether it can establish that a public 
nuisance exists will, of course, depend on the facts of the individual case, but its entitlement to seek the 
injunction in its own name is clear.  The court would then have to exercise its discretion, once a public nuisance 
was established, on the well-known principles applicable to such injunctions.” 
549 Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 (UK) provides: ‘(1) Where a local authority consider it 
expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area - (a) they may 
prosecute or defend or appear in any legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them 
in their own name.’ 
550 [2001] EWCA Civ 1248, [2002] 1 WLR 607.  The appeal concerned the powers of a local authority to seek 
an injunction restraining the defendant from entering a housing estate in its area.  The authority claimed that a 
lot of dealing in drugs was going on publicly on the estate and that the defendant was associating there with 
well known drug dealers and had himself been in possession of drugs and had been arrested on suspicion of 
dealing in drugs.  The central question was whether a local authority had the power to bring proceedings in 
equity claiming injunctive relief.  The Court of Appeal for England and Wales allowed the appeal by the Local 
Authority.  Lord Justice Schiemann commented, at paragraph [13]: “In my judgment it is within the proper 
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2),551 the Council of the City of Bathurst, in New South Wales, brought proceedings seeking 
an injunction to prevent the continuance of a public nuisance in the stead of the Attorney-
General pursuant to the powers conferred on it by the former section 587 of the Local 
Government Act 1919 (NSW).552  The New York Court of Appeals has determined that a 
municipal corporation has the capacity and is the proper party “to bring an action [at 
common law, as was the suit in the instant case] to restrain a public nuisance which allegedly 
has injured the health of its citizens.”553  In New York Trap Rock Corp v Town of Clarkstown, the 
Court of Appeals in New York stated, somewhat dramatically, that “it is clear that a public 
nuisance which injures the health of the citizens of a municipality imperils the very existence 
of that municipality as a governmental unit.”554  To the like effect, City of New York v Beretta 
USA Corp,555 where the United States District Court held that: “The [City of New York] is a 
proper party to bring an action to restrain a public nuisance that allegedly may be injurious to 
the health and safety of its citizens.”556   
 
In some common law jurisdictions local authorities now possess power to abate a public 
nuisance without recourse to legal proceedings to obtain an injunction.  Note, for example, 
                                                
sphere of a local authority’s activities to try and put an end to all public nuisances in its area provided always 
that it considers that it is expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its 
area to do so in a particular case.  Certainly my experience over the last 40 years tells me that authorities 
regularly do this and so far as I know this has never attracted adverse judicial comment.  I consider that an 
authority would not be acting beyond its powers if it spent time and money in trying to persuade those who 
were creating a public nuisance to desist.  Thus in my judgment the County Council in PYA [Attorney-General v 
PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169] was not acting beyond its powers in seeking the Attorney General’s fiat in 
trying to put a stop to the nuisance by dust in that case and thus exposing itself to potential liability in costs.  It 
follows that, provided that an authority considers it expedient for the promotion and protection of the interests 
of the inhabitants of its area, [as prescribed by section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 (UK)] it can 
institute proceedings in its own name with a view to putting a stop to a public nuisance.” 
551 (1986) 58 LGRA 201, BC8601183 (Supreme Court of New South Wales). 
552 Although s 587 Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) permitted the Council to sue in some cases of public 
nuisance, it did not, pursuant to the powers given to it under that section, have standing in all cases of public 
nuisance: see Farley and Lewers Ltd v Attorney-General (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814.  The present power of local 
councils viz. public nuisances is contained in section 125 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). 
553 New York Trap Rock Corp v Town of Clarkstown 299 NY 77, 85 NE 2d 873 (1949) at p 83 of the former report. 
554 ibid at p 84 of the former report. 
555 315 F Supp 2d 256 (2004). 
556 315 F Supp 2d 256 at p 276-77.  In City of New York v Beretta USA Corp, the United States District Court, at p 
273, held that: “Precluding the City from bringing suit aimed at redressing the problem of gun-related violence 
would interfere with the authority accorded it under New York’s home rule provisions.  Consistent with Article 
IX of the state constitution, the City has the authority to take action on issues of local concern including those 
affecting the safety, health and well-being of its inhabitants.  See N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c)…” 
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section 125 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW),557 sections 199 to 204 of the Local 
Government Act 1993 (Tas), and section 725 of the Local Government Act RSBC 1996 c. 
323.558   
 
The use of abatement suits by local authorities, as a distinct remedy from the ex officio and 
relator action of the Attorney-General to abate a public nuisance, has drawn the need for 
caution.  In Nottingham City Council v Z (a minor).559, Lord Justice Schiemann sounded a 
warning against the excessive use of ex officio suits for abatement of public nuisances by local 
authorities, stating, at paragraph 22: “Even where an authority is empowered to take 
proceedings for an injunction in aid of the criminal law, it must bear in mind that there are 
many arguments against authorities applying for and the courts making injunctions in such 
cases and caution has repeatedly been enjoined when it is sought to use the civil law in 
support of the criminal law.  As Lord Templeman said in the Stoke-on-Trent case [1984] 1 AC 
754, [1984] 2 All ER 332 at p 775 of the former report:  ‘Section 222 requires that a local 
authority shall only act if they ‘consider it expedient for the promotion or protection of the 
interests of the inhabitants of their area’.  Any exercise by the local authority of this statutory 
power is subject to the control of judicial review…  Where the local authority seeks an 
injunction, the court will consider whether the power was rightly exercised and whether, in 
all the circumstances at the date the application for an injunction is considered by the court, 
the equitable and discretionary remedy of an injunction should be granted.’”  To the like 
effect, we might assume that the powers of local authorities granted by legislation in other 
common law jurisdictions is subject to judicial review.560   
                                                
557 Section 125 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) reads: “Abatement of Public Nuisances.  A council may 
abate a public nuisance or order a person responsible for a public nuisance to abate it.”  The Act defines the 
terms ‘abatement’ and ‘nuisance’ in the following fashion: “Note. Abatement means the summary removal or 
remedying of a nuisance (the physical removal or suppression of a nuisance) by an injured party without having 
recourse to legal proceedings.  Nuisance consists of interference with the enjoyment of public or private rights 
in a variety of ways. A nuisance is “public” if it materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a 
sufficient class of people to constitute the public or a section of the public. For example, any wrongful or 
negligent act or omission in a public road that interferes with the full, safe and convenient use by the public of 
their right of passage is a public nuisance.” 
558 Section 725 provides: “(1) If a regional district provides a service referred to in section 797.1 (1) (d), the 
board may, by bylaw, do one or more of the following: (a) prevent, abate and prohibit nuisances, and provide 
for the recovery of the cost of abatement of nuisances from the person causing the nuisance or other persons 
described in the bylaw…” 
559 [2001] EWCA Civ 1248, [2002] 1 WLR 607. 
560 Research has failed to yield case law, as of 2009, of judicial review of the summary power of local authorities 
in other common law jurisdictions to abate a public nuisance. 
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The instituting of public nuisance abatement proceedings against sports federations or the 
owners, managers, or operators of sports arenas, by diverse local authorities in diverse 
locations, may result in some sporting activities, or some acts concomitant with sport, being 
lawful in one local shire or council, whilst unlawful in another.  There is nothing problematic 
in this, per se; particularly so where some sports events are conducted in very close 
proximity to residential areas, whilst others are conducted in more industrial or rural areas.  
A sport must be conducted according to the sensibilities of the locale wherein it is practised.  
It may very well come to pass that the residents of Wimbledon become tired of the very long 
queue stretching down Church Road from the gates of the Wimbledon tennis centre toward 
Southfields in June and July of every year.  The appropriation of the footpath by hopeful 
attendees to the tennis tournament, desirous of a ticket, with such persons camped on the 
footpath, and often sleeping overnight, or over a number of days, eating, and staking out 
their place in the queue, on the public footpath, over a considerable number of hours and 
days, may amount to a public nuisance being an obstruction to the highway or an 
inconvenience to the public in the exercise of a public right to use of the highway.  The 
queue appears to be one continuous BBQ, with many of the tents draped with national flags, 
and cannot be hygienic on a sultry summer’s day.  In 2002, 9,000 people desirous of a ticket 
camped out in Wimbledon Park; and in 2009, over 2000 people camped overnight.561  The 
existence of queues in other circumstances have been held to be a public nuisance.562  That 
the operation of sports events must conform to the sensibilities of the locale where it is 
                                                
561 H Arkell and S Bhatia ‘Wimbledon Limits Seats for People’s Saturday’ Evening Standard (London United 
Kingdom 19 June 2003) 
<http://www.thisislondon.com/sport/wimbledon/articles/5401063%3Fsource%3DEvening%2520Standard> 
(18 May 2005).  M Townsend and E Ferguson ‘Heatwave Forecast Triggers the First UK Alert Over Health 
Fears’ The Guardian (London United Kingdom 27 June 2009) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jun/27/heatwave-forecast-met-office> (28 June 2009) 
562 See eg Lyons Sons & Co v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 631 at p 642 (Cozens-Hardy MR), where His Honour states: 
“…a man is or may be liable to an indictment for attracting, even by something lawfully done on his own 
premises, a crowd in the street adjoining his premises.”  Cozens-Hardy also noted, at p 639: “Then it is said by 
or on behalf of the defendants, ‘But we are not responsible for what goes on in the streets, it is the duty of the 
police to keep the streets clear, and if they do not do that, make a complaint to the police, do not attack us for 
collecting this crowd; we do not want them there; we only invite them to come in at the time when the doors 
are open, and when they are willing to pay their sixpences, and it is altogether unreasonable that we should be 
attacked because this number of people chooses, without any invitation from us, permanently to obstruct the 
roadway and the pathway, one or other or both, for a considerable period of time.’ Now is that the law? In my 
view it is not.” 
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practised is supported by the decisions of Bellamy v Wells,563 where boxing matches held in a 
club in a residential area attracted boisterous crowds who disturbed the sleep of the 
residents, and British Columbia (Attorney General) v Haney Speedways Ltd,564 where the activities 
of a motorcar racing speedway disturbed local residents. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
With respect to public nuisance and its application to sport, the powers of the Executive 
branch of government are extensive.  The Executive may prosecute a sports federation, or 
the promoter or organiser of a sporting event, or may prosecute the owner or occupier of a 
sports facility or ground at which a public nuisance occurs, in jurisdictions where the 
common law offence of public nuisance has not been codified in a criminal code.  In lieu of 
prosecution, the Attorney-General may prefer to sue for injunctive relief.  Suing for 
abatement of a public nuisance is the more common and usual method to remedy a public 
nuisance.  The Executive may quickly bring civil suit for injunctive relief either on relator 
action of aggrieved residents or persons affected by the public nuisance, or ex officio, against a 
sports federation, or the promoter or organiser of a sporting event, or the owner or occupier 
of a sports facility or ground.  Further, the Executive may seek and obtain damages against 
these same persons.   
 
The injunctive remedy for a public nuisance is not directed to punishment of any individual 
person, whether they be an athlete or a fan attending a sporting event.  This is an important 
qualification, signalling the uniqueness of the equitable remedy for a public nuisance.  Sports 
federations, as private enterprises or private entities, albeit promoting and managing a public 
cultural endeavour, risk sanction of their sporting activity if their sporting activity is 
conducted in such a way as to amount to a public nuisance, or is conducted such that acts 
concomitant with the playing of a sporting activity, such as violent, riotous or boisterous 
behaviour by crowds attending the sport, or by players participating in the sport, amount to a 
public nuisance.  These sports federations operate their sports in “peril of punishment if they 
                                                
563 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
564 [1963] 39 DLR(2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme Court). 
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failed to take proper precautions to prevent the detriment from occurring.”565  Proper 
precautions may include restricting the number of games played within any competition, 
scheduling games at times to cause as little or no inconvenience to local communities 
wherein such sport is practised, restricting the distribution of alcohol to attendant crowds, 
restricting the use of music, or fireworks, or ceasing games between particular clubs 
altogether.  The purpose of the Crown’s powers under public nuisance is to protect and 
preserve public rights.  The Crown has legitimate authority to require of sports federations, 
administrators, stadium operators, and professional athletes, that they conduct themselves 
and their sport events in such a manner as to minimize as much as practicable any 
impingement of public rights. 
 
 
                                                
565 Pregelj and Wurramura v Manison [1987] NTSC 76 at para [31] (Nader J, obiter), (1987) 51 NTR 1. 
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Chapter 9 
 
The modern utility of public nuisance 
 
 
1. Cristicms of public nuisance 
 
Public nuisance has been variously described in pedagogical writing as “immersed in 
undefined uncertainty”,566 and as “vague and infinitely extensible” and incongruous with 
modern notions of certainty and precision in law.567  Although Courts have roundly rejected 
these criticisms,568 such criticisms remain cogent and have their basis in the famous polemic 
Truth versus Ashurst, written in 1792 and published in 1823 by Jeremy Bentham, and remain 
persuasive.  Bentham made a searing criticism of judge-made criminal law, which he called 
‘dog-law’: 
“It is the judges (as we have seen) that make the common law.  Do you 
know how they make it?  Just as a man makes laws for his dog.  When 
your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does 
it, and then beat him for it.  This is the way you make laws for your dog: 
and this is the way the judges make law for you and me.  They won’t tell 
a man beforehand what it is he should not do - they won’t so much as 
allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something which they 
say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it.” 
 
                                                
566 See Professor Newark who wrote in his paper ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’: “…the truest dictum in the 
books is that of Erle CJ when he said that the answer to the question, What is a nuisance? is ‘immersed in 
undefined uncertainty’.” (1949) 65 LQR 480 at p 480. 
567 JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) CLJ 55 at pp 55 and 83. 
568 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [36], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill); Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] 20 OR (3d) 229 at p 269; Attorney-General of 
British Columbia v Couillard [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169 (McEachern CJSC).  
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Courts have accepted that vagueness in the definition of a law can warrant its being declared 
void.  In Grayned v City of Rockford, the United States Supreme Court identified “a basic 
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined.  Vagueness offends several important values…  A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.”569  Further, in Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg 
AG, Lord Diplock commented that: “The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional 
principle requires that a citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should 
be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it.”570  And 
in R v Misra and Srivastava, Judge LJ observed that: “Vague laws which purport to create 
criminal liability are undesirable, and in extreme cases, where it occurs, their very vagueness 
may make it impossible to identify the conduct which is prohibited by a criminal sanction.  If 
the court is forced to guess at the ingredients of a purported crime any conviction for it 
would be unsafe.  That said, however, the requirement is for sufficient rather than absolute 
certainty.”571 
 
In the 17th century Bacon proclaimed the essential link between justice and legal certainty:  
“For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself 
to the battle?  So if the law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to 
obey it?  It ought therefore to warn before it strikes … Let there be no 
authority to shed blood; nor let sentence be pronounced in any court 
upon cases, except according to a known and certain law…  Nor should 
a man be deprived of his life, who did not first know that he was risking 
it.”572 
 
                                                
569 408 US 104 (1972).  Lord Phillips MR approved this dicta in R (L and another) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2003] EWCA Civ 25, [2003] 1 WLR 1230, para [25]. 
570 [1975] UKHL 2, [1975] AC 591 at p 638, [1975] 2 WLR 513 (House of Lords). 
571 [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 at para [34], [2005] 1 Cr App R 328 (Judge LJ). 
572 Quoted in DR Coquillette Francis Bacon (Edinburgh University Press Einburgh 1992) at pp 244 and 248, 
from Aphorism 8 and Aphorism 39—A Treatise on Universal Justice; quoted in R v Misra and Srivastava [2004] 
EWCA Crim 2375 at para [32], [2005] 1 Cr App R 328 (Judge LJ); approved and followed in R v Rimmington, R v 
Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [33], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
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The principal criticism of public nuisance – that it is vague and uncertain – was raised in 
trenchant argument by appellant Counsel before the House of Lords in the leading case of R 
v Rimmington, R v Goldstein.573  The appellants submitted that the crime of causing a public 
nuisance, as currently interpreted and applied, lacked the precision and clarity of definition, 
and the certainty and the predictability necessary to meet the requirements of either the 
common law itself or article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).574  
It was also argued that the courts could not apply the offence of public nuisance to the facts 
in Rimmington because the courts would be creating a new offence.  On this latter point, 
specifically, the appellants contended (1) that conduct formerly chargeable as the crime of 
public nuisance had now become the subject of express statutory provision, (2) that where 
conduct was the subject of express statutory provision it should be charged under the 
appropriate statutory provision and not as public nuisance, and (3) that accordingly the crime 
of public nuisance had ceased to have any practical application or legal existence.  The 
appellants relied on the House of Lords decision in R v Withers where it was declared that the 
judges have no power to create new offences.575  Nor may the courts nowadays widen 
existing offences so as to make punishable conduct of a type hitherto not subject to 
punishment.576 
 
In meeting these arguments Lord Bingham adopted the comments of Judge LJ for the Court 
of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Misra and Srivastava,577 and His Lordship then 
concluded: “There are two guiding principles: no one should be punished under a law unless 
it is sufficiently clear and certain to enable him to know what conduct is forbidden before he 
does it; and no one should be punished for any act which was not clearly and ascertainably 
punishable when the act was done.  If the ambit of a common law offence is to be enlarged, 
                                                
573 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [28] et seq, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982, [2006] 2 All ER 257. 
574 Article 7(1) of the Convention provides that: “No-one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law 
at the time when it was committed nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the criminal offence was committed.’ 
575 [1975] AC 842 (House of Lords) at p 854G (Lord Reid), at p 860E (Viscount Dilhorne), at pp 863D and 
867E (Lord Simon of Glaisdale), and at p 877 (Lord Kilbrandon). 
576 ibid at p 863D (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
577 [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 at paras [29]-[34], [2005] 1 Cr App R 328. 
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it ‘must be done step by step on a case by case basis and not with one large leap’: R v Clark 
(Mark) [2003] EWCA Crim 991, [2003] 2 Cr App R 363 at para [13].”578 
 
At paragraph 36, Lord Bingham continued: 
“How, then, does the crime of causing a public nuisance, as currently 
interpreted and applied, measure up to these standards?…  I would for 
my part accept that the offence [of public nuisance] as defined by 
Stephen, as defined in Archbold (save for the reference to morals), as 
enacted in the Commonwealth codes quoted above, and as applied in the 
cases… is clear, precise, adequately defined and based on a discernible 
rational principle.  A legal adviser asked to give his opinion in advance 
would ascertain whether the act or omission contemplated was likely to 
inflict significant injury on a substantial section of the public exercising 
their ordinary rights as such: if so, an obvious risk of causing a public 
nuisance would be apparent; if not, not.” 
 
The House of Lords in Rimmington affirmed the Court of Appeal’s earlier holding that the 
offence was sufficiently precise to preclude breach of Article 7 of the European Convention.579  
Nor was the offence of public nuisance capable of amounting to a breach of Articles 8 or 10 
of the European Convention.580  A long series of consistent precedents provided clear authority, 
                                                
578 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [33], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill). 
579 [2005] UKHL 63 at paras [34]-[36], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill); R v 
Goldstein, R v R [2003] EWCA 3450, [2004] 1 WLR 2878, [2004] 2 All ER 589 (Court of Appeal).  With 
reference to Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
(as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)), the Court of Appeal’s view was that the 
elements of the offence of causing a public nuisance were sufficiently clear to enable a person, with appropriate 
legal advice if necessary, to regulate his behaviour.  “All that is required is a reasonable degree of foreseeability 
of the consequences which action or conduct may entail. The indictments in the present cases do no more than 
seek to apply the elements of the offence to the particular facts; and it is for the jury, appropriately directed, to 
determine whether or not the charges are made out. A citizen, appropriately advised, could foresee that the 
conduct identified was capable of amounting to a public nuisance.” (Latham LJ, at para [17]). 
580 ibid.  Concerning Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)), Lord Justice Latham in the Court 
of Appeal stated, at paragraph 25, “…the offence of causing a public nuisance is a proper and proportionate 
response to the need to protect the public from acts, or omissions, which substantially interfere with the 
comfort and convenience of the public as being taken in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder, for the protection of health and morals, and in particular the need to protect the rights of others. The 
level of imprecision inherent in the offence is necessary to enable it to be applied flexibly to meet new 
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by which a court is bound, for the continued existence of the offence of public nuisance at 
common law, as defined in the current edition of Archbold.581  Lord Bingham accepted that 
courts have no power to create new offences, but also declared that they have no power to 
abolish existing offences.  Only Parliament may undertake the task of abolishing public 
nuisance, following careful consideration as to whether there are aspects of the public 
interest which the crime of public nuisance has a continuing role to protect.582  Though His 
Lordship accepted that the circumstances in which, in future, there can properly be resort to 
the common law crime of public nuisance will be relatively rare, he concluded that it was not 
open to the House of Lords to declare that the common law crime of causing a public 
nuisance no longer existed.583 
 
The Rimmington decision is essentially a pruning exercise by the House of Lords; an exercise 
which restates the definition of public nuisance in clear terms and refines and strengthens 
the application of public nuisance to those factual circumstances to which it applies.  The 
House of Lords held in Rimmington that several earlier cases had been wrongly decided by the 
Court of Appeal during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s and that, as a result, the offence 
of public nuisance had become less clear because public nuisance had been extended to 
cover a new class of cases which it was not defined to include.  These cases were the criminal 
telephone call cases (such as R v Norbury [1978] Crim LR 435 and R v Johnson (Anthony) [1997] 1 
WLR 367) where convictions had been upheld against persons perpetrating nuisance and 
harassing telephone calls.  Rimmington decides that the telephone call cases were wrongly decided 
and that the offence of public nuisance does not encompass acts where there exists 
individual victims of behaviour in contradistinction to the public generally.   
 
The House of Lords in Rimmington meets the criticism that the common law offence of 
public nuisance is vague and indiscriminate in its application by agreeing with the criticism in 
                                                
situations. We therefore reject the argument that the offence is capable of amounting to a breach of arts 8 or 
10.” 
581 [2005] UKHL 63 at para [36], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill); [2003] 
EWCA 3450 at para [12], [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 2883, [2004] 2 All ER 589 (Lord Justice Latham); following 
R v White and Ward (1757) 1 Burr 333; R v Moore (1832) 3 B&Ad 184; R v Medley (1834) 6 C&P 292; R v Henson 
(1852) Dears 24, 169 ER 621; R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702; Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 
169; R v Madden [1975] 3 All ER 155; R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279, [1993] 3 WLR 698, [1993] 3 All ER 917 
(Court of Appeal); R v Johnson [1996] 2 Cr App R 434. 
582 ibid at para [31]. 
583 ibid at para [31] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
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one respect and by laying down certain precedent that refines and clarifies the circumstances 
in which the offence is applicable.  The House confirmed that the errors of the Court of 
Appeal for England and Wales, over several decades, in applying the common law offence of 
public nuisance to the perpetrators of nuisance telephone calls had confused the definition 
of public nuisance, contradicted its rationale, perverted its nature, and changed the essential 
constituent elements of the offence.584  Mr Rimmington’s and Mr Goldstein’s convictions 
were quashed because the House of Lords held that the public nuisance offence could not 
be applied to them on the facts of their cases.585  The facts alleged against each man did not 
cause common injury to a section of the public and so lacked the essential ingredient of 
common nuisance, whatever other offence they may have constituted. 
 
The judgment affirms that, although the offence of public nuisance is clearly defined, public 
nuisance is an offence which can be incorrectly applied to factual circumstances to which it 
does not relate or in respect of which it can have no lawful application.  In such instances, 
confusion, vagueness and uncertainty as to the proper meaning and interpretation of the 
offence can be exacerbated. 
 
 
 
                                                
584 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [37], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill) 
585 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982 was the appeal to the 
House of Lords from the Court of Appeal decision affirming their convictions for public nuisance ([2003] 
EWCA Crim 3450, [2004] 1 WLR 2878 (Court of Appeal)).  The appeals were upheld and convictions quashed.  
In two otherwise unrelated cases, the defendants had been indicted for the common law offence of causing a 
public nuisance.  In Goldstein’s case, the defendant was convicted of causing a public nuisance by sending 
through the post, at the height of a security alert, an envelope containing salt which had leaked out at the 
sorting office of Royal Mail, causing the evacuation of postal workers and the attendance of specialist police 
officers to determine whether the salt was anthrax.  In Rimmington’s case, on a preparatory hearing, the judge 
made an adverse ruling against the defendant who faced an indictment of having caused a nuisance to the 
public by sending through the post, over a nine-year period, several hundred packages containing racially 
offensive material.  On their conjoined appeals to the Court of Appeal, the defendants argued that the 
definition of the offence of public nuisance was so vague and uncertain in its scope that it should no longer be 
recognised at common law.  Alternatively, they submitted that the offence of public nuisance infringed the 
principle of legal certainty enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)) 
because it was not formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct.  The 
defendants further argued that the offence was capable of resulting in a breach of Articles 8 and 10 of the 
convention (the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression respectively) because it 
was not necessary in a democratic society to meet a pressing social need of the sort identified in each of those 
provisions. 
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2. Clarity in the application of public nuisance 
 
The circumstances of the Rimmington appeal demonstrate that the predominant issue in a suit 
for public nuisance is one of interpretation.586  The challenge for a court is to properly 
interpret public nuisance by applying the definition of public nuisance only to those factual 
circumstances which warrant its application.  Courts must interpret and apply public 
nuisance with clarity and precision or otherwise they will “contradict the rationale of the 
offence and pervert its nature”.587   
 
The House of Lords reaffirms in Rimmington that the offence of public nuisance must result 
in common injury, and not injury directed to individuals alone, as detailed by the long line of 
precedents on public nuisance.588  Lord Bingham of Cornhill, speaking for the House, 
affirms and follows a long line of precedents in his judgment and in so doing reaffirms the 
clarity and particularity of the offence of public nuisance.  Indeed, “the use of precedent [is] 
an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to 
individual cases.  It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can 
rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal 
rules.’”589  Lord Bingham also firmly criticised earlier Court of Appeal judgments for their 
imprecise and unclear interpretation and application of the offence of public nuisance and 
their failure to adhere to precedents.  The circumstances in which the offence of public 
nuisance might apply had become confused and the courts had lost their way because some 
judges were lax in interpreting precedents and applying the fundamental principle of 
common injury in public nuisance caselaw.590  The offence of public nuisance “was cut adrift 
                                                
586 ibid at para [37] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
587 ibid. 
588 Citing the early writings of Hawkins and Blackstone, United Kingdom and Commonwealth caselaw, as well 
as Commonwealth statutes codifying the common law offence of public nuisance, Lord Bingham of Cornhill 
states: “All of the foregoing definitions, as I read them, treat the requirement of common injury as a, perhaps 
the, distinguishing feature of this offence.” (ibid at para [12]). 
589 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) (1986) 83 Cr App R 191, [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (Lord Gardiner LC on behalf 
of himself and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary on July 26, 1966); approved and followed in R v Misra and 
Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 at para [33];  [2005] 1 Cr App R 328 (Judge LJ); approved and followed in R 
v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [33], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2006] 3 WLR 982 (Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill). 
590 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at paras [37]-[38], [2006] 1 AC 459, [2006] 3 WLR 982 (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill).  His Lordship stated, “To permit a conviction of causing a public nuisance to rest on an 
injury caused to separate individuals rather than on an injury suffered by the community or a significant section 
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from its intellectual moorings”.591  These judges, referenced by the House of Lords in 
Rimmington, had perverted the definition of public nuisance because they had applied the 
offence to new circumstances without trenchant clarity and had extended the application of 
public nuisance principles to a new category of actions where there were a large number of 
separate individual victims rather than common injury, contrary to precedent. 
 
There is, perhaps, a warning for us in this judgment; a warning that we must be clear and 
precise when discussing those factual circumstances we argue amount to a public nuisance.  
This is important to bear in mind when considering the applicability of the offence of public 
nuisance to publicly exhibited sporting events.  Only where the circumstances of sporting 
events staged at public places contain a common injury for the public can a public nuisance 
be said to be found.  A lack of assiduity in applying the offence of public nuisance to human 
circumstances does not mean that the offence itself is imprecise.  All it means is that we are 
not being careful enough lawyers, like those judges of the Court of Appeal for England and 
Wales who Lord Bingham criticised.   
 
Though it has been argued that public nuisance ought to be abolished because “everything in 
public nuisance runs contrary to modern notions of certainty and precision in criminal 
law,”592 the offence remains one at common law, and, a useful one, too, provided that we 
make use of it conscientiously, alert to the critical element of common injury so as to enable 
the offence to be applied to relevant factual circumstances. 
 
The offence of public nuisance is necessarily broad so as to encompass many types of 
behaviour inimical to the public for whom and by whom the common law subsists.  If 
offending acts do, indeed, cause common injury by endangering the life, health, property, or 
the comfort of the public, or by obstructing the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights 
common to all, then a public nuisance is committed.  This is so even though the particular 
acts may be novel or unprecedented, such as a newly invented sport, or even where a newly 
or recently professionalised sport desiring to maximize monetary profit and media exposure 
                                                
of it as a whole was to contradict the rationale of the offence and pervert its nature, in Convention terms to 
change the essential constituent elements of the offence to the detriment of the accused.” 
591 ibid. 
592 JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) CLJ 55 at p 83. 
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conducts itself in such a way that is inconsiderate of public rights.  The key factor to 
consider is the existence of common injury.  Precedents will assist in providing a point of 
reference to those circumstances where common injury may exist. 
 
The common law offence of public nuisance is not ill defined.  Common law offences are 
necessarily flexible.  The question as to whether particular acts amount to a public nuisance, 
for example, is always a question of fact.593  The application of public nuisance to modern 
sports activities provides the Executive Government, or a local authority where such local 
authority is empowered by statute, with an appropriate remedy against the excesses of 
sporting activity in order to protect and preserve public rights.  The existence of such a 
remedy is constructive and invaluable in a sports market now dominated by profit motive 
and desire for maximum media exposure and advertising revenue.  Common law public 
nuisance exists to protect the public’s common interests from unfettered impingement in an 
unregulated environment.  The methodology for the application of the law of public 
nuisance to sport is the same as that for any aspect of the common law, proceeding through 
the assiduous application of a general principle to the factual circumstances of the case at 
bar.  The words of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v 
Director of Public Prosecutions are apposite:  
“…the common law proceeds generally by distilling from a particular 
case the legal principle on which it is decided, and that legal principle is 
then generally applied to the circumstances of other cases to which the 
principle is relevant as they arise before the courts.  As Parke J said, 
giving the advice of the judges to your Lordships’ House in Mirehouse v 
Rennell (1833) 1 Cl & Fin 527 at 546: ‘Our common-law system consists 
in the applying to new combinations of circumstances those rules of law 
which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents; and for the 
sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we must apply 
those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable or inconvenient, to 
all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty to reject them, and to 
abandon all analogy to them, in those to which they have not yet been 
                                                
593 R v White and Ward (1757) 1 Burr 333 at p 337, 97 ER 338; New York Trap Rock Corp 85 NE 2d (1948) at p 
875; Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839 (1995) at p 840. 
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judicially applied, because we think that the rules are not as convenient 
and reasonable as we ourselves could have devised.’”594 
 
As is shown in Part 3 of this thesis, below, publicly exhibited sporting events have created 
and do create public nuisances.  We are not at liberty to reject this fact.  But we may desire a 
new legislative framework to manage these activities, in preference to reliance on common 
law rules and judicial reaoning to obtain a remedy. 
 
 
3. The effect of codification on the common law offence of public nuisance 
 
A further criticism of the offence of public nuisance is that it has no application in the 
modern juridical system because of the effect of codification.  In the Rimmgton appeal before 
the House of Lords, the appellants contended that the crime of public nuisance had ceased 
to have any practical application or legal existence because conduct that was formerly 
chargeable as the crime of public nuisance had now become the subject of express statutory 
provision, such as those acts or ommisions referenced in section 79(1) of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 (UK), in section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (UK) or in section 1 of 
the Protection from Harrassment Act 1997 (UK).595  What of the utility of the common law 
offence of public nuisance in an age of codification?   
 
The common law offence of public nuisance may be codified as a criminal offence by 
Criminal Codes or Penal Laws.  For example, pursuant to section 230 Criminal Code Act 
1899 (Qld) in Queensland;596 and section 180(1) Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, in 
                                                
594 [1973] AC 435 at p 492, [1972] 2 All ER 898 (House of Lords). Mirehouse v Rennell (1833) 1 Cl & Fin 527 at 
546 (ParkeJ) was cited with approval in Shaw’s case [1961] 2 All ER at 465, [1962] AC at 289 by Lord Tucker, 
Lord Simonds [1961] 2 All ER at 448, [1962] AC at 261 and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest [1961] 2 All ER at 
467, [1962] AC at 291 concurring, and by Lord Hodson [1961] 2 All ER at 468, [1962] AC at 292, 293. 
595 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [28] et seq, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982, [2006] 
2 All ER 257.  See nn 289-94, below, and accompanying text. 
596 Section 230 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) in effect amounts to a faithful replication of the common law 
definition of public nuisance.  Section 230 provides: 
“230. Any person who⎯ 
(a) without lawful justification or excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, does any act, or omits to do 
any act with respect to any property under his control, by which act or omission danger is caused to the lives, 
safety, or health, of the public; or 
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Canada,597 and section 370 of the California Penal Code,598 public nuisance is now a statutory 
criminal offence, not a common law offence.  And even where the common law offence of 
public nuisance has not itself been codified, parliamentary legislation may declare certain acts 
or certain omissions to be public nuisances, such as actions causing environmental harm.599   
 
Judicial comments on the effects of these movements toward codification provide guidance 
on the modern utility of the offence of public nuisance.  Where the common law offence of 
public nuisance has been codified as a statutory offence under a criminal code or under 
environmental legislation, road or transport legislation, or public order legislation, for 
example, the Crown may now only institute criminal proceedings against an offender under 
the provisions of such legislation.  Examples of such codification, detailed by the Court of 
Appeal for England and Wales in R v Goldstein, R v R,600 include the several statutory 
enactments and amendments of recent years in the UK where new offences have been 
created to cover acts or omissions previously the subject of the common law offence of 
public nuisance; for example:  section 79(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
                                                
(b) without lawful justification or excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, does any act, or omits to do 
any act with respect to any property under the person’s control, by which act or omission danger is caused to 
the property or comfort of the public, or the public are obstructed in  the exercise or enjoyment of any right 
common to all Her Majesty’s subjects, and by which injury is caused to the person of some person; 
is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for 2 years.” 
597 Under the title ‘Common Nuisance’ section 180 Criminal Code, RSC c. C-46 provides: 
“180. (1) Every one who commits a common nuisance and thereby 
(a) endangers the lives, safety or health of the public, or 
(b) causes physical injury to any person, 
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, every one commits a common nuisance who does an unlawful act or fails 
to discharge a legal duty and thereby 
(a) endangers the lives, safety, health, property or comfort of the public; or 
(b) obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of any right that is common to all the subjects of Her 
Majesty in Canada.” 
598 Cal Pen Code s 370 (2005) provides: “Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to 
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of 
life or property by an entire community or neighbourhood, or by any considerable number of persons, or 
unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, 
stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a public nuisance.” 
599 See eg n 601, below, and accompanying text.  And see c 720, s 47-5 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (720 
ILCS 5/47-5 (2005)) which declares numerous acts and omissions to be a public nuisance; s 79 Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 (UK) which declares certain acts to be “statutory nuisances”; and s 77 Health Act 1937 
(Qld) declares designated acts to be nuisances.  Note, also, s 400.05(1) Penal Law New York, which declares 
the unlawful possession, manufacture, transportation or disposition of any weapon, instrument, appliance or 
substance specified in article 265, or when utilized in the commission of an offence, a nuisance. 
600 [2003] EWCA Crim 3450, [2004] 1 WLR 2878 (CA), [2004] 2 All ER 589 (CA).  R v Goldstein, R v R was 
appealed to the House of Lords in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 
WLR 982. 
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(UK);601 section 85 of the Water Resources Act 1991 (UK);602 section 137 of the Highways 
Act 1980 (UK);603 section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK);604 section 63 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK);605 and section 85 of the Postal 
Services Act 2000 (UK).606  However, the separate remedy of civil suit for abatement of a 
public nuisance at common law remains and is not affected by codification of the offence of 
public nuisance as a statutory criminal offence.  This is so, principally, because at common 
law the two remedies available for the redress of a public nuisance offence, on the one hand 
criminal prosecution and on the other hand civil suit for abatement, were regarded by the 
judges as two distinct and separate procedures and separate remedies.607  In his seminal 
critique of common law public nuisance, JR Spencer writes that the remedy of injunction to 
abate a public nuisance was first instituted in Chancery and not before the criminal 
jurisdiction of the King’s Bench as a preliminary proceeding to a criminal trial – Baines v 
Baker (1752) Amb 158, 27 ER 105; Attorney General v Cleaver (1811) 18 Ves Jun 212, 34 ER 
297; and Attorney General v Johnson (1819) 2 Wils Ch 87, 37 ER 240.608  And once the 
possibility of an injunction had been established, injunctions and relator actions rapidly 
became popular in public nuisance cases.  A long line of actions followed throughout the 
                                                
601 Section 79(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (UK) as amended, establishes nine categories of 
statutory nuisance (the state of premises, smoke emissions, fumes or gases from dwellings, effluvia from 
industrial trade or business premises, accumulations or deposits, animals, noise from premises, noise from 
vehicles or equipment in a street and other matters declared by other Acts to be statutory nuisances).  Section 
33 controls the dumping of waste.  The Act lays down a detailed procedure for securing abatement, provides 
for criminal proceedings and prescribes maximum penalties for failure to comply with an abatement notice. 
602 Section 85 of the Water Resources Act 1991 (UK) makes it an offence to pollute controlled waters.  It 
prescribes a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment and a fine of £20,000 on summary conviction, 
and two years' imprisonment and a fine on conviction on indictment. 
603 Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (UK) makes it is a summary offence punishable by a fine not 
exceeding level 3 on the standard scale willfully to obstruct free passage along a highway. 
604 Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) creates a crime of harassment, punishable 
summarily by imprisonment for a maximum of six months and a fine on scale 5.  If the harassment involves 
repeated threats of violence the defendant is liable under section 4, on conviction on indictment, to five years’ 
imprisonment and a fine. 
605 Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) confers powers on the police to remove 
persons attending or preparing for a rave ‘at which amplified music is played during the night (with or without 
intermissions) and is such as, by reason of its loudness and duration and the time at which it is played, is likely 
to cause serious distress to the inhabitants of the locality’.  Breach of the statutory requirements is punishable 
on summary conviction by imprisonment for up to three months and a fine not exceeding level 4 on the 
standard scale. 
606 Section 85 of the Postal Services Act 2000 (UK) makes it an offence to send by post anything which is likely 
to injure a postal worker or anything which is indecent or obscene.  On summary conviction the offence is 
punishable by a fine, on conviction on indictment by imprisonment for a maximum of 12 months and a fine. 
607 See JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55 on the development of civil 
remedy at common law and the distinction between the criminal and civil proceedings in respect of public 
nuisances. 
608 JR Spencer ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) 48 CLJ 55, at pp 66-73. 
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nineteenth century and Chancery granted injunctions that were permanent and not merely 
temporary ones until a criminal trial took place.  In these cases there was no prosecution in 
the background, the relator action was the only proceedings taken.  Relator actions thus 
rapidly became the usual means of dealing with the more common types of public nuisance 
and rapidly became a proceeding quite separate and distinct from criminal prosecution.  
Prosecutions then virtually died as a method of dealing with continuing health-hazards, and 
were thereafter used mainly to deal with singular actions of misbehaviour affecting the public 
generally.609  JR Spencer summarises the development of the civil suit remedy thus:  
“The idea of the Attorney General applying in Chancery for an 
injunction to restrain the criminal offence of public nuisance occurred to 
contemporary lawyers quite naturally as an amalgam of various existing 
notions.  First, the Attorney General was already in the habit of coming 
to Chancery to ask for injunctions.  He sought them against those who 
were committing private nuisances against the property of charitable 
foundations.  He also regularly sought injunctions against those who 
encroached on Royal property and, by way of an extension to this, he 
sometimes sought injunctions to stop people building wharfs in 
navigable waterways which would obstruct harbours used by the Royal 
Navy – something very similar to obtaining an injunction to restrain an 
encroachment on a public highway.  From here it was only a small step 
to say that the Attorney General can seek an injunction to restrain any 
public nuisance…”  
 
Courts have regularly affirmed that the Crown retains the right at common law to proceed 
against offenders in the civil jurisdiction, for abatement of a public nuisance, even where the 
offence of public nuisance itself has been codified as a statutory offence.610  This is so 
because the remedy of civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance is a separate remedy 
available to the Crown from the remedy of criminal prosecution for a public nuisance.  The 
civil suit remedy exists concomitantly with the criminal prosecution remedy as a separate 
                                                
609 ibid at p 71. 
610 Attorney-General of British Columbia v Couillard [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169; Attorney General (ex rel 
Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346; City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 
1099 (2004). 
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remedy.  In Attorney-General of British Columbia v Couillard,611 the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia held that the Attorney General may sue in the civil jurisdiction for abatement of a 
public nuisance even when the acts the subject of the public nuisance and injunction are 
covered exhaustively by a Criminal Code provision.  The Court considered the case at bar “a 
perfect example of how the common law supplements legislation for the protection of the 
public.”612  The real question is never the standing of the Attorney-General to sue for 
injunctive relief for a public nuisance, but, rather, the jurisdiction of the court; for, “in a 
proper case, the Attorney General has standing to bring proceedings for enforcing any law 
within the province.”  McEachern CJSC, speaking for the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, affirmed that: 
“…[I]t is apparent that a small group of prostitutes has assumed, quite 
incorrectly, that causing public inconvenience for the purpose of 
prostitution is lawful subject only to prosecution under the Criminal 
Code… It is not, and if it amounts to a public nuisance anywhere in the 
province, it may be enjoined upon a proper application being made by 
the Attorney General… Those who would defile our city must 
understand that in addition to the criminal law, the citizens of this 
country are protected by the common law which is a statement of the 
accumulated wisdom of history.  But it is a dynamic force which is 
always ready to respond to the reasonable requirements of 
civilization.”613 
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland has also affirmed that courts have jurisdiction to grant an 
injunction at the suit of the Attorney-General in relator proceedings even where the issues 
the subject of the suit lie entirely within the competency of the defendant local government 
pursuant to local government legislation.614  In this case, the local government sought to 
reclassify a narrow strip of land between houses, used as a pathway, as a laneway for 
vehicular traffic in a suburb of the city of Brisbane.  Residents disapproved and obtained the 
                                                
611 [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169, followed Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] 20 OR (3d) 
229. 
612 [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169, at para [29] (McEachern CJSC). 
613 [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169, at paras [26] and [27] (McEachern CJSC). 
614 Attorney General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346 at p 353, following Attorney-General v 
Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478. 
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fiat of the Attorney General to sue for an injunction.  They claimed that as the pathway was 
being used exclusively for foot passengers, use of it for vehicular traffic was a use contrary to 
the purpose for which it was dedicated.  The local government claimed that they had powers 
under statute to reclassify the pathway and that the Attorney General had no standing to sue 
on grounds of public nuisance, nor had the court jurisdiction to grant the injunction sought, 
because control and regulation of local roads lay entirely within the competency of the local 
government pursuant to the then Local Government Act 1936-1986.   
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland held, citing McBride & Co. v. Brisbane Municipal Council, 
that the provisions of section 30 of the then Local Government Act which gave the Council 
the functions of management, control, and regulation of use of roads, including a highway, 
such as the pathway, dedicated to the public, also created an obligation to prevent nuisances 
occurring in respect of such roads.615  Though the Court accepted that there was little 
authority that a body such as the Council is obliged to suppress nuisances on public ways 
under its control, as distinct from refraining from causing or encouraging such nuisances 
itself, the Court held, following Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, that an occupier 
or other person having control of land may be liable for nuisances on the land of which he is 
aware even though caused by some third person without his authority.  McPherson J opined 
that,  
“Any excessive or unauthorised use of a public way is a public nuisance 
at common law and may be restrained at the suit of the Attorney-
General.  There were, and still are, several different kinds of proceedings 
available for this purpose.  One was by indictment for public nuisance, 
which was a common law misdemeanour: see now s.230 of The Criminal 
Code; another by proceedings for an injunction: see Woolrych: Law of 
Ways (1847), at 423–424; another by prerogative writ of mandamus 
against a person subject to a public duty to keep the highway open and 
in repair.  A private individual could, of course, sue in respect of a public 
nuisance only if he sustained injury over and above that suffered by 
                                                
615 In McBride & Co. v. Brisbane Municipal Council (1885) 2 Q.L.J. 73,76, Lilley C.J. said in arguendo that “whoever 
has charge of a highway is bound to prevent nuisances”. 
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other subjects; but that is of no relevance here, where the Attorney-
General is the plaintiff.”616    
 
An Attorney General is entitled under the general law to an injunction restraining the 
Council from permitting the pathway from being used for vehicular traffic.617 
 
Both Couillard and ex rel Pratt are consistent with earlier decisions such as Attorney General v 
Ashbourn Recreation Ground, where the court said that an injunction could be granted even 
though the breach of a statutory duty was one which Parliament had decreed to be 
punishable on prosecution with a fine, thus suggesting that the mode of enforcement was 
meant to be through the criminal courts.618  Further, the House of Lords for the United 
Kingdom have upheld the powers of the Crown to also prosecute, at common law, for an 
offence of public nuisance, provided that Parliament does not expressly abolish, when 
enacting the statutory offences, the corresponding aspect of the common law offence of 
public nuisance.  The House stated, at paragraph 52 of their judgment in Rimmington: 
“…[A] charge could not have been regarded as bad simply because it 
was framed in terms of the common law rather than in terms of the 
statute…  [W]here Parliament has not abolished the relevant area of the 
common law when it enacts a statutory offence, it cannot be said that 
the Crown can never properly frame a common law charge to cover 
conduct which is covered by the statutory offence.  Where nothing 
would have prevented the Crown from charging the defendant under the 
statute and where the sentence imposed would also have been 
competent in proceedings under the statute, the defendant is not 
prejudiced by being prosecuted at common l aw and can have no 
legitimate complaint.”619 
  
                                                
616 (1988) 1 QdR 346 at p 352. 
617 (1988) 1 QdR 346 at p 353. 
618 [1903] 1Ch 101.  A builder was restrained from erecting a housing estate in contravention of local by-laws. 
619 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [52] (Lord Roger of Earlsferry), [2006] 1 AC 459, 
[2005] 3 WLR 982. 
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This view is supported by judgments in City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corp,620 and Attorney-
General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc;621 and Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Racing Corp;622 and 
City of New York v Beretta USA Corp,623 wherein the courts state, consistenty, that the 
codification of certain common law nuisances as statutory offences does not exclude 
common law nuisances not codified therein from being declared as public nuisances by the 
courts. 
 
Although legislatures have codified public nuisance in terms of its criminal jurisdiction, the 
civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance in the civil jurisdiction remains a common law 
action until such time as it too is codified.  The effect of the juridical pronouncements in 
response to challenges that common law remedies for public nuisance are now obsolete may 
be summarised as follows:  
(i) Where public nuisance has been codified as a criminal offence in a criminal code, 
criminal proceedings may only be instituted under the criminal code and not at 
common law; but the separate common law remedy of civil suit for abatement of 
a public nuisance in the name of the Crown survives and continues to exist as a 
separate common law remedy to statutory criminal prosecution; (Attorney-General 
of British Columbia v Couillard [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169; Attorney 
General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346; City of Chicago v 
Beretta USA Corporation 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004)); 
(ii) Where circumstances that were formerly the subject of proceedings for public 
nuisance are now the subject of specific legislative arrangement creating new 
statutory offences, criminal proceedings may only be instituted under the new 
legislative arrangement; but the separate common law remedy of civil suit for 
abatement of a public nuisance in the name of the Crown survives and continues 
to exist as a separate common law remedy; (Attorney-General of British Columbia v 
Couillard [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169; Attorney General (ex rel Pratt) v 
Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346; City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation 
213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004)); 
                                                
620 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004), at pp 382-83 of the former report. 
621 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003). 
622 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003) at p 792 of the former report. 
623 315 F Supp 2d 256 (2004) at p 276. 
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(iii) Where circumstances yield a public nuisance which are not required to be dealt 
with by way of proceedings under a specific legislative arrangement, the Crown 
may either seek criminal prosecution at common law, or, the Crown may seek to 
institute civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance at common law.  The Court 
of Appeal decisions of R v Shorrock,624 and R v Madden,625 and the House of Lords 
decision in Rimmington, confirm that although the common law offence of public 
nuisance has been comparatively rarely relied on by prosecutors in recent years, 
because of the increased availability of statutory offences covering large areas of 
what used to be the subject matter of prosecutions for the common law offence, 
it still exists at common law to cover those areas not included in new legislative 
frameworks. 
 
The civil remedy for abatement of a public nuisance at the suit of the Attorney-General ex 
officio or ex relatione remains relevant and important for the protection of public rights.  The 
standing of the Attorney-General to bring proceedings for abatement of a common law 
public nuisance is an intrinsic factor in the protection of public rights.  The common law 
remedy of civil suit has been declared by the courts to have survived codification.  The 
courts have held that codification of the offence of public nuisance as a criminal offence 
affects only the criminal prosecution remedy that existed at common law and does not affect 
the civil suit remedy which existed and continues to exist as a parallel, twin, or concomitant 
remedy separate from criminal prosecution. P rofessor Jamie Cassels in his article on 
prostitution and public nuisance provides a similar view.  The author wrote:  
“…[I]t would appear that the jurisdiction of the courts to regulate public 
conduct is not limited by existing legislation and that there remains a 
residual common law jurisdiction to define and protect public rights.”626   
 
The existence of statutory public nuisances, or the codification of the common law of public 
nuisance in a Criminal Code, whereby a Code purports to exhaustively define public 
                                                
624 [1993] 3 WLR 698 (CA), at p 701. 
625 [1975] 1 WLR 1379. 
626 J Cassels ‘Prostitution and Public Nuisance: Desperate Measures and the Limits of Civil Adjudication’ (1985) 
63 Can Bar Rev 764 at p 782, cited with approval in Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] ONSC 7509 at 
para [473], [1994] 117 DLR (4th) 449, [1994] 20 OR (3d) 229 (Adams J). 
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nuisance, does not preclude the Attorney General from recourse to the common law to seek 
abatement of a public nuisance at common law: See, for example, Attorney-General (ex rel 
Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 Qd R 346, following Attorney-General v Blackpool 
Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478.  The common law right to action to abate public nuisance exists 
independently of any statutory right, unless the statutory right clearly and unambiguously 
abrogates the common law right.627  The judgment of Justice Garman in the recent case City 
of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation,628 is dispositive of this issue:  
“Our own research reveals that the Criminal Code contains a nuisance 
provision listing 17 categories of conduct or uses of land that are public 
nuisances. 720 ILCS 5/47-5 (West 2002).  In addition, the General 
Assembly has enacted numerous other statutes defining certain conduct 
as constituting a public nuisance. See, e.g., 510 ILCS 5/15(b) (West 
2002) (permitting a dangerous dog or other animal from leaving the 
premises of the owner without a leash or other method of control); 515 
ILCS 5/1-215 (West 2002) (use of illegal fishing device); 605 ILCS 5/9-
108 (West 2002) (planting of willow trees or hedges on the margin of a 
highway);… 
 
As these examples well illustrate, the legislature has the power to declare 
something to be a nuisance that was not such at common law.  People v 
Jones 329 Ill App 503, 69 NE2d 522 (1946); Village of Gurnee v Depke 114 
Ill App2d 162, 251 NE2d 913 (1969).  However, the codification of 
certain common law nuisances in the Criminal Code and the 
legislative declaration that certain other conditions constitute 
nuisances does not exclude common law nuisances not codified 
therein from being classed as public nuisances.  People ex rel Dyer v 
Clark, 268 Ill 156, 108 NE 994 (1915).  See also Gilmore, 261 Ill App 3d 
at 661 (public nuisance statute does not displace common law actions; 
                                                
627 Gilmore v Stanmar Inc 261 Ill App 3d 651, applying City of Chicago v Festival Theatre Corp 91 Ill 2d 295 (1982) at 
p 303, considered in City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation 213 Ill 2d 351 (2004) at p 383.  See also R v Shorrock 
[1993] 3 WLR 698 (Court of Appeal) at p 701E (Justice Rattee).  And see Attorney-General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane 
City Council (1988) 1 Qd R 346., following Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478. 
628 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004). 
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common law right to action to abate public nuisance exists 
independently of any statutory right).  As this court observed in Festival 
Theatre: ‘Equitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is said to be of 
‘ancient origin,’ and it exists even where not conferred by statute, where 
the offender is amenable to the criminal law, and where no property 
rights are involved.  Too, in a common law action, the extent of the 
concept of public nuisance is not limited to those activities the legislature 
has declared public nuisances.’ Festival Theatre 91 Ill 2d at 303.”629 
 
A civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance is preventative in its nature, not retributive.  
The common law offence of public nuisance is an important tool for the Executive 
Government in administering the law; a tool that is unique to the common law offence of 
public nuisance.  A civil action for redress of a public nuisance remains an important action 
for the Executive of Government in an age of statutory proliferation because it is not 
dependent on statute; nor is it dependent on the criminal law; nor is it focussed to 
punishment or pecuniary penalty or blame.  The civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance 
on ex officio or relator action by the Attorney-General survives codification of the common 
law of public nuisance,630 and is not dependent on the continuing use of criminal 
proceedings for common law offences of public nuisance, because such civil suit is a 
separate remedy and separate proceeding at common law.  It is not correct to state that no 
civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance would exist unless public nuisance is a criminal 
offence at common law or under statute.  The civil suit remedy against a public nuisance is a 
separate proceeding entirely and if precedent can be found to support an argument that the 
act which is sought to be enjoined is a public nuisance, then the courts will found jurisdiction 
to grant an injunction.631 
 
The action for redress of a public nuisance enables the Executive of Government to protect 
the health and wellbeing of the people generally and to work concomitantly with the civic 
                                                
629 ibid at pp 282-283 (emphasis added). 
630 Attorney-General of British Columbia v Couillard [1984] 11 DLR(4th) 567, 14 CCC (3d) 169; Attorney General (ex rel 
Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346; City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 
1099 (2004). 
631 ibid. 
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standards of the people and with statutory regulation to prevent or to stop acts which are 
harmful to public rights.  Statutory law is not undermined in this process; nor is an 
unreasonable level of responsibility placed on individuals to institute their own expensive 
civil suits.  The remedy civil suit for abatement of a public nuisance enables the Executive 
Government to fulfil its constitutional function as parens patriae and remains an important 
legal tool in the modern legislative environment. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Whilst many circumstances that were formerly the subject of prosecution or a relator action 
for a public nuisance are now the subject of specific statutory remedies under specific 
enactments of the Legislature, such as acts causing environmental harm,632 this does not 
mean that the common law offence of public nuisance is obsolete.  On the contrary, the 
offence of public nuisance remains critical to the criminal law and common law.  The 
modern relevance of such remedy may be seen in the light of increased pressure to maximize 
profit, media exposure and advertising revenue from public exhibitions of sporting events.  
By what law is it to be determined whether a new sport or game, devised by an individual 
solely for the purposes of making money, and involving conduct or activity that is odious to 
the community, is lawful or not?  What of dwarf throwing, which was mentioned in Chapter 
8 above?  What of some new game which might have as the basis of its rules of play the 
binding of players with ropes, alike a rodeo?  What of the use of dangerous weapons in 
sports such as Martial Arts?  What of sports which appropriate public beaches, or public 
parks, for their exclusive use, preventing the public right to unhindered recreation?  What of 
public sports events which appropriate the public highways for the exclusive use of the 
sport, such as triathlon and cycling sporting events, thereby preventing public access to and 
unhindered use of the public highway?  What of the playing of very popular sports, such as 
football, on every night of the week to the detriment of local communities who would have 
to live their lives at the behest of great throngs of rowdy and vociferous crowds attending 
football games?  In each of these instances, in every sport devised and played, there is, 
                                                
632 See, eg, Section 79(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (UK) as amended, which establishes nine 
categories of statutory nuisance. 
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necessarily, an interface with public morals, public peace, public health, and the public right 
to be free of unlawful obstruction or inconvenience.  Ought the neighbours of the grand 
stadiums wherein a football game is played tolerate the unabated increase in the noise and 
bacchanalian behaviour of fans in and about the football stadium every night simply because 
a football association desires to maximize its profit?  Whether a sport played on particular 
occasions at particular times or days or whether sports create obstruction, endangerment to 
health or life or public peace, amounting to a public nuisance, are all questions of fact for a 
court to determine.   
 
Sir John Smith notes, in contradistinction to Spencer’s censure of public nuisance, above, 
that: “A great many varieties of nuisance are now the subject of special legislation and 
proceedings are unlikely to be brought at common law where there is a statutory remedy.  
But the common law may still be useful where no statute has intervened…”633  Public 
nuisance is a useful tool for the Executive of Government to protect public rights and to 
limit the excesses arising from the unchecked growth of public sporting fixtures.  “[A]t the 
core of public nuisance lies a concern to protect the use and enjoyment of public resources 
and facilities...”634 
 
Many public sporting events involve ever increasing degrees of noise with music, 
entertainment, concerts, crowd participation, and crowd disturbances.  Alcohol is habitually 
utilised by fans to augment the occasion.  Sporting associations have of recent times changed 
the competition structure of their sports and hold many more, if not an excessive number of, 
games, finals, preliminary finals, and secondary competitions, which used not to occur at an 
earlier time when the sporting association was not corporative, and many of the players were 
not professional.  There is an increase in the usage of public spaces, such as beaches, parks 
and roads, for public sporting competitions.  Such competitions appear to supplant the 
public right to use public areas, such as beaches and parks, for recreation and physical 
exercise in favour of a commercial sport activity.  Must the public give up their public right 
to use the beach and to swim in the surf because a corporatized sporting association seeks to 
                                                
633 Sir John Smith (ed) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8th edn Butterworths London 1996) at p 773. 
634 J Cassels ‘Prostitution and Public Nuisance: Desperate Measures and the Limits of Civil Adjudication’ (1985) 
63 Can Bar Rev 764 at p 784, cited with approval in Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] ONSC 7509 at 
para [474], [1994] 117 DLR (4th) 449, [1994] 20 OR (3d) 229 (Adams J) 
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conduct races for their own profit using the public beaches, parks, and roads, to the 
exclusion of the public?  The Court of Appeal for England and Wales stated, recently, in 
reference to public nuisance: “In our view the offence of causing a public nuisance is a 
proper and proportionate response to the need to protect the public from acts, or omissions, 
which substantially interfere with the comfort and convenience of the public as being taken 
in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder, for the protection of health 
and morals, and in particular the need to protect the rights of others.  The level of 
imprecision inherent in the offence is necessary to enable it to be applied flexibly to meet 
new situations.”635 
 
 
 
 
                                                
635 R v Goldstein, R v R [2003] EWCA Crim 3450 at para [25], [2004] 1 WLR 2878 at p 2887 (Court of Appeal).  
Goldstein was appealed to the House of Lords: R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, 
[2005] 3 WLR 982. 
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Part 3 Applying Public Nuisance to Sport 
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Chapter 10 
 
Public sport events & the principles of public nuisance 
 
 
1. Are public exhibitions of sport public nuisances? 
 
Where a publicly exhibited sporting event creates obstruction, annoyance or discomfort to 
the public, endangers the life, or health or safety of the public, or offends public morals, it 
may be proscribed as a public nuisance.  A public nuisance extends to everything that 
endangers life or health, gives offence to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or 
obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property, including public exhibitions of 
sport.636 
 
Adopting the judicially approved definitions of public nuisance and applying these 
definitions to sports as practised in contemporary times yield numerous factual 
circumstances wherein public exhibitions of sport may be delimited and controlled by the 
Executive authority of the state acting on behalf of the people as parens patriae.  These factual 
situations prove important as a guide for the Executive of Government who, as parens patriae, 
                                                
636 Sherrod v Dutton 635 SW 2d 117 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee 1982) at p 119, citing with approval Caldwell 
v Knox Concrete Products 54 Tenn App 393, 391 SW 2d 5 (1964) and City of Nashville v Nevin 12 Tenn App 336.  
For the definition of public nuisance see: JF Archbold Archbold’s Criminal Pleading and Practice (44th edn 1992) vol 
2, p 3374, paras [31]-[40]; (2003 edn Sweet & Maxwell London 2003) at p 2550, paras [31]-[40]; applied in 
Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169 (Court of Appeal) at p 184 (Lord Justice Romer); applied 
in R v Shorrock [1993] 3 WLR 698 (Court of Appeal) at p 701 (Justice Rattee); applied in R v Rimmington; R v 
Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982, at paras [10] and [36] (Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill) and para [45] (Lord Roger of Earlsferry).  For the definition of public nuisance used in the United 
States of America, see: Copart Industries Inc v Consolidated Edison Co of New York Inc 41 NY 2d 564 at p 568, 394 
NYS 2d 169, 362 NE 2d 968 (1977) (Justice Cooke), citing New York Trap Rock Corp v Town of Clarkston 299 NY 
77 (1948) at p 80; applied in Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995) at p 840 of the former 
report; Attorney-General of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91, 761 NYS 2d 192 (2003); and Wheeler 
v Lebanon Valley Racing Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003) at p 792 of the former report; and City of 
New York v Beretta USA Corporation 315 F Supp 2d 256 (2004) at p 276 
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is foremost responsible for protecting public rights.  The needs of the public are not 
necessarily in agreement with the needs of sports federations.  On the one hand, the 
Executive of Government is faced with seeking to preserve and to protect those common 
law public rights which the courts have declared extant in public nuisance suits, such as the 
public right to quietude,637 the public right to use of places dedicated to public use,638 or the 
public right to safety.639  On the other hand, the Executive of Government is faced with a 
sports industry that is prevalent and financially motivated, desirous of increasing the financial 
gain of athletes and those employed in the management and ownership of sports federations 
and franchises.  Financially motivated public sports competitions must be staged at 
increasing levels, attracting larger crowds to larger arenas to a greater number of 
tournaments, competitions and games, in public areas or at places accessible to the public, in 
order to be profitable for those with pecuniary interest in sport.  Heightened levels of public 
sporting competition challenge the legal protections provided to the public generally by 
virtue of public nuisance at common law.  Faced with this challenge, the Executive of 
Government ought to be conscious of the legal tools attendant with the offence of public 
nuisance – the ex officio and relator actions for abatement of a public nuisance – and, 
utilizing legal procedure or the threat of legal action, ought to protect public rights by 
limiting the excesses of publicly exhibited sporting competition.  Should a government desire 
to augment public exhibitions of sport, to the possible detriment to public rights, they ought 
to amend the law through the Legislature.  The common law does not support the solipsistic 
growth of publicly exhibited sport events.  In the words of the Vice-Chancellor in Dewar v 
City and Suburban Race Course Co: “No majority, however large, is entitled to interfere with the 
common right of a minority, though small, to the enjoyment of the comfort and quiet of 
                                                
637 See Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345; Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] 
CanLII 7509 (Ontario Supreme Court). 
638 See Hue v Whiteley [1929] I Ch 440 at p 445 cited with approval in Jones v Bates [1938] 2 All ER 237 at p 241 
(Slesser LJ), at p 245 (Scott LJ); Attorney-General and Newton Abbot RDC v Dyer [1947] Ch 67 at p 85.  And see R 
v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Braim The Times, 11 October 1986, where McCullough J held that 
a public right of recreation can be created at common law based on long user, in the instant case being use of a 
common over many years for recreative activities such as walking, jogging, flying kites and model aeroplanes, 
picnicking and ball games and French cricket.  And see, further, North Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v Sutherland 
Shire Council [1999] NSWCA 438 at para [4] citing with approval Brodie v Mann [1885] 10 App Cas 378, Poole v 
Huskinson (1843) 11 M & W 830, 152 ER 1039, and R v Oxfordshire County Council; ex parte Sunningwell Parish 
Council [1999] UKHL 28, [1999] 3 WLR 160 at p 168, cited at paras [5] and [6] in North Cronulla Precinct 
Committee (Sheller JA). 
639 See Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd The Times 22 March 1991; State ex rel Attorney-General v Canty 207 
Mo 439 (1907); Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 615. 
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their homes, and the free use of the public thoroughfares which lead to them.  The 
Legislature alone, acting for the common weal, has this power entrusted to it.”640  Common 
law precedents reveal that a broad variety of public sporting events have been declared to be 
public nuisances because they create circumstances which are an inconvenience or 
obstruction to the public or which endanger the public’s right to comfort, or which endanger 
public health, or public morals. 
 
In Part 1 of this thesis, the question as to whether public exhibitions of sporting events 
create public nuisances by interfering with use by the public of a public place, such as a 
beach or park, was assessed.  Here, in Part 3 of this thesis, the appraisal of the public 
nuisance precedents is presented under three broad headings: namely, (1) public sporting 
events causing obstruction or inconvenience to the public, (2) public exhibitions of sporting 
events causing annoyance or discomfort to the public; and (3) public exhibitions of sporting 
events endangering public health, public safety, or life of the public.   
 
 
2. Who is responsible for the public nuisance where a publicly exhibited 
sporting event creates a public nuisance? 
 
The owner, operator, or manager, of a sports facility or sports team, or the entity responsible 
for staging or promoting a public sporting event, may severally and jointly be required to 
stop the sporting event from taking place or to abstain from staging a future planned 
sporting event where the public sporting event creates or is likely to create a public nuisance.  
Public nuisance thus has a very wide application for the disparate organizations, 
corporations, governments and individuals connected with the staging of publicly exhibited 
sports events.  In Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation,641 the local government was held 
responsible for perpetrating a public nuisance in licensing a motorcar race.  In Castle v St 
                                                
640 [1899] 1 IR 345 at p 356. 
641 (1907) 71 JP 478, followed Attorney General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346 at p 353. 
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Augustine’s Links Ltd,642 the sports association was liable.  And in State of New York v Waterloo 
Stock Car Raceway Inc,643 sports event promoters were liable.   
 
The entity responsible for staging the publicly exhibited sporting event may create a nuisance 
in two ways: (1) either through a direct act or omission attributable to such entity, such as, 
for example, where a motor sport event creates noise directly causing annoyance to the 
public by impinging on the public right to quietude (Attorney-General of British Columbia v 
Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC)); or (2) indirectly, where the combined 
effect of staging a sporting event and the conduct and activities of participants in or 
attendees to the sporting event creates a public nuisance, such as where a publicly exhibited 
sporting event draws crowds of spectators causing obstruction to the public by impinging on 
the public right of way on the highway (Shaw’s Jewelry Shop Inc v New York Herald Co 170 AD 
504, 156 NYS 651 (NY App Div 1915), affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, 224 
NY 731, 121 NE 890 (1918)).   
 
 
3. Public nuisance may be created by the direct actions of a sporting event or 
by the actions of people attending at a sporting event 
 
Public nuisance suits have been successful where the harm created is directly attributable to 
defendant or defendant’s activity.  In Hoover v Durkee,644 the evidence supported the finding 
by the court that the racetrack was a public nuisance.  The noise generated by the track 
drowned out all other sounds, prevented conversation at home or on the telephone, even 
with windows closed, the public address system at the racetrack could be heard from a 
significant distance, and there was an increase in traffic which was an inconvenience.  The 
public nuisance was caused by the direct acts of the sport in question.  In State of New York v 
Waterloo Stock Car Raceway,645 the operation of a racetrack for stock cars constituted a public 
nuisance that should be discontinued because the activities of the defendant directly created 
discomfort and inconvenience indiscriminately.  The evidence was to the effect that 
                                                
642 (1922) 38 TLR 615. 
643 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978). 
644 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995). 
645 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978) at p 357 of the former report. 
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everyone had their eardrums ‘hammered away’ during night stock car races, there was dust 
accumulation on their properties in the aftermath of the races, and everyone lived in fear for 
their continued safety.646  Again, the publicly exhibited sporting event itself created a public 
nuisance. 
 
Whilst, on the one hand, a defendant may cause a public nuisance directly and be liable for it, 
a defendant need not be the sole source of a nuisance so long as the combined activities of 
the defendant and others amounts to a public nuisance.  The following cases demonstrate 
how a lawfully conducted activity may nonetheless amount to a public nuisance and be 
restricted.  Even where a sports federation, or the manager of a sporting event, or a sporting 
club, in their conduct taken alone would not amount to a public nuisance, the sports 
federation, manager or club is still the proper subject of injunctive relief because their 
conduct, taken in conjunction with others, constitutes a public nuisance. 
 
In the leading case of R v Moore,647 the defendant maintained on land of his, abutting the 
public highway, a rifle shooting range.  The defendant was a gun-maker and had taken some 
land at Bayswater, in the county of Middlesex, distant about one hundred feet from the 
north side of the main London and Uxbridge road, and had enclosed part of it and 
converted it into a shooting range.  People attending at the shooting range and engaging in 
the sport, shot at fixed targets and at pigeons.  A large number of people congregated 
outside the defendant’s land on the public highway and in adjacent fields in order to shoot 
the pigeons which escaped from the guns on the defendant’s land.  The defendant was 
indicted for a public nuisance.  Lord Tenterden CJ directed the jury that the defendant was 
responsible for the activities of the people gathering on the highway, even though they were 
not invited on to the defendant’s land to participate in the shooting.  He gave leave, 
however, for the defendant to argue the point in the Court of King’s Bench.  The defendant 
was found guilty.  In the course of his judgment in that court, Lord Tenterden CJ said at 
page 188: “If a person collects together a crowd of people to the annoyance of his 
                                                
646 Note Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906) where a public nuisance was created by the 
direct act of appropriating the streets of New York for a motorcar race; and note, Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] 
OR 595, [1952] 4 DLR 93, [1952] OWN 516, where a public nuisance was created by the direct act of a 
motorcar crashing through a fence surrounding the racetrack into a public park.   
647 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184. 
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neighbours, that is a nuisance for which he is answerable.  And this is an old principle.”  
Littledale J concurred: “It has been contended that to render the defendant liable, it must be 
his object to create a nuisance, or else that must be the necessary and inevitable result of his 
act.  No doubt it was not his object, but I do not agree with the other position; because if it 
be the probable consequence of his act, he is answerable as if it were his actual object.  If 
the experience of mankind must lead any one to expect the result, he will be answerable for 
it.”648 
 
Swinfen Eady LJ adopted that test in Lyons, Sons & Co v Gulliver,649 and in the same case 
Cozens-Hardy MR said: “…a man is or may be liable to an indictment for attracting, even by 
something lawfully done on his own premises, a crowd in the street adjoining his 
premises.”650  Even if a sport were lawfully played, in and of itself, the persons who promote, 
operate, or conduct a public sporting fixture may nonetheless be liable on indictment or civil 
suit for a public nuisance if the crowds, or patrons attending at, or the participants 
participating in the public sporting event create an obstruction, annoyance, inconvenience, or 
discomfort to a class of the public, attendant with such sporting event, or if the event is one 
which creates an endangerment to the life, health, or morals of the public.  It is probable that 
where crowds that gather at sporting events and cause endangerment to health and life, such 
as what occurred at Hillsborough in England in April 1989 when 95 attendees to a football 
match were crushed to death in a crowd congestion, they create a public nuisance for which 
the owners, operators, or managers of the sporting event are liable at common law, and not 
individual members of the crowd. 
 
In Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co,651 horseracing on a Sunday was enjoined at the 
suit of private plaintiffs.  Nuisance was caused to local residents adjoining the racetrack by 
vast crowds attending at the races.  In granting an injunction the Vice-Chancellor applied R v 
Moore, stating:  
                                                
648 ibid at p 188 (emphasis added). 
649 [1914] 1 Ch 631 at p 642. 
650 ibid at p 642.  In this case the defendants were liable for creating a nuisance because a queue formed outside 
the theatre they operated and stretched down the street, thereby obstructing access to shops in the street. 
651 [1899] 1 IR 345. 
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“The principles on which the Courts act and the general application of 
the principles are well settled.  They are clearly enunciated by the 
eminent Judges who decided the case of The King v Moore 3 B. & Ad. 184, 
a case which has ever since been followed, where it was laid down that a 
man cannot be allowed to make a profit to the annoyance of his 
neighbours; that if a person collects together a crowd of people to the 
annoyance of his neighbours, that is a nuisance for which he is 
answerable; that it need not be proved that it is his object to create a 
nuisance, or that it must be the necessary or inevitable result of his act, 
but if it be the probable consequence of his act, he is answerable as if 
it were his actual object; and that if the experience of mankind must lead 
anyone to expect the result, he will be answerable for it.”652 
 
R v Moore was also applied and followed in Newell v Izzard,653 a case involving a private 
nuisance in the Chancery Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court.  There the 
defendant operated a roller skating rink.  It attracted an undesirable element to the locality.  
Crowds attending the skating rink trespassed onto the plaintiff’s property and used it as a 
toilet.  It was held that their acts interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his land.  
Chief Justice Baxter held that this was a nuisance because none of the acts complained of 
would have happened but for the maintenance of the skating rink.  The proprietors of the 
skating rink were held responsible for the nuisance; and not individual members of the 
crowds attending at the skating rink.  Had there been several households affected, rather 
than merely one, it is likely that the court would have found a public nuisance to have been 
created by the crowds attending the sports arena.  In Sunset Amusement Co v Board of Police 
Commissioners,654 in denying the renewal of the appellants’ permit to operate a roller skating 
rink, the Supreme Court of California rejected the appellants’ claim that its roller skating rink 
should not be held responsible for serious traffic congestion, numerous and varied traffic 
offences, thefts and misuse of private property committed by its patrons off the premises.  
There was substantial evidence that the appellants’ operation of the rink did not comport 
                                                
652 ibid at pp 350-351. 
653 [1944] 3 DLR 118 (New Brunswick Supreme Court Chancery Division) at p 123. 
654 7 Cal 3d 64, 496 P 2d 840 (1972) at p 84 of the former report, appeal dismissed 409 US 1121, 93 S Ct 940 
(1973). 
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with the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare of the public, 
as they failed to provide adequate parking facilities, and failed to control or prevent 
disturbances on or near the premises.655 
 
Bellamy v Wells656 holds likewise.  The conduct of patrons attending boxing matches at a 
private club in London – conduct both inside the club and outside on the street – was 
sufficient to create a nuisance for which an injunction was issued against the club.  The fact 
that a defendant’s conduct is otherwise lawful does not preclude liability for public 
nuisance.657  In Shaw’s Jewelry Shop Inc v New York Herald Co,658 the court enjoined the 
defendants from operating a machine called an ‘automatic baseball playograph’ on which was 
reproduced images of each play of the baseball games in the ‘World Series.’  The court held 
that the exhibition constituted a public nuisance because large crowds formed in the street 
and on the footpath, on Broadway, to watch the baseball ‘playograph’.  The number of 
persons who witnessed the exhibition was between 30,000 and 40,000.  The street became so 
congested that between eighty and ninety policemen were required to handle the crowd.  
The south-bound traffic on Broadway between Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth streets was 
substantially restricted to the easterly side of the street.  The plaintiff storekeeper, whose 
business was hampered by the attending crowds, was entitled to an injunction for the public 
nuisance, as well as damages.659  It is settled, following decisions in New York, England, and 
Canada that an otherwise lawful business, even one operating in conformity with relevant 
statutory requirements, may be enjoined when it creates or contributes to a public nuisance 
because of the manner or circumstances in which it operates.660 
 
                                                
655 ibid. 
656 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
657 See State v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40, pp 44-45 (NY Sup Ct 1978).   
658 170 AD 504, 156 NYS 651 (NY App Div 1915), affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, 224 NY 731, 
121 NE 890 (1918). 
659 170 AD 504 (1915) at p 508. 
660 Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 615; Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156; Lyons, Sons 
& Co v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 631; Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] OR 595, [1952] 4 DLR 93, [1952] OWN 516; 
Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995); State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc 96 
Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978).  The only exception to this rule is where the specific conduct at issue is 
“fully authorized by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation.”  See Hill v City of New York 139 NY 495, 
34 NE 1090 at p 1092 (1893) (“The authority which will thus shelter an actual nuisance must be express . . . 
For, consider what the proposition is.  It upholds a positive damage to the citizen and denies him any 
remedy… Surely, an authority which so results should be remarkably strong and clear.”). 
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These decisions have important application to popular modern sports events held at the 
behest of sports associations now corporatized and profit driven.  Injunctive relief may be 
obtained against a club, or manager, or organiser or promoter of a sporting event, where, for 
example, excessive numbers of spectators create obstruction, inconvenience or discomfort 
to the public, or where a riot or violent acts might occur on the part of fans, if the actions of 
the club, manager, or organiser is such that, taken together with the conduct of the fans, 
creates a public nuisance.  The conduct of the sports club, manager or organiser may be 
nothing more than the staging of the sporting event itself; a probable innocent and lawful act 
in itself.661  The act of the organiser of a publicly exhibited sporting fixture may be lawful, 
such as the scheduling of a game between two football teams.  Yet, if the result of the 
meeting of two tribal and opposed sporting teams leads to a riot or to violent acts by 
participants in the sporting event, or by fans attendant at the game, a public nuisance is 
committed.  The remedy, under civil suit for a public nuisance, at the instigation of the 
Attorney-General, is one of injunctive relief against the organiser of the sport, not against 
the individual rioters or fans.  But for the conduct of the organiser of the sporting event, the 
crowd would not have gathered.  The conduct of the organiser of the sporting event, taken 
in conjunction with others, creates a nuisance.  This is an important aspect of the law of 
public nuisance.  Public nuisance injunctive relief is less concerned with punishment of 
riotous or violent persons or fans, and instead is focussed on redressing an extant or 
threatened public nuisance by stopping or preventing its occurrence.  A sporting club, even 
perceiving themselves to be innocent of any cause of riotous or violent activity amongst their 
fans, or claiming to have endeavoured to have done all in their power to prevent the 
occurrence of riotous or violent activity, may nonetheless find themselves defendants to an 
injunctive remedy for a public nuisance. 
 
The civil remedy available for abatement of a public nuisance is not designed to punish any 
person, whether they be an individual fan who is violent or riotous, or whether they be a 
sports federation operating as a corporate entity.  Riotous or violent activity amongst fans 
may involve acts which necessitate criminal sanction.  Legislation in the United Kingdom has 
                                                
661 R v Moore (1832) 3 B & Ald 184; Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156; State of New York v Waterloo 
Stock Car Raceway Inc 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978). 
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created specific offences for football hooliganism and football violence.662  Football fans 
who are violent or riotous may thus be charged and receive penalties if their conduct falls 
within the specific terms of the Acts.663  Violent conduct by fans may also lead to liability 
under statutory criminal law, in particular for offences of assault, grievous bodily harm, or 
riot.  So where a very specific Act designed to address violent behaviour amongst football 
fans fails to address violence amongst fans attending at other sporting events such as Tennis 
Championships,664 individuals may nonetheless be punished.  But the existence of statutory 
sanction for, and retributive punishment of, individual persons attending sports events does 
not override the right of the Crown, acting as parens patriae, to protect the public right to 
safety and to suppress public nuisances.  Conduct which is liable to criminal sanction may 
also amount to a public nuisance and be the cause of injunctive relief.665  Whether violent 
conduct or riotous behaviour at sporting events is a public nuisance is a question of fact.  
Proceeding against individual fans for charges of assault or riot under the criminal law does 
not obviate the civil remedy at common law for abatement of a public nuisance.  The Crown 
may obtain injunctive relief against the sports federation or organiser or promoter of a 
publicly exhibited sporting event to prevent the occurrence of conduct amounting to a 
public nuisance, such as riotous of violent conduct, in the future.666 
 
Further, the conduct on the part of spectators or crowds attending at publicly exhibited 
sporting events need not be violent or riotous to amount to a public nuisance at common 
                                                
662 See Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK); Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK). 
663 Note eg that various types of behaviour and conduct, including throwing bottles or any other missile on to 
the field of play at the Sydney Cricket Ground, is an offence for which a person is liable to a fine pursuant to s 
12 Sydney Cricket Ground and Sydney Football Stadium By-law 2004 (NSW). 
664 Note eg the violence and riotous behaviour of 150 spectators attending the Australian Open tennis 
championships in Melbourne Australia in January 2007 where Croatian expatriate and Croatian national fans 
clashed with Serbian expatriate and Serbian national fans: B Doherty and S Spits ‘Violence Mars First Day of 
Open’ The Age <http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/violence-mars-first-day-of-
open/2007/01/15/1168709660638.html> (1 February 2009).  In 2009 violence erupted between Serbian and 
Bosnian nationals and expatriates supporting professional tennis players Delic and Djokovic born in those 
countries: M Tallentire ‘Violence Erupts Between Serbs and Bosnians After Djokovic’s Win’ The Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2009/jan/23/australian-open-violence-djokovic> (1 February 2009). 
665 Equitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances exists even where such is not conferred by statute, where an 
offender is amenable to criminal law, and where no property right is involved: City of Chicago v Festival Theatre 
Corp 91 Ill 2d 295, 438 NE 2d 159, 63 Ill Dec 421 (1982) followed in City of Chicago v Beretta USA Corporation 
213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004) at p 383 of the former report.  See Commonwealth v McGovern 116 Ky 212 
(1903) where the Court of Appeals of Kentucky enjoined the staging of a prize fight on the basis that the prize 
fight was a public nuisance at common law, albeit that prize fighting was also an offence under the Kentucky 
Statutes (Kentucky Statutes 1899, ss 1284-1288). 
666 Commonwealth v McGovern 116 Ky 212 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 1903). 
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law.  Publicly exhibited sporting events may create a public nuisance where crowds merely 
conglomerate to view the sporting event, such as where spectators might gather on a beach 
to watch a surfing championship competition.  Violence and riotous behaviour amongst fans 
impinges on the public right to safety.  Yet innocent acts, such as standing on a beach, might 
impinge on the public right to use of the public beach by creating an obstruction or causing 
inconvenience to the public.  The act or omission created either directly or indirectly need 
not be an offence in itself and may be entirely innocent.  But if the act or omission impinges 
on a public right then a public nuisance is created.  And so it is by looking at public rights 
and the circumstances whereby those public rights are impinged that makes possible a 
determination as to whether any particular publicly exhibited sporting event staged at any 
particular place amounts to a public nuisance at common law. 
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Chapter 11 
 
Public sporting events create public nuisances by causing 
obstruction or inconvenience to the public 
 
 
1. A public exhibition of sport which causes an obstruction of or 
inconvenience to the use of the highway is a public nuisance 
 
It has long been held that it is a public nuisance at common law unreasonably to obstruct or 
hinder free passage of the public along the highway.667  Any sporting event which causes an 
unreasonable obstruction of the highway is a public nuisance at common law.  Whether an 
obstruction is created, and whether the obstruction is unreasonable, are questions of fact.668  
Justice Joyce noted, in Lyons, Sons & Co v Gulliver: “Among the usual and recognized 
nuisances on a highway which you find enumerated in almost any text-book are these.  It is a 
nuisance to organize or take part in a procession or meeting which naturally results in an 
obstruction and is an unreasonable use of the highway, to use premises situate near a 
highway for exhibitions, entertainments, or other purposes of such a character that crowds 
of persons naturally collect and obstruct the highway, not by the mere act of coming and 
going but by remaining on it awaiting admission or watching the spectacle or endeavouring 
                                                
667 See Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29 at paras [253]-[259] (Hayne J), citing the long history of 
precedents on causes of obstruction of the highway.  See also R v Howell (1675) 3 Keb 465, 84 ER 826. 
668 Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906) at p 151.  Note 
also Original Hartlepool Collieries Company v Gibb (1877) 5 Ch D 713 at p 722, where Sir George Jessel says of the 
question of reasonableness: “…[I]t is not unreasonable that your neighbour should give an evening party 
occasionally and that there should be a file of carriages running across your door or opposite your door.  But it 
would be very unreasonable if anybody did not break the file to allow your carriage to come up to your own 
door, and still more unreasonable, if, instead of giving parties occasionally as people do, your neighbour were to 
turn his house into an assembly room or for some private purpose, in consequence of which a file of carriages 
came every day and obstructed the carriage way to your house.  I only give these as illustrations.  The law is 
quite clear.  The question of reasonableness has been said to be a question for a jury.  It must be reasonable 
user and nothing else.”  See also Barber v Penley [1893] 2 Ch 447 at p 452. 
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to obtain information as to what is going on out of their sight.”669  In Schubert v Lee, the High 
Court of Australia held that the use of a highway for purposes other than a highway must 
not lessen, in a substantial degree, the commodious use of the highway for legitimate 
purposes.670  Latham CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ, stated: “If a man deposits a load of stones in a 
highway there is no doubt that he obstructs the highway, even though the members of the 
public are able to walk round the stones and even though it is not proved that any member 
of the public actually endeavoured to use the highway while the stones were there.”671  There 
Honours concluded: “The extent of the unauthorized use of a highway or other place, its 
duration, the nature and the occasion of its use and the time must all be taken into 
consideration, and so too must the character of the place.  But, if the conclusion is that a 
substantial detraction takes place from the commodious use of the place by the members of 
the public who may reasonably be expected to make use of it, it is unimportant that upon a 
particular occasion none is in fact impeded.  The question which is involved, however, is 
always one of degree, and therefore of fact.”672 
 
An obstruction of the highway may be created on either of two grounds: (1) on the ground 
that the staging of the sport itself directly obstructs or causes inconvenience to the public’s 
right to use of, or passage along, the highway, by using the highway itself for the exhibition 
of the sport, or (2) indirectly, on the ground that the staging of the sport draws a crowd of 
people to spectate, which crowd obstructs or blocks up a part of the highway, thereby 
inconveniencing the public in the exercise of their public right. 
 
 
2. Publicly exhibited sporting events creating obstruction or inconvenience 
directly 
   
In Schubert v Lee the High Court of Australia declared that to carry on a trade or vocation in a 
street is to make use of it foreign to the purpose of a highway.673  A publicly exhibited 
                                                
669 [1914] 1 Ch 631 at p 637. 
670 [1946] HCA 28, (1946) 71 CLR 589 at p 594. 
671 ibid, following Haywood v Mumford [1908] HCA 62, (1908) 7 CLR 133. 
672 ibid. 
673 ibid. 
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sporting event conducted on a highway may directly create a public nuisance because the 
manner in which the event makes use of the highway is foreign to the purpose of the 
highway.   
 
The earliest case in which it is reported that a sport played in a public street amounted to a 
nuisance at common law is the case of Noy occurring during the reign of Charles I (1625-
1649).674  A writ was granted to remove a bowling-alley erected under the eaves of Saint 
Dunstan’s Church.  A publicly exhibited sporting event erected or conducted on the 
highway, whether under the eaves of a church or not, is a nuisance per se at common law 
because such activity is contrary to the purpose of the highway.  Such an activity either 
obstructs the public or inconveniences the public in the exercise of their common law right 
of passage along the highway. 
 
In Johnson v City of New York,675 the Court of Appeals of New York faced an appeal in a civil 
suit between the plaintiff spectator at a motorcar race held under the auspices of the 
defendants.  The suit concerned liability for negligence for injuries suffered by the plaintiff.  
During trial, the question as to whether the motorcar race held on the public streets of New 
York was a public nuisance was raised, and answered.  The motorcar race was held on the 
streets of New York on Sunday 31st May 1902.  The plaintiff was a spectator.  The race was 
conducted under the authority of a resolution adopted by the board of alderman of the 
Borough of Richmond which purported to give permission to the Automobile Club of 
America to conduct the car race.  During the race, the plaintiff was struck by a car which was 
racing in the race.  At trial, the trial court directed a verdict against the defendants on the 
ground that the motorcar race was unlawful and a public nuisance.  On review, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court affirmed.  The defendants appealed further to the Court of 
Appeals 
 
                                                
674 Noted in R v Howell (1675) 3 Keb 465, 84 ER 826; Jacob Hall’s case (1671) 1 Mod 76, 86 ER 744; and Bates v 
District of Columbia 1 MacArth 433 (1874), (1874) US App LEXIS 2098.  In Bates v District of Columbia, Justin 
Olin described the case as, “a pretty summary proceeding, which in effect destroyed a man’s property, and 
condemned him without trial or hearing, and yet the decision was in strict conformity to law,…” ((1874) US 
App LEXIS 2098 at para [4]. 
675 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906). 
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The Court of Appeals upheld the appeal and ordered a new trial finding that the question 
whether the contest as conducted was in fact a nuisance, whether the city or the race 
sponsors were guilty of negligence in the management of the race and the contributory 
negligence, if any, on the part of the spectator, were all questions of fact, which should have 
been submitted to the jury for determination.  In upholding the appeal the court commented 
on the legality of the motorcar race on the facts of the case, concluding that a motorcar race 
on the streets of the city was a public nuisance per se and the purported license or 
authorization of the race by the City of New York was irrelevant to the determination that a 
public nuisance had occurred.  Chief Justice Cullen, for the court, stated:  
“The authority [of the city of New York] was to regulate public travel, 
not to exclude the public.  Of course, in the congested condition of 
many of the streets of New York restrictions, possibly of a somewhat 
arbitrary character, are necessary to secure public passage along the 
highway; otherwise intolerable confusion would exist and the streets 
become blocked so that travellers could move in no direction.  Such 
regulations are within the power of the municipal authorities…  In those 
cases every member of the public has an equal right to share in the 
privileges granted in the street.  There is no appropriation for a private 
use.  The present case is radically different.  The occupation of the 
highway was to be exclusive in the parties to whom the permission was 
granted.  Therefore, the race or speed contest held by the defendants 
was an unlawful use and obstruction of the highway and per se a nuisance 
(Penal Code, s. 385, sub. 3.)”676 
 
In a strikingly similar case, Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation,677 a local authority was 
restrained from using “The Parade”, a promenade for foot-passengers at Blackpool, for the 
purposes of a motor race.  By a local Act passed in 1865 the corporation of Blackpool were 
authorized to make and maintain a carriage-drive and a promenade (called ‘the parade’) by 
the sea.  The parade was used exclusively for foot passengers and pedestrians.  Motor races 
                                                
676 186 NY 139 (1906) at p 146, followed Attorney General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346 at 
p 353. 
677 (1907) 71 JP 478. 
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were held in 1904, 1905, and 1906, on this sea front.  In each of the three years, the course 
used for racing was barricaded on both sides for a distance of over a mile and a half, and on 
each occasion the tramtrack was, for a portion of its length, closed for trams and used for 
motor cars.  In 1906 the corporation gave their approval to motor car races being held on 
the parade, and gave permission for part of the tramway road to be used for the purpose of 
cars returning to the starting point.  They also undertook to keep the portion of the parade 
over which the races were to be run clear of traffic, and to erect a barrier and provide the 
necessary police control.  In all respects, the corporation acted in the same manner as local 
councils or municipal councils act in supporting contemporary public sporting events such 
as triathlon events and marathons. 
 
Suit was brought by the Attorney-General, on relator of a ratepayer, for an injunction to 
restrain the corporation from organizing or promoting motor races on the sea front.  The 
Attorney-General argued that the parade was a highway, and that racing upon it was an 
improper use at common law.  It was also a breach of the Motor Car Act 1903 (UK), 
because the cars necessarily exceeded the speed limit.  The erection of barricades caused 
obstruction, and constituted a nuisance at common law, and an offence against the Highway 
Act.  And the collection of crowds and of motor cars waiting to start on the carriage-drive 
was also a nuisance which ought to be restrained.  In defence to the action the local authority 
argued that: “Some latitude must be given to the corporation to allow its use for events 
causing public enjoyment, just as cricketers are allowed temporarily to monopolize portions 
of public parks…”  The local government claimed “a bona fide use of a public work for a 
public purpose, viz the creation of an attraction in the off-season, and the advertisement of 
Blackpool.”678  It would be to these policy reasons which a contemporary local council or 
municipal council would appeal to justify their license of contemporary public sporting 
events such as triathlons and marathons which use the highway. 
 
The Blackpool Corporation was found by the court to have taken an active part in the 
promotion of the motor race.  They issued notices closing a portion of the parade and 
tramway to the public.  They put up barriers and a grand stand, and the receipts of the grand 
stand were received by the corporation.  The effect of what the corporation did was to 
                                                
678 ibid. 
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exclude the public from the use of the parade for any purpose during certain hours on 
certain days, and to stop the tramway service during substantially the same periods.  The 
Vice-Chancellor held that the corporation were in the position of trustees of the parade for 
limited public purposes, namely, for the purpose of use by foot passengers, perambulators, 
invalid carriages, and similar vehicles, and that it was an abuse of the parade to allow it to be 
used for either horses or motor cars, and a fortiori motor races.679  The staging of a motor 
race was a public nuisance.  
 
Public exhibitions of sport that utilise highways and public streets exclusive of the public 
generally, even for a limited time, are a public nuisance.  Sporting events such as triathlon 
races, wherein thousands of professional and amateur triathletes cordon off the highway and 
use the highway for the cycling leg of the race create a common law public nuisance.  The 
same is true of cycling races such as the Tour Down Under and of other professional or 
amateur criterion cycling events.  Licenses by local authorities or local councils, as was the 
case in Johnson v City of New York,680 and in Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation,681 will not 
be sufficient in law to make such a sporting event using public roads exclusive of the public 
lawful unless there exists unambiguous legislation in clear terms granting power to a local 
authority to license a public nuisance.  The only means of making lawful the appropriation of 
public roads for the exclusive use of a sporing event is legislation through Parliament, the 
effect of which is to change the common law position.682 
 
It is probable that events such as the annual Noosa Triathlon and the Mooloolaba Triathlon 
in Queensland, where the highways and public streets are appropriated for the bicycle and 
running legs of the race, exclusive of the public, are creating a public nuisance.  During the 
races, barriers are erected, traffic cones are placed on the roads, cars lawfully parked in the 
street are towed away, and police and marshals stop members of the public from driving 
along the public roads, walking along the public thoroughfares, or using the canals or 
beaches or parks for recreation.  Grandstands and elite private corporate boxes for the 
management and for sponsors of the triathlon event are constructed on the public footpaths 
                                                
679 ibid at p 480. 
680 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906). 
681 (1907) 71 JP 478. 
682 See further the discussion in Part 4, Chapters 14 and 15, below. 
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adjoining the road.  A pedestrian is not able to utilize his public right to use of the public 
footpath.  These buildings, built on the public highway, are also a public nuisance being an 
obstruction of the highway.  The roads which are closed also obstruct residents of homes in 
the towns of Noosa, Mooloolaba, and Alexandra Headland, where the triathlon races are 
staged, who are unable to leave their homes by vehicle during the conduct of the race.  In 
such circumstances the residents of these communities are sufficient in number to constitute 
the “public” against whom a public nuisance is committed.  It is sufficient, as a matter of law 
if the nuisance affects only seven families,683 or sixteen households,684 or thirty households.685 
 
Other sports events, such as marathon running events, fun run events, and cycling events 
also use the public highways exclusive of the public.  Such events take place annually, as 
evidenced by the Gold Coast Marathon, which is run on the public highways of the Gold 
Coast, Queensland.  During the Gold Coast Marathon the roads are cordoned off to vehicles 
and to the public for several hours and residents of the scores of apartment buildings 
adjacent the public highways used for the marathon race are obstructed in leaving their 
homes by vehicles.  There is no legislation of the Queensland Parliament which authorises 
the appropriation of the public highway for the exclusive use of the race organisers or 
sponsors of either of these triathlon or marathon events in Queensland.  Nor is there any 
legislation of the Queensland Parliament which empowers a local council to issue a license 
permitting the appropriation of a public highway for their exclusive use.  The Race 
organisers of sports such as the Noosa Triathlon and the Gold Coast Marathon invariably 
obtain a license from a local council, and pay a fee to the local council for such license, to 
make use of a public highway.  But these licenses, issued by local councils under their care 
and management responsibilities under Local Government Acts (such as sections 28, 60 and 
69 Local Government Act 2009 (Qld)),686 are insufficient in law to authorise race organisers 
to commit a public nuisance.  The decisions in Johnson v City of New York and Attorney-General 
                                                
683 Attorney General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme 
Court). 
684 Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity 
Division, 13 March 1986) BC8601183 at 5. 
685 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, [1957] 1 All ER 894. 
686 Section 60 empowers a local government to ‘regulate’ the use of vehicles on local roads.  And, consistent 
with its powers to ‘regulate’ roads, section 69 empowers a local government to close a road (permanently or 
temporarily) to traffic or particular traffic, if there is another road or route reasonably available for use by the 
traffic. 
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v Blackpool Corporation, confirm that a local authority does not have power to license the 
appropriation of a public highway for a sporting event unless there is legislation which 
explicitly empowers that local authority to change the common law and to license the 
commission of what amounts to a common law public nuisance obstructing the public in the 
exercise of their right of way on the highway. 
 
There is a difference in the application of the common law of public nuisance to public 
sporting events which take place at public places, such as beaches, parks and public highways 
compared with public sporting events which take place in sports stadiums which are owned 
by individual persons, sports clubs, corporations, or governments.  Whilst sports events held 
at stadia might create a public nuisance indirectly by drawing crowds to the stadia which 
leads to obstruction of the public’s right to unfettered use of the highway or inconvenience 
to the public, by obstructing access to and egress from adjoining premises, discussed below, 
sports events that are staged in public places such as beaches, parks and public highways are 
nuisances not only because they may draw crowds, but principally because they appropriate a 
public place for their own exclusive use and personal profit, albeit for a limited period of time.  
In so doing, the sports event, operated by a private company or private sports association, 
interferes with or obstructs the public in the exercise of their immutable public right to use 
of, enjoyment of, or movement along, public places. 
 
An obstruction of the highway, if unreasonable, is a public nuisance in itself.687  It is not 
every obstruction of the highway which constitutes a public nuisance.  The obstruction must 
be unreasonable.  Permanent obstruction erected on the highway without lawful authority 
unavoidably constitutes a public nuisance because it amounts to a removal of a part of the 
highway from public use.  A temporary obstruction of the highway may be lawful if it is 
slight in point of time, or brought about by the reasonable and lawful use of the highway as a 
highway.688  So, for example, it is not a public nuisance to temporarily obstruct the highway 
by causing a car to stop on the road for the purpose of discharging passengers or goods.689  
But such use of the highway, or obstruction of the highway, must be temporary and without 
                                                
687 See further RVF Heuston & RA Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th edn Sweet & Maxwell 
London 1992) at pp 87 and 89. 
688 ibid at pp 90 and 91, citing Buck v Briggs Motor Bodies Ltd (1959) The Times, April 18. 
689 Trevett v Lee [1955] 1 WLR 113 at p 118. 
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delay.  Stoppage in the street must be prompt.690   The use of highways by public exhibitions 
of sporting events where professional sporting organizations and professional athletes make 
use of the highway exclusive of the public making money through prize money and television 
sponsorship is very different from these cases of temporary obstruction of the highway.  
And we may understand by analogy to the caselaw on this point – such as Johnson and 
Blackpool Corporation – that the use of other public spaces such as public beaches and parks by 
public exhibitions of sporting events where professional sporting organizations and 
professional athletes make use of the highway exclusive of the public similarly creates public 
nuisances.691  The exclusive use of public highways, parks, or beaches, is an appropriation for a 
temporal period exclusive of public rights to use of, and enjoyment of, the public highway, 
park or beach in question.  An appropriation of a public way for an exclusive use by a private 
entity, such as a sports association, a sports club, or a sports promoter, for a short period of 
time, such as for part of the day on a Sunday, is an unreasonable obstruction of the public 
way and per se a nuisance.692  In Johnson v City of New York, the Court of Appeals of New York 
held that the use of the public streets in New York for a motor vehicle race on a Sunday 
afternoon amounted to a public nuisance per se because the use was exclusive of the 
public.693 
 
                                                
690 Lord Ellenborough’s comment in R v Jones 3 Camp 230, where it was held to be an indictable offence for a 
timber merchant to cut logs of timber in the street adjoining his timber-yard, is dispositive.  His Lordship said: 
“If an unreasonable time is occupied in the operation of delivering beer from a brewer’s dray into the cellar of a 
publican, this is certainly a nuisance.  A cart or waggon may be unloaded at a gateway; but this must be done 
with promptness.” (cited in Barber v Penley [1893] 2 Ch 447 at p 450). 
691 Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906) at p 146 of the 
former report. Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478 at p 480.  On case law concerning 
nuisance of beaches and foreshores, note the judgment of Corporation of Hastings v Ivall [1871] 19 LR Eq 558, 
where Sir R Malins V-C said of the defendants claim to an “…absolute and uncontrolled liberty of depositing 
any quantity of earth or rubbish on the beach, and where, when, and as he thinks proper, [it] is, in my opinion, 
most unreasonable and unsustainable.”  Note, similarly Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 
182, [1954] 2 All ER 561 (CA), where, on the question of nuisance, Denning LJ said at p 571: “Applying the 
old cases to modern instances, it is, in my opinion, a public nuisance to discharge oil into the sea in such 
circumstances that it is likely to be carried onto the shores and beaches of our land to the prejudice 
and discomfort of Her Majesty’s subjects.  It is an offence punishable by the common law.”  The judgment of 
the Court of Appeal was reversed by the House of Lords, [1955] 3 All ER 864.  Although the issues of trespass 
and nuisance were not considered by it, Lord Radcliffe did say he agreed with Denning LJ’s views on the 
question of nuisance. 
692 Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906) at p 146 of the 
former report.  Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478. 
693 ibid. 
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The exclusive use of public highways for sports events by private entities (such as sports 
clubs, sports associations, or sports promoters) for the limited duration of a sports event, is 
different from case law where an obstruction is caused by a motor vehicle standing on the 
road for an unreasonable time or in an unreasonable manner because, in those 
circumstances, the highway is not cordoned off for exclusive use, but is merely obstructed by 
a motor vehicle stopped on the road.694  In such cases, vehicles and pedestrians can take an 
alternate route during the short time period when the road is obstructed.  Such use is also 
different from the case law on picketing on the public highway; for it cannot be a nuisance 
for a number of people to use the highway jointly and contemporaneously, for that is just 
what the highway is made for.695  Triathlon races such as the Byron Bay Triathlon in 
Australia and the Windsor Triathlon in England, where the public highways are not 
cordoned off for the exclusive use of most of the bicycle leg of the race, and the competitors 
must share the road for the bicycle leg of the race with cars, may not create an unreasonable 
use of the highway and may thus not amount to a public nuisance.  The same cannot be said 
of the run leg of these races, however, where the public roads are cordoned off, or for other 
triathlon races such as at Noosa or Mooloolaba, in Queensland, which use the public 
highway exclusively for several hours, erecting barriers and traffic cones along the roads and 
footpaths and engaging marshals and volunteers to prevent members of the public from 
exercising their right to free travel along the road or footpath.  In such circumstances there is 
no option of taking alternate routes during the race.  The whole highway is cordoned off.  
No part of the highway is shared.  Following the decision in Johnson v City of New York,696 and 
Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation,697 such public sporting events as triathlons and 
marathons are public nuisances at common law. 
 
                                                
694 RVF Heuston & RA Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1992) 
at p 88, citing Chesterfield Corporation v Arthur Robinson (Transport) Ltd (1955) 106 LJ (News) 61.  Note also R v 
Cross (1812) 3 Camp 244, where Lord Ellenborough, in reference to coaches stationed in the streets, said at p 
246: “Is there any doubt if coaches on the occasion of a rout, wait an unreasonable length of time in the public 
street, and obstruct the transit of His Majesty's subjects who wish to pass through it in carriages or on foot, the 
persons who cause and permit such coaches so to wait are guilty of a nuisance?”  Then he says: “A stage coach 
may set down or take up passengers in the street, this being necessary for public convenience: but it must be 
done in a reasonable time; and private premises must be procured for the coach to stop in during the interval 
between the end of one journey and the commencement of another.” 
695 ibid, citing Johnson v Kent (1975) 132 CLR 164 at p 176. 
696 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906). 
697 (1907) 71 JP 478, followed Attorney General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346 at p 353. 
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The facts of Bird v Jones,698 are pertinent in demonstrating how the law of public nuisance 
might apply to sports events where parts of the highway are obstructed, although in that case 
it was claimed that the plaintiff was falsely imprisoned.  He did not proceed on a claim in 
public nuisance.  In that case, Williams J outlined the facts at page 670, as follows:  “A part 
of Hammersmith Bridge, which is generally used as a public footway, was appropriated for 
seats to view a regatta on the river, and separated for that purpose from the carriage way by a 
temporary fence.  The plaintiff insisted upon passing along the part so appropriated, and 
attempted to climb over the fence.  The defendant (clerk of the Bridge Company) pulled him 
back; but the plaintiff succeeded in climbing over the fence.  The defendant then stationed 
two policemen to prevent, and they did prevent, the plaintiff from proceeding forwards 
along the footway in the direction he wished to go.  The plaintiff, however, was at the same 
time told that he might go back into the carriage way and proceed to the other side of the 
bridge, if he pleased.  The plaintiff refused to do so, and remained where he was so 
obstructed, about half an hour.”  The plaintiff failed in his action for false imprisonment.  
But the plaintiff might have had a better case if he had argued the obstruction of the 
footpath created a public nuisance because the footpath was appropriated for the exclusive 
use of the spectators to the regatta.  
 
In R v Cross,699 a case involving the appropriation of a part of the public road, six or seven 
stage coaches drew up at a place on the highway near Charing Cross in London and parked 
in a row close to the curb side.  They remained on the road for about three-quarters of an 
hour.  This practise continued twice a day each day.  Lord Ellenborough CJ held this was a 
public nuisance.  His Lordship said: “…[E]very unauthorised obstruction of a highway to 
the annoyance of the King’s subjects is an indictable offence…  The King’s highway is not 
to be used as a stableyard.”700  Another way of phrasing such dicta is; the King’s highway is 
not to be used by private entities for their personal or exclusive benefit.  What the court 
viewed to be a public nuisance was the situation of a corporate entity making use of public 
                                                
698 (1845) 7 QB 742, 115 ER 668. Only Lord Denman CJ, in his dissenting judgment, at page 671 of the record, 
correctly identified a public nuisance liability, stating that: “A company unlawfully obstructed a public way for 
their own profit, extorting money from passengers, and hiring policemen to effect this purpose. The plaintiff, 
wishing to exercise his right of way, is stopped by force, and ordered to move in a direction which he wished 
not to take.” 
699 (1812) 3 Camp 244. 
700 ibid at p 246. 
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place for their own profit ignoring and disrespecting public rights to use of the public 
highway.  Public sporting events such as triathlons and cycling races appropriating public 
spaces such as highways, public parks and public beaches may be viewed as ignoring and 
disrespecting public rights to use of the public space. 
 
 
3. Publicly exhibited sporting events creating obstruction or inconvenience 
indirectly 
 
Public exhibitions of sport may not only create an obstruction or inconvenience to the 
public directly by appropriating public spaces such as highways, public parks or public 
beaches for their exclusive use, but may create obstruction or inconvenience to the public 
indirectly by drawing crowds of spectators to witness the sporting event.  These crowds may 
obstruct the highway or cause inconvenience to the public in the use of the highway or of 
other public spaces.  And as was highlighted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, it is the promoters or 
organizers of the public sporting event, and not the individual members of the crowd drawn 
to witness the public sporting event, who are answerable for the public nuisance.  The 
principal judgment supporting the principle that the attractor of a crowd to the highway is 
liable for a public nuisance is Lyons, Sons & Co v Gulliver, where the court states: “…a man is 
or may be liable to an indictment for attracting, even by something lawfully done on his own 
premises, a crowd in the street adjoining his premises.”701  In that case the plaintiffs were 
entitled to relief against the defendants, who were proprietors of the Palladium Theatre, in 
respect of a nuisance caused by a queue formed twice daily by people going to the 
defendant’s theatre.  The queue extended for a considerable distance in front of the 
plaintiffs’ place of business and was extant for considerable periods of time.  In consequence 
of the queue access to the plaintiffs’ adjacent shop was obstructed and the plaintiff lost 
business.  The Court of Appeal held, per Cozens-Hardy MR and Swinfen Eady LJ, 
Phillimore LJ dissenting, that the obstruction of access to the plaintiffs’ shop caused by the 
crowd of theatregoers was an actionable nuisance, the obstruction of the highway (in this 
case the footpath) being a public nuisance.  Consequent to this public nuisance the plaintiffs 
                                                
701 [1914] 1 Ch. 631 at p 642 (Cozens-Hardy MR). 
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were affected specially.  The defendants were liable to be restrained by injunction and the 
failure of the police to prevent the obstruction by regulating the crowd and keeping proper 
gaps for the passage of the public through the queue was no defence.  When a person uses a 
highway otherwise than for passage and attracts a crowd which congregates and ceases to 
use the highway for passage, the congregation may result in a public nuisance for which the 
attractor may be liable: Johnson v Kent.702 
 
Spectators, accumulated on the public highway, to observe a show or a sporting event, even 
for a short period of time, create a public nuisance by unreasonable obstruction.  In Shaw’s 
Jewelry Shop Inc v New York Herald Co,703 a public nuisance was created when crowds were 
drawn to the premises of the New York Herald where a baseball ‘playograph’ was exhibited.  
The ‘playograph’ was a large screen or board on which a baseball game was recreated from 
telegraph reports from the press box at the game.  In R v Carlisle,704 it was held that if a 
person exhibits effigies, or puppets, at his windows and thereby attracts a crowd to look at 
them, which causes the footway to be obstructed so that the public cannot pass as they 
ought to do, this is an indictable nuisance.  It is not essential that the effigies should be 
libellous, and, semble, it is not necessary to show that the crowd consisted of idle, disorderly, 
and dissolute persons. 
 
Further, as was held in Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co,705 the inconvenience caused 
to residents of a local community where a public exhibition of sport occurs, in being unable 
to move freely from their home along the public roads, is a public nuisance at common law.  
In Dewar horserace meetings held on Sundays were held to be a nuisance because the sport 
create a discomfort to inhabitants of the neighbourhood, by the shouting and cheering of the 
crowds collected on the course, and by the cries of the bookmakers, and by the noise of 
crowds going to and from the racetrack,706 and because the sport created an obstruction 
of the thoroughfares leading to the racetrack by vehicles conveying persons to and 
from the races, and by vehicles drawn up near the racecourse waiting for fairs.  An 
                                                
702 [1975] HCA 4, (1975) 132 CLR 164 at p 174 (Jacobs J, obiter). 
703 170 AD 504, 156 NYS 651 (NY App Div 1915), affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, 224 NY 731, 
121 NE 890 (1918). 
704 (1834) 6 Car & P 636. 
705 [1899] 1 IR 345. 
706 See further Chapter 9, below. 
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injunction was granted to restrain horseraces from being held on Sundays on a racecourse 
adjoining a residential locality.  In granting an injunction to restrain the defendant company 
from conducting horseraces on their racecourse the court noted, “the many different 
inconveniences suffered by them from the races, the noise of shouting, cries of bookmakers, 
trespasses to their gardens and walls by persons scrambling for places of view, obstruction 
to the roads and streets by cars and carriages drawn up waiting for fares, crowds 
outside the racecourse as well as inside it, persons staring in at their back windows looking 
upon the racecourse, rude remarks by persons inside and outside the course, tables for 
roulette and other gambling, throwing of empty bottles into their gardens, and other 
matters…”707 
 
It is important to appreciate, again, here, that an obstruction or inconvenience to public 
rights, created by the staging of a sporting event in a public place, does not have to effect 
hundreds or thousands of people.  It is sufficient, as a matter of law if the nuisance affects 
only seven families,708 or sixteen households,709 or thirty households.710  A sporting event 
which is staged on public roads, or public beaches, such as a triathlon race, a road cycling 
race, or a marathon, need only create an obstruction or inconvenience to as few as seven 
households.  It is sufficient if the nuisance is indiscriminate in its’ operation affecting a 
relatively small number of persons.  The Noosa Triathlon, which utilises the public highways 
in and about Noosa and Noosaville for the exclusive use of the participants in the race, 
obstructs and causes inconvenience to more than seven households.  During the race a great 
number of residents are prevented from leaving their own homes by vehicle for several 
hours because the whole of the highway adjacent to their premises is closed for the race.  
There is no facility to drive a vehicle out of one’s own driveway, let alone to drive on the 
road outside one’s own home.  The same occurs at several other sports competitions which 
utilise the public highway, such as the Gold Coast marathon, for example.  These public 
exhibitions of sporting events by causing obstruction or inconvenience to the public in the 
                                                
707 ibid at p 353 (emphasis added). 
708 Attorney General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme 
Court). 
709 Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity 
Division, 13 March 1986) BC8601183 at 5. 
710 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, [1957] 1 All ER 894. 
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exercise of a public right to use of the public spaces where the public sporting event is staged 
are public nuisances at common law. 
 
 
4. The nature of the public right of way 
 
The term ‘public right of way’ suggests that persons have an indubitably established right to 
use the highway for passing and repassing.  Yet, the types of activities which the courts have 
recognized as encompassed within the public right of way are not limited to passage only. 
Various historical decisions are divided between those which take a narrow view of the right 
of way and those which take a broad view.711   If a narrow view of the public right of way is 
adopted the rights of members of the public extend only to those things incidental to 
passage.712  As Lord Irvine noted in DPP v Jones of the judgments of Lopes and Kay LJJ in 
Harrison v Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 QB 142: “The rigid approach of Lopes LJ and Kay LJ 
would have some surprising consequences.  It would entail that two friends who meet in the 
street and stop to talk are committing a trespass; so too a group of children playing on the 
pavement outside their homes; so too charity workers collecting donations; or political 
activists handing out leaflets; and so too a group of members of the Salvation Army singing 
hymns and addressing those who gather to listen.”713  If a broad view is adopted members of 
the public are entitled to make reasonable use of the public ways. 
 
It is beyond the purposes of this thesis to here discuss the distinction between the three 
categories of ‘highway’ at common law – footpaths, bridleways and cartways – and the 
                                                
711 See R v Pratt (1855) 4 E & B 860 at pp 868-869: “I take it to be clear law that, if a man use the land over 
which there is a right of way for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is 
a trespasser.” (Crompton J).  Ex parte Lewis (1888) 21 QBD 191, where Wills J said that a public right of 
passage is a “right for all Her Majesty's subjects at all seasons of the year freely and at their will to pass and 
repass without let or hindrance.”  DPP v Jones [1999] UKHL 5, [1999] 2 WLR 625 at pp 638-39 (Lord Slynn of 
Hadley, dissenting). cf Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752; DPP v Jones [1999] UKHL 5, [1999] 2 WLR 625 at pp 
631-32 (Lord Irvine of Lairg LC). 
712 JF Clerk and WHB Lindsell Clerk & Lindsell, The Law of Torts (18th edn Sweet and Maxwell London 2000) 
paras [17]-[41], p 861, viz: “The right of the public in respect of a highway is limited to the use of it for the 
purpose of passing and repassing and for such other reasonable purposes as it is usual to use the highway; if a 
member of the public uses it for any other purpose than that of passing and repassing he will be a trespasser.” 
713 [1999] UKHL 5, [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 630 (Lord Irvine of Lairg LC) citing Harrison v Duke of Rutland 
[1893] 1 QB 142 at p 154 (Lopes LJ) and at p 158 (Kay LJ) viz: “. . . the right of the public upon a highway is 
that of passing and repassing over land the soil of which may be owned by a private person. Using that soil for 
any other purpose lawful or unlawful is a trespass.” 
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consequences flowing from using a category of highway in a manner inconsistent with its 
designation.714  The riding of bicycles on footpaths may be either lawful or unlawful at 
common law or under statute.715  It is sufficient for the analysis of the nature of the public 
right of way to rest on those activities consistent with the category of highway and consistent 
with statute.  Courts have accepted that a right of passage once acquired will extend to more 
modern forms of traffic reasonably similar to those for which the highway was originally 
dedicated provided that any new form of traffic neither significantly increase the burden on 
the owner of the soil, nor markedly inconveniences persons exercising the right of passage in 
the manner originally envisaged.716  Where the mode of passage is consistent with the 
category of highway, the courts have stated that the public may use the highway either “for 
all purposes”,717 or only “for legitimate purposes”.718  However, in the Scottish case of Wills’ 
Trustees v Cairngorm Canoeing and Sailing School Ltd, the House of Lords disapproved of the 
various rules laid down as to “purpose”, stating that it was “most unattractive” for the courts 
to be examining the intentions of persons exercising their right of passage.719  Lord 
Wilberforce stated: “once a public right is established, there is no warrant for making any 
distinction, or even for making any enquiry, as to the purpose for which the right is 
                                                
714 See ibid at pp 47-53.  See also Attorney-General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 Qd R 346 at p 352 
(McPherson J): “At common law, ways were subject to a threefold classification of footways, bridleways, and 
cartways or carriageways: see Co Litt 56a.  The first of these were for use by pedestrians only.  See Woolrych 
‘Law of Ways’ (1847), at 1… The use of the word ‘pathway’ in the plan seems to me to be consistent only with 
an intention that the strip should be used exclusively by foot-passengers…  It follows that, being exclusively for 
foot-passengers, use of the strip or pathway for vehicular traffic is a use of it contrary to the purpose for which 
it was dedicated.  Any excessive or unauthorized use of a public way is a public nuisance at common law and 
may be restrained at the suit of the Attorney-General.  There were, and still are, several different kinds of 
proceedings available for this purpose.  One was by indictment for public nuisance, which was a common law 
misdemeanour: see now s.230 of the Criminal Code; another by proceedings for an injunction: see Woolrych 
[‘Law of Ways’ (1847)], at 423-424; another by prerogative writ of mandamus against a person subject to a 
public duty to keep the highway open and in repair…” 
715 The riding of a bicycle is not analogous to passage on foot because of the use of a vehicle, namely a bicycle.  
Consequently, it is not lawful to ride a bicycle on a footpath at common law: see Brotherton v Tittensor (1896) 60 
JP 49-50; R v Pratt (1867) LR 3 QB 64; Rodgers v Ministry of Transport (1952) 1 TLR 625 at p 627 (Lord Goddard 
CJ). Note eg that pursuant to s 72 of the Highways Act 1835 (UK) as amended by s 85 (1) of the Local 
Government Act 1888, it is an offence to ride a bicycle on the footpath.  cf Rule 250 of the Road Rules of 
Victoria, Australia, gazetted pursuant to Road Safety (Road Rules) Regulations 1999 (Vic) which states that a 
rider of a bicycle who is under the age of 12 years of age may lawfully ride a bicycle on a footpath. 
716 Case v Midland Railway Co (1859) 27 Beav 247, 54 ER 96; and R v Mathias (1861) 2 F & F 570, 175 ER 1191.  
These cases concerned, respectively, a steamboat on a canal and a pram on a footpath. 
717 Rouse v Bardin (1790) 1 H Bl 351, 126 ER 206 (Wilson J). 
718 R v Pratt (1855) 4 El & Bl 860 at p 868, 119 ER 319; Hubbard v Pitt [1976] QB 142 at p 175 (Lord Denning).  
Also Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 at p 20 (Hawkins J); Lord Fitzhardinge v Purcell [1908] 2 Ch 130 at pp 167-68 
(Parker J); and Randall v Tarrant [1955] 1 All ER 600 at p 603 (Evershed MR). 
719 (1976) SLT 162 (House of Lords) at p 203 (Lord Hailsham). 
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exercised”; for “one cannot stop a canoe, any more than one can stop a pedestrian on a 
highway, and ask him what is the nature of his use.”720   
 
In Harrison v Duke of Rutland, Lord Esher MR plainly contemplated that there may be 
‘reasonable’ or ‘usual’ uses of the highway as a right of way beyond mere passing and 
repassing.  At page 146 His Lordship stated:  “Highways are, no doubt, dedicated prima facie 
for the purpose of passage; but things are done upon them by everybody which are 
recognized as being rightly done, and as constituting a reasonable and usual mode of using a 
highway as such.  If a person on a highway does not transgress such reasonable and usual 
mode of using it, I do not think that he will be a trespasser.”721 
 
The House of Lords in DPP v Jones,722 by majority, adopted a broad view as to the scope and 
context of the lawful use of the highway applying the judgments of Lord Esher in Harrison v 
Duke of Rutland,723 and of Collins LJ in Hickman v Maisey.724  The facts in DPP v Jones 
concerned a protest at Stonehenge in England and raised a very clear question on appeal: 
“[This] appeal raises an issue of fundamental constitutional importance: what are the limits 
of the public’s rights of access to the public highway? Are these rights so restricted that they 
preclude in all circumstances any right of peaceful assembly on the public highway?”725  The 
House of Lords held that the public highway is a public place which the public may enjoy for 
any reasonable purpose, provided the activity in question does not amount to a public or 
private nuisance and does not obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the public’s 
primary right to pass and repass: within these qualifications there is a public right of peaceful 
assembly on the highway.  Lord Irvine, giving the principal judgment, stated:  
“[T]he judgments of Lord Esher MR and Collins LJ are authority for the 
proposition that the public have the right to use the public highway for 
such reasonable and usual activities as are consistent with the general 
public’s primary right to use the highway for purposes of passage and 
                                                
720 ibid at p191 (Lord Wilberforce). 
721 [1893] 1 QB 142 at p 146, applied DPP v Jones [1999] UKHL 5, [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 629 (Lord Irvine of 
Lairg). 
722 [1999] UKHL 5, [1999] 2 WLR 625. 
723 [1893] 1 QB 142 at p 146 (Lord Esher MR). 
724 [1900] 1 QB 752 at pp 757-8 (UK CA). 
725 [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 629 (Lord Irvine of Lairg LC). 
 239 
repassage…  If the right to use the highway extends to reasonable user 
not inconsistent with the public’s right of passage, then the law does 
recognize, (and has at least since Lord Esher’s judgment in Harrison 
recognized), that the right to use the highway goes beyond the minimal 
right to pass and repass.  That user may in fact extend, to a limited 
extent, to roaming about on the highway, or remaining on the highway.  
But that is not of the essence of the right.  That is no more than the 
scope which the right might in certain circumstances have, but always 
depending on the facts of the particular case.”726 
 
In discussing the scope of a ‘reasonable and usual’ mode of using the highway as a right of 
way, Lord Irvine declared:  
“I do not, therefore, accept that, to be lawful, activities on the highway 
must fall within a rubric incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the right 
of passage.  The meaning of Lord Esher’s judgment in Harrison, at pp 
146-147 is clear: it is not that a person may use the highway only for 
passage and repassage and acts incidental or ancillary thereto; it is that 
any ‘reasonable and usual’ mode of using the highway is lawful, provided 
it is not inconsistent with the general public’s right of passage.  I 
understand Collins LJ’s acceptance in Hickman, at pp. 757-758, of Lord 
Esher’s judgment in Harrison in that sense…  
 
Nor can I attribute any hard core of meaning to a test which would limit 
lawful use of the highway to what is incidental or ancillary to the right of 
passage. In truth very little activity could accurately be described as 
‘ancillary’ to passing along the highway; perhaps stopping to tie one’s 
shoe lace, consulting a street-map, or pausing to catch one’s breath.  But 
I do not think that such ordinary and usual activities as making a sketch, 
taking a photograph, handing out leaflets, collecting money for charity, 
singing carols, playing in a Salvation Army band, children playing a game 
on the pavement, having a picnic, or reading a book, would qualify.  
                                                
726 ibid. 
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These examples illustrate that to limit lawful use of the highway to that 
which is literally ‘incidental or ancillary’ to the right of passage would be 
to place an unrealistic and unwarranted restriction on commonplace day-
to-day activities.  The law should not make unlawful what is 
commonplace and well accepted.”727 
 
Lord Clyde concurred with Lord Irvine, applying the dicta of Lord Esher in Harrison and 
Collins LJ in Hickman alike.  Discussing Harrison and Hickman at length, Lord Clyde stated:  
“The fundamental purpose for which roads have always been accepted 
to be used is the purpose of travel, that is to say, passing and re-passing 
along it.  But it has also been recognized that the use comprises more 
than the mere movement of persons or vehicles along the highway.  The 
right to use a highway includes the doing of certain other things 
subsidiary to the user for passage.  It is within the scope of the right that 
the traveller may stop for a while at some point along the way.  If he 
wishes to refresh himself, or if there is some particular object which he 
wishes to view from that point, or if there is some particular association 
with the place which he wishes to keep alive, his presence on the road 
for that purpose is within the scope of the acceptable user of the road.  
The view was expressed by AL Smith LJ, in Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 
QB 752, 756, that if a man took a sketch from the highway no 
reasonable person would treat that as an act of trespass.  So as it seems 
to me the particular purpose for which a highway may be used within the 
scope of the public’s right of access includes a variety of activities, 
whether or not involving movement, which are consistent with what 
people reasonably and customarily do on a highway…   
 
On the other hand the purpose for which the road is used must be for 
ordinary and lawful uses of a roadway and not for some ulterior purpose 
for which the road was not intended to be used. Thus in the case of 
                                                
727 [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 631 (Lord Irvine).  Lord Clyde (at pp 653-54) and Lord Hutton (at pp 664-65) 
similarly approve of the judgments of Lord Esher in Harrison and Collins LJ in Hickman. 
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Hickman v Maisey to which I have already referred, it was held to be a 
trespass for someone to use the road as a vantage point for observing 
the performance of racehorses undergoing trial.  To use the language of 
Collins LJ (at p 758) that was a use of the highway ‘in a manner which is 
altogether outside the purpose for which it was dedicated.’”728 
 
In Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752 AL Smith LJ expressly followed the approach of Lord 
Esher MR in Harrison.  Applying that reasoning, he accepted, at page 756, that a man resting 
at the side of the road, or taking a sketch from the highway, would not be a trespasser.  The 
defendant’s activities, which comprised of remaining on the highway to observe racehorses 
being trained on the plaintiff’s land, however, fell outside “an ordinary and reasonable user 
of the highway” and so amounted to a trespass.  Collins LJ similarly approved Lord Esher’s 
approach, noting that:  
“… in modern times a reasonable extension has been given to the use of 
the highway as such . . . The right of the public to pass and repass on a 
highway is subject to all those reasonable extensions which may from 
time to time be recognized as necessary to its exercise in accordance with 
the enlarged notions of people in a country becoming more populous 
and highly civilized, but they must be such as are not inconsistent with 
the maintenance of the paramount idea that the right of the public is that 
of passage.”729   
 
What is reasonable or usual may develop and change from one period of history to 
another;730 but the fundamental principle remains that any use of the highway must be 
consistent with the paramount idea that the right of the public is that of passage.   All use of 
the highway is lawful only insofar as it does not amount to a public or private nuisance and 
does not obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the primary right of the public to 
pass and repass.731  Members of the public are entitled to use public rights of way for 
activities which have no relation to passage, so long as the relevant conduct is otherwise 
                                                
728 ibid at pp 653-54. 
729 [1900] 1 QB 752 at pp 757-58. 
730 [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 655 (Lord Clyde). 
731 [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 631 (Lord Irvine). 
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lawful and reasonable and provided that such activity does not ‘occupy’ the highway in a way 
inconsistent with its primary use for passage.  Lord Clyde, speaking in DPP v Jones, warned 
that any action on the highway which has the effect of occupying the highway is not 
congruous with the public right of way.  Lord Clyde said: “The test then is not one which 
can be defined in general terms but has to depend upon the circumstances as a matter of 
degree.  It requires a careful assessment of the nature and extent of the activity in question.  
If the purpose of the activity becomes the predominant purpose of the occupation of the 
highway, or if the occupation becomes more than reasonably transitional in terms of either 
time or space, then it may come to exceed the right to use the highway.”732  
 
The public may make use of their public right of way on the highway for many activities 
unconnected with passage, including, for sketching (as suggested by Lord Justice Smith in 
Hickman v Maisey),733 for bird-watching,734 for picnics,735 and reading a book.736  The playing 
games by children, on a footpath adjacent their home, would also likely be a lawful use of the 
highway.737  The public might not use the highway in any manner which seeks to occupy the 
highway, however, and so using the highway for staging a publicly exhibited sporting event 
would be incongruous with the right of way, and using the highway to spectate sporting 
events such as horseracing would be similarly unlawful as was held in Hickman v Maisey.  
Other activities which would be consistent with the right of way might include recreational 
activities such as jogging, provided that such jogging is not unlawful pursuant to statute,738 or 
cycling, provided that such cycling is not unlawful pursuant to statute.739 
 
                                                
732 ibid at p 655. 
733 [1900] 1 QB 752 at p 756; DPP v Jones [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 631 (Lord Irvine). 
734 See T Bonyhady The Law of the Countryside, The Rights of the Public (Professional Books Abingdon 1987) at p 
57. 
735 ibid, by analogy with Rodgers v Ministry of Transport [1952] 1 TLR 625; DPP v Jones [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 631 
(Lord Irvine). 
736 DPP v Jones [1999] 2 WLR 625 at p 631 (Lord Irvine). 
737 ibid. 
738 Note eg following r 238 Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 1999 
(Qld) it is unlawful to run or jog on a road if there is a footpath or nature strip adjacent to the road.  The 
infringer is liable to a fine of $2,000.00 (pursuant to s 5 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)).  Note also r 
238 Road Rules Victoria, gazetted pursuant to the Road Safety (Road Rules) Regulation 1999 (Vic) which 
similarly states that a pedestrian must not travel along a road if there is a footpath or nature strip adjacent to the 
road.  The penalty for infringement is $113.42 in the 2008-09 financial year (1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 
pursuant to s 5(3) Monetary Units Act 2004 (Vic). 
739 Note eg that pursuant to s 72 of the Highways Act 1835 (UK) as amended by s 85 (1) of the Local 
Government Act 1888, it is an offence to ride a bicycle on the footpath, attracting a fine of £500.00. 
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Publicly exhibited sporting events may thus create pubic nuisances if they obstruct or 
inconvenience the public not only when the public is using the highway for their motorcars, 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, when the public is using the highway for walking, 
meeting or accosting fellow residents or strangers, jogging, cycling, or sketching.  The only 
type of activity which would not be capable of being impinged by a publicly exhibited 
sporting event creating a public nuisance would be an activity which is declared unlawful 
when practised on the highway by statute.  One example of this is that it is unlawful to play 
games on the highway.  For example, pursuant to section 161(3) of the Highway Act 1980 
(UK) it is an offence for a person to play football or any other game on a highway to the 
annoyance of a user of the highway;740 and in Queensland, rule 151(2) of the Traffic 
Regulation 1962 (Qld) provides that it is unlawful to play or take part in any game on any 
road in Queensland. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
A publicly exhibited sporting event may create a public nuisance either directly or indirectly.  
Directly, the sporting event may appropriate the highway or some other public place such as 
a public park or a public beach for the exclusive use of the participants in the sporting event.  
The sporting event may erect barriers, stands, VIP marquees.  These acts by the organizers 
or promoters of the public sporting event obstruct the public in the exercise of public rights 
to use of the highway or use of the public space, or may cause inconvenience to the public.  
The sporting event is thus a public nuisance at common law.  Indirectly, the sporting event 
may draw crowds of spectators.  These crowds may obstruct the public in the exercise of 
public rights to use of the highway or use of the public space, or may cause inconvenience to 
the public in the exercise of their public rights.  The sporting event is thus a public nuisance 
at common law.  Popular modern publicly exhibited sporting events such as marathons, 
triathlons, cycling criterions, fun runs, and rowing regattas, airplane acrobatic competitions, 
etc, are susceptible to injunction on grounds of public nuisance. 
                                                
740 The infringer is liable to a fine of £200.00 in England (section 37 Crime Justice Act 1982 (Eng)). 
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Chapter 12 
 
Public sporting events create public nuisances by causing 
annoyance or discomfort to the public 
 
 
A publicly exhibited sporting event may create a public nuisance because the event causes 
annoyance or discomfort to the public.  The public right which is impinged upon here is, 
invariably, the public right to quietude or the public right to comfort.741  In Attorney-General of 
Ontario v Dieleman, a case determining whether the focussed picketing activities of anti-
abortionist protesters outside of doctors’ private homes amounted to a public nuisance, the 
Ontario Supreme Court noted that nuisance embraces an expansive set of principles aimed 
at protecting a person’s entitlement to reasonable use and enjoyment of one’s home and 
neighbourhood.742  The Canadian court referenced commentary of the United States 
Supreme Court on the unique nature of the home.  The United States Supreme Court speaks 
of the home as “the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,”743 and speaks of the 
need to protect “the well-being, tranquillity and privacy of the home…”744  The public right 
to quietude or comfort may be impinged by the direct acts or omissions of the publicly 
exhibited sporting event (such as where, for example, a motorsport event creates noise) or 
the public right to quietude or comfort may be impinged by the staging of a publicly 
exhibited sporting event indirectly (such as where, for example, crowds of spectators disturb 
residents and communities adjacent the place where the publicly exhibited sporting event is 
staged. 
                                                
741 A public right to comfort is acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Illinois: City of Chicago v Beretta USA 
Corporation 213 Ill 2d 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004) at p 370 of the former report (Garman J). 
742 Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] CanLII 7509 at paras [693]-[698] (Ontario Supreme Court) 
743 Gregory v Chicago 394 US 111, 125 (1969) (Black J, concurring). 
744 Carey v Brown 447 US at 471.  Here the US Supreme Court declared that “[p]reserving the sanctity of the 
home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily 
pursuits, is surely an important value”. Carey, supra, at 471. 
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Publicly exhibited sporting events may cause annoyance and discomfort to the public.  Such 
annoyance and discomfort may amount to a public nuisance at common law.  Whether 
annoyance and discomfort to the public is created by a sporting event is a question of fact.  
Sports staged at certain times of the day, or on certain days of the week, may cause 
annoyance and discomfort to the public and thereby warrant abatement as a public nuisance, 
and yet when held at other times of the day, or on a weekend, may not be a public nuisance. 
Considerations which can greatly impact upon a determination as to whether a sporting 
event creates a public nuisance by impinging on the public right to quietude or comfort 
involve practical questions such as: How many events are staged per week? At which times 
of the day is a sporting events staged?  What is tolerable to the residents and local 
community where a publicly exhibited sporting event is staged? 
 
A publicly exhibited sporting event may create a public nuisance by a single, isolated event,745 
or by a continuing state of affairs,746 or by an increase in the degree of sport exhibited or 
manner of exhibition.747 
 
The standard applying to a determination as to whether a publicly exhibited sporting event 
creates annoyance and discomfort to the public is that expressed by Bruce-Knight VC in 
Walter v Selfe: “Ought this inconvenience to be considered in fact as more than fanciful, more 
than one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially interfering with 
the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or 
dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions 
                                                
745 See Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] OR 595 at p 610 where it was said: “All wrongful escapes of deleterious 
things, whether continuous, intermittent, or isolated, are equally to be classed as nuisances in law; for they are 
all governed by the same principles.”  In Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906), the holding 
of a single motorcar race on a single occasion was opined to be a nuisance per se by the Court of Appeals of 
New York: at p 146.  See also Matheson v Northcote College Board of Governors [1975] 2 NZLR 106.  See also Holling 
v Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 662 (Court of Appeal) and Dollman v Hillman Ltd [1941] 1 All 
ER 355 (Court of Appeal).   
746 See Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 615 were the evidence was to the effect that golf balls 
were very frequently sliced on to or over the public highway from the 13th tee.  There was evidence of 
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the road.  See also Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd 
[1957] 2 QB 169 at p 182, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 900. 
747 Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC); Stretch v Romford 
Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 763. 
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among the English people?”748  See also Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways 
Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC) where Justice Brown states, at p 52, referring to Goltan v 
De Held, 21 LJ Ch 167, that the test as to what is a nuisance is an inconvenience materially 
interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence according to plain, 
sober, and simple notions.  However, the character of the locality in which a publicly 
exhibited sporting event takes place, or is proposed to take place, is important in determining 
the standard of comfort claimed.  The court in Laing v St Thomas Dragway followed the 
dictum of Justice Morden in Walker v Pioneer Construction Co Ltd, where His Honour said: 
“The law makes it clear that the character of the locality in question is of importance in 
determining the standard of comfort which may reasonably be claimed by an occupier of 
land.  ‘What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in 
Bermondsey’: Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch 852, at p 865.”749 
 
 
1. Publicly exhibited sporting events creating annoyance or discomfort directly 
 
Annoyance and discomfort amounting to a public nuisance at common law is not only 
caused by crowds attending at sporting events, whether inside or outside the arena or 
premises where the sport is staged,750 but may be created by the sport itself.  In order to 
establish nuisance it must be shown that there has been substantial interference, annoyance, 
or discomfort to the public – a question of fact and degree dependent on the locality in 
which the sport is practised.751  Although, mere noise alone will be sufficient to cause a 
public nuisance: for in Gilbough v West Side Amusement Co it was stated “That mere noise may 
be so great…as to amount to an actionable nuisance…is thoroughly established.  The reason 
                                                
748 (1851) 4 De G and Sm 315 at p 322, 64 ER 849 at p 852 (Knight-Bruce VC).  Vice Chancellor Bruce-
Knight’s dictum in Walter v Selfe was referred to with approval in Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR 
482 at p 486 (Jordan CJ), and followed in Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 
ACWS (3d) 776 at para [41]. 
749 (1967) 56 DLR (3d) 677 at p 680, followed in Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 
1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 776 at para [38]. 
750 Contrast Cronin v Bloemecke 58 NJ Eq 313 (1899) with Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
751 See eg Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 776 (Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice), and Stretch v Romford Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 763, both discussed below, and 
both citing, with approval, Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315 at p 322 (Knight-Bruce VC). 
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why a certain amount of noise is or may be a nuisance is that it is not only disagreeable, but 
it also wears upon the nervous system and produces that feeling which we call ‘tired’….”752   
 
Racetracks are among the sources of “noise and other disturbances of the peace in a 
neighborhood” that have been found to be public nuisances.753  In Hoover v Durkee,754 the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed the trial court’s holding that 
the cumulative effect from the operation of a motorcar raceway created a public nuisance.  
The record supported the trial court’s conclusion that a public nuisance was established by 
clear evidence, and that the trial court correctly determined that the citizens had standing to 
institute an action based upon their showing of special damages.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the issuance of a permanent injunction.  The facts which evidenced the public 
nuisance were: the testimony of numerous residents surrounding the racetrack that the noise 
generated by the racetrack drowned out all other sounds, prevented conversation outside the 
home or on the telephone, and was inescapable even when inside their homes with the 
windows closed.  The noise was most commonly described as a constant roar like jets taking 
off or flying overhead.  The evidence further revealed a noticeable increase in traffic on 
those days when the racetrack was operating and that the public announcement system could 
be heard not only in the immediate vicinity but also within a significant distance.755  The 
racetrack was a public nuisance because it affected the comfort of the public. 
 
The court in Hoover v Durkee followed State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc.756  In 
this earlier case, the defendants were permanently enjoined from operating a stock car 
racetrack or any related activity involving motorized vehicles on the premises of the Seneca 
County Fairgrounds in the village of Waterloo, New York.  The Supreme Court found that 
the racetrack created a public nuisance based on the cumulative effect of (i) excessive noise, 
(ii) dust, and (iii) danger to public safety.  The court concluded that the operation of the 
                                                
752 Gilbough v West Side Amusement Co 64 NJ Eq 27, 53 A 289 (1902) at p 289 of the latter report. 
753 Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839 (1995) at p 840; see State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway 96 Misc 2d 
350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978); State of New York v Bridgehampton Road Races Corp 54 AD 2d 929, 388 NYS 2d 131 
(1976); Bedminster Township v Vargo Dragway Inc 434 Pa 100 (1969); Jones v Queen City Speedways Inc 276 NC 231, 
172 SE 2d 42 (1970); Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 
776 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice); Stretch v Romford Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 763. 
754 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2d 348 (1995). 
755 ibid at p 841. 
756 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978). 
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raceway was an affront to, and invasion of, the surrounding residential community as a 
whole in the enjoyment of its common right to be free of conditions disrupting the 
tranquillity of the neighbourhood. 
 
In a series of cases concerning the right to operate a racetrack in Missouri the Supreme 
Court of Missouri and, subsequently, the Court of Appeals of Missouri, found that the 
racetrack created a nuisance by noise – consisting of engine noise, the screeching of tires, the 
loudspeaker system, and the general hullabaloo of the racing fans – dust, offensive odours 
and fumes, and the glare from the floodlights at the track.757 
 
When conducted in residential or quiet neighbourhoods, publicly exhibited sports are more 
readily subject to injunction, whether the noise levels generated by the sport increase or 
decrease over time.  The rights of the neighbourhood are paramount to the rights of the 
sports promoter.  In Jones v Queen City Speedways Inc,758 the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
referred, with approval, to Town of Bedminster v Vargo Dragway Inc,759 where the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court permanently enjoined the operation of a drag strip which was located in an 
area primarily residential and farming in character with about 62 houses within one mile of 
the track.  With reference to the equities involved, the court was of the opinion that: “…that 
the rights of those occupying properties adjoining or in the neighbourhood of this track are 
paramount to the rights of the [defendants], and that the former must be protected by equity 
in the enjoyment of their homes.”  In West v Luna,760 the Court of Appeals of Tennessee 
held, in reference to the proposed operation of a racetrack in a rural area: “Losing the 
peaceful enjoyment of your home and yard for a six hour portion of every Saturday during 
the warm months of every year is a very substantial loss and would constitute a nuisance 
even if it were quiet as a tomb next to the racetrack at 2:00 a.m. every Sunday of the year.”  
Motorcar races were proposed to take place only 15 times per year, only on a Saturday, and 
only between the months of May through August, yet the Court of Appeals was satisfied that 
                                                
757 Lee v Rolla Speedway Inc 494 SW 2d 349, Supreme Court of Missouri (1973); and subsequently, Lee v Rolla 
Speedway Inc 539 SW 2d 627 (1976), and Lee v Rolla Speedway Inc 668 SW 2d 200, Court of Appeals of Missouri 
(1984). 
758 276 NC 231, 172 SE 2d 42, Supreme Court of North Carolina (1970). 
759 434 Pa 100, 253 A 2d 659 (1969). 
760 2003 Tenn App LEXIS 968 (Tenn Ct App, 6 January 2003), appeal denied West v Luna 2004 Tenn LEXIS 
750 (Tenn, 7 September 2004). 
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such created a nuisance in the circumstances of the case.  “Whether a particular noise is 
sufficiently excessive to constitute a nuisance is ordinarily a question of degree and locality – 
in essence a question of fact to be considered in light of all the attending circumstance.”761 
 
In 2005, in Laing v St Thomas Dragway,762 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued an 
injunction against the operators of a dragway preventing them from racing drag cars on a 
Sunday before 1 p.m., even though the races had been conducted at the dragway for over 40 
years previously, and even though noise levels associated with the drag racing had decreased 
since 1999.763  Despite the decrease in noise levels which was brought about by restrictions 
implemented by the owners of the dragway, the court was satisfied that the plaintiffs had a 
paramount right to enjoy their Sunday mornings free of interruption or annoyance.  The 
various plaintiffs were a group of thirty-three residents of the Hamlet of Sparta – which may 
have satisfied the ‘public’ element of public nuisance.764  They complained of the audibility, 
the nature and the consistency of the noise emanating from the dragway, where dragster cars 
raced against each other.  Further, they complained of the vibrations felt when the jet cars 
were operating, the audibility of the public announcement system, the traffic congestion 
when the special events occurred, and the odour and smoke from the burning tires.  On 
Sunday mornings, the noise interfered with church services and Quaker meditation sessions, 
or just quiet Sunday mornings.  Noise analysis indicated that the noise level emanating from 
the dragway, at sounds levels above 80dba, exceeded the Ministry of Environment guideline 
limits.  The judge was satisfied that the plaintiffs had discharged their onus in proving a 
nuisance with respect to Sunday mornings when they wished to lie quiet in bed or worship at 
their various churches or meet at their Quaker meeting hall. 
 
In deciding whether the use of the dragway amounted to a private nuisance, the court in 
Laing v St Thomas Dragway followed the dictum of Justice Morden in Walker v Pioneer 
                                                
761 ibid. 
762 [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 ACWS (3d) 776. 
763 ibid at para [53] and paras [62]-[63]. 
764 In Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, [1957] 1 All ER 894, the Court of Appeal for 
England and Wales held that the residents of 30 households were sufficient to prove the public element of the 
offence of public nuisance, as distinct from a private nuisance actionable by private plaintiffs.  Sixteen 
households were sufficient to prove the ‘public’ element of public nuisance in Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 
2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, 13 March 1986) BC8601183 at 
5.  Seven families were all that was required to prove public nuisance in Attorney General of British Columbia v 
Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme Court). 
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Construction Co Ltd, where His Honour said: “The law makes it clear that the character of the 
locality in question is of importance in determining the standard of comfort which may 
reasonably be claimed by an occupier of land.  ‘What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square 
would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey’: Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch 852, at p 865.”765  
The court also noted Justice Morden’s dictum that: “An alleged nuisance of the type with 
which we are concerned, to be actionable: ‘…must be such as to be real interference with the 
comfort or convenience of living according to the standards of the average man…  
Moreover, the discomfort must be substantial not merely with reference to the plaintiff; it 
must be of such a degree that it would be substantial to any person occupying the plaintiff's 
premises, irrespective of his position in life, age, or state of health; it must be ‘an 
inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human 
existence, not merely according to the elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but 
according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English [Canadian] people’ 
(Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315, 322).”766 
 
Although much of the case law concerning sports and nuisance involves private litigants 
suing in private nuisance or suing for public nuisance creating special and peculiar damage to an 
individual, there is no reason to doubt the applicability of the case law to public nuisance suits 
at the instigation of the Attorney-General.  A public nuisance is nothing more than a 
sufficiently large number of private nuisances such that the ‘public’ element of the offence of 
public nuisance is proved.  Indeed, as noted by Lord Justice Romer in Attorney-General v PYA 
Quarries: “Some public nuisances (for example, the pollution of rivers) can often be 
established without the necessity of calling a number of individual complainants as witnesses.  
In general, however, a public nuisance is proved by the cumulative effect which it is shown 
to have had on the people living within its sphere of influence.  In other words, a normal and 
legitimate way of proving a public nuisance is to prove a sufficiently large collection of private nuisances.”767  
The use of the common law of public nuisance to combat noise or crowds associated with 
sporting events is not confined to case law involving private plaintiffs suing for injunctive 
                                                
765 (1967) 56 DLR (3d) 677 at p 680, followed in Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 
1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 776 at para [38]. 
766 ibid at p 690, followed in Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 
ACWS (3d) 776 at para [41]. 
767 [1957] 2 QB 169 (CA) at p 187 (italics mine).  See also People v Rubenfeld 254 NY 245 (1930) at p 247 (Chief 
Justice Cardozo), followed in Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839 (1995) at p 840. 
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relief or damages.  Case law in New York and British Columbia has highlighted the extent to 
which the state, through their Attorney-General, ought to be involved in the control of 
nuisance arising from sport, particularly with reference to nuisances caused by noise.  In State 
of New York v Bridgehampton Road Races Corp,768 the Attorney-General of New York “instituted 
an action as parens patriae” of those individuals who had been or would be injured by the 
alleged public nuisance created by the defendant sports corporations.  The action 
commenced by the State was for a mandatory injunction restraining the maintenance of a 
public nuisance, consisting of the emission of loud and disagreeable noises from unmuffled 
vehicles operating at an automotive racetrack at Long Island.  In the recent decision of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, in Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Auto 
Racing Corp,769 the court found that owing to the absence of proof of special injury to the 
private plaintiffs, the trial court erred in allowing the private litigants to prosecute the action 
as one to enjoin a public nuisance.  The defendants operated an oval automobile racing track 
and a drag strip located in a rural area.  The Speedway had been in operation for 40 years, 
but the plaintiff’s contended that the Speedway’s racing events and activities in preparation 
for racing had become much noisier and more frequent since 1994 when $2,000,000 worth 
of improvements to the track were made.770  The defendants sought to increase the use of, 
and increase the profit to be gained from, the speedway.  The Supreme Court found that all 
persons in the affected community were ‘similarly impacted’ by exposure to ‘unacceptable’ 
noise levels during the Speedway’s activities.  Most plaintiffs testified only that the 
Speedway’s noise interfered with their ability to converse, listen to music or television, 
conduct social activities, and/or sleep at their residences.  The facts therefore gave rise to a 
public nuisance offence, actionable at the behest of the Executive Government on relator 
action of the plaintiffs.  Because the plaintiffs could not prove special injury to themselves 
different from the community generally, they did not have standing to prosecute the public 
nuisance and their action for abatement of the nuisance failed.  Of course, what the lawyers 
for the plaintiff’s ought to have done was to seek the consent of the Attorney-General of 
New York to commence a relator action for abatement of a public nuisance based on the 
increased levels of noise generated by the increased activity at, and use of, the speedway. 
                                                
768 44 AD 2d 725 (1974). 
769 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003), appeal denied 100 NY 2d 507, 795 NE 2d 39 763 NYS 2d 813 
(2003). 
770 303 AD 2d 791 (2003) at pp 791 and 794. 
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In Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd,771 seven neighbouring families 
commenced action against the racetrack in the name of the Attorney-General on relator 
action for a declaration that a motor speedway constituted a public nuisance, and for an 
injunction.  The case provides a classic example of a relator action brought by aggrieved 
plaintiffs in the name of the Attorney-General for abatement of a sport causing a public 
nuisance.  A motor racing speedway was operated by defendant in a rural and somewhat 
sylvan area on sixteen Sundays a year, in the summer time, under an agreement with the 
municipality in which the land lay but it was not a statutorily-authorized activity.  The 
evidence showed that cars without mufflers raced on the quarter-mile oval track with 
consequent noise before average Sunday crowds of 1,400 to 1,600 persons.  The plaintiffs 
gave evidence that their Sundays were made hideous by the operation of the speedway.  The 
British Columbia Supreme Court held that the seven residents comprised a sufficient 
number of persons to constitute a class of the public, and that the Attorney-General was 
entitled to an injunction against operation of the speedway as being a public nuisance.  The 
court was satisfied that there was a material interference with ordinary physical comfort 
according to plain and sober and simple notions obtaining among the people of the 
Province.  
 
As evidenced by State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc, discussed above, and State 
of New York v Bridgehampton Road Races Corp, and Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney 
Speedways Ltd., the Attorney-Generals of New York and British Columbia appear more 
conscious of the Executive Government’s responsibility under constitutional law, as parens 
patriae, to protect public rights through the application of common law public nuisance suits, 
than other common law jurisdictions.  These cases demonstrate the degree to which the 
Crown ought to be involved with sports associations, or sponsors, promoters, or owners of 
sports teams, as well the owners or occupiers of sports stadia or sportsgrounds, in 
controlling the excesses of corporatized sports franchises and businesses in the interest of 
the public wellbeing. 
 
                                                
771 [1963] 39 D.L.R. (2d) 48 (BCSC). 
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Public exhibitions of sport must, as a matter of law, and in order to comply with the 
common law rules of public nuisance, be conducted in such a way as to obviate 
unreasonable annoyance or discomfort to the peaceable rights of residents of the local 
community wherein such sport is practised.  If this means that public exhibitions of sport 
must modify the way in which they are played, such as by altering the shape, length or 
direction of a fairway or a hole on a golf course, or by refraining from conducting motorcar 
racing at night, or by staging football contests at times which do not interfere with the 
peaceable progress of life, then that is the charge which sports organizations must bear in 
order that they be lawfully conducted in civil society.  The commercial motivations of 
corporatized sporting associations must yield to the rights of the public generally to live 
peaceably and comfortably without undue interference.  This is the principle of law 
established by the nuisance cases involving sports enterprises.772  It is a principle which, for 
several centuries, underpinned Executive edicts and statutory provisions outlawing 
designated sports such as football.773  A sport which creates a nuisance must either cease its 
practise or amend its practise to end a threatened or an existing nuisance.  Given the 
magnitude of interest in sport, its cultural significance, and given the Executive 
Government’s constitutional function, in reference to the common law offence of public 
nuisance, the Executive Government is the responsible entity to monitor the use of stadia, 
parks, roads, highways, and public areas, where sports are practised, and to prevent or 
                                                
772 Note as discussed above Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156; Cronin v Bloemecke 58 NJ Eq 313 
(1899); Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345; Stretch v Romford Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 
763; New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978); Sherrod v Dutton 635 SW 2d 
117 (1982); Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, (1995) at p 840; and Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 
2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 776 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice). 
773 See eg the Proclamation on Tournaments of Richard I dated 20th August 1194: Foedera vol i, at p 65; W 
Stubbs (RS) (ed) Chronica magistri by Hovenden (Longman London 1868-1871) vol iii, at p 268; and R Howlett (ed) 
Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I edited from the manuscripts (Longman London 1884–1889) vol 
ii, cap IV, at p 422; Short extracts from Public Records Additional MS 4712 (British Library) at f. 91b; and Harl 
MS 69 (British Library). And see Executive edicts in subsequent centuries such as: (1) the Statuta Armorum of 
1292 (Danby Pickering (ed) The Statutes at Large (Joseph Bentham London 1762) vol 1).  See also A Luders (ed) 
The Statutes of the Realm: Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the 
House of Commons of Great Britain, From Original Records and Authentic Manuscripts, 11 vols (Record Commission 
London 1810-1828) vol I, at pp 230-231.  (2) The Proclamatio facta pro Conservatione Pacis, 1314 (Proclamatio 
facta pro Conservatione Pacis, (Extract from the Liber Memorandorum) in HT Riley (ed) Munimenta Gildhallae 
Londoniensis; Liber Albus, Liber Custumarum, et Liber Horn (Longman London 1862) vol III, at pp 439-441); and 
(3) The Proclamation of 39 Edw. 3, memb. 23d 39 Edw 3 membrane 23d; Calendar of Close Rolls, Edward III, 
1364-1368 (HMSO London 1910) vol XII, at p 181.  For statutes which evidence the underlying principle that 
sports must be practised so as not to endanger public wellbeing, see eg 33 Hen 8 c 9 (1541); 16 Chas 2 c 7 
(1664); and 9 Anne c 14 (1710).  See further the discussion in Chapter 15, below. 
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remedy the existence of any public nuisance.  Failure to so do is an abrogation of their 
constitutional function as parens patriae to protect public rights. 
 
Further to case law on baseball, boxing, horseracing and motorcar racing, discussed above, 
there have been a number of cases where the playing of golf with many golf balls trespassing 
onto adjoining property or onto the public highway has been held a nuisance.  Whilst 
projectile golf balls may create a public nuisance by causing obstruction to the highway 
(Castle v St Augustine’s Links)774 or by impinging on the public right to health and safety 
(Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc)775 (Townsley v State of New York)776 golf tournaments may 
create a public nuisance by causing annoyance or discomfort to the public.  In cases where 
games of golf annoy and disturb the public thereby creating public nuisances, the courts have 
intricately framed injunctions by requiring defendant golf course owners or golfing clubs to 
reposition golf tees, fairways and greens to obviate the creation of public nuisances.  The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Sans v Ramsey Golf & Country Club Inc,777 in an action in 
private nuisance, held that an injunction enjoining the use of the two tees was proper where 
play on the tees continued from 6 a.m. until twilight, crowds collected while waiting to tee 
off, the golfers demanded absolute silence and immobility of everything in sight when teeing 
off, and the adjoining landowner and his family and pet were constantly annoyed, 
endangered, and restricted in the use of their property by the golfers’ activities.  The court 
pointed out that relocation of the tees the cause of the nuisance in the case was feasible.  A 
similar case was argued in the unreported New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of 
Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton.  In this case, a submission was put that the plaintiffs 
had built their houses with full knowledge of the existence of the golf course and further, 
that their houses were built on land included in a subdivision in which the golf course was 
designed as the focal point.  In reference to the appellant’s arguments, Sheppard AJA said at 
page 3:  
“The problem with the appellant’s submission is that it endeavours to 
relegate houses built on land in the subdivision to an inferior position to 
that occupied by the golf course.  In the appellant’s submission, the golf 
                                                
774 (1922) 38 TLR 615. 
775 148 Misc 246, 265 NYS 886 (1933). 
776 6 Misc 2d 557, 164 NYS 2d 840 (1957). 
777 29 NJ 438, 149 A 2d 599 (1959) 
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course was the focal point.  If it created a problem for residents, that was 
something which the residents had to tolerate.  That is not the law.  
What was required was that the golf course should so adjust its 
activities as not to interfere unreasonably with the peaceable 
enjoyment by residents of their land.  At the same time, the residents, 
bordering as they did a golf course, had to accept the fact that the game 
of golf was going to be played on land adjoining their properties and that 
it could be expected that from time to time some golf balls might come 
on to their land.  But what they were not bound to accept was the 
situation such as was suffered by the respondents in which their property 
was peppered with golf balls on a daily basis thus posing a threat, not 
only to the respondents’ property but also to their physical safety.  The 
golf course was obliged so as to construct the hole as to divert balls hit 
normally away from their property.  This could be done by re-sitting the 
direction of the hole or by appropriate screens, whether natural or 
artificial, or a combination of both as indeed has apparently 
happened.”778 
 
 
2. Publicly exhibited sporting events creating annoyance or discomfort 
indirectly 
 
Public sporting events at which cheering, jeering, and swearing is often heard, and to which 
large crowds are amassed together, may be a public nuisance at common law.  The potential 
legal difficulties which might arise when staging a modern publicly exhibited sporting event 
such as cricket were contemplated as early as 1743.  In the September 1743 edition of 
Gentleman’s Magazine it was noted: “Noblemen, gentlemen and clergymen have certainly a 
right to divert themselves in what manner they think fit, nor do I dispute their privilege of 
making butchers, cobblers or tinkers their companions, provided they are gratified to keep 
them company.  But I very much doubt whether they have any right to invite thousands of 
                                                
778 Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton [1998] NSWSC 257 (New South Wales Court of Appeal, 23 June 
1998) at p 3.  
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people to be spectators of their agility.”779  In Bellamy v Wells,780 Justice Romer enjoined the 
staging of boxing matches at a club in London, which had the effect of collecting large and 
noisy crowds in the streets outside of the premises.  The nuisance created in the 
circumstances of the case was nuisance by noise of the crowds at night.  Whilst this case 
concerned the law of private nuisance, there is no cause to rebuff its applicability to public 
nuisance.  A defendant may be guilty of a public nuisance if the nuisance is committed in 
such a place and in such manner that the aggregation of private injuries becomes so great 
and extensive as to constitute a public annoyance and discomfort, and a wrong against the 
community, which may be properly the subject of a public prosecution.  The area of tumult, 
and the range of its disturbing power, may be wide enough to bring the behaviour in 
question within the category of a public nuisance.781   
 
In Bellamy v Wells, the club was formed to hold boxing contests, for large money prizes, 
between celebrated professional boxers.  The boxing matches took place at night, generally 
from about midnight until early in the morning, in the basement of the club premises several 
times in the year.  The boxing matches attracted large crowds of spectators.  These crowds 
congregated outside the club on all nights that the boxing matches were held.  The 
spectators to the boxing events created a nuisance by the noise they generated, by “cheering, 
hooting and whistling”, especially when the boxers arrived at the club for the fight, and by 
whistling for carriages and cabs to the club between the hours of midnight and 7 a.m.782  
Justice Romer considered the nuisance of a “serious nature”, preventing sleep, and 
interfering with the comfort of the plaintiffs.783  The proprietor of the club, his managers, 
and agents, were restrained from carrying on boxing contests at the club so as to cause a 
crowd to be assembled, or to cause whistling for cabs or carriages.784  Justice Romer followed 
                                                
779 Quoted in Sir Derek Birley Sport and the Making of Britain (Manchester University Press Manchester 1993) at p 
120. 
780 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
781 Note eg Attorney-General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169 where Lord Justice Romer stated at p 187: “Some 
public nuisances (for example, the pollution of rivers) can often be established without the necessity of calling a 
number of individual complainants as witnesses.  In general, however, a public nuisance is proved by the 
cumulative effect which it is shown to have had on the people living within its sphere of influence.  In other 
words, a normal and legitimate way of proving a public nuisance is to prove a sufficiently large collection of 
private nuisances.” (italics mine).  See also People v Rubenfeld 254 NY 245 (1930) at p 247 (Chief Justice 
Cardozo), followed in Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839 (1995) at p 840. 
782 ibid at pp 161 and 162. 
783 ibid. 
784 ibid at p 164. 
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R v Moore785 in holding that the assembled crowd was the probable consequence of the 
defendant’s act in staging the boxing matches.786 
 
The public right impinged upon by the staging of boxing matches in the Bellamy v Wells case 
was the public right to quietude.  The nuisance was created not be the direct actions of the 
promoters of the boxing matches, or of the owners of the premises where the boxing 
matches were staged, but, rather, indirectly by the noise of the crowds attending as 
spectators to the boxing matches.  The crowds created a public nuisance not by causing 
obstruction or inconvenience to the public by impinging on the public right of way on the 
highway, but by causing annoyance and discomfort to the public impinging public comfort 
and the public right to quietude. 
 
Sporting activities may be public nuisances on the basis that they are apt to draw together 
large numbers of disorderly persons to the annoyance and discomfort of the neighbourhood 
where the sport is staged.  This principle for a long time justified the prosecution of gaming 
houses as public nuisances.  Hawkins lays it down that: “There is no doubt but that common 
bawdy-houses are indictable as common nuisances,… and also common gaming houses, are 
nuisances in the eye of the law, not only because they are great temptations to idleness, but 
also because they are apt to draw together great numbers of disorderly persons, which 
cannot but be very inconvenient to the neighbourhood.”787  In R v Higginson,788 a decision 
from 1762, the Court of King’s Bench upheld an indictment for a public nuisance which was 
alleged to have been created by a premises at which was staged boxing matches, 
cockfighting, and playing at cudgels.  The premises attracted crowds which were a nuisance 
to the public.  The indictment was for keeping and maintaining “a certain common, ill-
governed, and disorderly house, and in the said house, for his own lucre and profit, certain 
evil and ill-disposed persons, of ill name and fame, and of dishonest conversation, to 
frequent and come together, then and there unlawfully did cause and procure; and the said 
persons, in the said house, then” &c., “and there to be and remain, fighting of cocks, boxing, 
playing at cudgels, and misbehaving themselves, unlawfully and wilfully did permit, and yet 
                                                
785 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184. 
786 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156 at p 161. 
787 1 Hawk PC ch 75, s 6. 
788 (1762) 2 Burr 1232, 97 ER 806. 
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doth permit; to the great damage and common nuisance of all the subjects of our said lord 
the king, inhabiting near the said house, and against the peace,” &c.  Upon motion in arrest 
of judgment the indictment was adjudged good by the Court of King’s Bench. 
 
Hawkins Pleas of the Crown was applied directly in Walker v Brewster,789 along with the decision 
of R v Moore.790  In Walker v Brewster Sir W Page Wood VC held that the collection of a crowd 
of noisy people, to the annoyance of the neighbourhood, outside grounds in which 
entertainments with music and fireworks are being given for profit, is a nuisance for which 
the giver of the entertainment is liable to injunction, even though the amusements within the 
grounds have been conducted in an orderly way to the satisfaction of police.  The defendant 
held fetes every Monday and Friday over the summer months in 1867.  The fetes brought 
together great crowds of persons.  Music was played.  Great numbers of boys climbed on to 
the walls of the plaintiff’s grounds adjoining the property where the entertainments were 
staged.  The shouting of the people assembled was loud and continuous.  Page Wood VC 
stated the circumstances of the case thus:  
“What, then, is the nuisance complained of?  Three things are alleged: 
First: The noise of a very powerful band of eighteen performers, which 
performs regularly twice a week, from two or three in the afternoon, 
until eleven at night.  The second evil complained of is a serious one, the 
throwing up of rockets, to say nothing of the noise and glare of the 
fireworks, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Plaintiff’s premises, 
and the risk to his garden and greenhouses from the falling of the rocket 
sticks.  The third nuisance complained of is exactly the case of R v Moore 
3 B & Ald 184, which stands upon grounds that are unimpeachable.  The 
plaintiff complains that when these fetes are given crowds of idle people 
are drawn together who, being idle, do not pass on, but occupy the road 
and the plaintiff’s wall so as to obtain a view of the fireworks and other 
entertainments…  [T]he complaint of the plaintiff is not against the 
                                                
789 (1867) LR 5 Eq 25 at pp 33-34. 
790 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184. 
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persons who are actually in the grounds, but against those who have 
been shut out and had admission refused to them.”791 
 
The Vice-Chancellor concluded “that a clear case of nuisance is established in the collecting 
of the crowd alone; and… I am not bound to specify the other nuisances to which this 
gentleman has been subjected.  Having regard to the fact of this court having restrained the 
ringing of bells (Soltau v De Held 2 Sim (NS) 133), I confess I have a strong opinion that the 
setting up of a powerful brass band, which plays twice a week for several hours in the 
immediate vicinity of a gentleman’s house, is a nuisance which this court would restrain.  I 
have a still clearer opinion that the noise of fireworks, as contrasted with the noise of the 
tolling of a bell, to say nothing of the damage that may be occasioned by falling rocket sticks, 
is a serious nuisance.”792  On the facts in Walker v Brewster the defendant’s entertainments 
created a nuisance both directly – with the music and fireworks – and indirectly – by drawing 
crowds of people to the roads and properties adjacent the defendant’s property. 
 
Many publicly exhibited sporting events augment their sport with loud music, half time 
musical entertainments, and fireworks.  Each of these may amount to a nuisance following 
Walker v Brewster, by causing annoyance or discomfort to the public directly.  But Walker v 
Brewster was decided principally on the basis of the annoyance and discomfort caused by the 
crowds of spectators drawn to the roads and properties adjoining the defendant’s estate.  
The defendant’s entertainments thus created a nuisance by causing annoyance and 
discomfort indirectly.  Indeed, on the facts of the case, the defendant had gone to great 
lengths to ensure that the crowd attending the entertainments was orderly and peaceable 
stationing policemen at the entrance to his estate,793 yet was nonetheless found liable for the 
nuisance created by those crowds seemingly beyond his control.  This decision has an 
important relevance to modern publicly exhibited sporting events which draw crowds of 
hopeful spectators to camp outside the premises of the sporting event waiting in line for 
entry or tickets.  One example of this is the great throngs of people who wait in a very long 
queue, often extending several hundred metres, on the footpaths of Church Road 
                                                
791 (1867) LR 5 Eq 25 at p 31. 
792 ibid at p 34. 
793 ibid at p 31. 
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Wimbledon outside the Wimbledon tennis complex. 794  The members of this queue are 
people who do not usually possess tickets to the tennis event, but who desire entry by the 
purchase of a limited number of daily tickets available for sale which are not presold, or by 
the purchase of returned tickets from spectators who are encouraged to hand their tickets 
back to the tournament organizers when leaving the tournament early in the day in order 
that these tickets might be resold to the profit of the tournament organizers.   The 
appropriation of the footpath by hopeful attendees to the tennis tournament, desirous of a 
ticket, with such persons camped on the footpath or in the public park adjoining the tennis 
complex, and often sleeping overnight, eating, and staking out their place in the queue on the 
public footpath, over a considerable number of hours and days, may amount to a public 
nuisance being either an obstruction to the public right of way, or being an annoyance or 
discomfort to residents living in close proximity to the tennis complex.795 
 
Crowds attracted to regattas, sponsored by a railway company who acquired ownership of a 
reservoir in a beautiful part of Staffordshire and desired to make profit from it, caused a 
public nuisance in Bostock v North Staffordshire Railway Co.796  Mrs Bostock complained that the 
result of the regatta was to collect disorderly crowds of people, who broke down her fences 
and trod down her grass, to her great injury, and she said it was not the right of the railway 
company, and it was not within the business of a railway company, to collect crowds of 
people and to permit this kind of disorder.  Sir James Parker, V-C, before whom the case 
                                                
794 In 2002, 9,000 people desirous of a ticket camped out in Wimbledon Park: H Arkell and S Bhatia 
‘Wimbledon Limits Seats for People’s Saturday’ Evening Standard (London United Kingdom 19 June 2003) 
<http://www.thisislondon.com/sport/wimbledon/articles/5401063%3Fsource%3DEvening%2520Standard> 
(18 May 2005).  In 2009, over 2,000 people were reported to be camping overnight: M Townsend and E 
Ferguson ‘Heatwave Forecast Triggers the First UK Alert Over Health Fears’ The Guardian (London United 
Kingdom 27 June 2009) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jun/27/heatwave-forecast-met-office> (28 
June 2009). 
795 See also Lyons, Sons & Co v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 631 where the plaintiffs were entitled to relief against the 
defendants, who were proprietors of the Palladium Theatre, in respect of a nuisance caused by a queue formed 
twice daily by people going to the defendant’s theatre.  The queue extended for a considerable distance in front 
of the plaintiffs’ place of business and was extant for considerable periods of time.  In consequence of the 
queue access to the plaintiffs’ adjacent shop was obstructed and the plaintiff lost business.  The Court of 
Appeal held, per Cozens-Hardy MR and Swinfen Eady LJ, Phillimore LJ dissenting, that the obstruction of 
access to the plaintiffs’ shop caused by the crowd of theatregoers was an actionable nuisance, the obstruction 
of the highway (in this case the footpath) being a public nuisance. 
796 (1852) 5 De G & Sm 584, 64 ER 1253. 
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came in the first instance, held the regatta was a nuisance and enjoined the defendant from 
holding more regattas.797 
 
R v Moore798 and Bellamy v Wells799 were followed in Cronin v Bloemecke,800 where the Court of 
Chancery of New Jersey granted a preliminary injunction against the playing of baseball 
games at a baseball field near Newark.  The Vice-Chancellor was satisfied that the crowds of 
disorderly persons upon the highways, drawn there by entertainments given by a the 
defendant upon his own land, for pecuniary profit, was a public nuisance.801  The court also 
noted the loud, indecent and profane noises occurring while games were in progress.  In 
issuing an injunction, the court’s approach was directed toward managing and limiting the 
nuisances created by the staging of a public sport, without the need to stop the playing of the 
games altogether.  Emery VC noted: “I think the complainant has made out a prima facie case 
of serious annoyance which entitles him to protection pending the final hearing,…  But this 
protection, if given, should not extend to an absolute restraint against playing the games of 
baseball upon the park.  A decree to this extent might not be proper, even upon final 
hearing, unless it appeared after full hearing that the games could not be carried on under 
defendants’ management without creating a nuisance.”802  The injunction was framed in the 
following fashion: “An interlocutory injunction should not go further than to restrain the 
defendants, pending the hearing, from using or permitting to be used the premises called the 
Shooting Park mentioned in the bill, or any part thereof for the purpose of base ball games, 
so that a nuisance may be occasioned to the annoyance and injury of the complainant and 
his family at his residence or premises mentioned in the bill, either by the driving or 
dropping of balls upon his premises, or by trespassing from the players or spectators of the 
games, or by profane or indecent language upon the grounds, or from idle or disorderly 
persons in the streets collected by the games.”803  The injunction did not prevent the playing 
of baseball altogether. 
 
                                                
797 There is also a summary of the facts of this case by Malins VC in Norton v London & North Western R Co 
(1878) 47 LJ Ch 859 at p 862. 
798 (1832) 3 B & Ald 184. 
799 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
800 58 NJ Eq 313 (1899) at p 318 (Vice-Chancellor Emery). 
801 ibid, at headnote and p 318. 
802 ibid at p 316. 
803 ibid. 
 262 
Cronin v Bloemecke provides a model example of how the equitable jurisdiction of the courts 
may be directed toward limiting conduct concomitant with public sports events which is a 
nuisance.  Injunctions can be framed to limit the inconvenient, obstructive, disturbing or 
discomforting conduct associated with the sport at issue, without stopping the playing of the 
sport in public altogether.  In utilising their right to institute ex officio civil proceedings for 
abatement of a public nuisance, the Executive of Government obtains an efficacious means 
of limiting the abuses and excesses concomitant with the playing of financially motivated 
public sports, without preventing the staging of those public events themselves.  The 
Executive of Government is thus doing no more than is required of them as parens patriae 
under constitutional law to protect public rights without unfairly treating sporting 
organizations desiring to stage sporting events. 
 
Cronin v Bloemecke was followed in Gilmour v Green Village Fire Department Inc,804 where the 
Superior Court of New Jersey held that an individual plaintiff was able to enjoin a public 
nuisance where it was shown that he has suffered some private, direct and material damage 
beyond the public at large.  The defendant corporation supplemented its primary purpose 
and became an active promoter in the field of athletic competition.  Several baseball teams, 
designated by class, were organized and practically all of the remaining land of the defendant 
was laid out as a baseball diamond and equipped with portable seating equipment for 
spectators.  The defendant sponsored night baseball games, with the benefit of arc lights, on 
the average of three games per week.  The usual starting time for such games was 9 p.m., 
concluding between 11 p.m. and midnight.  Large crowds of two hundred or three hundred 
spectators assembled to witness the games.  The spectators shouted at the games and a loud 
public address system was used to explain to those assembled various aspects of the games.  
Some of the more enthusiastic people, who observed the games from their automobiles, 
displayed their enthusiasm by blowing their automobile horns during the course of the 
games.805  The plaintiff did not object to the playing of baseball at night, merely to the 
playing of baseball at a late hour.  The case is similar on its facts to Bellamy v Wells.806  The 
plaintiff attempted to adjust matters amicably by appealing to the defendant, to the local 
                                                
804 2 NJ Super 393, 63 A 2d 918 (1949). 
805 2 NJ Super 393 (1949), at pp 394-395. 
806 (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156. 
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Board of Health, to the State Board of Health and to the local Township Committee, with 
no success.  Alike Cronin v Bloemecke,807 the court adopted a managerial approach to the 
nuisance, framing the injunction to limit the occurrences of the nuisances, without stopping 
the playing of the baseball games altogether.  The injunction provided that only three games 
per week were permitted, and that the games had to be completed and the lights turned off 
by 9 p.m., except if a game was played on a Friday, when the lights had to be turned of by 10 
p.m.808 
 
The playing of baseball is not a nuisance per se against which persons living in the vicinity 
are entitled to equitable relief.809  Of course, nuisance suits against the playing of baseball 
games to which crowds of spectators attend have failed.  In McMillan v Kuehnle,810 the plaintiff 
complained of “cheering and screaming and yelling and hooting, and stamping of feet on the 
boards, by those within the park attending said games.”811  Yet the Court of Errors and 
Appeals of New Jersey held that: “We think the bill and affidavits of the complainants do 
not make out a case which entitles them to a preliminary injunction.”812 In Casteel v Town of 
Afton,813 the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the trial court’s refusal to grant an injunction 
against the playing of baseball on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the baseball 
games created an annoyance or discomfort sufficient to amount to a nuisance.   
 
                                                
807 58 NJ Eq 313 (1899). 
808 The injunction read: “Three games may be played with the benefit of arc lights per week.  The games played 
on evenings other than Fridays must terminate at 10 p.m., that is, the arc lights must be extinguished at that 
hour on those nights.  One game may be played with the benefit of the arc lights on Friday evenings which 
game must terminate at 11 p.m., that is, the lights must be extinguished at that hour.  The loud-speaker may not 
be used at any time during the day or night.  (The defendant has agreed to this last restraint).  The blowing of 
automobile horns shall be controlled as much as possible by the defendant.  To accomplish this, the defendant 
shall, before the commencement of each game, designate one or more of its officers or members for the 
purpose of informing those who observe the games from the automobiles to desist from sounding their horns 
as a means of displaying their enthusiasm.  Unless the sounding of automobile horns at the games is controlled 
by the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to apply again to this court for an injunction as to the playing 
of all future games after 9 p.m.” (2 NJ Super 393 (1949), at p 396). 
809 Spiker v Eikenberry 135 Iowa 79, 110 NW 457 (1907) followed in Casteel v Town of Afton 227 Iowa 61, 287 NW 
245 (1939) at pp 65-66.  See also Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc 148 Misc 246, 265 NYS 886 (1933) at p 249 of 
the former report, citing Young v New York, New Haven & Hartford Railway Company 136 AD 730, 121 NYS 517 
(1910) at p 731 of the former report. 
810 78 NJ Eq 251 (1910). 
811 ibid at p 252. 
812 ibid at p 253 (Chief Justice Gummere). 
813 227 Iowa 61, 287 NW 245 (1939). 
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But injunctions restraining and preventing publicly exhibited sporting events being played in 
such manner as to create nuisances are appropriate.814  The rule established by R v Moore, that 
an individual is responsible in nuisance for collecting together a crowd of people where that 
crowd creates some obstruction, inconvenience or disturbance amounting to a nuisance, 
being followed in Bellamy v Wells, and Cronin v Bloemecke, was followed in Seastream v New Jersey 
Exhibition.815  In this latter case, the defendants contended that baseball had been played at 
the field now occupied by them for many years and that this fact ought to estop the plaintiffs 
from their claim in nuisance.  The Vice-Chancellor rejected this contention, being firmly of 
the view that the commercialisation of the sport of baseball at the field in question, which 
was previously open in common, and the playing of corporatized sport on a Sunday was a 
cause of nuisance.  Vice Chancellor Pitney stated:  
“The state of affairs, however, was entirely changed when the defendant, 
a corporation, obtained exclusive possession and fenced in the old ball 
ground, erected accommodations in the way of seats and a grand stand, 
and fitted it up and made it attractive to that part of the public which 
enjoys such sports, and invited baseball clubs to come there on Sundays 
to play matches, and placed around this ball ground a high fence to 
exclude spectators, except such as should pay an admission fee for the 
benefit of the defendant.  That action afforded an opportunity for the 
complainants to assert their rights in this court, and I am of the opinion 
that they are entitled to relief by way of interim restraint upon the case as 
made.”816   
 
The formation of a corporatized venture, such as public baseball matches, designed to attract 
crowds to a particular location, is a nuisance where those crowds create annoyance or 
discomfort to the neighbouring community.  This principle applies to any publicly exhibited 
sporting event, such as, for example, a triathlon event or a surfing or surf lifesaving 
championship event.  On Saturdays or Sundays residents and communities living adjacent 
                                                
814 Spiker v Eikenberry 135 Iowa 79, 110 NW 457 (1907), citing Seastream v New Jersey Exhibition Co 67 NJ Eq 178; 
Cronin v Bloemecke 58 NJ Eq 313; and R v Moore 3 B & Ad 184; followed in Casteel v Town of Afton 227 Iowa 61, 
287 NW 245 (1939) at pp 65-66. 
815 67 NJ Eq 178 (1904) at pp 183-184 (Vice Chancellor Pitney). 
816 ibid. 
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beaches and parks are exposed to loud speakers announcing race calls and the names of 
participants in the sporting event, loud music, the noise of crowds of spectators, the noise of 
traffic transporting athletes, participants and spectators, and the littering of roads, beaches 
and parks.  Triathlon events, surfing championship events, and surf lifesaving events, may 
impinge on the public right to public comfort or the public right to quietude by disturbing or 
annoying the public.  These sporting events are susceptible to injunction as public nuisances 
at common law. 
 
In Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co817 horserace meetings held on Sundays were held 
to be a nuisance because the sport create a discomfort to inhabitants of the neighbourhood, 
by the shouting and cheering of the crowds collected on the course, and by the cries of the 
bookmakers, and by the noise of crowds going to and from the racetrack, and because the 
sport created an obstruction of the thoroughfares leading to the racetrack by vehicles 
conveying persons to and from the races, and by vehicles drawn up near the racecourse 
waiting for fairs.  An injunction was granted to restrain horseraces from being held on 
Sundays on a racecourse adjoining a residential locality.  The plaintiffs lived in a residential 
area in Dublin, in the vicinity of the ground where the horseraces were held.  The defendant 
company owned and operated the racecourse.  The Vice-Chancellor was satisfied that the 
evidence of the plaintiffs established a nuisance:  “On full consideration of the evidence… I 
have arrived at the conclusion, that the plaintiffs have sufficiently established that the setting 
up of this racecourse and the holding of horseraces there, especially on Sundays, constituted 
a nuisance to the plaintiffs and other inhabitants in the neighbourhood, and that this 
nuisance is of a grave character, materially interfering, during the holding of the races, with 
the comfort and enjoyment of their houses, and is one which they are entitled to call on this 
court to prevent.”818  In granting an injunction to restrain the defendant company from 
conducting horseraces on their racecourse the court noted, “the many different 
inconveniences suffered by them from the races, the noise of shouting, cries of bookmakers, 
trespasses to their gardens and walls by persons scrambling for places of view, obstruction to 
the roads and streets by cars and carriages drawn up waiting for fares, crowds outside the 
racecourse as well as inside it, persons staring in at their back windows looking upon the 
                                                
817 [1899] 1 IR 345. 
818 ibid at pp 356-357. 
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racecourse, rude remarks by persons inside and outside the course, tables for roulette and 
other gambling, throwing of empty bottles into their gardens, and other matters…”819   
 
Speaking of neighbourhood wherein was established the racecourse, the Vice-Chancellor 
said: “It is a most unsuitable place for setting up a course for horseracing; and from its 
situation it would be impossible to prevent its creating disturbances to the quietness and 
comfort of the inhabitants of the houses adjoining it, no matter how carefully it was 
managed.  The very object of it was to attract large crowds to the place;…  for the purpose 
of making profit, and could only be made by attracting large crowds, and giving them free 
scope for their enjoyment, a considerable portion of which would naturally lead to noisy 
shouting and cheering.  But it is not only within the enclosure that this would take place; for 
the crowds, some on foot and some in vehicles of various kinds, who would be seen to hurry 
to its entrances, would be productive of further noise and disturbance…  The vehicles, 
waiting for fares, would, of course, be drawn up along the roads or streets approaching the 
racecourse, and add another material element of noise and obstruction.  It seems to me that 
without any proof of this state of things having actually existed, it might have been 
anticipated that it would exist from the establishment of such an entertainment in such a 
locality.”820 
 
The issue for the court was whether a public sport that is staged “for the purpose of making 
profit,” and thereby “attracting large crowds, and giving them free scope for their 
enjoyment” ought to be allowed free reign to create discomfort and annoyance to the public.  
The Vice Chancellor concluded: “…one man may consider certain facts as necessarily 
causing disturbance to the comfort and quiet of the district, while another may esteem these 
same facts as having no such effect, and a third may regard them as even enjoyable.  Cases of 
this kind are not to be dealt with here according to peculiar sensibilities or tastes, but 
according to the common sense of reasonable men.  No majority, however large, is entitled 
to interfere with the common right of a minority, though small, to the enjoyment of the 
                                                
819 ibid at p 353. 
820 [1899] 1 IR 345 at pp 352-353. 
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comfort and quiet of their homes, and the free use of the public thoroughfares which lead to 
them.  The Legislature alone, acting for the common weal, has this power entrusted to it.”821 
 
Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co highlights two distinct factual circumstances 
concomitant with sport which create a public nuisance: obstruction of the highway, and 
discomfort and annoyance to the public caused by crowds and noise. 
 
The issue of crowds attendant at public sporting events creating public nuisance involves not 
only considerations of public order, but also considerations of degree.  In order to establish 
nuisance it must be shown that there has been substantial inconvenience, obstruction, 
annoyance, interference, or discomfort to the public.  A community might tolerate 
annoyance or discomfort on isolated or intermittent occasions, but increased commercialised 
sports practises in which crowds of spectators are drawn on numerous occasions for the 
sake of profit for the sport promoting the matches may create circumstances which are an 
annoyance or discomfort to the public warranting abatement as a public nuisance.  The 
appropriate person to monitor this situation is not the individual persons residing near or 
adjacent stadia or public areas where sports take place.  Rather, the appropriate person to 
monitor this situation is the Crown, the Executive Government, who, consistent with their 
constitutional role as parens patriae, is obligated to protect the public wellbeing in 
paramountcy to facilitating the commercial interests of corporatized sports entities utilising 
public areas to ply their trade. 
 
 
3. Publicly exhibited sporting events may create annoyance or discomfort even 
when complying with municipal laws 
 
In State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc  “action [was] brought by the State of 
New York, for itself and as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens of New York, seeking to 
enjoin permanently the use of certain property in the Village of Waterloo for stock cars.”822  
The case thus represents a classic example of the ex officio use of civil proceedings, by the 
                                                
821 ibid at p 356. 
822 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978) at pp 351-352 of the former report. 
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Attorney-General, for abatement of a sport creating a public nuisance.  Noise, dust, and 
danger to public safety justified the holding that the operation of the racetrack for motorcar 
races was a public nuisance.  The noise levels during races were of such magnitude as to 
exceed the Environmental Protection Agency maximum acceptable sound level by a wide 
margin.  The nearly universal description of the noise was that of a constant roar.  As a 
consequence of this audio intrusion upon their lives, the witnesses testified to a serious 
alteration of their lifestyles in a futile attempt to adapt.  Some would keep their windows 
closed regardless of the heat, others would make it a point to absent themselves from their 
homes on race nights, and most of them had been forced to cease using their out-of-doors 
property for entertainment of guests or for recreation on these nights.  A common 
complaint was that sleep both for the adults and their children had been inhibited.  The 
Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was a definite danger of 
safety in the vicinity of the raceway from launched projectiles.  Undisputed testimony was 
had at trial that at one time a racing tire flew across the street and hit a witness’ garage, and 
that on other occasions steel guide rails had fallen apart upon impact from the autos and had 
been projected as far as the public street.   
 
The defendant company in State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc argued that the 
use of the racetrack was in full compliance with zoning ordinances, and that owing to this 
fact they were not liable in nuisance.  But the Supreme Court held that even if a sport 
complies with zoning ordinances, it may still be enjoined as a nuisance.823  The court 
concluded: “This court concludes that while there is nothing unlawful about the operation of 
a stock car raceway under proper circumstances, its use at its present location in the Village 
of Waterloo, under all the circumstances, constitutes a public nuisance and should be 
discontinued. ‘A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place.’”824   
 
In a more recent decision, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York has 
gone further and held that the fact that the defendant company receives both an operating 
permit required by the local law governing motor vehicle racing, and a special use permit 
necessitated by the zoning law, to operate the racetrack, does not bar an action by the 
                                                
823 ibid at p 358, citing Little Joseph Realty v Town of Babylon 41 NY 2d 738, Court of Appeals of New York (1977). 
824 ibid at p 359. 
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plaintiffs alleging that an automobile race track is a public nuisance.  Nor are plaintiffs barred 
from bringing a suit at common law by res judicata because of an earlier action instituted by 
them challenging the permitting process.825  Even where a sport meets all requirements of 
local planning laws and environmental laws for the place where the sport is practised, it may 
still amount to a public nuisance at common law and warrant abatement.  In Laing v St 
Thomas Dragway, Morissette J. in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice noted, in reference to 
a nuisance created by a dragway: “The fact that both the municipality and the Ministry have 
approved the operation of the dragway does not in and of itself preclude a finding of 
nuisance.” 826  The question is one of fact and degree.  To avoid proscription as a public 
nuisance a sport must be conducted in such a manner as to accord with the sensibilities of 
the locale wherein it is practised, irrespective of municipal approval.  Only express statutory 
terms authorising the particular sport at the particular location or stadium where it is 
practised at a particular time, at the behest of legislation from the sovereign Parliament of 
the state wherein the sport is practised, will enable a sport which might otherwise be a 
nuisance to be conducted lawfully.  The only way to authorize a publicly exhibited sporting 
event which creates a public nuisance is to “shelter” the public nuisance in express 
legislation: Hill v City of New York 139 NY 495, 34 NE 1090, 1092 (1893) (“The authority 
which will thus shelter an actual nuisance must be express . . . For, consider what the 
proposition is.  It upholds a positive damage to the citizen and denies him any remedy . . . 
Surely, an authority which so results should be remarkably strong and clear.”)  Absent such 
definite legislation, the numbers of occasions when the sport is practised, the noise levels 
actually generated by the sport when it is practised, and the times at which the sport is 
practised, may be facts which create an annoyance or discomfort to the public, and thus a 
public nuisance. 
 
                                                
825 Citizens of Accord v Twin Tracks Promotions 236 AD 2d 665, 653 NYS 2d 717, Appellate Division of Supreme 
Court (1997). 
826 [2005] 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 ACWS (3d) 776, at para [57]. 
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4. Publicly exhibited sporting events may create annoyance and discomfort 
where they escalate in occurrence 
 
A sport which has been habitually practised at a stadium or some other location open to the 
public, on an occasional recurrent basis, such as one game once per week, may create a 
public nuisance should the sports promoters increase the number of games played at the 
stadium or location, or by conducting games at night, for example.  The question as to 
whether an increase level of sports activity at any particular location or stadium amounts to a 
nuisance is a question of fact and degree.  In Sherrod v Dutton,827 the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a nuisance claim against a go-cart racetrack 
and ordered that a permanent injunction issue to restrain the racetrack operators from 
conducting races at night.828  The injunction further required the defendant to pave the 
access road to the racetrack and water the track as frequently as necessary to prevent 
unreasonable dust during races.  In Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd,829 
the British Columbia Supreme Court granted an injunction against the operation of motorcar 
races on the relator action of seven families living near a motorcar racetrack.  In so doing the 
court referred, with approval, the dictum of Cozens-Hardy L.J. in Rushmer v Polsue & Alfieri 
Ltd where his Lordship noted that a nuisance may be created by new or fresh circumstances 
in contrast to that which has been habitual and tolerable: 
“It was strenuously contended… that a person living in a district 
specially devoted to a particular trade cannot complain of any nuisance 
by noise caused by the carrying on of any branch of that trade without 
carelessness and in a reasonable manner.  I cannot assent to this 
                                                
827 635 SW 2d 117 (1982). 
828 In so holding the Court of Appeals referred, with approval, to Gilbough v West Side Amusement Co 64 NJ Eq 
27, 53 A 289 (1902) where it was stated: “That mere noise may be so great…as to amount to an actionable 
nuisance…is thoroughly established.  The reason why a certain amount of noise is or may be a nuisance is that 
it is not only disagreeable, but it also wears upon the nervous system and produces that feeling which we call 
‘tired’…  Another reason is that mankind needs rest and sleep, and noise tends to prevent both…  Mankind 
needs sleep for a succession of several hours once in every 24 hours, and nature has provided a time for that 
purpose, to wit, the nighttime, and by common consent of civilized man the night is devoted to rest and sleep, 
and noises which would not be adjudged nuisances… if made in the daytime, will be declared to be nuisances if 
made at night and during the hours which are usually devoted by the inhabitants of that neighbourhood to 
sleep.” (53 A 289 (1902) at p 289). 
829 [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC). 
 271 
argument.  A resident in such a neighbourhood must put up with a 
certain amount of noise.  The standard of comfort differs according to 
the situation of the property and the class of people who inhabit it.  This 
idea is expressed by Thesiger L.J. in Sturges v Bridgman, 11 Ch.D. 852, 
when he said that what might be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would 
not be a nuisance in Bermondsey.  But whatever the standard of comfort 
in a particular district may be, I think the addition of a fresh noise caused 
by the defendant’s works may be so substantial as to create a legal 
nuisance.  It does not follow that because I live, say, in the 
manufacturing part of Sheffield I cannot complain if a steam-hammer is 
introduced next door, and so worked as to render sleep at night almost 
impossible, although previously to its introduction my house was a 
reasonably comfortable abode having regard to the local standard; and it 
would be no answer to say that the steam-hammer is of the most 
modern approved pattern and is reasonably worked.  In short, if a 
substantial addition is found as a fact in any particular case, it is no 
answer to say that the neighbourhood is noisy, and that the defendant’s 
machinery is of first-class character.”830 
 
The effect of this dictum is that even though a local community may tolerate, or become 
accustomed to, occasional recurrent sporting events in an adjacent stadium or at an adjacent 
beach or park, such local community is not obliged to then tolerate a “fresh”, new, or 
increased level of noise merely because a sports association desires to utilise a stadium more 
frequently for more sports tournaments to maximize their profit, or merely because a sports 
association desires to increase the ‘entertainment’ experience of the publicly exhibited 
sporting event by playing music or allowing commentators to talk over loud speakers.  This 
principle is applicable even when the focus of a local community is the sports stadium or 
arena itself, and most definitively applies where a sports association desires to expand its 
sport to new communities. 
 
                                                
830 [1906] 1 Ch 234 (CA) at pp 250-251, affirmed [1907] AC 121 (HL), followed in Attorney-General of British 
Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC) at p 53 (Brown J). 
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The use of stadiums or sports grounds for purposes other than what they have been 
habitually used for may create a nuisance.  A publicly exhibited sporting event may become a 
public nuisance if the manner of exhibition changes.  A “fresh” or new or increased level of 
noise concomitant with such purpose may create a nuisance in that it is a discomfort or 
annoyance to the neighbourhood in which the stadium is located.  This was the issue in 
Stretch v Romford Football Club Ltd,831 where the defendants, who occupied the Brooklands 
Stadium in Romford, England, promoted and conducted motorcar speedway races in the 
summer months, on Thursday evenings from May to October from 7.30 p.m. to about 9.30 
p.m., supplemental to the football matches that were habitually played at the stadium.  Whilst 
the football matches generated noise, this noise was tolerated by the neighbourhood in 
which the stadium was situated.  When a totally different sport from football was promoted 
and conducted at the stadium, namely motorcar speedway racing, this sport generated noise 
which was not tolerable to the neighbourhood.  Justice Goff followed the rule laid down by 
Knight Bruce VC in Walter v Selfe, followed more recently in Laing v St Thomas Dragway, that 
the evidence of a nuisance must be adjudged “not merely according to elegant or dainty 
modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the 
English people.”832  The plaintiff, who was a resident of the quiet neighbourhood adjoining 
the Brooklands Stadium, complained of the overall noise created by the use of the stadium 
for speedway racing, in contrast to the noise generated from football matches that took place 
at the stadium.  The plaintiff was particularly distressed by the revving of motorcycle engines 
which took place both before and during races.  The defendants had carried out certain 
remedial measures with their loudspeakers, including setting the volume control at a lower 
level, and erecting an 8-ft-high sound-shielding fence along the top of the bank adjoining the 
plaintiff’s premises.  But the court was of the view that these measures were clearly 
                                                
831 [1971] EGD 763. 
832 (1851) 4 De G and Sm 315 at p 322; 64 ER 849 at p 852 (Knight-Bruce VC).  Vice Chancellor Bruce-
Knight’s dictum in Walter v Selfe was referred to with approval in Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR 
482 at p 486 (Jordan CJ), and followed in Laing v St Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 
ACWS (3d) 776 at para [41].  In Walter v Selfe, Knight-Bruce VC said: “Ought this inconvenience to be 
considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience 
materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant 
or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English 
people?”  See also Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC) where 
Justice Brown states, at p 52, referring to Goltan v De Held, 21 LJ Ch 167, that the test as to what is a nuisance is 
an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence according to 
plain, sober, and simple notions. 
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insufficient, and the plaintiff was entitled to a perpetual injunction.  His Lordship arrived at 
the conclusion, from the evidence, that overall there had been a substantial increase in noise 
from that occasioned by football matches at the stadium.  Justice Goff held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to an injunction against speedway races that took place at the stadium.  It had 
been argued on behalf of the defendants that speedway gave pleasure to many people.  Yet, 
Justice Goff held that the defendants were carrying on a business, and were not entitled to 
carry it on in such a way as to interfere substantially with the ordinary notions of comfort in 
the plaintiff’s house and garden, however many people might derive pleasure from it, and 
however well run it might be.  The injunction restrained the defendants and each of them, by 
themselves, their servants or agents or otherwise howsoever, from causing or permitting 
speedway racing at Brooklands Stadium. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Publicly exhibited sports may create public nuisances by causing annoyance or discomfort to 
the public either directly or indirectly.  The public right which is impinged upon in 
circumstances where public exhibitions of sport cause annoyance or discomfort is the public 
right to quietude or the public right to comfort.833  Publicly exhibited sporting events may 
create a public nuisance directly because of the noise generated by the sporting activity, such 
as motorsport racing,834 or by projectile objects such as golf balls or baseballs.835  Publicly 
exhibited sporting events may also create a public nuisance indirectly because of the noise 
                                                
833 Public comfort is identified by the Supreme Court of Illinois as a public right: City of Chicago v Beretta USA 
Corporation 213 Ill 2d. 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004), at p 370 of the former report (Garman J). 
834 Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC); Town of Bedminster v 
Vargo Dragway Inc 434 Pa 100, 253 A 2d 659 (1969); Jones v Queen City Speedways Inc 276 NC 231, 172 SE 2d 42, 
Supreme Court of North Carolina (1970); Stretch v Romford Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 763; State of New York v 
Bridgehampton Road Races Corp 44 AD 2d 725 (1974); State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc 96 Misc 2d 
350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978); Sherrod v Dutton 635 SW 2d 117 (1982); Hoover v Durkee 212 AD 2d 839, 622 NYS 2 
d 348 (1995); Wheeler v Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corp 303 AD 2d 791, 755 NYS 2d 763 (2003), appeal denied 
100 NY 2d 507, 795 NE 2d 39 763 NYS 2d 813 (2003); West v Luna 2003 Tenn App LEXIS 968 (Tenn Ct App, 
6 January 2003), appeal denied West v Luna 2004 Tenn LEXIS 750 (Tenn, 7 September 2004); Laing v St Thomas 
Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 ACWS (3d) 776. 
835 Sans v Ramsey Golf & Country Club Inc 29 NJ 438, 149 A 2d 599 (1959); Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton 
[1998] NSWSC 257 (New South Wales Court of Appeal, 23 June 1998). 
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and behaviour of crowds attending as spectators to the publicly exhibited sporting event.836  
Compliance with local or municipal laws by the promoters or managers of the publicly 
exhibited sporting event will not prevent a finding of public nuisance.837  Common law 
public nuisance exists, insofar as it is relevant to sport, to protect public rights and to limit 
the excesses of unregulated commercialized and profit motivated sports practice.838  In no 
area is this as stark as in the precedents concerning the public right to quietude.  In these 
precedents, the sports events in question drew together great numbers of people which 
proved generally annoying or discomforting to the places adjacent to where the sports events 
were staged.  A commercialised and profit driven approach to sports practice, wherein there 
is a proliferation of sporting fixtures attracting crowds and noise and supplemental 
entertainment products such as music and dancing, in order to maximum financial gain, may 
more readily create circumstances which amount to a public nuisance.  Publicly exhibited 
sporting events may cause annoyance and discomfort to the public and be declared a public 
nuisance on a single, isolated occasion,839 or by a continuing state of affairs,840 or by an 
increase in the degree of sport exhibited or manner of exhibition.841  The same is true of 
theatres and playhouses.842  To this might be added, in relation to modern urban 
                                                
836 R v Moore (1832) 3 B & Ald 184; Bostock v North Staffordshire Railway Co (1852) 5 De G & Sm 584, 64 ER 
1253; Bellamy v Wells (1890) 60 LJ Rep Ch NS 156; Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345; 
Cronin v Bloemecke 58 NJ Eq 313 (1899); Seastream v New Jersey Exhibition 67 NJ Eq 178 (1904) at pp 183-184 
(Vice Chancellor Pitney); Gilmour v Green Village Fire Department Inc 2 NJ Super 393, 63 A 2d 918 (1949). 
837 State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc 96 Misc 2d 350, 409 NYS 2d 40 (1978); Laing v St Thomas 
Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, 136 ACWS (3d) 776. 
838 In earlier times common law public nuisance existed to limit the excesses of unregulated and profit 
motivated corporations who pursued greed without moderation and without consideration for the impact of 
their actions upon local communities adjacent their business premises: Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd 
[1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 1 All ER 894 (CA). 
839 See Aldridge v Van Patter [1952] OR 595 at p 610 where it was said: “All wrongful escapes of deleterious 
things, whether continuous, intermittent, or isolated, are equally to be classed as nuisances in law; for they are 
all governed by the same principles.” Gleeson v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc 148 Misc 246, 265 NYS 886 (1933). 
In Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906), the holding of a single motorcar race on a single 
occasion was opined to be a nuisance per se by the Court of Appeals of New York: at p 146. See also Matheson 
v Northcote College Board of Governors [1975] 2 NZLR 106.  See also Holling v Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd [1948] 
2 All ER 662 (Court of Appeal) and Dollman v Hillman Ltd [1941] 1 All ER 355 (Court of Appeal).   
840 See Castle v St. Augustine’s Links Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 615 were the evidence was to the effect that golf balls 
were very frequently sliced on to or over the public highway from the 13th tee.  There was evidence of 
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the road.  See also Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd 
[1957] 2 QB 169 at p 182, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 900. 
841 Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC); Stretch v Romford 
Football Club Ltd [1971] EGD 763. 
842 Betterton’s Case rep Temp Holt 538; Barber v Penley [1893] 2 Ch 447 at p 449, cited in Russell on Crime vol 1 at p 
1734. 
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environments, dance clubs, rave music events, and such like.843  A single publicly exhibited 
sporting event such as a surfing championship event which draws a crowd of 100,000 
spectators to the beach to witness surfing,844 may cause annoyance or discomfort to the 
public (being comprised of the residents and local community living in the locale where the 
surfing championship is staged) and may be declared a public nuisance at common law. 
 
Excessive public exhibitions may, indeed, create a circumstance that proves annoying or 
discomforting to the people generally.  Sports may be public nuisances when conducted too 
often, when conducted at certain times or days, or when conducted at certain places.  The 
character of the locality where the publicly exhibited sporting event is staged, or is proposed 
to be staged, is of relevance in determining whether there is annoyance or discomfort.845  
Above all, no majority, however large, is entitled to interfere with the common right of a 
minority to the enjoyment of the comfort and quiet of their homes, and the free use of the 
public thoroughfares which lead to them.  The Legislature alone, acting for the whole State, 
has this power entrusted to it.846 
                                                
843 R v Shorrock [1993] 3 WLR 698 (CA). 
844 100,000 spectators occupied Huntington Beach in California to watch the 2004 US Surfing Open: ‘Taj, 
Chelsea Grab US Titles’ Sunday Mail (Australia, 8 August 2004) at p 64. 
845 Walker v Pioneer Construction Co Ltd (1967) 56 DLR (3d) 677 at p 680 (Morden J); followed in Laing v St 
Thomas Dragway [2005] OJ No 254, 2005 ACWSJ 1385, [2005] 136 ACWS (3d) 776 at para [38]. 
846 Dewar v City and Suburban Race Course Co [1899] 1 IR 345 at p 356. 
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Chapter 13 
 
Public sporting events endangering public safety, public health, or 
the life of the public 
 
 
A public exhibition of sport that endangers public safety, public health, or the life of the 
public is a public nuisance at common law.  The definitions of public nuisance discussed in 
Chapter 5, supported by the decisions in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein,847 City of Chicago v 
Beretta USA Corporation,848 state that an act or omission which endangers public safety, public 
health or the life of the public is a public nuisance.  The public right which is impinged upon 
by acts or omissions endangering the safety, health or life of the public are the public right to 
safety, the public right to public peace, the public right to health, and the public right to 
life.849   
 
Public exhibitions of sports have long been attendant with danger and the courts have long 
recognised this fact.  Courts have often noted the inherent danger in sport.  The deaths and 
injury of competitors, and of spectators and the public generally, has been recorded in court 
reports.  The death of a football player in a match played between football clubs under the 
Association Rules was the subject of a prosecution in R v Bradshaw and in R v Moore.850  A 
terrible accident in a motorcar race in which two spectators were killed and several injured 
when a car shot into the air and off the course, travelling for a dozen yards, over rails by the 
side of the track into a crowd of spectators was the cause of litigation in Hall v Brooklands 
Auto Racing Club851 Lord Justice Scrutton commented in Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club 
                                                
847 [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982, [2006] 2 All ER 257. 
848 213 Ill 2d. 351, 821 NE 2d 1099 (2004) at p 369 of the former report. 
849 ibid. 
850 R v Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83; R v Moore (1898) 14 TLR 229. 
851 [1933] 1 KB 205 
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that the dangers of public exhibitions of sports are numerous: “A spectator at Lord’s or the 
Oval runs the risk of being hit by a cricket ball, or coming into collision with a fielder 
running hard to stop a ball from going over the boundary, and himself tumbling over the 
boundary in doing so.  Spectators at football or hockey or polo matches run similar risks 
both from the ball and from collisions with players or polo ponies.  Spectators who pay for 
admission to golf courses to witness important matches, though they keep beyond the 
boundaries required by the stewards, run the risk of players slicing or pulling balls which may 
hit them with considerable velocity and damage.”852  Ibrox and Hillsborough, in which 
scores of spectators were killed, were disasters closely associated with lack of effective 
regulation in publicly exhibited sporting events.853  Between 1933 and 1976 organised 
football in the United States claimed the lives of 1,198 participants.854 
 
Publicly exhibited sporting events may create a public nuisance by endangering public safety, 
public health or the life of the public in either a direct or an indirect manner.  Directly, 
public sports may endanger public safety, health or life where equipment used in the sporting 
contest injures, maims or kills spectators or other members of the public.  Indirectly, publicly 
exhibited sporting events may endanger public safety, health or life where the sport draws 
violent or riotous crowds to the harm of spectators of the sporting event or to residents and 
communities living in the locale where the sporting event is staged.  Both circumstances are 
now discussed. 
 
 
                                                
852 ibid at p 209. 
853 See Justice Popplewell Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds Final 
Report (Cmnds 9710).  At p 2 of the Final Report the author states: “the paramount need is to protect the 
public by improving safety standards, and thereby restoring confidence among those who attend sporting 
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1. Publicly exhibited sporting events endangering public safety, health or life, 
directly 
 
Publicly exhibited sporting events may pose a direct threat, not by virtue of noise or crowds, 
but by virtue of the very nature of the game itself and the inherent dangers of the game.  In 
Castle v St Augustine’s Links,855 the use of a golf tee and golf fairway constituted a public 
nuisance because golf balls often strayed onto the public highway.  On the facts of the case 
golf balls hit cars, broke windscreens and endangered the safety and lives of motorists.  The 
same was the holding of courts in New York in Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc,856 and 
Townsley v State of New York.857  In the Townsley case, the plaintiff was driving in her car on the 
highway when a golf ball struck her.  She contended that the 18th hole of the golf course, 
with its fairway running parallel and immediately adjacent to the highway, constituted a 
menace and public nuisance to travellers using the highway.  The court agreed with her 
argument.  The court noted that the driver had the right to the free and unmolested use of 
the highway.858  In Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc, the court said: “Like baseball, the golf 
game is not a nuisance per se.  Both games involve the same element, ie, striking the ball with 
an instrument with force so as to send it spinning into the air.  If, however, the ball playing is 
attended with a reasonable degree of danger, as to make it likely that it would ‘work hurt’ 
upon a traveller in the street, a question of fact is presented, and if it be decided adversely to 
the parties who are responsible for, or who participated in, or who authorized the setting of 
the ball in motion, liability will attach on the theory that the playing was a nuisance.”859  The 
key question for the court, then, was whether the degree of danger associated with the 
situation of the golf hole and the sport in question was such that, as a matter of fact, it 
created a public nuisance.  The court noted that the precedent of Castle v St Augustine’s Links 
Ltd was directly on point.  The New York Court followed the holding of the English King’s 
Bench in Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd, where it was stated that a plaintiff could “…recover 
from the golf club on the theory that the particular portion of the grounds was a public 
nuisance under the conditions and in the place where it was situated.  It was said that the 
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858 6 Misc 2d 557 at p 558. 
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club was under a duty to obviate the danger to persons upon the highway and that this could 
be done in several ways, as by having a lesser number of holes, or omitting the objectionable 
hole, or playing it in a different way.  Those features and the theories upon which liability 
was predicated appeal to me as justifiable both upon reason and authority, and applicable to 
the facts at bar.”860 
 
To sports purists, the idea that a golf tournament ought to be conducted over only 17 holes 
rather than 18 holes is anathema.  Yet this is the response of the common law where a public 
nuisance is created by projectile golf balls endangering public safety, public health or the life 
of the public.  The suggestion from Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc and Castle v St Augustine’s 
Links Ltd that a sport must change its course, layout, or manner of play, or omit playing a 
particular part of the game, such as a golf hole, where a public nuisance is created, has been 
adopted by more recent authority.861  In Challen v McLeod Country Golf Club, the Court of 
Appeal of Queensland found that: “Even two or three balls per week regularly coming onto 
the appellant’s property with the risk of physical harm or damage to persons or property on 
the appellant’s premises is a material interference with the enjoyment of the appellant of her 
property.”862 Although an action in private nuisance, the court was of the opinion that golf 
balls hit into the plaintiff’s property was a threat to physical safety.863  In this case, action by 
the respondents changing the layout of the 12th hole on the golf course (the hole the cause of 
the nuisance), at a cost of $26,000, prior to the litigation, obviated the need for an injunction.  
The Court of Appeal awarded damages.  And in Schneider v Royal Wayne Motel Ltd,864 the 
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863 [2004] QCA 358, at para [39] (Mullins J). 
864 (1995) 27 Alberta Law Reports (3d) 18, followed in Transcona Country Club v Transcona Golf Club (1982) Inc 
[2000] MBQB 22. 
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plaintiffs owned homes adjacent to a golf course which had existed when they bought their 
homes.  Over the years many golf balls had been driven into their yards and had hit their 
homes and vehicles.  There were as many as 321 such incidents in one season.  The golf 
course took action to attempt to alleviate the problem by moving a green and erecting a 
fence.  Unfortunately this action only met with modest success.  The court concluded that 
the plaintiffs were subjected to a nuisance emanating from the golf course.  The fact that the 
golf course had taken steps to alleviate the nuisance, although possibly relevant with respect 
to damages, was not sufficient to vitiate the plaintiff’s claim.  While the plaintiffs’ bought 
their homes knowing of the existence of the course, that did not excuse the golf course’s 
continued intrusion.  The golf course did not acquire the right to commit a nuisance by 
existing prior to the plaintiffs’ purchase of the adjacent property. 
 
In Transcona Country Club v Transcona Golf Club (1982) Inc,865 Hanssen J in the Manitoba Court 
of Queen’s Bench discussed several decisions of the courts in Canada, Australia, England 
and America on nuisance liability, holding that the defendant Golf Club was liable in 
nuisance because its use of a golf course substantially and unreasonably interfered with the 
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of their land.  On the facts, golf balls struck the plaintiff’s 
premises on four occasions breaking windows.  Precedents relied upon by the Manitoba 
court included: Miller v Jackson,866 where the Court of Appeal of England and Wales found a 
cricket club liable in nuisance because balls from a cricket ground entered the plaintiffs’ yard 
and hit their house; Lester-Travers v The City of Frankston,867 where the defendants were found 
liable in nuisance because some 36 golf balls played by golfers on two holes and the practice 
fairway landed on the plaintiff’s property, some striking her house and others simply landing 
in her grounds; and Cook v Lockeport (Town),868 where the court had found the operator of a 
baseball diamond liable in nuisance as a result of baseballs going onto the plaintiff’s property 
and had issued an injunction restraining the activity.869 
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In other cases, courts have refrained from finding, as a matter of fact, that a baseball hit 
from a park and into the public street injuring a pedestrian was an actionable nuisance: Young 
v The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.870  And in Stone v Bolton, discussed above 
in Chapter 5, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales refused to find that a cricket ball hit 
from a cricket ground into the public highway injuring the plaintiff was a public nuisance.  
The decision in Stone v Bolton and the subsequent decision of the House of Lords in Bolton v 
Stone are not consistent with the case law on projectiles from sports grounds.  The issue as to 
the liability of the owner’s, occupiers, or operators of a sports ground or sports facility from 
which balls or vehicles are projected into a public highway or public park, for public 
nuisance, has perhaps yet to be conclusively adjudged by an appellate court. 
 
The determination as to whether a sporting event creates a public nuisance by endangering 
public safety, health or the life of the public, is often a cumbersome exercise requiring a 
court to make a choice between competing interests.  This was made clear recently in 
McGuire v New Orleans City Park Improvement Association,871 where the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana dismissed a negligence suit by a jogger who had part of his right testicle removed 
as a result of being hit by an errant golf ball.  The plaintiff was running, for exercise, along a 
road which traversed a golf course.  The difficulty which this case highlights is one which 
endeavours to balance the social benefits gained from sport against the inherent dangers 
associated with the sport.  The effect of the decision is to relegate the sport of running – 
which may be a natural right in and of itself, being a physical activity of benefit to man – to 
an inferior status to golf, in the location of a golf course.  This is a difficult call.  And 
perhaps, alike the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Stone v Bolton,872 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court viewed the sport the subject of the case with partiality.873  In Stone v Bolton the 
sport was cricket.  In McGuire the sport was golf.  The Supreme Court in McGuire was 
persuaded by the fact that the place where the plaintiff was running was designated for golf, 
the golf course having been in existence for over 75 years, and signs having been erected at 
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the entrances to the golf course warning entrants of golf activity.  The plaintiff was not a 
trespasser on the golf course because the road on which he was running was open to the 
public. 
 
The situation may be very different where golf balls, or any other ball used in a sport, are 
projected out of the field of play and into an adjacent public utility such as a public park or a 
public road; rather than where members of the public are injured when traversing a course 
itself by using a public road, as was the facts in McGuire.  Had the plaintiff been jogging on 
an adjacent public highway or in an adjacent public park when he was hit, the golf course 
owners would have been liable for creating a public nuisance following the decisions in 
Gleason v Hillcrest Golf Course Inc and in Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd.  Yet by what 
reasonable application of the law should Ms Townsley succeed on grounds of public 
nuisance and Mr. McGuire fail?  A public park, or a public highway, through which persons 
might jog, for exercise, enjoyment, and wellbeing, ought to be a place free from the threat to 
public safety or life posed by projectile golf balls from an adjacent golf course.  Perhaps the 
decision in McGuire rests on the fact that the suit was brought in negligence and not on 
grounds of public nuisance as was the case in Laing v Allen.874   
 
Had Mr. McGuire sued on grounds of public nuisance causing special damage to himself he 
might have succeeded.  A launched projectile, under the circumstances in the McGuire case, 
albeit an accident and an inherent aspect of the sport of golf, would amount to a public 
nuisance.  Liability for such public nuisance is absolute.  The offence of public nuisance, as 
was indicated by Sir John Smith in his seminal work on criminal law, is essentially a crime of 
negligence.875  The use of the golf hole in question endangered public safety and may thus be 
properly regarded as a public nuisance.  The use of the golf hole by players of golf in such 
circumstances as Castle, Gleason etc is indiscriminate in its scope because any person using an 
adjacent public highway or public park for their own enjoyment or wellbeing might be 
physically harmed by an errant golf ball.  Skewed, sliced, hooked, or wayward golf shots are 
common amongst players in the game of golf – even amongst professional players.  Even 
the best golf players in the world hit their golf balls into trees, woods, forests, ponds, or 
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lakes, adjacent the fairways, or into the crowds of spectators observing the tournament.  The 
people ought not to have to amend their free use of public parks, or public roads, or cease 
going to a public park or using public roads altogether, or keep constant watch in thin air for 
errant golf balls, simply because a golf hole is situated too close to such a public park or 
public road.  In the McGuire case either the public road ought to be moved or the golf hole 
from which the errant golf ball was projected ought to be removed or changed.  The case 
law suggests that in circumstances where a game of golf creates a public nuisance it is the 
golf game which must amend its practise so as not to further endanger public safety, public 
health or the life of the public.876  Doing otherwise would be to relegate some other activity, 
such as jogging, picnicking in the park, or walking, or driving a motorcar, occurring on land 
beyond the strict confines of a golf course to an inferior status to the right to play golf.  
Under injunctive relief for public nuisance, a Golf Club would be required to change the 
layout of the golf hole, place natural or artificial screens, or omit playing the golf hole in 
question.  In so mandating, a court is not suggesting that the game of golf cannot be played 
at all.  Rather, the game of golf is allowable provided it not be played in such a manner as to 
endanger public rights.  This is a most reasonable principle of law.  The public ought to able 
to walk, jog, practise yoga, play football, play catch, exercise, picnic, or rest, in a public park, 
or travel by foot, horse, motorcar or some other vehicle along the public roads without an 
endangerment to their safety created by errant golf balls from golf courses. 
 
This is not an issue that ought to be left to private litigants.  It is a public issue.  The 
necessity to monitor the possible liability in public nuisance created by ball games at public 
parks or in public facilities, or at private facilities adjacent or adjoining public land would 
avoid the need to relegate one sport, such as ball sports, to an inferior statues, to other 
sports. 
 
It is not only golf which may endanger public safety, health or the life of the public directly. 
In State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway,877 danger to public safety justified the 
holding that the operation of the racetrack for motorcar races was a public nuisance.  The 
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Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was a definite danger of safety in 
the vicinity of the raceway from launched projectiles.  Undisputed testimony was had at trial 
that at one time a racing tire flew across the street and hit a witness’ garage, and that on 
other occasions steel guide rails had fallen apart upon impact from the autos and had been 
projected as far as the public street. 
 
In Aldridge v Van Patter,878 the plaintiffs sued variously in nuisance, negligence and under the 
rule in Rylands v Fletcher.  A stock car, racing in a car race on a track adjacent to a public park, 
crashed through a frail fence surrounding the track and injured the plaintiffs who were 
walking in the park.  The plaintiffs were walking in the park and proceeding to the entrance 
to the track to buy tickets to enter and witness the sporting event.  The Ontario High Court 
held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs were entitled to found a claim in nuisance, notwithstanding 
that there was but the single instance of crashing of a racing car into the public park.  
Liability under nuisance did not rest on the driver but it did rest on the licensee of the track 
and also on the licensor.  Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd, and Dollman v Hillman Ltd, were 
applied and Stone v Bolton was not followed.  Justice Spence stated: “The evidence in the 
present case shows conclusively that the defendant the Western Fair Association through its 
officers, particularly Jackson, the general manager, and Saunders, the grounds 
superintendent, and also the defendant Martin, knew that there was grave and constant 
danger of competing drivers going through the fence into this public park and in fact on that 
very afternoon one competitor already had struck and torn down the fence near which the 
accident occurred, although by chance the vehicle did not proceed beyond the fence.  In the 
circumstances of this case, I find that Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd and not Bolton v Stone 
applies.”879 
 
In Wilkinson v Joyceman,880 the owner of the land in question permitted stock car racing to be 
conducted on it knowing that insufficient precautions had been taken to protect spectators 
from the serious risk of injury it presented.  The Supreme Court of Queensland found him 
liable for create a nuisance stating that if an occupier of land permits a nuisance to be 
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conducted on his land, a nuisance which he knows of or ought to know of, he becomes 
liable for that nuisance and its potentially harmful consequences to others from the time at 
which he acquired that knowledge or ought to have done so. 
 
 
2. A violent sporting event may be a public nuisance 
 
The sport of boxing may be a public nuisance, and thus a common law crime, on the basis 
that, because the sport involves punching and hitting a human being in the face and head, 
boxing may endanger the safety, health or life of the combatants, and by extension of all 
other professional and amateur boxers and members of the public who desire to emulate the 
boxers by taking up boxing themselves.  The dangerousness of the sport of boxing and the 
very serious physical injuries that boxers suffer, established through medical science, 
provides evidence of the degree to which the sport may endanger public health and safety.  
Whether boxing is a public nuisance is a question of fact.  Disparate common law 
jurisdictions may arrive at different conclusions.  In common law jurisdictions where public 
boxing is legislatively permissible, such as New South Wales and New York, for example, the 
question as to whether boxing is a public nuisance is moot.  In other common law 
jurisdictions where no statute authorises boxing, such as Queensland and England, for 
example, the sport of boxing is liable to proscription at common law as a public nuisance.  
The only means of making lawful that which might be unlawful at common law is for 
Parliament to enact legislation to change the common law. 
 
The permissibility of conduct within sports is not a private issue for the participants of the 
sport, but is a public law issue.  Defences of consent and volenti non fit injuria have no relevant 
application to the common law crime of public nuisance.  Consent and volenti non fit injuria do 
not apply in public nuisance suits because it is not the nature of the actions of the sport 
which is adjudged criminal by the common law, but, rather, it is the affect of the actions of 
the sport which is adjudged as harming health or life, thus amounting to a public nuisance. 
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The State has a vested interest in the health of its citizens.  This was the dictum from the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel Attorney-General v Canty.881  In Canty, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri enjoined a bullfight staged at the World Exposition in St. Louis in 1904 
on the grounds that the proposed public sporting exhibition constituted a public nuisance at 
common law.  The defendants had on divers occasions conducted, and proposed to 
continue to conduct, a public exhibition of bull-fighting in an arena constructed for that 
purpose, in St. Louis, near the St. Louis World’s Fair Exposition which was at the time in 
progress. Many thousands of people attended at the bullfights, being each charged an 
admission fee of fifty cents.  Great publicity was given to the performances by advertising in 
the public press to induce the people to attend.  The Attorney General contended that the 
defendants were maintaining and conducting, and threatening to continue to maintain and 
conduct, a public nuisance.  And he further contended that such nuisance should be abated 
and enjoined by a court of equity, because the nuisance is an offence against public order, 
the common good and public decency and morals.  The court enjoined the defendants from 
operating the bullfights.  It is worth noting the full description of the sport provided in the 
judgment of Justice Woodson, which led to the decision to issue an injunction.  Of particular 
merit is Justice Woodson’s dictum on how these bullfights endanger public safety, health and 
life: 
“According to the evidence in this case there can be no doubt but that 
the bull-fights, in so far as the bulls were concerned, were genuine fights 
and partook of the ferocity and brutality which has ever characterized 
them in Spain and Mexico.  Two matadors were knocked down and 
injured more or less by the bulls the first night, and might have been 
seriously injured or killed had it not been for the timely arrival and 
assistance of their associates; and two others were knocked down, one of 
them a crazy man, but both escaped injury, through the assistance of 
their fellows. 
 
While it is true the evidence discloses that the matadors did not use the 
sword, as is the practice in Spain and Mexico in such fights, nor inflict 
injury or death upon the bulls, yet that very fact made it more hazardous 
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and dangerous for the matadors.  If they had been furnished with swords 
they would have been more able to have stopped the mad career of 
the infuriated bull, and thereby escaped the deadly charge of the Socorro 
brute, without relying exclusively upon the timely arrival and prompt 
assistance of their fellow matadors, or the convenient ‘escapes’ erected 
along the wall of the arena. 
 
The managers in disarming those poor bull-fighters and placing them in 
the arena with those mad bulls were almost if not quite as guilty of as 
great a crime as the Romans were in ancient times, who threw the 
criminals and Christians into the public arena with the wild beasts to be 
torn to pieces and killed by them for the edifice and amusement of the 
morbid and vicious populace… 
 
The State is deeply interested in the lives and well being of all her 
citizens, and of those who come within her borders, and much more so 
than she is in the lives and safety of the bulls.  The immunity of the bull 
from punishment under the system of fighting as shown by the evidence 
in this case in no manner or degree lessened the interest of the State in 
the lives and limbs of the men who were engaged in those highly 
dangerous combats and struggles.  But in the case at bar one of the 
steers injured and broke one of his horns, which hung down over his 
face, and in that condition, with blood flowing therefrom, he would 
charge and recharge the men and dummy horses, and strike the broken 
horn against the dummy or the ‘escapes’ and thereby caused the flow of 
the blood to increase, which must have been very painful and no less 
cruel to the dumb brute.” 
 
If there is a cognizable public right to protect, such as the public right to safety, health or 
life, a court has power to enjoin an act as a public nuisance.  The court in Canty found that 
the bullfights injured the public right to safety.  One key impacting upon the determination 
as to whether the public right to safety or the public right to health or life has been impinged 
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upon by the violent sport is whether there exists a class of persons capable of satisfying the 
definition of “public” under the public nuisance offence.  Clearly the court in Canty was 
satisfied that the bullfights affected the public.  We know from the discussion early in this 
thesis that: “‘[The] number of persons affected need not be shown to be ‘very great’… [only 
that the public nuisance is] not unreasonably classified as a wrong to the community.”882  It is 
sufficient, as a matter of law if the nuisance affects only seven families,883 or sixteen 
households,884 or thirty households.885  Persons who participate as bullfighters, boxers, or as 
athletes in other violent sports, may well comprise a cognisable ‘neighbourhood’ or “class of 
Her Majesty’s subjects” whose public rights to safety, health or life are endangered by their 
participation in the violent sporting event.  And even if a court finds that the participants in 
the violent sport themselves do not comprise a class against whom a public nuisance is 
committed, a court may nonetheless find that it is those members of the public who desire 
to emulate these violent sportsmen who comprise a class whose public rights warrant 
protecting.  The question is one of fact which a tribunal of fact would be required to 
determine. 
 
An early case in which pugilism was litigated was the case of Hunt v Bell in 1822.  In this case 
the plaintiff, a promoter of boxing, sued for libel.  The defendant contended that public 
exhibitions of sparing matches are illegal and that a party who pursues such illegal activity 
has no remedy by action for a libel regarding his conduct in such vocation.  On the facts, the 
plaintiff was the proprietor of a building called the Tennis-court and exhibited boxing 
matches “for the amusement of any persons desirous of being spectators thereof, and paying 
for their admission into such building a certain sum of money per head.”886  Four justices 
comprised the bench hearing an appeal from the plaintiff who moved for a new trial.  The 
Justices unanimously dismissed the motion; yet the question as to the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of boxing proved vexing for them.  Dallas CJ stated:  
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“…[I]n the early periods of their history, it has been the practice of all 
civilized nations to train up their population to exercises of activity and 
courage; and, with a view to national defence, to promote emulation in 
amicable contests of strength.  I stated to the jury the difficulty of 
distinguishing between fencing and boxing.  Many persons, now present, 
can recollect the exhibitions of skill by Angelo, Roland, St George, and 
others; and yet, is not fencing the art of attack as well as of defence, and 
is it not more dangerous than boxing?  But is fencing illegal?  Or is it 
illegal to attend a fencing school?  Is it illegal to practice the bow and 
arrow?  Are archery meetings illegal?  On all these views of the subject, I 
felt considerable difficulty.  But, on the whole, when I consider that 
these sparring exhibitions are conducted by professors of pugilism; that 
they are meetings which may tend to encourage and illegal vocation, and 
to form prize-fighters, I see no reason for disturbing the present 
verdict.”887   
 
Burrough J viewed public exhibitions of boxing as unlawful because such exhibitions 
endangered life.  His Honour stated: “I am of the opinion, that the practice in question is 
illegal.  The chief object for which persons attend these exhibitions is to see and judge of the 
comparative strength and skill of parties, who may be afterwards matched as prize-fighters, 
and that, frequently, to the loss of life; for there can be no doubt that the skill acquired in 
these schools enables the combatants to destroy life, in some instances, by a single 
blow…”888  Justice Richardson took yet another view, opining that public exhibitions of 
boxing as unlawful because they were a public activity, as opposed to a private pursuit.  His 
Honour drew a distinction between the exercise of boxing as a private recreative activity and 
public exhibitions of boxing contests: “If the question were merely, whether it is lawful or 
unlawful for persons to learn the art of self-defence, whether with artificial weapons or such 
only as nature affords, there can be no doubt that the pursuit of such an object is lawful; but 
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public prize-fighting is unlawful and any thing which tends to train up persons for such a 
practice, or to promote the pursuit of it, must also be unlawful.”889  
 
Sometimes the role of the Executive of Government, as parens patriae, through the Attorney 
General, is to act on behalf of the public to protect the people from themselves.  On other 
occasions the Executive intervenes to protect the public from charlatanism and barbarism. 
What of the public boxing matches where members of the public, untrained in the sport of 
boxing, enter into a contest in the ring and are badly injured or killed?  Is such a sport a 
public nuisance?  Should such a sport be abated as a public nuisance?  Recently, in the 
United States a boxing promoter named Art Dore has been conducting ‘Toughman’ public 
boxing contest for amateur boxers and members of the public through a sports association 
enterprise he established.  In June 2003, a 30-year-old mother of two, weighing 110 
kilograms and having no boxing experience at all, died two days after contesting a three-
round amateur boxing match at a public arena in Sarasota, Florida.890  The contest was 
reportedly captured on video camera.  Ms. Young, the mother of two, was persuaded to 
enter into the boxing contest because another woman who wanted to box did not have an 
opponent.  During the match she received repeated blows to the head.  It was reported that 
Ms. Young turned from her opponent several times during the bout and tried to walk away.  
The referee did not stop the fight.  The promoter of the ‘Toughman’ competitions, Art 
Dore, was present at this contest and acted as the announcer at the match.  At one point he 
is reported to have said of the contest that it was ‘a real cat fight’.  Ms. Young had never 
been in a fight before and was so exhausted by the third round that she could no longer raise 
her arms in defence.  There were shouts from the crowd for the fight to stop.  Ms. Young 
was knocked unconscious and suffered massive brain haemorrhaging, while her family, 
including her young daughters, watched.  It was reported that she was at least the tenth 
person to die in one of these ‘Toughman’ bouts since they started 24 years previously.891  The 
‘Toughman’ contests operated outside the regulatory and legislative framework governing 
                                                
889 (1822) 1 Bing 1 at p 5. 
890 See ⎯ ‘Boxer was hit as she returned to corner: Caught on videotape. Florida mother is fourth person to die 
in Toughman bouts in last nine months’ Montreal Gazette (Montreal Canada 26 June 2003) at p A19; Editorial, 
‘Toughman Tragedy’ St Petersburg Times (Florida USA 27 June 2003) at p 18A; T Zucco ‘Ringside at Fatal 
Toughman Bout’ St Petersburg Times (Florida USA 25 June 2003) at p 1A; Editorial ‘Not a Tough Call’ The Palm 
Beach Post (Palm Beach Florida USA 26 June 2003) at p 20A. 
891 ibid. 
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the sport of boxing in many United States jurisdictions.  As a result of this fact, most of the 
protections and regulations that are in place for professional boxing matches – such as that 
commanded by New York’s boxing statute,892 for example – were missing in the Toughman 
series.  Competitors were not required to be trained and did not have to pass any physical 
examination.  Referees often were unlicensed and were slow to stop one-sided fights.  The 
‘Toughman’ contests were able to circumvent the legislative agenda in the State of Florida 
because they offered prizes of less than $50.893  
 
This type of publicly exhibited sport is appalling.  There is, quite simply, no other way to 
describe it.  That a man is permitted to profit from the maiming and death of a mother of 
two children is an affront not only to the communal ethic, but also, to the common law.  
This ‘Toughman’ series of contests is indubitably a public nuisance, following the definition 
of public nuisance in sections 823.01 and 823.05 of the Florida Statutes,894 as well as that 
provided at common law in Archbold or Wood, for example.  The conduct of these public 
boxing matches endangers the life, health, and morals, of the public.  The absence of strict 
rules requiring competitors to be properly trained in boxing; the absence of appropriate and 
qualified medical assistance at the contests; and the absence of properly qualified and trained 
referees; all evidence endangerment of the health of those who might enter the boxing ring 
to compete.  The events are indiscriminate in their effect, and it would not be reasonable to 
expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it.895  These 
boxing contests are morally culpable.  The ‘Toughman’ event attracts, in the words of the 
Court of Appeal of Kentucky in Commonwealth v McGovern, “men of idle, vicious and criminal 
                                                
892 See NY Reg Boxing Sparing and Wrestling c 912 of 1920; American Boxing and Athletic Association v New York 
State Athletic Commission 13 AD 3d 842, 787 NYS 2d 413, Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division 
(2004) 
893 See ⎯ ‘Boxer was hit as she returned to corner: Caught on videotape. Florida mother is fourth person to die 
in Toughman bouts in last nine months’ Montreal Gazette (Montreal Canada 26 June 2003) at p A19; Editorial, 
‘Toughman Tragedy’ St Petersburg Times (Florida USA 27 June 2003) at p 18A; T Zucco ‘Ringside at Fatal 
Toughman Bout’ St Petersburg Times (Florida USA 25 June 2003) at p 1A; Editorial ‘Not a Tough Call’ The Palm 
Beach Post (Palm Beach Florida USA 26 June 2003) at p 20A. 
894 Fla Stat § 823.01 provides: “All nuisances that tend to annoy the community, injure the health of the citizens 
in general, or corrupt the public morals are misdemeanors…”  Fla Stat § 823.05 provides: “Places declared a 
nuisance; may be abated and enjoined -- Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, or maintain, own or lease any 
building, booth, tent or place which tends to annoy the community or injure the health of the community, or 
become manifestly injurious to the morals or manners of the people as described in s. 823.01,… shall be 
deemed guilty of maintaining a nuisance, and the building, erection, place, tent or booth and the furniture, 
fixtures and contents are declared a nuisance.  All such places or persons shall be abated or enjoined as 
provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06.” 
895 [1957] 2 QB 169 at pp 190-191, [1957] 1 All ER 894 at p 908 (Denning LJ). 
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habits and practices, whose business is to prey upon the public in some form or other…”896  
That these contests attract violent, aggressive, and avaricious members of society is 
cognisable.  That such contests also attract the naïve, such as the wife and mother of two 
children, Ms. Young, who are coaxed to partake of the contest, is also apparent.  In this 
process, the noble and peaceable qualities of community life are harmed.  Innocent members 
of the community are goaded into partaking of violent behaviour.  In the depraved 
environment of the ‘Toughman’ public boxing ring, honour yields to ignominy, decorum 
yields to malice, and life yields to death.  Violence, ferocity, cruelty, and bloodshed – 
particularly haemorrhages – is pervasive in such an immorally infected environment.  The 
innocent and trusting become fallen.  No one, but perhaps an expertly trained athlete 
cognisant of the great harm which he might inflict on his own health through training and 
competition, whether amateur or professional, ought to be allowed to be coaxed or 
persuaded, let alone permitted, to enter into a sporting contest in a public arena.   
 
Public rights were ignored by the Attorney-General of Florida.  The Attorney-General of 
Florida ought to have instituted ex officio proceedings to abate any further of the ‘Toughman’ 
public boxing contests.  He ought to have utilised the immediate and swift procedure in 
equity for abatement of a public nuisance.  But this did not take place.  A lone parliamentary 
representative of the Florida legislature assumed responsibility for obtaining redress for 
vicious events alike the ‘Toughman’ public boxing contest.  This representative of the 
Florida legislature, Donna Clarke, is reported to have said in reference to the ‘Toughman’ 
contests: “It’s disturbing to me that as much as we work on the laws in this state that we 
would allow someone to die for entertainment.”897  She introduced legislation to close 
loopholes that allowed boxing competitions alike the ‘Toughman’ boxing matches to be 
staged without having referees and ringside doctors who meet the standards required in 
regulated amateur boxing matches. 
 
The Florida State legislature passed the Stacy Young Act, c. 2004-69 in 2004, which amended 
the provisions in chapter 548 of the Florida Statutes on Pugilistic Exhibitions.  The Act 
                                                
896 116 Ky 212 (1903) at p 237. 
897 C Sherman ‘Regulations Urged for Amateur Boxing – Polk County will Listen to a Plea from the Relative of 
a 30-year-old Mother who Died from Fatal Blows’ Orlando Sentinel (Orlando Florida USA 29 July 2003) at p B2. 
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provides, amongst other amendments, that no amateur boxing or kickboxing match may be 
held in Florida unless it is sanctioned and supervised by an amateur sanctioning organization 
approved by the Florida Boxing Commission.898  The Act provides, further, that any person 
holding, promoting, or sponsoring a match prohibited under the section commits a third 
degree felony;899 that any person participating in a match prohibited under the section may 
be charged with a second degree misdemeanour;900 and that no amateur mixed martial arts 
match may be held in Florida.901  In other states, more stringent regulation effectively 
prevented the staging of the ‘Toughman’ boxing matches.  The New York State Athletic 
Commission was granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the American Boxing and 
Athletic Association from holding its ‘Toughman’ contests in New York: American Boxing and 
Athletic Association v New York State Athletic Commission.902  The court held that the 
Commission was vested with the sole direction, management, control, and jurisdiction over 
all boxing matches or exhibitions conducted within the State of New York pursuant to New 
York State Unconsolidated Law, c. 7, s. 6; and thereby could obtain an injunction preventing 
the staging of any boxing match not approved by the Commission.903  Yet, as is evidenced by 
the facts surrounding the death of Ms. Young in June 2003, even where there exists 
legislative regulation of the sport of boxing, there remains a pertinent role for the Executive 
arm of Government to ensure that events inimical to the people, such as the ‘Toughman’ 
boxing contests, do not take place.  The role of the Executive in endeavouring to prevent the 
occurrence of events inimical to the people is apparent particularly in states where there is no 
legislative regulation of boxing.904  The Executive ought to act consciously and swiftly, as 
parens patriae, to protect the life, health, and moral welfare of its subjects.  The people of 
Florida had to wait close to a year before the law was changed legislatively to outlaw the 
‘Toughman’ boxing contest, and alike boxing and kickboxing contests, during which time 
other similar boxing matches were staged.905  The people of Florida had to wait because the 
                                                
898 The Act created Fla Stat § 548.065. 
899 The Act amended Fla Stat § 548.008, the relevant provision is at Fla Stat § 548.008(4)(b). 
900 ibid, the relevant provision is at Fla Stat § 548.008(4)(a). 
901 ibid, the relevant provision is at Fla Stat § 548.008(2). 
902 13 AD 3d 842, 787 NYS 2d 413, Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division (2004). 
903 See also Ohio Boxing Commission v Adore Ltd 110 Ohio App 3d 288, 673 NE 2d 1016 (1996); Ohio Boxing 
Commission v Dore 1996 Ohio App LEXIS 2504. 
904 States where the sport of boxing is not regulated by statute include, eg, United Kingdom and Queensland. 
905 JA Zeitlin ‘Toughman Competition Returns to action at TECO’ Naples Daily News (Naples Florida USA 27 
September 2003) <http://www.bonitanews.com/03/09/naples/e16049a.htm> (11 May 2005). 
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Executive of Government took no action.  Perhaps the Executive was unaware of its powers 
and its duties.   
 
The use of an ex officio suit by the Attorney-General for abatement of a public nuisance 
would have provided, in the circumstances surrounding the ‘Toughman’ boxing matches in 
Florida, for example, a more immediate remedy pending the passage of legislation to outlaw 
the sport.  In this way, the Executive and the Legislature would work concomitantly for the 
people to ensure that the safety and moral welfare of the people is protected at all times.  
The use of injunctive relief for abatement of a public nuisance pending the trial and 
conviction of the perpetrator of the public nuisance was the usual procedure when the 
injunctive remedy was first established in Chancery: Attorney-General v Johnson.906  The 
Executive can move more quickly than the Legislature, and the Executive ought to be 
cognisant of this fact.  Utilising the common law to abate a public nuisance does not mean 
that the Executive Government is working against the legislative agenda of Parliament.  The 
Executive does not exercise its powers in defiance of Parliament.  The common law is not 
the enemy of statute.  Rather, in the use to which the common law offence of public 
nuisance can be put, the Executive can work to obtain an immediate, even if temporary, 
remedy, pending full and appropriate inquiry by Parliament of changes to statute laws.  In 
such circumstances, the people do not have to anticipate the death of any other wife and 
mother of two children to obtain a remedy.  The people can be secure in the knowledge that 
their public rights are not being derided by the unprincipled and debauched. 
 
                                                
906 (1819) 2 Wils Ch 87, 37 ER 240.  The use of civil proceedings for injunctive relief was undertaken as a 
supplement to criminal proceedings, rather than as a substitute for them.  In one of the earliest cases involving 
public nuisance where the Crown’s right to sue in Chancery for injunctive relief was established, Attorney-General 
v Johnson (1819) 2 Wils Ch 87, 37 ER 240, a prosecution had already been launched to stop the defendant from 
unlawfully obstructing the Thames by building a wharf.  The defendant continued to build despite the 
institution of criminal proceedings against him and the Crown feared that the obstruction of the Thames would 
be complete in defiance of conviction.  The Attorney-General went to Chancery for immediate relief.  Lord 
Chancellor Eldon granted a temporary injunction until the trial.  See also Attorney-General v Cleaver (1811) 18 Ves 
212, 34 ER 297; and Crowder v Tinkler (1816) 19 Ves 618, 34 ER 645. 
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3. Publicly exhibited sporting events endangering public safety, health or life, 
indirectly 
 
There are other factual scenarios associated with public sporting events for which the 
common law offence of public nuisance is applicable.  Football, tennis, cricket, or baseball 
tournaments, or other contests, which bring together riotous or violent persons may create a 
public nuisance where the riotous or violent crowd endangers the safety, health or life of the 
spectators in the crowd or of the residents or communities living in the locale where the 
tournament is staged.  There are countless media reports of occurrences where melees have 
broken out amongst fans at football matches, at tennis matches, and at cricket and baseball 
games, for example.  A good record of a violent crowd at a football match can be found in 
Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd,907 where is described fighting amongst spectators, 
spectators breaking up concrete and using pieces of concrete as missiles, the throwing of 
missiles such as sharpened coins and concrete onto the pitch and into adjoining grandstands.  
The entity responsible for such acts endangering public safety, public health or the life of the 
public is the sports event promoter or sports event organizer and not only the individual 
members of the rioting or violent crowd.908  Whether a particular match creates a public 
nuisance by endangering public safety, health, or the life of the public is a question of fact. 
 
In a football stadium, or at a tennis championship, the peaceable spectators attending a 
public sporting event to witness the competition being staged would most certainly comprise 
the “public” for the purposes of a public nuisance suit should these peaceable spectators 
being caught in the middle of violent or riotous behaviour from other spectators.  In number 
they would need to comprise only seven or thirty families to constitute a class whose rights 
to safety or life are endangered by a violent or riotous crowd.909 
                                                
907 The Times 22 March 1991. 
908 Note the holdings in R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279 (Court of Appeal) at p 289 (Justice Rattee) approved by the 
House of Lords in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at para [21] and [39] (Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill) and para [56] (Lord Roger of Earlsferry), [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982; Wilkinson v Joyceman 
[1985] 1 Qd R 567; Attorney-General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (BCSC); 
Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478; and Commonwealth v McGovern 116 Ky 212 (1903) at p 
238 (Settle J). 
909 Note the holdings in Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, [1957] 1 All ER 894; Attorney 
General of British Columbia v Haney Speedways Ltd [1963] 39 DLR (2d) 48 (British Columbia Supreme Court); State 
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Where a publicly exhibited sporting event may be found to have committed a public 
nuisance by endangering public safety, public health or the life of the public owing to crowds 
of violent or riotous fans, an injunction might command that a subsequent competition be 
cancelled or that a subsequent competition be held without attendant crowds.  An injunction 
might even go as far as disallowing two teams from ever competing against one another 
within an organised sporting tournament. 
 
 
4. Doping in sport may be a public nuisance 
 
Sports organizations that conduct publicly exhibited sporting events and fail to implement 
comprehensive and safe anti-doping procedures may create a public nuisance by endangering 
public safety, pubic health or the life of the public.  The common law offence of public 
nuisance may also have pertinent application to sports organisations that fail to maintain a 
strict anti-doping policy.  In jurisdictions where a uniform code or legislation has been 
adopted, such as in Australia, the need for the involvement of the Attorney-General in 
protecting public rights against sports organisations failing to implement a comprehensive 
and safe anti-doping policy is obviated.  In Australia, for example, section 9 of the Australian 
Sports Anti-Doping Authority Act 2006 (Cth) and regulation 3 of the Australian Anti-
Doping Authority Regulation 2006 (Cth) establish a National Anti-Doping Scheme which 
requires all Australian athletes competing in sporting events to comply with anti-doping 
rules.910  In the absence of legislation requiring strict and uniform drug testing in sport, for all 
                                                
of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc 96 Misc 2 d 350 (1978) at p 356 (Conway J); Bathurst City Council v 
Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, 13 March 1986) 
BC8601183 at 5. 
910 The class of athletes covered by the National Anti-Doping Scheme and doping testing procedures is 
exhaustive and effectively comprises of all athletes competing in sport competitions in Australia and includes 
the class of athletes listed at cl 1.06 of Schedule 1 of the Australian Anti-Doping Authority Regulation 2006 
(Cth) as follows: 
“1.06  Classes of athletes subject to the NAD scheme 
(1)  The anti-doping rules apply to all persons who are involved as athletes in a sport with an anti-
doping policy and such persons are subject to the NAD scheme. 
          (2)  The following classes of athletes may be tested by ASADA under the NAD scheme: 
(a)  athletes in ASADA's registered testing pool; 
(b)  athletes in ASADA's domestic testing pool; 
(c)  international-level athletes; 
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sports, including non-Olympic sports leagues, however, the Executive Government could 
seek compliance with a uniform policy through the use of common law public nuisance 
suits.  Non-Olympic sports leagues may have different or divergent anti-doping policies to 
national sports federations or international sports federations and some governing sports 
bodies may appear to be more lenient on anti-doping policy implementation than others 
depending on the nature and extent of any penalty applying to doping within their sport or 
sports league.  The health risks or health dangers posed by the use of even lawfully obtained 
drugs by athletes in sport competition is real.  Medical science continues to investigate the 
health dangers, including long-term health dangers, of the use of lawful drugs in extreme and 
professional sporting contexts.  The use of any drug, whether legal, illegal or performance 
enhancing, in extreme and professional sporting contexts may be a public nuisance where 
there is medical evidence to support the argument that such use poses a health risk not only 
to the players themselves but to members of the public at large who seek to emulate the 
success of these athletes. 
 
On the issue of public health, a lenient or acquiescent drugs policy may be said to impliedly 
encourage drug use not only amongst athletes in a sport, but also amongst aspiring 
participants in the sport and members of the public who emulate the athletes.911  Particularly 
vulnerable are young men and young women, and children in school, who are desirous of 
emulating sporting prowess.  A lenient or non-existent anti-doping policy implies that 
                                                
(d)  athletes who compete in international events; 
(e)  athletes who compete in national events; 
(f)  athletes for whom ASADA is required or permitted to test under a contract or an anti-
doping arrangement; and 
(g)  athletes in the registered testing pool of an International Sporting Federation or national 
anti-doping organisation.” 
911 The use of drugs in sport is a public health issue.  This view is supported by the Committee on Government 
Reform and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, United States 
Congress.  Indeed, members of both committees hold the view that the United States Congress has a 
responsibility to protect the public from these dangerous, performance enhancing substances.  See, The 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, ‘Anti-Steroid Bill Wins 
Subcommittee Approval’ <http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/05252005_1538.htm> (27 May 
2005); Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, ‘Government Reform 
Committee Approves Anti-Steroid Clean Sports Act 2005’ (Washington, 26 May 2005) 
<http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=28038> (27 May 2005); 
and Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, ‘McCain, Davis and 
Waxman Announce Introduction of  Clean Sports Act of 2005; Legislation Sets Uniform Testing Standards 
and Stringent Penalties for Performance-Enhancing Drugs’ (Washington, 24 May 2005) 
<http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=28021> (27 May 2005). 
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aspiring athletes have little chance of being competitive or of succeeding in their chosen 
sport absent the use of performance enhancing drugs.  Thus, the policy of a sports 
federation which does not actively seek to prohibit all drugs in sport or to enforce doping 
bans in sports activity may be viewed as creating endangerment to public health.  A public 
nuisance may be caused by an act or an omission on the part of a sports federation.  This 
endangerment is indiscriminate in its operation because the potential scope of a permissive 
or acquiescent drug testing policy, and the resultant health problems for a multitude of 
people who might aspire to participate in the sport, is vast.  A court ought to have little 
problem in finding there to be a sufficient cross-section of the public whose public right to 
health is endangered by a lenient or acquiescent drugs policy. 
 
In the United States, the disparate sports of baseball, basketball, gridiron and hockey 
maintain different policies on doping in their individual sport.912  A 2005 Congressional 
Research Service report found that the anti-doping policies for the Olympic movement are 
more independent of the sports they regulate than are the policies of Major League Baseball, 
the NBA, and the NFL, both in the mode in which they are established and in the entities 
responsible for their implementation.  For example, the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) autonomously established the anti-doping policy for Olympic athletes, whereas the 
professional sports leagues’ policies are the result of negotiations with their respective 
players associations.913  Further, the Olympic movement also maintains the most 
comprehensive list of prohibited substances and methods, and provides sanctions that are 
more severe than in the professional sports.  The Olympic standard provides a two-year ban 
for a first violation, whereas Major League Baseball imposes a 10-day suspension without 
pay for a first violation.  Also, Olympic athletes and NFL players are responsible for what is 
in their bodies, but neither Major League Baseball nor the NBA addresses this subject.914  
Members of the United States Congress attempted to create a uniform anti-doping policy for 
United States sports in 2005, introducing bills including the Clean Sports Bill and Drug Free 
                                                
912  See R Sandomir ‘Congress Keeps Pressure on Leagues’ New York Times (New York, United States of 
America, 19 May 2005) at p 2. 
913 LE Halchin ‘Anti-Doping Policies: The Olympics and Selected Professional Sports’ (Congressional Research 
Service The Library of Congress Washington 29 April 2005) 
<https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/2423> 
<https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/2423/RL32894_20050429.pdf?sequence=1> (15 
March 2009). 
914 ibid. 
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Sports Bill that would set uniform minimum drug-testing rules and penalties for the four 
major United States professional sports.915  Each of these bills never became law, having died 
at the Committee stage of the congressional legislative process.916  In lieu of a legislative 
agenda, the Executive Government could develop a strict uniform policy concerning doping 
in sport and require compliance from sports federations through threat of injunctive relief 
for a public nuisance.   
 
The Executive Government has a crucial role to play in sports because, as parens patriae, the 
Executive exists to protect, inter alia, public safety and public health.  The Executive does 
not make law, but rather enforces the law.  The law which the Executive enforces through 
proceedings for a public nuisance is the common law; there being no legislative provision 
protecting the public right to safety and the public right to health in respect of doping in 
sport.  The formulation of policy consistent with the common law, and seeking compliance 
with such policy and law, are functions of the Executive Government.  Failure to accede to 
the Executive Government’s policy may result in civil suit for a public nuisance.  Any 
injunctions granted might disallow public competitions being staged in a sport until such 
time as the sport’s governing body amended their rules to reflect the WADA anti-doping 
standards. 
 
                                                
915 As of May 2005, two proposed bills, one entitled Clean Sports Act 2005, the other entitled Drug Free Sports 
Act 2005, are in Committee hearings in the United States Congress.  Both bills propose a uniform standard for 
drug testing and uniform penalties for first, second and third time offences.  Based on the Olympic model, the 
Clean Sports Act would set drug-testing policy for the NFL, NBA, NHL and Major League Baseball. It calls for 
a two-year ban for a first offence, a lifetime ban for a second, and mandates five tests per athlete each year.  
The Drug Free Sports Act calls for the same penalties as the Clean Sports Act, but it requires only two tests 
each year.  The bill would give the secretary of commerce authority over sports’ drug-testing policies; whereas 
the Clean Sports Act gives oversight to the White House drug tsar. See s 1114 ‘Clean Sports Act of 2005 ‘A Bill 
To Establish Minimum Drug Testing Standards for Major Professional Sports Leagues’, 109th Congress, 1st 
Session, Government Printing Office, United States Congress, , <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s1114is.txt.pdf> (27 May 2005). 
916 See <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1114> (20 August 2008); 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-1862 > (20 August 2008); 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1114&tab=related> (20 August 2008). 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
A sporting event may endanger public safety, public health or the life of the public either 
directly, such as where equipment used in a sport becomes a projectile injuring members of 
the public, or indirectly, such as where the event draws crowds of violent persons injuring 
the safety of peaceable spectators.  Further, public exhibitions of violent sports such as 
boxing may be public nuisances because they create a standard of behaviour which is unsafe 
and physically harmful not only to those persons who participate in the sport but to those 
members of the public, often children and young adults, who emulate violent athletes.  
Finally, an organised publicly exhibited sporting competition may a create public nuisance 
because the sport’s governing body fails to implement an appropriate anti-doping deterrence 
policy.  In this last situation, a public nuisance is created because the safety, health and life of 
athletes participating in the sport, as well as the safety, health and life of those members of 
the public, particularly children and young adults, who emulate those athletes, is endangered. 
 
The development of the law in public nuisance litigation is comprehensive.  Yet the question 
as to whether public rights are adequately protected by such litigation remains relevant. 
Whilst it may appear from the analysis of the development of the law in public nuisance suits 
that the law has happily dealt with the myriad issues which arise in public sport activity, and 
particularly given the growth of such activities within the public domain, consideration as to 
the need for legislative interference is warranted because the fact remains that it is unlawful 
at common law for the Executive to participate in or to acquiesce in the promotion of public 
sport activity where such activity impinges upon public rights.  The Executive is, effectively, 
complicit in the commission of a common law criminal offence in such circumstances.  
Consideration of the need for a new legislative regime is further warranted because of 
evidence of reluctance on the part of the Executive to prosecute offences in sport,917 and 
                                                
917 See R Horrow Sports Violence: The Interaction Between Private Lawmaking and the Criminal Law (Carrollton Press 
Arlington Virginia 1980) at pp 110-160 for a comprehensive discussion concerning the several factors that have 
an effect on a prosecutor’s decision to adjudicate professional sport violence.  Horrow examines the results of 
his own 1978 survey of 34 prosecutors, who were solicited about the relative legal inaction against athletes.  
Many prosecutors feel that prosecuting professional athletes for actions taken during competition would not 
have a deterrent effect, as most athletes would not view their actions as criminal: see also JH Katz ‘From the 
Penalty Box to the Penitentiary – The People Versus Jesse Boulerice’ (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 833 at pp 853-854; 
BC Nielsen ‘Controlling Sports Violence: Too Late for Carrots – Bring on the Big Stick’ (1989) 74 Iowa L Rev 
 301 
because of the danger that public rights might be ignored.  The discourse on the 
development of common law public nuisance in cases of sport in this Part 3 of the thesis 
also highlights that much of the precedent in public nuisance suits where the courts have 
restrained public sport activity is old, with the most persuasive juridical pronouncements 
dated from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and with few contemporary 
judgments.  In Part 4 of the thesis, following, limits on the powers of the Executive and 
Local Government to promote public exhibitions of sport are discussed.  Practically, public 
rights may dissipate where the Crown fails to bring suit to abate public exhibitions of sport 
on grounds of public nuisance and, instead, in fact promote public exhibitions of sport.  
                                                
681and J Yates and W Gillespie ‘The Problem of Sport Violence and the Criminal Prosecution Solution’ (2002) 
12 Cornell J L & Pub Pol’y 145 at p 148, citing RB Horrow ‘Violence in Professional Sports: Is it Part of the 
Game?’ (1982) 9 J Legis 1 at p 1. 
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Chapter 14 
 
The power of local councils vis-à-vis sports events 
 
 
1. No authority but Parliament can license or pardon a public nuisance 
 
Neither the Crown, exercising executive sovereignty, nor a local authority, possessing no 
executive authority and being a mere creature of statute, can license or pardon a public 
nuisance.  This has been a common law principle since at least the seventeenth century.  In 
Dewell v Sanders,918 the court referred to Fowler v Sanders,919 as deciding that “none can 
prescribe to make a common nuisance, for it cannot have a lawful beginning by license or 
otherwise, being an offence at common law”.  Chief Justice Montague is recorded to have 
stated: “Neither the King nor the lord of the manor can give any liberty to erect a common 
nuisance.”  Chitty lays it down in his treatise Prerogatives of the Crown: “It is generally laid down 
in the books, that the Crown cannot pardon a common nuisance whilst it remains 
unredressed, and is continuing; so as to prevent abatement of it, or a prosecution against the 
offender: though his Majesty might afterwards remit the fine.  As the continuation of a 
nuisance is, of itself, a fresh offence in point of law; this doctrine may be supported on the 
ground that the King cannot… dispense with the laws by any previous license.”920 
 
Publicly exhibited sporting events are invariably staged consequent to the obtaining of a 
license from a local authority who has care and management responsibilities in respect of the 
public place where the public sporting event is proposed to be staged.  This was the case in 
                                                
918 (1619) Cro Jac 490, 79 ER 419. 
919 (1617) Cro Jac 446, 79 ER 382. 
920 J Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown (Butterworths London 1820) at p 91, citing 12 Co 30, 2 Hawk b 2 c 37 s 33, 4 
Bla Com 398, Ld Raym 370, 713. 
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the public nuisance sporting cases of Johnson v City of New York,921 Attorney-General v Blackpool 
Corporation,922 and State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc.923  A license issued to a 
sporting association by a local government authority may be viewed as an arbitrary attempt 
to dispense with the laws by license alone.   
 
Local governments obtain their care and management responsibilities from a grant of power 
pursuant to a statute from the supreme legislature in the jurisdiction wherein they operate.  
Local governments are not sovereign.  They are a construct of the supreme legislature and 
are entirely dependent upon the supreme legislature for the source of their authority and 
jurisdiction.  It is highly questionable whether this grant of power to care for and manage 
public spaces under an Act of Parliament incorporates a power to alter the common law by 
license and to permit the commission of a common law offence.924  Local or municipal 
                                                
921 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906). 
922 (1907) 71 JP 478, followed Attorney General (ex rel Pratt) v Brisbane City Council (1988) 1 QdR 346 at p 353. 
923 96 Misc 2d 350 (1978) at p 358, citing Little Joseph Realty v Town of Babylon 41 NY 2d 738, Court of Appeals of 
New York (1977). 
924 Any purported local government power to alter the common law must be found to be clearly expressed in 
the grant of power from the supreme legislature.  Local government powers may, of course, be exercised in a 
manner consistent with the common law.  “It is a well recognized rule in the interpretation of Statutes that an 
Act will never be construed as taking away an existing right unless its language is reasonably capable of no other 
construction.” Sargood Brothers v Commonwealth [1910] HCA 45, (1910) 11 CLR 258 at p 279 (O’Connor J).  The 
point has frequently been repeated: Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [1983] HCA 9, (1983) 45 ALR 
609 at p 617; Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174 at p 206; Baker v Campbell [1983] 
HCA 39, (1983) 153 CLR 52 at p 123; De Innocentis v Brisbane City Council [1999] QCA 404 at para [22].  cf Bone v 
Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120 at para [15] where McPherson JA said: “It is well settled that inconsistency 
between a local law and the general law or common law of Queensland does not result in invalidity of the local 
law.  See Widgee Shire Council v Bonney [1907] HCA 11, (1907) 4 CLR 977 at p 982, where Griffith CJ said that the 
suggestion that a by-law may not add to the law was untenable, ‘for in that view the power to make by-laws 
would be absolutely nugatory’.  In the same case (at pp 986-987), Isaacs J, quoting from a judgment in an earlier 
English decision, said that a by-law ‘must necessarily superadd something to the common law, otherwise it 
would be idle’.  To deny a local government authority to alter or add to the general or common law would 
completely stultify the legislative power conferred on it.”  With respect to McPherson JA, the Supreme Court 
of Queensland holding erroneously interprets the ratio decidendi of Widgee Shire Council.  The cited dicta is 
taken out of context.  The High Court in Widgee Shire Council confined their analysis to local laws which were 
not inconsistent with legislative enactments.  Isaacs J, in his judgment in Widgee Shire Council cited Edmonds v The 
Master and Senior Warden of the Company of Watermen and Lightermen [24 LJMC 124 at p 128] where it was claimed 
that a by-law was ‘inconsistent with the laws of this kingdom.’  Lord Campbell LC answered that claim by 
saying:—“A by-law cannot be said to be inconsistent with the laws of this kingdom merely because it forbids 
the doing of something which might lawfully have been done before, or requires something to be done which 
there was no previous obligation to do; otherwise a nominal power of making by-laws would be utterly 
nugatory.”  Isaacs J further cited Martin B in The Queen v Saddler’s Co [3 El & E 72 at p 80] who observed that a 
by-law ‘must necessarily superadd something to the common law, otherwise it would be idle.’”  However, 
Isaacs J did not go so far as to say that a local government by-law by itself will be held to alter the common law.  
He concluded his analysis by stating: “That a by-law should be contrary to a law in force in Queensland it must 
be inconsistent with it.  No provision of Queensland law has been referred to which this by-law can be said to 
contravene, either by penalizing an act declared to be lawful or by legalizing what is forbidden.”  Further 
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councils may enact by-laws which provide that a license or written approval must be 
obtained prior to the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event.925  The actions of local 
governments under such circumstances raise a number of very important legal questions.  
Does the local government possess power to approve or license actions which may create a 
public nuisance?  What is the nature of local government power respecting the staging of 
public exhibited sporting events and the licensing of activities which would otherwise be 
public nuisances?  Can a local council change the common law by their license?  How is a 
statute granting power to local government to be construed?  Is the local government’s 
approval or license a defence to liability for committing a public nuisance for the promoter 
or sports organization staging the public sporting event? 
 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a common law doctrine which ensures that only 
the supreme legislative authority has power to alter the common law, and that the Executive 
and local authorities both lack power to alter the common law unless the supreme legislature 
has specifically devolved that power to them. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
McPherson’s dictum in Bone v Mothershaw, and that of the High Court of Australia in Widgee Shire Council, may be 
incompatible with the High Court of Australia’s holdings in Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 
at p 304, where O’Connor J said: “It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow 
fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its 
intention with irresistible clearness.” Aff’d: Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 
CLR 1 at p 18; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at pp 436-437; K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court 
[2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ).  See also Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 
174 at p 206.  In K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ), the court 
referred to “a well established and conservative principle of interpretation that statutes are construed, where 
constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and freedoms at 
common law.”  There is a presumption against a parliamentary intention to infringe upon such rights and 
freedoms: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 
(Lord Steyn). “Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words”: R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131 (Lord Hoffmann).  See also 
Benson v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942) AC 520 at pp 526-527. 
925 See eg r 24(2) Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks and Reserves which 
provides that: “A person shall not in any park without the written approval of the Council except at places set 
apart therefor, organize or play a game, the playing of which requires the exclusion from the playing space of all 
persons other than those engaged in that game.”  Pursuant to regs 20-21 Local Government Reform 
Implementation (Transferring Areas) Regulation 2007 (Qld) and regs 12-13 Local Government Reform 
Implementation Regulation 2008 (Qld) the local laws of the Noosa Shire Council continue to operate until 31 
December 2010 upon the amalgamation of Noosa Shire Council with Sunshine Coast Regional Council. 
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2. Parliamentary sovereignty 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty, also referred to as parliamentary supremacy, is the rule that 
Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person 
or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament.  Parliament is not bound by its predecessor.”926  Dicey draws 
distinction between parliamentary sovereignty as “a merely legal conception”, which “means 
simply the power of law-making unrestricted by any legal limit,” and “‘sovereignty’ 
sometimes employed in a political rather than in a strictly legal sense.”927  But the two uses of 
the word sovereignty are not the same thing.  Parliamentary sovereignty is a legal concept, 
foremost, because: “The judges know nothing about any will of the people except in so far 
as that will is expressed by an Act of Parliament, and would never suffer the validity of a 
statute to be questioned on the ground of its having been passed or being kept alive in 
opposition to the wishes of the electors.”928  Julius Stone similarly highlighted the fine 
distinction between “sovereignty as descriptive of power relations”, and the “sovereignty-
concept in the logical structuring of law.”929  The phrase parliamentary sovereignty describes 
two complementary concepts.  Parliamentary sovereignty describes the political supremacy 
of Parliament.  In this sense the doctrine focuses on the relations, particularly the division of 
power, between the Judiciary, Executive and Legislature and subordinate political bodies 
such as local governments, and the relations between each of these institutions and the 
Constitution.  Parliamentary sovereignty also describes the nature and effect of law.  And in 
this sense the doctrine focuses on the relations between law created by statute, the common 
law, local laws, and subordinate rules and regulations.930 
 
                                                
926 AV Dicey The Law of the Constitution (8th edn MacMillan London 1920), (10th edn MacMillan London 1959) at 
pp 39-40. 
927 AV Dicey Law of the Constitution (MacMillan London 1920) at pp 70, 72. 
928 ibid. 
929 J Stone The Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings (Maitland Sydney 1964) at p 69ff. 
930 Other lawyers write of a distinction between ‘statutory omnicompetence’ (parliamentary power over all 
subject matters, including the ‘supremacy’ of Parliament over the King’s prerogative powers) and ‘statutory or 
legal omnipotence’ (power not only to legislate on all subject matters, but also to legislate free of any legal 
limitations setting moral or other minimum standards for the content of legislation): MD Walters ‘St German 
on Reason and Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 335 at pp 367-68. 
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The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a common law doctrine.931 In Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, the High Court of Australia quoted with approval the following 
observations of Sir Owen Dixon: 
“The British conception of the complete supremacy of Parliament 
developed under the common law; it forms part of the common law and, 
indeed, it may be considered as deriving its authority from the common 
law rather than as giving authority to the common law.  But, after all, the 
common law was the common law of England.  It was not a law of 
nations.  It developed no general doctrine that all legislatures by their 
very nature were supreme over the law.”932   
 
As descriptive of the power relations between the diffuse organs of government and the 
relations between legislative enactments and common law, parliamentary sovereignty has 
been described as a common law rule created by judges which judges can change;933 as a 
common law rule of recognition which judges may not change;934 and as a mixture of 
                                                
931 In Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24, (1996) 189 CLR 51, Dawson J opined at p 76: 
“The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy is a doctrine as deeply rooted as any in the common law.  It is of its 
essence that a court, once it has ascertained the true scope and effect of an Act of Parliament, should give 
unquestioned effect to it accordingly.”  Lord Steyn similarly stated in Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56 
at para [102], [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 3 WLR 733: “…[T]he supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle 
of our constitution.  It is a construct of the common law.”  See also HWR Wade ‘Sovereignty – Revolution or 
Evolution?’ (1996) 112 LQR 568; HWR Wade ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ (1955) 13 CLJ 172 at p 189; J 
Goldsworthy ‘The Myth of the Common Law Constitution’ in DE Edlin (ed) Common Law Theory (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2007); and J Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament (Clarendon Press Oxford 
1999). 
932 [1997] HCA 25, (1997) 189 CLR 520 at pp 562 and 563-64, citing Sir Owen Dixon ‘Sources of Legal 
Authority’ in Jesting Pilate (Law Book Co Sydney 1965) at pp 199-200, followed Egan v Chadwick & Ors [1999] 
NSWCA 176 at para [5] (Spigelman CJ). 
933 Parliamentary sovereignty has been argued to subsist, “in the tranquil development of the common law, with 
a gradual reordering of our constitutional priorities to bring alive the nascent idea that a democratic legislature 
cannot be above the law.” (Sir John Laws ‘Illegality and the Problem of Jurisdiction’ in M Supperstone and J 
Goudie (eds) Judicial Review (2nd edn Butterworths London 1997) at 4.17).  Lord Steyn in Jackson v Attorney-
General [2005] UKHL 56 at para [102], [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 3 WLR 733, spoke of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty as a common law doctrine which is fully within the authority of the judicature to 
change: “…[T]he supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution.  It is a construct of 
the common law.  The judges created this principle.  If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could 
arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of 
constitutionalism.” (at para [102] (Lord Steyn)).  Lord Steyn’s comments resonate Trevor Allan’s writing: “the 
common law is prior to legislative supremacy, which it defines and regulates.” (TRS Allan Constitutional Justice: A 
Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2001) at p 271).  cf Professor Goldsworthy, 
who observes that: “Parliament’s sovereignty was not created by the judges alone, and its continued existence 
depends only partly, and not solely, on their willingness to accept it.”(J Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament 
(Clarendon Press Oxford 1999) at p 240). 
934 See Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24, (1996) 189 CLR 51 at pp 73-73 (Dawson J). 
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political reality and law beyond the power of judges to change unilaterally.935 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty is a doctrine which recognizes Parliament’s plenary powers to 
make law, even where a written Constitution and a federal system of government, such as in 
Australia and Canada, for example, established limits on the supreme legislative authority by 
subject matter.  In Kartinyeri v Commonwealth, the High Court of Australia said of the powers 
of the Federal Parliament that: “The legislative powers conferred on the Parliament by s 51 
of the Constitution are plenary powers, that is to say, ‘subject to’ any prohibition or 
limitation contained in the Constitution, the Parliament can ‘make laws with respect to’ the 
several subject matters contained in s 51 in such terms, with such qualifications and with 
such limitations as it chooses.  The power ‘to make laws’ is a power as ample as that 
described by Sir Edward Coke and later adopted by Blackstone: ‘Of the power and 
jurisdiction of the parliament, for making of laws in proceeding by bill, it is so transcendent 
and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds.’”936  
In Singh v Canada, Strayer JA noted of the Canadian constitutional framework that “both 
before and after 1982 our system was and is one of parliamentary sovereignty exercisable 
                                                
935 In Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2001] HCA 7 at para [62], (2001) 205 CLR 399, Kirby J noted 
that, in Australia at least, the common law operates within an orbit of written constitutional laws and political 
realities.  Professor Goldsworthy argues that the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy itself is not properly 
regarded as either a matter of statute law or a matter of common law.  Parliament did not enact a law that it 
should be supreme, nor is the doctrine judge-made law like a contemporary rule of precedent.  ((JD 
Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament (Clarendon Press Oxford 1999) at pp 243-4).  Goldsworthy quotes 
with approval GC Winterton’s statement that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is ‘sui generis, a unique 
blend of law and political fact deriving its authority from acceptance by the people and by the principal 
institutions of the state, especially parliament and the judiciary. (See G Winterton ‘Constitutionally Entrenched 
Common Law Rights: Sacrificing Means to Ends?’ in C Sampford and K Preston (eds) Interpreting Constitutions: 
Theories, Principles and Institutions (Federation Press 1996) at p 136).  Goldsworthy further argues that: “for many 
centuries there has been a sufficient consensus among all three branches of government in Britain to make the 
sovereignty of Parliament a rule of recognition in HLA Hart’s sense, which the judges by themselves did not 
create and cannot unilaterally change.  Judicial repudiation of that doctrine would amount to an attempt 
unilaterally to alter that political fact.  This would be a dangerous step for the judges to take.  The judges cannot 
justify taking that step on the ground that it would revive a venerable tradition of English law, a golden age of 
constitutionalism, in which the judiciary enforced limits to the authority of Parliament imposed by common law 
or natural law. There never was such an age.” (Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy 
(Clarendon Press Oxford 1999) at p 235). Lord Irvine, former Lord Chancellor of the United Kingdom has 
stated extra judicially that: “…representative and participatory democracy [is] the primary principle of 
constitutional and political theory in Britain…  Thus legal sovereignty exercised by Parliament is now viewed as 
deriving its legitimacy from the fact that Parliament’s composition is, in the first place, determined by the 
electorate in whom ultimate political sovereignty resides.”  Lord Irvine ‘Sovereignty in Comparative 
Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America’ (paper presented at the James Madison Memorial 
Lecture New York 2000).  See also M Elliott The Constitutional Principles of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing 
London 2001) at p 47. 
936 [1998] HCA 22 at para [12], (1998) 195 CLR 337 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J). 
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within the limits of a written constitution.”937  A written Constitution does not alter the 
common law doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.938  A written Constitution merely 
distributes the powers of law-making between the disparate levels of government within a 
federal system.  In Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales, the High Court of Australia 
met arguments questioning the absolute sovereignty of State Parliaments in Australia.  
Referring to a large number of decisions the court stated: “These decisions equate the power 
of a Parliament of a State to the uncontrolled legislative authority enjoyed by the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom in its own sphere.”939   
 
Parliamentary supremacy has been described as a basic principle of the legal systems of 
Australia and of the United Kingdom.940  In Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), 
Justice Dawson, in dissent, stated: 
“Judicial pronouncements confirming the supremacy of parliament are 
rare but their scarcity is testimony to the complete acceptance by the 
courts that an Act of Parliament is binding upon them and cannot be 
questioned by reference to principles of a more fundamental kind.  
Indeed, it is a principle of the common law itself ‘that a court may not 
question the validity of a statute but, once having construed it, must give 
effect to it according to its tenor’.  There is more academic writing on 
                                                
937 [2003] 3 FC 185 at para [16], and see paras [12]-[24] (FCA), aff’d Babcock v Canada [2002] SCC 57 at para 
[56], [2002] 3 SCR 3 (McLachlin CJ). 
938 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24 at para [10], (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Dawson J): “The 
legislative power of the New South Wales legislature is no less than the legislative power of the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom within the scope of the grant of its power.” cf Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
[1997] HCA 25, (1997) 189 CLR 520 at p 563, where the High Court of Australia stated: “The Constitution 
displaced, or rendered inapplicable, the English common law doctrine of the general competence and 
unqualified supremacy of the legislature.  It placed upon the federal judicature the responsibility of deciding the 
limits of the respective powers of State and Commonwealth governments [R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ 
Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10, (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 267-268].  The Constitution, the federal, State and 
territorial laws, and the common law in Australia together constitute the law of this country and form ‘one 
system of jurisprudence’ [McArthur v Williams [1936] HCA 10, (1936) 55 CLR 324 at p 347; cf Thompson v The 
Queen [1989] HCA 30, (1989) 169 CLR 1 at pp 34-35]… Within that single system of jurisprudence, the basic 
law of the Constitution provides the authority for the enactment of valid statute law and may have effect on the 
content of the common law.” 
939 [2001] HCA 7 at para [56], (2001) 205 CLR 399 (Kirby J).   
940 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24 at para [13], (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Dawson J): “there 
can be no doubt that parliamentary supremacy is a basic principle of the legal system which has been inherited 
in this country from the United Kingdom.”  In Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56 at para [102], [2006] 
1 AC 262, [2005] 3 WLR 733, Lord Steyn said: “…[T]he supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of 
our constitution.  It is a construct of the common law.” 
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the subject but it tends to dwell upon the apparent riddle posed by the 
question whether parliament can relinquish its powers by exercising 
them in order to do so.  The answer to that riddle appears to lie in that 
area where law and political reality coincide.  The same may be said of 
examples of extreme laws which would offend the fundamental values of 
our society which are sometimes suggested in disproof of parliamentary 
supremacy.  It may be observed that a legislature wishing to enact a 
statute ordering that all blue-eyed babies be killed would hardly be 
perturbed by a principle of law which purported to deny it that power.  
Whether one speaks as Salmond does of ‘ultimate legal principles’, or as 
Kelsen does of a grundnorm, or as Hart does of the ‘ultimate rule of 
recognition’, there can be no doubt that parliamentary supremacy is a 
basic principle of the legal system which has been inherited in this 
country from the United Kingdom.” 941 
 
Earlier precedents describe parliamentary sovereignty in unqualified terms.  In Lee v Bude and 
Torrington Junction Railway Co Willes J said: “I would observe, as to these Acts of Parliament, 
that they are the law of this land; and we do not sit here as a court of appeal from 
parliament.”942  In Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke, Lord Reid, speaking for the Privy Council, 
said: “It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom Parliament 
to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other reasons against doing them 
are so strong that most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did these 
things.  But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things.  
If Parliament chose to do any of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament 
invalid.”943  And in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs, Lord Edmund-Davies observed: “From time to 
                                                
941 [1996] HCA 24, (1996) 189 CLR 51 at pp 73-74, citing British Railways Board v Pickin (1974) AC 765 at p 782 
(Lord Reid); Sir Owen Dixon ‘The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation’ in Jesting Pilate 
(Law Book Co Sydney 1965) at p 206; Sir JW Salmond Jurisprudence (2nd edn Steven and Haynes London 1907) 
at p 125; G Winterton ‘The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined’ (1976) 92 Law 
Quarterly Review 591; and HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1961) at p 145. 
942 (1871) LR 6 CP 576 at p 582 (Willes J). 
943 [1968] UKPC 2, (1969) 1 AC 645 at p 723 (Lord Reid). 
 311 
time some judges have been chafed by this supremacy of Parliament, whose enactments, 
however questionable, must be applied.’944 
 
Similarly, the High Court of Australia said in a joint judgment in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v 
South Australia: 
“The question whether a particular legislative enactment is a necessary or 
even a desirable solution to a particular problem is in large measure a 
political question best left for resolution to the political process.  The 
resolution of that problem by the Court would require it to sit in 
judgment on the legislative decision, without having access to all the 
political considerations that played a part in the making of that decision, 
thereby giving a new and unacceptable dimension to the relationship 
between the Court and the legislature of the State.”945 
 
The Court of Appeal of New South Wales has similarly stated, in R v Elliott and Blessington, 
that: “The Court should not exercise a discretion in such a way as to undermine the purpose 
and object of valid legislation with the effect, indeed for the purpose, that the intention of 
Parliament will be frustrated.”946 
 
Other courts view the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as more animate.  The House of 
Lords sees parliamentary sovereignty as an organically evolving concept intimately connected 
to political realities as well as to the evolving concept of law and human rights:  Lord 
Bingham in Jackson v Attorney-General addressed the considerable political historical factors 
impacting upon parliamentary supremacy;947 and Lord Hope dismissed the notion that 
parliamentary sovereignty was absolute and that its freedom to legislate admits of no 
qualification whatever.  His Lordship disapproved of Lord Birkenhead LC dicta in McCawley 
                                                
944 (1980) 1 WLR 142 at p 164, (1980) 1 All ER 529 at p 548.  See also Liyanage v The Queen [1965] UKPC 1, 
(1967) 1 AC 259, where the Privy Council rejected the notion that the power of the Ceylon Parliament to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the island was limited by an inability to pass laws which 
offend against fundamental principles. 
945 [1990] HCA 1, (1990) 169 CLR 436 at p 473. 
946 [2006] NSWCCA 305 at paras [75] (Spigelman CJ, Howie J). 
947 [2005] UKHL 56 at paras [9]-[20], [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 3 WLR 733 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
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v The King that parliament’s powers are uncontrolled.948  “Step by step, gradually but surely, 
the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey 
derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified.”949  The political and legal relationship 
between the United Kingdom Parliament and the European Union, and the effect of the Act 
of Union between England and Scotland, provide examples of the qualification of unfettered 
supremacy.  Lord Hope also referred to the rule of law as a qualification, seeing the courts 
constitutional function of statutory interpretation and its dipole relationship with Parliament 
as a principle protecting the people from arbitrary government.950 
 
Even Dicey himself in his seminal work Law of the Constitution recognized that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty did not provide Parliament with unfettered rights: 
“Everyone, again, knows as a matter of common sense that, whatever 
lawyers may say, the sovereign power of Parliament is not unlimited, and 
that King, Lords and Commons united do not possess anything like that 
‘restricted omnipotence’… which is the utmost authority ascribable to 
any human institution.  There are many enactments, and these laws not 
in themselves obviously unwise or tyrannical, which Parliament never 
would and never could pass.  If the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty involves the attribution of unrestricted power to Parliament, 
the dogma is no better than a legal fiction, and certainly is not worth the 
stress here laid upon it.”951 
 
                                                
948 [1920] AC 691 at p 720. 
949 [2005] UKHL 56 at para [104], [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 3 WLR 733 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
950 ibid at paras [104]-[107].  One of the guiding principles which Lord Hope identified as arising from the 
recognition of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and as operating as a qualification to the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy, is the principle expounded by Dicey himself, and similarly by Sir Owen Dixon, as 
follows: “… [O]ne of the guiding principles that were identified by Dicey at p 35 was the universal rule or 
supremacy throughout the constitution of ordinary law.  Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and Constitution’ (1935) 51 
LQR 590, 596 was making the same point when he said that it is of the essence of supremacy of the law that 
the courts shall disregard as unauthorized and void the acts of any organ of government, whether legislative or 
administrative, which exceed the limits of the power that organ derives from the law.   In its modern form,… 
this principle protects the individual from arbitrary government.  The rule of law enforced by the courts is the 
ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based.” (at para [107] (Lord Hope of Craighead), citing 
AV Dicey The Law of the Constitution (10th edn MacMillan London 1959) at p 35, and Sir Owen Dixon ‘The Law 
and Constitution’ (1935) 51 LQR 590 at p 596). 
951 AV Dicey Law of the Constitution (MacMillan London 1920) at p 69, cited in O’Halloran ‘Inherent Rights’ in 
Obiter Dicta (Spring edn student journal of Osgoode Hall Law School 1948) at p 30, cited with approval in R v 
Lindsay [2003] BCSC 1203 at para [21], (2003) 110 CRR(2d) 30 (British Columbia Supreme Court). 
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The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy is not so much a Hobbesean concept of Leviathan 
as a Montesquieuan concept.  Perhaps the best way to understand the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is in Montesquieuan terms: that is, that the doctrine describes the 
relations within the constitutional system of government and the relations of different types 
of law to each other.  Parliamentary sovereignty is not especially a doctrine about the power 
of Parliaments to make laws – that is a political as well as a legal fact.  Parliamentary 
sovereignty is also concerned with the structure or hierarchy of the laws and the relations 
between legislative enactments and the common law.  The judiciary thus has a pivotal and 
paramount role in determining the character and effect of laws created by Parliament and the 
relation of these laws, as they are interpreted, to the common law.  This is not to say that 
there are fundamental principles which might invalidate legislative enactments.  The doctrine 
of parliamentary supremacy ensures that courts will give effect to legislative enactments.  But 
this doctrine also ensures that the courts play their role under the Constitution, by 
interpreting the scope and effect of those legislative enactments.  The judicial role – judicial 
performance – is subsumed within the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
principles of statutory interpretation are thus intricately connected with the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  Dicey reminds us that: “There is no legal basis for the theory that 
judges, as exponents of morality, may overrule Acts of Parliament.  Language which might 
seem to imply this amounts in reality to nothing more than the assertion that the judges, 
when attempting to ascertain what is the meaning to be affixed to an Act of Parliament, will 
presume that Parliament did not intend to violate the ordinary rules of morality, or the 
principles of international law, and will, therefore, whenever possible, give such an 
interpretation to a statutory enactment as may be consistent with the doctrines of both 
private and of international morality…  The plain truth is that our tribunals uniformly act on 
the principle that a law alleged to be a bad law is ex hypothesi a law, and therefore entitled to 
obedience by the Courts.”952 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty may thus be summarised as a common law doctrine explaining the 
dipole relations between Parliament and the courts, on the one hand, and a doctrine 
explaining the relations of statute law and common law whereby the courts recognize ex 
hypothesi the power of the supreme legislature to make laws and to alter the common law, 
                                                
952 AV Dicey Law of the Constitution (MacMillan London 1920) at pp 60-61. 
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giving effect to such law by performing their constitutional judicial function to interpret 
those enactments.  Coke rightly spoke of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as 
doctrine not only of the common law, but concerning the common law.  In the First Institute 
Coke acknowledged that only Parliament controlled, and could alter, the common law: ‘[t]he 
common law hath no controller in any part of it, but the high court of parliament; and if it 
be not abrogated or altered by parliament, it remains still.”953  And in The Case of Proclamations 
he said that “the King cannot change any part of the common law, nor create any offence by 
his proclamation… without Parliament.”954 
 
In the context of a publicly exhibited sporting event staged at a public place such as a beach, 
park, village or town green, or common, under a purported license or written approval from 
a local government, the local government’s action in granting a license or approval or in 
promulgating a by-law that such activities cannot occur without the license or written 
approval of the local government changes the common law.  The local government’s action 
changes the common law because the local government purports to exercises a power to 
excuse a common law offence which impinges public rights.  The doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy applies in such circumstances, and a court assessing the lawfulness of a local 
government’s actions, or a local government’s by-laws, will hold that a local government will 
only have the power to alter the common law if that power is devolved to them from the 
supreme legislature.  Parliamentary sovereignty is concerned not only with the supremacy of 
parliament’s power to make laws, but also with the logical structuring of law and the idea 
that subordinate powers must exercise their power within the strict confines of the grant of 
power from the supreme legislature.  The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty safeguards 
common law rights as much as statutory ones.  The judiciary performs a fundamental 
constitutional function by recognizing the law-making supremacy of Parliament and by 
interpreting Parliament-made law.  
 
                                                
953 C Butler (ed) Sir Edward Coke First Institutes (19th edn Clarke London 1832) at 115b. 
954 12 Co Rep 74 at p 75, 77 ER 1352 at p 1353, [1610] EWHC KB J22.   See also JD Goldsworthy The 
Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford University Press Oxford 1999) at p 112. 
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3. Judicial performance and the dipole of Parliament and the courts 
 
In British Railways Board v Pickin, Lord Simon referred to the parliamentary justiciary dipole 
within the constitution in the following terms: 
“It is well known that in the past there have been dangerous strains 
between the law courts and Parliament – dangerous because each 
institution has its own particular role to play in our constitution, and 
because collision between the two institutions is likely to impair their 
power to vouchsafe those constitutional rights for which citizens depend 
on them.  So for many years Parliament and the courts have each been 
astute to respect the sphere of action and the privileges of the 
other…”955 
 
The judiciary will – in the performance of their constitutional role – preserve their sphere of 
influence and safeguard common law rights by ensuring, through the rules of statutory 
construction, that only statutory provisions which use clear and unambiguous words will 
sufficiently abolish or modify fundamental common law principles or rights.956  In 
                                                
955 [1974] UKHL 1, [1974] AC 765 at p 799 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale), and see also at p 788 (Lord Reid), cited 
with approval in R v Elliott and Blessington [2006] NSWCCA 305 at para [78] (Spigelman CJ, Howie J); and Egan v 
Chadwick & Ors [1999] NSWCA 176 at para [91] (Spigelman CJ). 
956 In Potter v Minahan, O’Connor J said: ‘It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow 
fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its 
intention with irresistible clearness.’ Potter v Minahan  [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304.  Justice 
O’Connor quoted these words from Maxwell on Statutes with obvious approval. Aff’d: Bropho v Western Australia 
[1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at pp 436-437; K-
Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ).  In Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Stretton [2001] HCA 14 at para [27]-[29], 204 CLR 290 at pp 298-99 McHugh J noted that: “Courts have long 
held that a statute should not be construed as amending fundamental principles, infringing common law rights 
or departing from the general system of law unless it does so with ‘irresistible clearness’.  The legislative 
intention to do so, it is often said, must be ‘unambiguously clear’.”  In K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing 
Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ) referred to “a well established and conservative principle of 
interpretation that statutes are construed, where constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach 
upon fundamental rights and freedoms at common law.”  There is a presumption against a parliamentary 
intention to infringe upon such rights and freedoms: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson 
[1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 (Lord Steyn). “Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general 
or ambiguous words”: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 
115 at p 131 (Lord Hoffmann).  See also Benson v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942) AC 520 at pp 526-
527.  See further discussion under heading ‘Statutory Interpretation’ in this Chapter. 
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recognizing the supreme authority of parliament to make laws, and in properly interpreting 
the scope and effect of legislative enactments, by performing their constitutional judicial 
function, the courts safeguard common law public rights.  It is not argued that there are 
fundamental common law rights which go so deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted 
by the Courts to have destroyed them.957  It is not suggested that any of the pubic rights 
discussed in this thesis – the public right of way, the public right to quietude, the public right 
to peace, or the public right to recreation – are of a ‘fundamental’ nature in the sense that 
they may not be abrogated by Parliament.  Parliament has supremacy with respect to the 
making of laws.  Rather, what is here asserted is that the courts will only declare these 
common law public rights to be abrogated, and the common law of public nuisance thus 
altered, when Parliament uses clear and unambiguous terms in exercising its sovereignty.  
Parliamentary supremacy is a common law concept that endorses the supreme legislature 
with the law-making powers whilst simultaneously endorsing the judicature with the 
authority to give effect to the law as created by the supreme legislature by interpreting those 
legislative enactments.  In the absence of clear unambiguous terms that the staging of 
publicly exhibited sporting events at public places do not create a public nuisance by 
impinging on common law public rights, the courts will obfuscate any statutory law or grant 
of power which purports to have the effect of altering these common law public rights. 
 
Courts view the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy as ineluctably encompassing the 
judicial function of statutory interpretation.  Parliamentary sovereignty, as a doctrine, only 
has meaning where the judiciary are fulfilling their constitutional role of interpreting the law-
making authority of Parliament.  In Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), Dawson J 
noted that: “The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy is a doctrine as deeply rooted as any in 
the common law.  It is of its essence that a court, once it has ascertained the true scope and 
effect of an Act of Parliament, should give unquestioned effect to it accordingly.”958  
Dawson J also adopted Sir Owen Dixon’s extra judicial reference to: “a proposition of the 
                                                
957 In Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2001] HCA 7 at para [62], (2001) 205 CLR 399, Kirby J noted 
that, in Australia at least, the common law operates within an orbit of written constitutional laws and political 
realities and that: “There are thus no common law rights which lie so deep that even a parliament may not 
contradict them”, citing Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25, (1997) 189 CLR 520 at p 566; 
Lipohar v The Queen [1999] HCA 65, (1999) 74 ALJR 282 at p 291, (1999) 168 ALR 8 at p 22; John Pfeiffer Pty 
Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36, (2000) 74 ALJR 1109 at p 1118, (2000) 172 ALR 625 at p 638. cf Fraser v State 
Services Commission (1984) 1 NZLR 116 at p 121 (Cooke J). 
958 [1996] HCA 24, (1996) 189 CLR 51 at p 76. 
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common law that a court may not question the validity of a statute but, once having 
construed it, must give effect to it according to its tenor.”959  Similarly, Lord Bingham in 
Jackson v Attorney General, spoke of only ‘properly interpreted’ statutes as enjoying the highest 
legal authority within British constitutional law: “…the Crown in Parliament was 
unconstrained by any entrenched or codified constitution.  It could make or unmake any law 
it wished.  Statutes, formally enacted as Acts of Parliament, properly interpreted, enjoyed the 
highest legal authority.”960 
 
In determining whether a local government has power to dispense with the common law and 
to license the commission of a common law public nuisance, in circumstances where a 
publicly exhibited sporting event creates a public nuisance by impinging on public rights, 
courts will apply the rules of statutory interpretation.  The doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty ensures that all local government’s must derive any and all their purported 
powers from the legislative enactments of the supreme legislature, subject always to judicial 
interpretation of the tenor and effect of that legislatively based devolution of power.  Judicial 
review of devolved powers and administrative action can be viewed as merely an aspect of 
the proper role of the courts in both recognising and enforcing parliamentary sovereignty 
 
 
4. Statutory interpretation 
 
In some common law jurisdictions specific rules of statutory interpretation have developed 
to determine the nature and extent of the powers of local or municipal governments.  The 
‘Dillon Rule’ of statutory construction, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States and the Supreme Court of Canada, states that municipal governments only 
have the powers that are expressly granted to them by the state legislature, those that are 
necessarily implied from that grant of power, and those that are essential and indispensable 
to the municipality’s existence and functioning.  Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the 
                                                
959 ibid at pp 73, citing Sir Owen Dixon ‘The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation’ in Jesting 
Pilate (Law Book Co Sydney 1965) at p 206. 
960 [2005] UKHL 56 at para [9], [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 3 WLR 733 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
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existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is 
denied.961 
 
This strict rule of construction of the powers of local government rests on the prevailing 
constitutional theory that the relationship of local governments to the state is a unitary one 
and that no local government has sovereign powers.  Local governments are the creations of 
the State, and the powers, functions, and responsibilities that they exercise are entirely 
delegated or granted to them by the supreme legislature. “Municipal corporations owe their 
origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature.  It breathes into 
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.  As it creates, so may it destroy.  If 
it may destroy, it may abridge and control.”962  In Merrill v Monticello, the United States 
Supreme Court said: “As corporations are the mere creatures of law, established for special 
purposes, and derive all their powers from the acts creating them, it is perfectly just and 
proper that they should be obliged strictly to show their authority for the business they 
assume, and be confined, in their operations, to the mode and manner and subject-matter 
prescribed.”963  
 
In Hunter v Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court of the United States spelled out in clear detail the 
nature of local government and the extent of local government power:  
“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of 
the state as may be entrusted to them.  For the purpose of executing 
                                                
961 JF Dillon Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations (4th edn Little Brown Boston 1890) at s 89; Merrill v 
Monticello [1891] USSC 79, 138 US 673 (1891), reaff’d. Hunter v Pittsburgh 207 US 161 (1907), citing OW Holmes 
Jnr Kent: Commentaries on American Law (12th edn Little Brown Boston 1884) vol 2, at pp 298-99, and JF Dillon 
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations (4th edn Little Brown Boston 1890) at s 89.  The Supreme Court 
of Canada applied Dillon’s rule, as expressed in SM Makuch, N Craik & SB Leisk, Canadian Municipal and 
Planning Law, (2nd edn Thomson-Carswell Toronto 2004) at p 82, in Morguard Properties Ltd v Winnipeg [1983] 
SCC 33, (1983) 3 DLR(4th) 1 at pp 12-13; and R v Sharma [1993] SCC 165, [1993] 1 SCR 650 at p 668.  cf The 
“benevolent construction” or “broad and purposive” rule of construction that allowed for a more generous 
interpretation of municipal powers, first adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nanaimo (City) v Rascal 
Trucking Ltd [2000] SCC 13 at paras [36]-[37], [2000] 1 SCR 342, 49 BCLR(3d) 164) applying Shell Canada 
Products Ltd v Vancouver [1994] SCC 115, [1994] 1 SCR 231 at pp 244 and 248 (McLachlin J); aff’d Croplife Canada 
v Toronto [2005] ONCA 15709 at paras [16]-[19] and [33], (2005) 75 OR(3d) 357, (2005) 254 DLR(4th) 40.  See 
also Hamilton (City) v Hamilton Distillery Co [1907] SCC 1, (1907) 38 SCR 239; Howard v Toronto (City) (1928) 61 
OLR 563 (CA); Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA); and Kuchma v Tache (Rural 
Municipality) [1945] SCR 234. 
962 Clinton v Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
963 [1891] USSC 79, 138 US 673 (1891). 
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these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to 
acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property.  The number, 
nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations 
and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute 
discretion of the state.  Neither their charters, nor any law conferring 
governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for 
governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such 
property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a 
contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.  
The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such 
powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or 
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the 
whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and 
destroy the corporation.  All this may be done, conditionally or 
unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even 
against their protest.  In all these respects the state is supreme, and its 
legislative body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do 
as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United 
States.”964 
 
In Breard v Alexandria,965 and in Avery v Midland County,966 the United States Supreme Court 
reiterated that local governments: “ have only such powers as are delegated them by the State 
of which they are a subdivision, and when they act they exercise the State’s sovereign 
                                                
964 [1907] USSC 157, 207 US 161 at pp 178-79; followed in City of Trenton v State of New Jersey [1923] USSC 123, 
262 US 182 at pp 186-87, 43 S Ct 534 at p 536; Reynolds v Sims [1964] USSC 202, 377 US 533, 84 S Ct 1362; City 
of Inglewood v City of Los Angeles [1972] USCA9 44 at para [24], 451 F2d 948; Lyes v City of Riviera Beach Florida 
[1999] USCA11 303 at para [46], 166 F 3d 1332; Barefoot v City of Wilmington III [2002] USCA4 183 at para [11], 
306 F 3d 113; Professional Lawn Care Association v Village of Milford [1990] USCA6 1384 at para [48], 909 F2d 929: 
“Municipal bodies are ‘essentially creatures of the state.’ (South Macomb Disposal Authority v Township of Washington 
[1986] USCA6 857, 790 F2d 500 at p 507 (6th Cir 1986) (Engel J concurring)).  They are ‘created as convenient 
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.’  (Kelley v 
Board of Educ. of Nashville & Davidson County [1988] USCA6 488, 836 F2d 986 at p 994 (6th Cir 1987), quoting 
Hunter v Pittsburgh [1907] USSC 157, 207 US 161 at p 178, 28 S Ct 40 at p 46 (1907)).” Louisiana ex rel Folsom v 
Mayor of New Orleans [1883] USSC 222, 109 US 285 at p 287, 3 S Ct 211 at p 213: “Municipal corporations are 
instrumentalities of the State for the convenient administration of government within their limits.” 
965 [1951] USSC 71, 341 US 622 at p 640, 71 SCt 920 at p 931. 
966 [1968] USSC 60, 390 US 474 at p 480, 88 SCt 1114 at p 1118. 
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power.”  In R v Greenbaum, the Supreme Court of Canada stated tersely that: “Municipalities 
are entirely the creatures of provincial statutes.  Accordingly, they can exercise only those powers 
which are explicitly conferred upon them by a provincial statute.  It follows that the exercise of 
a municipality’s statutory powers… is reviewable to the extent of determining whether the 
actions are intra vires.”967  And In Verdun (City) v Sun Oil Co, Fauteux J articulated the then 
restrictive approach to statutory construction of local government powers in Canada in this 
way: ‘That the municipalities derive their legislative powers from the provincial Legislature 
and must, consequently, frame their by-laws strictly within the scope delegated to them by 
the Legislature, are undisputed principles.’”968 
 
Dillon’s rule of statutory construction of local government’s legislatively devolved powers is 
consonant with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  Yet neither decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Merrill v Monticello,969 and in Hunter v Pittsburgh,970 have been 
considered by a court in Australia or in England.  Even in New South Wales where section 
51 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) speaks directly of the nature and extent of local 
government powers, authorities, duties and functions as being in every respect determined 
only by the Legislature and subject to the will of Legislature, which may “from time to time” 
choose to establish a local government system of government,971 Dillon’s strict rule of 
statutory construction remains unrecognised.  The general rule of construction applying to 
the statutory grant of powers to local authorities in English and Australian jurisprudence is 
the reasonableness test first articulated by Lord Russell in Kruse v Johnson:  
“I do not mean to say that there may not be cases in which it would be 
the duty of the court to condemn by-laws, made under such authority as 
these were made, as invalid because unreasonable.  But unreasonable in 
what sense?  If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal 
in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly 
                                                
967 [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at p 687 (Iacobucci J). 
968 [1951] SCC 53, [1952] 1 SCR 222 at p 228. 
969 [1891] USSC 79, 138 US 673 (1891). 
970 [1907] USSC 157, 207 US 161 (1907) at pp 178-79. 
971 The exact words of s 51 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) reads:  
“(1) There shall continue to be a system of local government for the State under which duly elected or duly 
appointed local government bodies are constituted with responsibilities for acting for the better government of 
those parts of the State that are from time to time subject to that system of local government. 
(2) The manner in which local government bodies are constituted and the nature and extent of their powers, 
authorities, duties and functions shall be as determined by or in accordance with laws of the Legislature.” 
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unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or 
gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could 
find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the court might 
well say, ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; 
they are unreasonable and ultra vires’.  But it is in this sense, and in this 
sense only, as I conceive, that the question of unreasonableness can 
properly be regarded.  A by-law is not unreasonable merely because 
particular judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or 
necessary or convenient, or because it is not accompanied by a 
qualification or an exception which some judges may think ought to be 
there.  Surely it is not too much to say that in matters which directly and 
mainly concern the people of the county, who have the right to choose 
those whom they think best fitted to represent them in their local 
government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand 
their own requirements better than judges.”972 
 
Lord Russell’s dictum in Kruse v Johnson has been followed by the courts as a general guide as 
to the construction to be given to the powers devolved on local governments.973  In 
Brunswick Corporation v Stewart, Starke J apparently approved of the argument that a by-law is 
beyond the power of a local authority to make where it, “…is unreasonable, that is, in this 
connection, so oppressive or capricious that no reasonable mind can justify it (Slattery v 
Naylor (1888) 13 App Cas 446; R v Broad (1915) AC at p 1122; Widgee Shire Council v Bonney 
[1907] HCA 11, (1907) 4 CLR 977; Kruse v Johnson (1898) 2 QB at p 99).”974  Williams J stated 
at page 99: “It is necessary to remember that the legislature has left it to the judgment of 
councils acting bona fide to enact such by-laws, and the exercise of their discretion should 
not be lightly interfered with.  In the case of by-laws made by public bodies, it was pointed 
out by Lord Russell of Killowen LCJ in Kruse v Johnson that such by-laws should be 
                                                
972 [1898] 2 QB 91 at pp 99-100 (Lord Russell of Killowen CJ). 
973 Widgee Shire Council v Bonney [1907] HCA 11, (1907) 4 CLR 977 at pp 982-83 (Griffith CJ) and at p 986 
(Isaacs J); Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at p 150 (Starke J); Brunswick 
Corporation v Stewart [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 97 (Starke J), at p 99 (Williams J). 
974 Brunswick Corporation v Stewart [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 97 (Starke J).  In Brunswick Corporation v 
Stewart, a local government by-law dealing with the erection and construction of buildings was challenged on 
the ground, among others, that it was unreasonable.  The challenge was rejected by the High Court. 
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benevolently interpreted, and that credit should be given to those who have to administer 
them that they will be reasonably administered.  The provisions of the by-laws which have 
been challenged must be approached in the light of these general principles.”975  Williams J 
referred to unreasonableness as involving “oppressive or gratuitous interference with the 
rights of those who are subject to it as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable 
men.”976 
 
In the earlier case Widgee Shire Council v Bonney,977 a local government by-law was challenged 
on the ground, among others, that it was unreasonable.  The challenge was rejected by the 
High Court.  Griffith CJ referred to the English decisions of Slattery v Naylor (1888) 13 App 
Cas 446 and Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 and formulated the test of unreasonableness for 
delegated legislation in terms of “no reasonable man, exercising in good faith the powers 
conferred by the Statute, could under any circumstances pass such a by-law.”978  Isaacs J 
referred with approval to two statements in the advice of the Privy Council in Slattery v 
Naylor,979 namely, a by-law may be struck down as unreasonable where it is “a merely 
fantastic and capricious bye-law, such as reasonable men could not make in good faith” and 
a by-law will not “be treated as unreasonable merely because it does not contain 
qualifications which commend themselves to the minds of judges.”980 Lockhart J in Minister 
for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd subsequently confirmed this opinion, 
stating that: “Delegated legislation is not invalid on the ground of unreasonableness in the 
sense that the courts may form a different view as to what is reasonable.  Unreasonableness 
in this branch of the law means unreasonable in the sense that ‘a merely fantastic and 
capricious by-law, such as reasonable men could not make in good faith’ is bad, because 
delegated legislation of this kind could not be regarded as an exercise of the power conferred 
upon the subordinate legislative body making the delegated legislation: Slattery v Naylor (1888) 
13 App Cas 446 at 452.”981  And at page 384, Lockhart J reiterated that: “Delegated 
legislation may be declared to be invalid on the ground of unreasonableness if it leads to 
                                                
975 See also Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189, (2005) 147 FCR 299 at [142]-[148]; Qi Guang Guo v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 356 at paras [30]. 
976 [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 99 
977 [1907] HCA 11, (1907) 4 CLR 977. 
978 ibid at pp 982-83. 
979 (1888) 13 App Cas 446 at pp 452-453. 
980 ibid at p 986. 
981 [1993] FCA 45, (1993) 40 FCR 381 at p 382. 
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manifest arbitrariness, injustice or partiality; but the underlying rationale is that legislation of 
this offending kind cannot be within the scope of what Parliament intended in authorising 
the subordinate legislative authority to enact law.”982  Unreasonableness, in this sense, is 
connected uniquely with the question whether the actions of a local government are ultra vires 
the grant of power to them.  
 
Lord Justice Diplock, in Mixnam’s Properties Ltd v Chertsey Urban District Council,983 (in a passage 
that was apparently approved by the House of Lords),984 similarly observed that: “The 
various special grounds upon which subordinate legislation has sometimes been said to be 
void – for example, because it is unreasonable; because it is uncertain; because it is repugnant 
to the general law or to some other statute – can, I think, today be properly regarded as 
being particular applications of the general rule that subordinate legislation, to be valid, must 
be shown to be within the powers conferred by the statute.  Thus, the kind of 
unreasonableness which invalidates a by-law is not the antonym of ‘reasonableness’ in the 
sense of which that expression is used in the common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, 
injustice or partiality that a court would say: ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to 
make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires’.”985  This view was recently affirmed 
by the House of Lords.  Whilst courts affirm the use of a reasonableness test in construing 
the ambit of local government powers, this test is invariably connected with, “…a general 
rule of construction that, while the legislature may make whatever changes to the law that it 
likes, subordinate legislative authorities can make only such changes in the law as Parliament 
has empowered them to make.  This rule was applied in Rossi v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1904) 
7 F (HL) 85, [and] in Mixnam’s Properties Ltd v Chertsey Urban District Council [1965] AC 
735…”986  Further, Lord Hope declared in Stewart v Perth and Kinross Council, again following 
                                                
982 [1993] FCA 45, (1993) 40 FCR 381 at p 384; aff’d Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v 
Minister for Natural Resources [2005] NSWCA 10 at para [130] (Spigelman CJ); Qi Guang Guo v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 356 at para [32]. 
983 [1964] 1 QB 214. 
984 See Chertsey Urban District Council v Mixnam’s Properties Ltd [1965] AC 735. 
985 [1964] 1 QB 214 at pp 237-8, cited in Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189, (2005) 147 FCR 299 at [145]; in 
Qi Guang Guo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 356 at paras [20]; and in Stewart v Perth and 
Kinross Council [2004] UKHL 16 at para [26], [2004] 28 SLLP 32, (2004) SLT 383. 
986 Stewart v Perth and Kinross Council [2004] UKHL 16 at para [26], [2004] 28 SLLP 32, (2004) SLT 383 (Lord 
Hope of Craighead), citing Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at p 96 (Lord Russell of Killowen CJ).  In Rossi v 
Magistrates of Edinburgh (1904) 7 F (HL) 85, conditions in an ice-cream vendors’ licence which restricted their 
right to open their shops when they liked and sell what they pleased were held to be ultra vires of the licensing 
authority; see also Spook Erection Ltd v City of Edinburgh District Council, 1995 SLT (Sh Ct) 107.  In Mixnam’s 
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Lord Russell’s dictum in Kruse v Johnson, that courts must look, “to the character of the body 
which is legislating, the subject matter, and the nature and extent of the authority which is 
given to the body to legislate in matters of this kind.”987  The reasonableness test employed 
by UK Courts in construing the powers of local government is now that the exercise of 
power must “be reasonable in the modern public law sense of that word: see Newbury District 
Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578 at p 599.”988 
 
In Canada, the courts have similarly made use of a reasonableness test in construing the 
powers of local governments.  In Montréal (City) v Arcade Amusements Inc, in declaring invalid a 
part of the Montréal by-law governing amusements, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted 
this classic statement of Lord Russell’s in Kruse v Johnson, stating that: “According to that 
definition, by-laws are only unreasonable in the wide or legal sense, and ultra vires, if: (1) they 
are partial and unequal in operation between different classes; (2) they are manifestly unjust; 
(3) they disclose bad faith; and (4) they involve such oppressive or gratuitous interference 
with the rights of those subject to them as can find no justification in the minds of 
reasonable men.”989  This interpretation was subsequently summarized in Montréal (City) v 
2952-1366 Québec Inc, where the Supreme Court of Canada said: “The rules governing the 
                                                
Properties Ltd v Chertsey Urban District Council [1965] AC 735, it was held that the local authority was not entitled 
under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 to lay down conditions relating to the licensee’s 
powers of letting or licensing caravan spaces to its customers. 
987 ibid at para [27] citing Kruse v Johnson [1898] QB 91 at p 99.  See also Brunswick Corporation v Stewart [1941] 
HCA 7 (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 95, where Starke J said that the court “should have regard to the body entrusted 
with the power and the language in which the power is expressed and the subject matter with which the body 
has to deal” (aff’d Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for the ‘The Lakes Coolum’ [2002] QCA 550 at para [8]). 
988 The ‘Newbury tests’ or principles were formulated by the House of Lords to test the validity of an apparently 
unlimited statutory power to impose planning conditions.  The test of reasonableness is the third of the tests 
articulated in Newbury, which is a restatement of the test of reasonableness in the special sense expressed by 
Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 at p 229.  As 
applied to legislatively devolved powers the test suggests that the exercise of power will be unreasonable if it 
does not fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted purposes of the power under the statute.  Followed in 
Stewart v Perth and Kinross Council [2004] UKHL 16 at paras [70]-[71], [2004] 28 SLLP 32, (2004) SLT 383, 2004 
SCLR 849 (Baroness Hale of Richmond). This test can result in construing local government powers very 
strictly.  Hence, in Stewart v Perth and Kinross Council the House of Lords held that the power, in para 5(1)(b) and 
(2) of Schedule 1 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, to grant a second hand motor dealer’s licence 
on “such reasonable conditions as the licensing authority think fit” did not give the authority power to insist on 
a detailed inspection report being made available to all purchasers. 
989 [1985] 1 SCR 368 at pp 405-406 (Beetz J).  The Canadian Supreme Court has recently adopted a test of 
reasonableness in construing municipal government powers, developed from Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at 
p 99; Hamilton (City) v Hamilton Distillery Co [1907] SCC 1, (1907) 38 SCR 239; Howard v Toronto (City) (1928) 61 
OLR 563 (CA); Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA); Kuchma v Tache (Rural 
Municipality) [1945] SCR 234; and Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver [1994] SCC 115, [1994] 1 SCR 231 at pp 
244 and 248: see Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd [2000] SCC 13 at para [37], [2000] 1 SCR 342. 
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exercise of regulatory powers are well known.  The intervention of courts in this sphere has 
been marked by great deference.  Only an exercise of power in bad faith or for improper or 
unreasonable purposes will justify judicial review.”990  By this rule of construction by-laws of 
local governments should be benevolently interpreted; by-laws should be assumed to be 
‘reasonably administered’; and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the decisions 
of local governments because members of local government are democratically elected.991 In 
Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver, Justice McLachlin in her dissentient judgment in the 
Supreme Court of Canada identified a more liberal approach to the construction of enabling 
                                                
990 [2005] SCC 62 at para [41], [2005] 3 SCR 141, (2005) 258 DLR(4th) 595, citing Kruse v Johnson [1898] 
2 QB 91; Hamilton (City of) v Hamilton Distillery Co (1907) 38 SCR 239; Montréal (City of) v Beauvais (1909) 
42 SCR 211; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA); Montréal (City of) v 
Arcade Amusements Inc [1985] 1 SCR 368; Juneau v Québec (Ville de) [1991] RJQ 2781 (CA); Shell Canada Products 
Ltd v Vancouver (City) [1994] 1 SCR 231.  In Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc [2005] SCC 62, [2005] 3 SCR 
141, (2005) 258 DLR(4th) 595, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a contextual methodology of statutory 
interpretation in construing the powers of a municipal council by-law dealing with noise nuisances.  The court 
held that although the legislative provision granting power was drafted using general language, and was 
ambiguous, a contextual interpretation by the court could resolve the ambiguity and enable the scope to be 
determined.  The court took note of the history of the by-law, which showed that the lawmakers’ purpose was 
limited to control of noises that interfere with peaceful enjoyment of the urban environment. 
991 Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at pp 99-100 (Lord Russell of Killowen CJ).  This is the position which the 
courts take in New Zealand, and now in Canada.  The Canadian judicial view has only very recently moved 
away from a strict approach to a “benevolent construction” or “broad and purposive” approach that allows for 
a more generous interpretation of municipal powers.  This new approach was first adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd [2000] SCC 13 at paras [36]-[37], [2000] 1 SCR 342, 
where the Supreme Court overturned the use of Dillon’s rule of construction which had been applied by the 
Court of Appeal of British Columbia (Nanaimo (City of) v Rascal Trucking Ltd [1998] BCCA 6119 at para [10], 
(1998) 161 DLR(4th) 177, (1998) 49 BCLR(3d) 164).  The Supreme Court stated a new preference for a rule of 
construction which McLachlin J had given in her dissenting opinion in the earlier case of Shell Canada Products 
Ltd v Vancouver [1994] SCC 115, [1994] 1 SCR 231 at pp 244 and 248; aff’d Croplife Canada v Toronto [2005] 
ONCA 15709 at paras [16]-[19] and [33], (2005) 75 OR(3d) 357, (2005) 254 DLR(4th) 40.  In Shell Canada 
Products, Justice McLachlin identified a more liberal approach to the construction of enabling statutes that was 
already reflected in such cases as Hamilton (City) v Hamilton Distillery Co [1907] SCC 1, (1907) 38 SCR 239; 
Howard v Toronto (City) (1928) 61 OLR 563 (CA); Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 
(CA); and Kuchma v Tache (Rural Municipality) [1945] SCR 234.  In stating her rule of construction she concluded 
at p 248: “…[J]udicial review of municipal decisions should be confined to clear cases.  The elected members 
of council are discharging a statutory duty.  The right to exercise that duty freely and in accordance with the 
perceived wishes of the people they represent is vital to local democracy.  Consequently, courts should be 
reluctant to interfere with the decisions of municipal councils.  Judicial intervention is warranted only where a 
municipality’s exercise of its powers is clearly ultra vires, or where council has run afoul of one of the other 
accepted limits on municipal power.”  
For New Zealand courts’ view, see Harrison v Auckland City Council [2008] NZHC 553 at paras [53].  The New 
Zealand High Court has now reaffirmed that a degree of deference to the decisions of local authorities is 
appropriate when determining the validity of a by-law: “Of relevance to the question of the level of deference 
which should apply, Conley emphasised at [75] the need for a ‘large margin of appreciation’ to apply where 
Parliament has entrusted a legislative task to local authorities which in turn are elected bodies.  In that case, 
Parliament had delegated the location of brothels to the elected local authorities and had decided to maintain a 
measure of ongoing review of prostitution.  The Court of Appeal endorsed the higher level of deference in 
cases where the choices involved are distinctly ones of social policy.  In such circumstances, ‘...a court should 
be very slow to intervene, or adopt a high intensity of review.’” Harrison v Auckland City Council [2008] NZHC 
553 at para [61] following Conley v Hamilton City Council [2007] NZCA 543 at para [75]. 
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statutes observing that: “Recent commentary suggests an emerging consensus that courts 
must respect the responsibility of elected municipal bodies to serve the people who elected 
them and exercise caution to avoid substituting their views of what is best for the citizens for 
those of municipal councils.  Barring clear demonstration that a municipal decision was 
beyond its powers, courts should not so hold.  In cases where powers are not expressly 
conferred but may be implied, courts must be prepared to adopt the ‘benevolent 
construction’ which this Court referred to in Greenbaum [[1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674] 
and confer the powers by reasonable implication.  Whatever rules of construction are 
applied, they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role of municipal bodies as 
community representatives.”992  Justice McLachlin’s view has been subsequently preferred 
and affirmed.993 
 
Australian jurisprudence has evolved to two distinct tests of reasonableness of the exercise 
of delegated powers, following the High Court decision of South Australia v Tanner.994  The 
cases Slattery v Naylor, Kruse v Johnson, Widgee Shire Council, Williams v Melbourne Corporation, 
Brunswick Corporation v Stewart, and Mixnam’s Properties Ltd v Chertsey Urban District Council, all 
cited above, “deal principally, if not exclusively, with the unreasonableness ground of 
review.”  The proportionality principle is “differently focused”, and, as stated by Lockhart J 
in Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd: “The fundamental 
question is whether the delegated legislation is within the scope of what the Parliament 
intended when enacting the statute which empowers the subordinate authority to make 
certain laws.”995  In Qi Guang Guo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Federal Court of 
Australia opined: “In summary, delegated legislation may be held invalid because it is an 
                                                
992 Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver [1994] SCC 115, [1994] 1 SCR 231 at p 244; aff’d Croplife Canada v 
Toronto [2005] ONCA 15709 at paras [16]-[19] and [33], (2005) 75 OR(3d) 357, (2005) 254 DLR(4th) 40, 
following Hamilton (City) v Hamilton Distillery Co [1907] SCC 1, (1907) 38 SCR 239; Howard v Toronto (City) (1928) 
61 OLR 563 (CA); Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA); and Kuchma v Tache 
(Rural Municipality) [1945] SCR 234. 
993 See nn 913 above. 
994 [1989] HCA 3, (1989) 166 CLR 161.  As was stated by the Federal Court of Australia in Qi Guang Guo v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 356 at para [31]: “Tanner is the leading High Court case on the 
doctrine of reasonable proportionality in relation to delegated legislation. In that case it was held that delegated 
legislation will not be valid where it is not capable of being considered to be reasonably proportionate to the 
end to be achieved. It is not enough that the Court thinks the delegated legislation inexpedient or misguided. It 
must be so lacking in reasonable proportionality as not to be a real exercise of the power. The Court found 
support for the ground of review in the judgment of Dixon J in Williams v Melbourne Corporation.” 
995 [1993] FCA 45, (1993) 40 FCR 381 at pp 383-384. 
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unreasonable exercise of the empowering provision or because the delegated legislation is 
not reasonably proportionate to the purposes of the empowering provision. There is 
considerable overlap between the two grounds of review (see De Silva v Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 502 at 510).  As the Court does not have authority to 
conduct merits review, the test in the case of each ground of review is a very demanding one 
and, in the final analysis, involves a question of whether the delegated legislation represents a 
real exercise of the power in the empowering section.  Cases in which delegated legislation 
has been held invalid on either ground of review are rare.”996 
 
In both Qi Guang Guo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, and the earlier case of Vanstone 
v Clark,997 the Federal Court cited Williams v Melbourne Corporation, where Dixon J said:  
“To determine whether a by-law is an exercise of a power, it is not 
always enough to ascertain the subject matter of the power and consider 
whether the by-law appears on its face to relate to that subject.  The true 
nature and purpose of the power must be determined, and it must often 
be necessary to examine the operation of the by-law in the local 
circumstances to which it is intended to apply.  Notwithstanding that ex 
                                                
996 [2009] FCA 356 at paras [35].  The court went on to consider examples of case law where the two distinct 
tests were used, noting at para [35]: “Examples of cases in which regulations under the Act have been held 
invalid on the unreasonableness ground are Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 
377, (2000) 98 FCR 77 and Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1147, (1999) 94 FCR 
219.  Examples of cases in which delegated legislation has been held invalid on the reasonable proportionality 
ground of review are Re Gold Coast City Council By-laws [1994] 1 Qd R 130, Paradise Projects Pty Ltd v Gold Coast 
City Council [1994] 1 Qd R 314, Re Gold Coast City (Touting and Distribution of Printed Matter) Law 1994 (1995) 86 
LGREA 288 and House v Forestry Tasmania [1995] TASSC 95, (1995) 5 Tas R 169.  Before leaving this brief 
review of the cases, I refer to the illuminating discussions of the relevant principles in De Silva v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189, (2005) 147 FCR 299 at 331-343 
[99]- [160] per Weinberg J.”  In Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189, (2005) 147 FCR 299 at [148], the court 
noted any distinction between English and Australian tests of unreasonableness as overstated: “Though 
Lockhart J [in Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 45 (1993) 40 FCR 
381 at p 384] spoke of ‘unreasonableness’, his Honour plainly had in mind the considerations that now tend to 
be subsumed within the notion of ‘reasonable proportionality’.  The move from ‘unreasonableness’ to ‘lack of 
reasonable proportionality’ appears linked to the increasing use by the High Court of the latter concept in 
certain aspects of constitutional law: see generally B Selway ‘The Rise and Rise of the Reasonable 
Proportionality Test in Public Law’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 212.  This appears to reflect a divergence from 
the approach in the United Kingdom, where ‘unreasonableness’ per se is still regarded as a ground for 
invalidating subordinate legislation.  See generally HWR Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law (8th edn 2000) 
at 860-2.  Nonetheless, there are dicta, even in this country, that suggest that regulations can be challenged 
purely on the basis of unreasonableness: De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 
502.  Likewise, see Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 977, (2003) 131 FCR 
300 at 467-8 per Tamberlin J.” 
997 [2005] FCAFC 189, (2005) 147 FCR 299. 
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facie there seemed a sufficient connection between the subject of the 
power and that of the by-law, the true character of the by-law may then 
appear to be such that it could not have reasonably have been adopted as 
a means of attaining the ends of the power.  In such a case, the by-law 
will be invalid, not because it is inexpedient or misguided, but because it 
is not a real exercise of the power.”998 
 
Williams v Melbourne Corporation concerned the reasonableness of a by-law regulating traffic in 
Melbourne.  Justice Starke noted: “The by-law deals with the passage of cattle in and through 
the streets of the city.  It prohibits the use of most streets, and permits the use of others.  
Such a by-law concerns the subject of traffic, and regulates it.  Prima facie, therefore, it is 
within the ambit of the power conferred by the Local Government Act.”999  The nature of 
the power which a local government purports to exercise in respect of authorizing the 
staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event is, however, very different to their power to 
‘regulate’ (as was the case in Williams v Melbourne Corporation).  The license to a publicly 
exhibited sporting event purports to grant a right to exclusive use of a public place such as a 
road, beach or park, to the exclusion of the public’s use of these places.  This is not the 
exercise of a power to ‘regulate’ whereby rights of use are preserved but are managed in 
order to afford equitable use of public places amongst the disparate users of those public 
places as was highlighted in Williams v Melbourne Corporation.  It was claimed that the by-law in 
Williams v Melbourne Corporation was unreasonable, and “cannot reasonably be regarded as 
being within the scope or ambit or purpose of the power.”  To this Justice Starke responded: 
“It is well settled that the Court is not entitled to form its own opinion as to the 
reasonableness of a by-law and if it thinks it unreasonable, though within the scope of the 
powers granted, to declare it invalid.  Griffith CJ said in Widgee Shire Council v Bonney… that 
since the cases of Slattery v Naylor and Kruse v Johnson it is very difficult to make a successful 
attack on a by-law on this ground…  Slattery v Naylor, however, recognizes that ‘a merely 
fantastic and capricious by-law, such as reasonable men could not make in good faith’ would 
                                                
998 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at p 155, cited Qi Guang Guo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship 
[2009] FCA 356 at para [27]; Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189, (2005) 147 FCR 299 at [155]; Murrumbidgee 
Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources [2005] NSWCA 10 at para [130] (Spigelman 
CJ); Frankham v Adelaide City Council [2004] SASC 263 at para [35]. 
999 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at p 150 (Starke J). 
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be bad, for such a by-law could not in any proper sense be regarded as an exercise of the 
power conferred upon the authority making the by-law.”1000   
 
It is certainly within the power of local governments, pursuant to Local Government Acts, 
to regulate the use of public places by creating by-laws limiting the time of day when a public 
place is open to the public, or by designating some of the public spaces within their 
jurisdiction for the use of particular public purposes or public sports, such as a Zoo or a 
cricket ground.  Such acts are, prima facie, within the powers devolved to local governments 
from the supreme legislature.1001  Justice Starke observed in Williams v Melbourne Corporation, 
citing Isaacs J in the earlier case of Melbourne Corporation v Barry, that: “A power to regulate 
traffic does not warrant an absolute prohibition of all traffic, but it does involve more than 
restrictions upon the conduct of persons in traffic, and extends in my opinion to the 
regulation of the times when, and the streets, roads or routes in which, traffic may 
proceed.”1002  But where a local government purports to grant by license to a sporting 
association, or to a pecuniarily motivated sports promotion company, the exclusive use of a 
public place which is otherwise designated to public use (however limited in time and 
manner of use that public place may be made available to the public by by-laws), a local 
authority may be said to be going beyond its power to ‘regulate’ and may, in fact, be 
complicit in the commission of a common law public nuisance offence.  It was affirmed in 
Williams v Melbourne Corporation that power to regulate use cannot warrant a prohibition of 
use.1003  Noting the dicta of Higgins and Isaacs JJ in the earlier High Court case of Melbourne 
Corporation v Barry,1004 Starke J was of the opinion that: “And, while ‘every regulation implies 
restraint, prohibition in some degree,’ the limit is reached, as I understand the argument, if 
the by-law goes beyond rules of conduct for the behaviour of persons in traffic, that is, for 
                                                
1000 ibid at pp 149-150, citing Widgee Shire Council v Barry (1907) 4 CLR 977 at pp 982-83 (Griffith CJ); Slattery v 
Naylor (1888) 13 App Cas 446; and Kruse v Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91. 
1001 See Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174 at pp 199 (Isaacs J), at p 207 (Higgins 
J); Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at pp 148-49, Herald and Weekly Times Ltd 
v VCAT [2005] VSC 44 at para [15].  See eg s 60 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) and s 46 Local 
Government Act (NSW). 
1002 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at pp 148-149, citing Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, 
(1922) 31 CLR 174 at pp 199 (Isaacs J). 
1003 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at pp 148-49, citing with approval Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto 
v Virgo (1896) AC 88; Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney-General for the Dominion (1896) AC 348; Melbourne 
Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174. 
1004 [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174 at pp 199 (Isaacs J), at p 207 (Higgins J). 
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their behaviour when passing to and fro along any street or road or route, with or without 
vehicles or animals.”  Justice Dixon in Williams v Melbourne Corporation, stated similarly at page 
156: “…The ultimate question in the present case appears to me to be whether, when 
applied to the conditions of Melbourne, the bylaw involves such an actual suppression of the 
use of the streets for the purposes of the necessary transit of an important and ordinary 
commodity as to go beyond any restraint which could be reasonably adopted for the purpose 
of preserving the safety, convenience and proper facility of traffic in general.”  Justice 
Dixon’s use of the word ‘suppression’ is potent.  ‘Suppression’ has direct relation to public 
rights.  In granting a license to a sports association for the exclusive use of a public place 
such as a beach, park or road, in order to conduct a publicly exhibited sporting event, to the 
detriment of the public’s right to use of such places, the power of a local council may be 
appropriately termed ‘an actual suppression’ of the public’s rights of use of those public 
places consistent with their purpose. 
 
Rules of statutory construction may be affected by whether a court adopts a unitary view of 
local government, expressed as Dillon’s rule, or a benevolent view of local government 
where deference is shown to local government decisions because of the fact the local 
government members are democratically elected.1005  Whether local government power is to 
be viewed in a broad manner or strictly can be critically important when considering the 
extent of local government power in respect of public places such as roads, beaches, parks, 
village or town greens, or commons.  Is their power comprehensive?  Or is their power 
properly cognizable only in the context of their care and management responsibilities.  Is 
their grant of power from the legislature so extensive that a local government can effectively 
‘legislate’ to overturn long standing common law rules protecting public rights?  Could 
Parliament really have intended to grant such extensive power to a subordinate, and 
principally administrative, body?  Or is local government power in respect of public places 
                                                
1005 For Dillon’s rule cases applying strict rules of construction of local government power see Merrill v Monticello 
[1891] USSC 79, 138 US 673 (1891); Hunter v Pittsburgh [1907] USSC 157, 207 US 161 (1907) at pp 178-79; and 
Verdun (City) v Sun Oil Co [1951] SCC 53, [1952] 1 SCR 222.  For the benevolent rule of construction see Kruse v 
Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at pp 99-100 (Lord Russell of Killowen CJ); Widgee Shire Council v Bonney [1907] HCA 11, 
(1907) 4 CLR 977 at pp 982-83 (Griffith CJ) and at p 986 (Isaacs J); Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 
56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at p 150 (Starke J); Brunswick Corporation v Stewart [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 
97 (Starke J), at p 99 (Williams J); Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd [2000] SCC 13 at paras [36]-[37], [2000] 1 
SCR 342; Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver [1994] SCC 115, [1994] 1 SCR 231 at pp 244 and 248; aff’d 
Croplife Canada v Toronto [2005] ONCA 15709 at paras [16]-[19] and [33], (2005) 75 OR(3d) 357, (2005) 254 
DLR(4th) 40. 
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essentially an ‘administrative’ power, where local governments have care and management 
responsibilities in respect of public property?  If we apply Dillon’s rule we state, effectively, 
that local government power is predominantly administrative in its scope and that any power 
or by-law of a local government must be reasonably and fairly consistent with its care and 
management responsibilities.  If the supreme legislature which grant powers to local 
governments desire local governments to possess powers to alter either common law or 
statute law, they must do so by using express words in legislation granting such power.  If we 
apply the benevolent construction rule we state, effectively, that local government power is 
similar to the legislative power of the supreme legislature and that local governments may 
make local by-laws which alter the common law and may license acts which are common law 
offences without the express grant of such power to so do in enabling legislation.  The 
danger in adopting a benevolent rule of construction is that judges, in construing an Act of 
Parliament granting power to a local government in a broad fashion, may in fact be reading 
words into the legislative provision granting power and may be extending the scope of that 
power beyond what was intended.  Local governments will always claim a more extensive 
power than that which is actually devolved to them under statute.  Yet the High Court of 
Australia’s position on this methodology of interpretation is clear: “It is no power of the 
judicial function to fill gaps disclosed in legislation.”1006  And further: “To read words into 
any statute is a strong thing and, in the absence of clear necessity, a wrong thing.”1007 
                                                
1006 Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640 at p 648 (Stephen J).  See also Council of the City of Parramatta v 
Brickworks Ltd (1971) 128 CLR 1 at 12; Footscray City College v Ruzicka (2007) 16 VR 498 at para [6]; and Cornwell 
v Lavender (1991) 7 WAR 9 at p 23.   
1007 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201 at p 251 (Stephen J).  Examples of where courts have 
read words into the text of a statute in order to construe the meaning of the statute include the English cases of 
Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74 at p 105 (Diplock LJ), and Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice 
Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586 at p 592 (Lord Nicholls).  The Supreme Court of Canada has also utilized, in a 
constitutional context, a methodology of reading words into legislation in order to ensure compliance with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights: Schacter v The Queen [1992] 2 SCR 679 at p 698, (1992) 93 DLR(4th) 1 at pp 12–13.  
In Inco Europe Lord Nicholls was of the opinion that a task of reading words into a statute, as an element of the 
process of statutory interpretation, can only be employed to “correct obvious drafting errors” in a statute.  His 
Lordship stated: “In suitable cases, in discharging its interpretative function the court will add words, or omit 
words or substitute words…  This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes.  The courts are ever 
mindful that their constitutional role in this field is interpretive.  They must abstain from any course which 
might have the appearance of judicial legislation.  A statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by 
the legislature.  So the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting or substituting words…” 
([2000] 1 WLR 586 at p 592).  Justice Spigelman explained these cases, and the interpretive methodology used 
by the justices in those cases in the following manner: “The process remains one of construction if the words 
actually used by the Parliament are given an effect as if they contained additional words.  That is not, however, 
to ‘introduce’ words into the Act.  It is to construe the words actually used.  Interpretation must always be text 
based.  The reformulation of a statutory provision by the addition or deletion of words should be understood 
as a means of expressing the court’s conclusion with clarity, rather than as a precise description of the actual 
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The first task which a Court ought to undertake is to determine whether the ‘license’ of a 
local government permitting or condoning the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event 
at a public place such as a road, beach, park, village or town green, or common, which is 
subject to the care and management responsibilities of the local government pursuant to an 
Act of Parliament, is ultra vires or intra vires.  Whether a strict rule or a benevolent rule of 
construction is used, the courts in essence apply standard contextual statutory interpretation 
methodology in construing the nature and effect of a legislative provision.1008  One very 
important fact which courts also take account of in employing a contextual statutory 
interpretation methodology is the fact that the legislatively devolved powers and 
responsibilities in Local Government Acts are invariably set out in clear and unambiguous 
                                                
process which the court has conducted.  The authorities which have expressed the process of construction in 
terms of ‘introducing’ words to an Act or ‘adding’ words have all, so far as I have been able to determine, been 
concerned to confine the sphere of operation of a statute more narrowly than the full scope of the dictionary 
definition of the words would suggest.  I am unaware of any authority in which a court has ‘introduced’ words 
to or ‘deleted’ words from an Act, with the effect of expanding the sphere of operation that could be given to 
the words actually used… There are many cases in which words have been read down.  I know of no case in 
which words have been read up.” R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 at paras [87]–[88] (Spigelman J).  See also J 
Spigelman ‘Legitimate and Spurious Interpretation’ (paper presented at McPherson Lectures University of 
Queensland – Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights 12 March 2008) 
<http://acthra.anu.edu.au/resources/McPherson%20Lectures%2012%5B1%5D.3.08%20Third.doc> (1 
February 2009) 
1008 Courts are now, increasingly, emphasizing also the importance of context in interpretation.  As was said in 
the joint judgment in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at p 408: “[T]he 
modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not 
merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses ‘context’ in its widest sense 
to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means… one may 
discern the statute was intended to remedy.”  See P Finn ‘Statutes and the Common Law – The Continuing 
Story’ in S Corcoran and S Bottomley (ed) Interpreting Statutes (Federation Press Sydney 2005) at pp 52-63. 
See also P Finn ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22 UWALR 7.  Recent Canadian authorities dictate that 
statutes be construed purposively in their entire context and in light of the scheme of the Act as a whole with a 
view to ascertaining the legislature’s true intent.  See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re) [1998] SCC 837, [1998] 1 SCR 
27 at paras [21]-[23]; M & D Farm Ltd v Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp [1999] SCC 648, [1999] 2 SCR 961 at 
para [25]; Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd [2000] SCC 13 at paras [19]-[20].  A recent standard treatise (J Bell 
and Sir G Engle (eds) Cross: Statutory Interpretation (3rd end Butterworths London 1995) at ch 3) expresses the 
basic rules of statutory interpretation this way: 
(1) The judge must give effect to the ordinary or, where appropriate, the technical meaning of words in the 
general context of the statute; he must also determine the extent of general words with reference to that 
context. 
(2) If the judge considers that the application of the words in their ordinary sense would produce an absurd 
result, which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, he may apply them in 
any secondary meaning, which they are capable of bearing. 
(3) The judge may read in words which he considers to be necessarily implied by words which are already in the 
statute and he has a limited power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words in order to prevent a provision 
from being unintelligible or absurd or totally unregulated, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of 
the statute. 
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detail.1009  This contextual approach, and the use of a reasonableness test, can result in Judges 
obfuscating Local Government Act statutory provisions to effectively render any ambiguous 
provisions void.1010  The proper role of the courts is to determine if the relevant act or 
decision of a local authority was in breach of or unauthorised by the law or was beyond the 
scope of the power given to the decision maker by the law and was consequently of no legal 
effect, or if the relevant decision maker had failed to comply with the law and should be 
compelled to do so.  In construing the nature and effect of a purported local government 
power to license the staging of publicly exhibited sporting events on public land, the courts 
will have regard for the fact that the effect of a local government ‘license’ in these 
circumstances is to permit the commission of a common law public nuisance and to obstruct 
or interfere with public rights in respect of the public place where the publicly exhibited 
sporting event is staged. 
 
In consideration of the fact that common law rights may be infringed by the license of a 
local government authorizing the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event, a rule of 
statutory construction which would hold that a local government does not possess power to 
license the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event unless the Local Government Act 
use clear and unambiguous terms in granting such power to local governments is the 
appropriate rule to apply.  It is not difficult for Parliament – with its vast resources – to use 
clear and unambiguous language in its legislative enactments devolving power to local 
                                                
1009 Rather than providing a broad and general governing power, Local Government Acts invariably provide 
separate authority for each conceivable function of local government and set out in clear terms the nature and 
extent of the functions to be performed by local governments.  In R v Greenbaum [1993] 1 SCR 674 at p 693 the 
Supreme Court of Canada noted that there are many limits on a municipality’s general power to adopt by-laws.  
In particular, when specific powers have been provided for, the general power should not be used to extend the 
clear scope of the specific provisions.  In Greenbaum (at p 693), the Court agreed with Middleton JA of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Morrison v Kingston (1937) 69 CCC 251.  At p 255 of that decision, Middleton JA had 
given a general description of the limits on a municipality’s regulatory powers, noting inter alia, that Local 
Government or Municipal Acts are very detailed in their provisions and contain clear direction as to the nature 
and extent of delegated power.  Speaking in the context of the Municipal Act: “Very few subjects falling within 
the ambit of local government are left to the general provisions…  Almost every conceivable subject proper to 
be dealt with by a municipal council is specifically enumerated in the detailed provisions in the Act, and in 
some instances there are distinct limitations imposed on the powers of the municipal council…”  Aff’d Montréal 
(City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc [2005] SCC 62 at para [51], [2005] 3 SCR 141, (2005) 258 DLR(4th) 595. 
1010 The use of the reasonableness test in Stewart v Perth and Kinross Council [2004] UKHL 16 at paras [70]-[71], 
[2004] 28 SLLP 32, (2004) SLT 383, 2004 SCLR 849 (Baroness Hale of Richmond), resulted in the House of 
Lords construing local government powers very strictly.  The House held that the power, in para 5(1)(b) and (2) 
of Schedule 1 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, to grant a second hand motor dealer’s licence on 
“such reasonable conditions as the licensing authority think fit” did not give the authority power to insist on a 
detailed inspection report being made available to all purchasers. 
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governments.  Whilst the courts will grant a degree of latitude to local governments in the 
exercise of the powers delegated to them by the supreme legislature, dicta suggests that 
where civil or public rights are affected by local government action, the courts will use a 
much more stringent rule of construction when determining the nature and extent of local 
government power.  In Potter v Minahan, O’Connor J said: “It is in the last degree improbable 
that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from 
the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.”1011  In 
so declaring the court noted the view of Maxwell on Statutes that in cases where a statute 
affects civil rights there are certain objects which a legislature is presumed not to intend.1012  
“One of these presumptions is that the legislature does not intend to make any alteration in 
the law beyond what it explicitly declares (per Trevor J in Arthur v Bokenham 111 Mod at p 
150; See also Harbert’s Case 23 Rep 12a at p 13b), either in express terms or by implication…  
In all general matters beyond, the law remains undisturbed.  It is in the last degree 
improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or 
depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible 
clearness [32 Cranch at p 390]; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because 
they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a 
meaning in which they were not really used.”1013 
 
                                                
1011 Potter v Minahan  [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304.  Justice O’Connor quoted these words from 
Maxwell on Statutes with obvious approval.  Aff’d: Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 
171 CLR 1 at p 18; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at pp 436-437; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49 at para [11], (2002) 213 CLR 543; and K-Generation 
Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ).  cf Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton [2001] 
HCA 14 at para [27]-[29], 204 CLR 290 at pp 298-99, where McHugh J although noting that, “Courts have long 
held that a statute should not be construed as amending fundamental principles, infringing common law rights 
or departing from the general system of law unless it does so with ‘irresistible clearness’” and that, “The 
legislative intention to do so, it is often said, must be ‘unambiguously clear’”; was of the opinion that, 
“…[T]imes change.  What is fundamental in one age or place may not be regarded as fundamental in another 
age or place.  When community values are undergoing radical change and few principles or rights are immune 
from legislative amendment or abolition, as is the case in Australia today, few principles or rights can claim to 
be so fundamental that it is unlikely that the legislature would want to change them…  Clear and unambiguous 
language is needed before a court will find that the legislature has intended to repeal or amend [many] 
fundamental principles.  Some rights may be the corollaries of fundamental principles.  In that sense, they are 
fundamental rights which are presumed to continue unless the legislative language is clear and unambiguous.  
But nearly every session of Parliament produces laws which infringe the existing rights of individuals.  Given 
the frequency with which legislatures now amend or abolish rights or depart from the general system of law, it 
is difficult to accept that it is ‘in the last degree improbable’ that a legislature would intend to alter rights or 
depart from the general system of law unless it did so ‘with irresistible clearness’.” 
1012 Sir Peter B Maxwell On the Interpretation of Statutes (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1905) at pp 121-22. 
1013 ibid. 
 335 
In K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court, the High Court of Australia referred to “a well 
established and conservative principle of interpretation that statutes are construed, where 
constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and 
freedoms at common law.”1014  Furthermore, there is a presumption against a parliamentary 
intention to infringe upon common law rights and freedoms: R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; Ex parte Pierson.1015 “Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words”: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms.1016  In the 
leading New Zealand case on the unreasonableness test used for construing the nature of by-
laws, McCarthy v Madden, the New Zealand High Court stated that: “A bylaw which destroys 
or unnecessarily interferes with a public right without producing a corresponding benefit to 
the inhabitants of a locality will be unreasonable.”1017  In Bropho v Western Australia, the High 
Court of Australia declared there existed:  
“[O]ther ‘rules of construction’ which require clear and unambiguous 
words before a statutory provision will be construed as displaying a 
legislative intent to achieve a particular result.  Examples of such ‘rules’ 
are those relating to the construction of a statute which would abolish or 
modify fundamental common law principles or rights (see, eg, Benson v 
Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942) AC 520 at pp 526-527)…  
                                                
1014 [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ). 
1015 [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 (Lord Steyn). 
1016 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131 (Lord Hoffmann).  See also Benson v Northern Ireland Road 
Transport Board (1942) AC 520 at pp 526-527. 
1017 (1914) 33 NZLR 1251 at pp 1268-70; aff’d Harrison v Auckland City Council [2008] NZHC 553 at paras [51]-
[53].  The principles of law, as distilled in McCarthy v Madden are that: “(a) A bylaw is not unreasonable merely 
because particular Judges may think that it goes further than is prudent, necessary or convenient;… [but] (c) 
Where a bylaw affects a public common law right such as the right to use roads for the purpose of traffic, it will 
be scrutinised with greater care than a bylaw which affects only the particular rights of inhabitants within the 
local authority district;… (f) A bylaw regulating the exercise of a public right must take into consideration 
general legislation on the same subject, and not be framed in such a way as necessarily to destroy that public 
right; and (g) A bylaw which destroys or unnecessarily interferes with a public right without producing a 
corresponding benefit to the inhabitants of a locality will be unreasonable.” (Harrison v Auckland City Council 
[2008] NZHC 553 at paras [51]-[53]).  “The reasonableness of a bylaw can only be ascertained in relation to the 
surrounding facts, including the nature and condition of the locality in which it is to take effect; the evil, danger 
or inconvenience which it is designed to remedy; and whether or not public or private rights are unnecessarily 
or unjustly invaded…” McCarthy v Madden (1914) 33 NZLR 1251 at p 1269; JB International Ltd v Auckland City 
Council [2006] NZRMA 401 at para [56]; Harrison v Auckland City Council [2008] NZHC 553 at para [51].  See 
also Carter Holt Harvey Limited v North Shore City Council [2006] 2 NZLR 787 at para [99], where Asher J referred 
to the need for a qualitative assessment, “by balancing the benefit of a bylaw against the nature of its 
interference with the public right”.  Such exercise involves an “element of subjectivity”.  “A cautious approach 
can be discerned in relation to administrative law attacks on Council decisions generally: Wellington City Council v 
Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA) at p 546.” 
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The rationale of all such rules lies in an assumption that the legislature 
would, if it intended to achieve the particular effect, have made its 
intention in that regard unambiguously clear.  Thus, the rationale of the 
presumption against the modification or abolition of fundamental rights 
or principles is to be found in the assumption that it is ‘in the last degree 
improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, 
infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without 
expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such 
effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their 
widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in 
which they were not really used.’”1018 
 
Gleeson CJ has described the presumption against parliamentary intention to infringe on 
common law rights as “a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to 
Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted.”  He added, 
“[t]he hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law.”1019  Lord Hoffmann refers to the 
presumption as an aspect of a ‘principle of legality’ governing the relationship between 
parliament, the executive and the courts.  In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex 
parte Simms, Lord Hoffmann explained: “[T]he principle of legality means that Parliament 
must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.  Fundamental rights 
cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words.  This is because there is too great a 
risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process.  In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the 
contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual.”1020 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Greenbaum, whilst recognizing the benevolent rule of 
construction of local government powers, nonetheless clearly viewed a by-law’s purported 
                                                
1018 [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18, citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at p 304; and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93. 
1019 Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union [2004] HCA 40, (2004) 221 CLR 309 at 329. 
1020 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
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alteration of common law rights as requiring the court to use a stricter rule of construction.  
The Supreme Court of Canada observed that:  
“As Davies J wrote in his reasons in City of Hamilton v Hamilton Distillery 
Co [1907] SCC 1, (1907) 38 SCR 239 at p 249, with respect to construing 
provincial legislation enabling municipal by-laws:  ‘In interpreting this 
legislation I would not desire to apply the technical or strict canons of 
construction sometimes applied to legislation authorizing taxation.  I 
think the sections are, considering the subject matter and the intention 
obviously in view, entitled to a broad and reasonable if not, as Lord 
Chief Justice Russell said in Kruse v Johnson [[1898] 2 QB 91] at p 99, a 
‘benevolent construction’, and if the language used fell short of expressly 
conferring the powers claimed, but did confer them by a fair and 
reasonable implication I would not hesitate to adopt the construction 
sanctioned by the implication.’ 
 
Accordingly, a court should look to the purpose and wording of the 
provincial enabling legislation when deciding whether or not a 
municipality has been empowered to pass a certain by-law.  [But] [a]s Ian 
Rogers has noted in The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (2nd edn 
1971), at p 388, a somewhat stricter rule of construction than that 
suggested above by Davies J is in order where the municipality is 
attempting to use a power which restricts common law or civil rights… 
[C]ourts must be vigilant in ensuring that municipalities do not impinge 
upon the civil or common law rights of citizens in passing ultra vires by-
laws (see, eg, Merritt v City of Toronto (1895) 22 OAR 205 at p 207).”1021 
 
There is abundant precedent requiring a court to construe a Local Government Act as 
lacking any grant power to license the staging of publicly exhibited sporting events at public 
places such as roads, beaches, parks, village or town greens, or commons, unless there is 
                                                
1021 [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at pp 687-88 (Iacobucci J).  In R v Greenbaum, the Supreme Court of 
Canada favoured restricting a municipality’s jurisdiction to those powers expressly conferred upon it by the 
legislature.  The Court noted that a purposive interpretation should be used in determining what the scope of 
those powers are. 
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clear and unambiguous language in the legislative enactment granting a local government 
such clear power.  Local Government Acts must use irresistibly clear language unmistakeably 
devolving power to local authorities to alter the common law through granting licenses to 
stage publicly exhibited sporting events which infringe on common law public rights.  Local 
Government Acts, in Australia at least, do not use clear and unambiguous language in 
reference to a local governments care and management responsibilities in respect of public 
land and parkland. 
 
Whilst the sports events using public roads may be tolerated, or even encouraged and 
facilitated, by a local or municipal council, such local authority has no power at law to negate 
or to authorize the commission of a common law crime – a public nuisance.  This was made 
clear in Johnson v City of New York,1022 Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation,1023 and State of 
New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc.1024  Acquiescence by a local authority in the staging 
of the events, and the use of public beaches, parks, and highways in the staging of the 
events, is not sufficient in law to disqualify public nuisance and legitimate the use of public 
spaces for an exclusive private activity or for a private pecuniary purpose.1025  Whilst local 
councils possess powers to close roads for maintenance, consistent with their responsibilities 
to care for and manage local public roads,1026 it is doubted that this power extends to creating 
a public nuisance by granting exclusive license to a sports promoter, such as Crossport 
Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (ABN 670 5234 2239), trading as USM Events, which 
organises, promotes, and stages the disparate sporting events of the Noosa Triathlon, the 
Mooloolaba Triathlon, the Gold Coast Half Ironman Triathlon, the Queensland Triathlon 
Series, the National Road Cycling Championships, the Noosa Blue Water Swim (a two 
kilometre ocean swim), the River Run (a ten kilometre run about the streets of Brisbane), 
and the Queensland Run Series.  The fact that the triathlon races at the seaside towns of 
                                                
1022 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906). 
1023 (1907) 71 JP 478. 
1024 96 Misc 2d 350 (1978) at p 358, citing Little Joseph Realty v Town of Babylon 41 NY 2d 738, Court of Appeals 
of New York (1977). 
1025 This was the express opinion of the Court of Appeal of New York in Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139 
(1906), where the Court held that a permit of the aldermen of the borough where the motorcar race was staged, 
authorising the sponsors of the motorcar race, the Automobile Club of America, to conduct the race about the 
public streets of New York, was not sufficient authority in law.  Because the motorcar race used the public 
highway for private use, thereby creating an illegal interference with the rights of the public to travel on the 
public streets, what was required was a statutory power. (Chief Justice Cullen at p 147). 
1026 See eg s 60 Local Government Act 2009 (Qld). 
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Noosa and Mooloolaba are very popular, attracting some 3,000 competitors each and some 
10,000 spectators; and the fact that the races may be good for tourism and for the local 
economy; are not relevant factors in the determination that the appropriation of a public 
highway for the exclusive use of a triathlon race – to say nothing of the appropriation of 
public parks and the inconvenience caused by crowds, the installation of temporary 
marquees and stands, and the annoyance and discomfort to local resident created by loud 
music loudspeakers and commentary – is a public nuisance.  As was highlighted by Lord 
Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms, there is too great a 
risk that a purported claim to possess power to override the common law may have passed 
unnoticed in the democratic process.1027  The general words of a Local Government Act will 
not be found by the courts to uphold the exercise of a purported power of a local authority 
to alter or infringe upon public rights at common law.  The supreme legislature must use 
express language to devolve such power to a subordinate body. 
 
 
5. The nature and extent of power devolved under Local Government Acts 
 
The fundamental question to assess in respect of the sufficiency of any purported license 
given by a local authority to a sports organisation to stage a sporting event at a public place is 
to assess whether the legislation empowering the local authority properly devolves a power 
to local authorities to alter common law public rights through the granting of a license to 
stage publicly exhibited sporting events at public places.   
 
Sports events using public highways, beaches, parks, or other public places are generally held 
with the approval of local authorities and purport to be lawfully conducted according to such 
approval.  The Noosa Triathlon, for example, obtains approval from the Sunshine Coast 
Regional Council.1028  The Sunshine Coast Regional Council believe themselves to have the 
                                                
1027 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
1028 Consequent to council amalgamation legislation in Queensland, the Noosa Shire Council is now merged 
with the Maroochydore Shire Council and the Caloundra Shire Council to form the Sunshine Coast Shire 
Council. Pursuant to regs 20-21 Local Government Reform Implementation (Transferring Areas) Regulation 
2007 (Qld) and regs 12-13 Local Government Reform Implementation Regulation 2008 (Qld) the local laws of 
the Noosa Shire Council continue to operate until 31 December 2010 upon the amalgamation of Noosa Shire 
Council with Sunshine Coast Regional Council. 
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power to approve events such as the Noosa Triathlon, pursuant to their own local laws, even 
though the race amounts to a public nuisance at common law as being an obstruction or 
interference of the public highway, public canal, public beach and public park, for the 
exclusive use of the promoters, organisers, and competitors in the race.  Just how, as a 
matter of law, the local authority believes its own local by-laws take precedence over 
common law rights in the absence of clear legislative language granting local authorities 
power to alter common law rights is bewildering. 
 
The power of local authorities in Queensland to issue local laws is provided by sections 9 
and 28 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), formerly section 26 of the Local 
Government Act 1993 (Qld).  This provision states that a local government has the power to 
do anything that is necessary or convenient for the good rule and local government of its 
local government area.  Powers which a local council in the state of Queensland may exercise 
in respect of public places such as roads, canals and beaches, are now dispersed between 
section 60 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), regulations 20 and 23-26 of the Local 
Government (Operations) Regulations 2010 (Qld), and section 30 of the Land Act 1994 
(Qld).  All powers are to be exercised in a manner consistent with the fundamental nature of 
a local council as having care and management responsibilities in respect of the public places 
within their jurisdiction.1029  With respect to roads, section 60(1) gives local authorities 
‘control’ over all roads in its area.  By section 60(2) control of roads is defined as including 
the following types of actions: (i) the survey and resurvey of roads; (ii) the construction, 
maintenance and improvement of roads; (iii) regulation of the use of roads; and (iv) 
regulation of the movement of traffic and parking vehicles on roads.  In no sense does this 
grant of power to a local authority entitle a local authority to grant an exclusive right to a 
sporting association to possession of a public road in order to conduct a publicly exhibited 
sporting event on a road within its jurisdiction.  Such a license facilitates the creation of a 
                                                
1029 Pursuant to s 7 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) councils exist, “to provide goods, services and 
facilities, and to carry out activities, appropriate to the current and future needs of local communities and of the 
wider public; to administer some regulatory systems under this Act; and to manage, improve and develop the 
resources of their areas.” See also s 30(b)(ii) of the Land Act 1994 (Qld) which provides for powers and 
responsibilities in respect of public places such as parks and reserves in Queensland provides that all powers 
must be exercised to, “ensure that reserves and land granted in trust are properly and effectively managed in a 
way that is consistent with the purpose for which the reserve was dedicated…” and further, following s 30(c), 
power is to be exercised to, “ensure that the community purpose for which the reserve was dedicated or the 
land was granted in trust is not diminished by granting inappropriate interests over the reserve or land…” 
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public nuisance at common law.  Section 69 gives power to local authorities to close a road 
during a temporary obstruction to traffic or if it is necessary or desirable to close the road for 
a temporary purpose; or in the interests of public safety.  Yet even this power, which on its 
face may seem quite extensive and may justify the temporary closing of a road during the 
staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event, must be read in the context of section 60(2) 
and the other provisions of the Act.  A temporary obstruction means exactly what it says – 
temporary.  At common law, temporary means momentary, brief, fleeting, transitory, 
transient.  Common law dictum dictates that a temporary obstruction must occur with 
promptness.1030  Any obstruction of the highway that is not prompt is a public nuisance 
because such obstruction impinges upon the fundamental common law public right of way.  
A local council is not empowered under section 69 to license an act which threatens a public 
nuisance at common law.  A temporary closure of a road under section 69 must be done in 
order to effect performance of a local government’s powers to ‘survey and resurvey’ roads, 
or undertake the ‘construction, maintenance and improvement of roads’, or to ‘regulate’ the 
use of roads.  What we are saying, in effect, is that a local government license to a sporting 
association to stage a publicly exhibited sporting event on a road is beyond the enumerated 
powers in section 60 and 69 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) and is ultra vires. 
 
The term ‘regulate’ as used in local government enabling legislation has been much discussed 
by the courts.  Dixon J declared in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury,1031 that a power to make 
by-laws regulating a subject matter does not extend to prohibiting it, either altogether or 
subject to a discretionary licence or consent.  Referring to the word ‘regulate’ and the 
definition of that word in its legal context as used in the Local Government Act 1915 (Vic) 
whereby a power to regulate was devolved to local governments, Dixon J stated:  
“…the force of the word ‘regulating’ has been discussed repeatedly and 
the cases dealing with its application have grown only too familiar.  
Prima facie a power to make by-laws regulating a subject matter does not 
extend to prohibiting it either altogether or subject to a discretionary 
licence or consent.  By-laws made under such a power may prescribe 
                                                
1030 In R v Jones 3 Camp 230 Lord Ellenborough referred to the need for acts in the public highways to “be 
done with promptness.”  Followed in Barber v Penley [1893] 2 Ch 447 at p 450. 
1031 [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at p 762 (Dixon J). 
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time, place, manner and circumstance and they may impose conditions, 
but under the prima facie meaning of the word they must stop short of 
preventing or suppressing the thing or course of conduct to be 
regulated.”1032   
 
As with his opinion in Williams v Melbourne Corporation,1033 Justice Dixon again here referred to 
local government acts of suppression of conduct as being beyond the power of local 
government.  Local governments may not, by discretionary license or by consent, such as 
may occur in relation to the staging of publicly exhibited sporting events, prevent or 
suppress public rights of use of public roads, and other public places.  Legislation does not 
permit local governments to so do and the courts will not interpret the legislative provisions 
devolving regulating power to local governments as encompassing acts of suppression or 
prohibition.   
 
In the earlier case of Melbourne Corporation v Barry,1034 the High Court held that a section of 
the Local Government Act 1915 (Vic) which authorised a council to make by-laws for the 
purpose of regulating traffic could not support a by-law which provided that any procession 
of persons or vehicles (except for military or funeral purposes) required the prior consent in 
writing of the council.  Isaacs J said that the effect of the by-law was that all processions 
(except military and funeral processions) were absolutely prohibited, no matter what their 
nature or effect on traffic, unless the Council chose, for any reason it liked, to permit a 
                                                
1032 ibid at p 762, citing Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v Virgo (1896) AC 88; Attorney-General for Ontario v 
Attorney-General for Canada (1896) AC 348; Londonderry Harbour Commissioners v Londonderry Bridge Commissioners 
(1894) 2 IR 384 at pp 390, 391; Co-operative Brick Co Pty Ltd v City of Hawthorn [1909] HCA 56, (1909) 9 CLR 
301; Shire of Tungamah v Merrett [1912] HCA 63, (1912) 15 CLR 407 at pp 423, 424; Metropolitan Meat Industry 
Board v Finlayson [1916] HCA 77, (1916) 22 CLR 340 at p 348; Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, 
(1922) 31 CLR 174; Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at pp 148-149, 155-156, 
157-158, 159; British Trawlers Federation Ltd v London and North Eastern Railway Co (1933) 2 KB 14 at bottom of p 
32 and bottom of p 33; Fox v Allchurch (1926) SASR 384 at pp 387, 388; Kerridge v Girling-Butcher (1933) NZLR 
646 at pp 690, 691 (Smith J).  See also Shanahan v Scott [1957] HCA 4, (1957) 96 CLR 245 at p 253 (Dixon CJ, 
Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ); Lyster v Camberwell City Council (1989) 69 LGRA 250 at p 258 (Cummins J); 
Morton v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand [1951] HCA 42, (1951) 83 CLR 402; and Ira, L & LC Berk Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 119.  Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at 
p 752 (Latham CJ), at p 762 (Dixon J) was cited and followed in Herald & Weekly Times Limited v VCAT [2005] 
VSC 44 at paras [15]-[16]; and Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for the ‘The Lakes Coolum’ [2002] QCA 550 at 
paras [7]-[8]. 
1033 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at p 156 (Dixon J). 
1034 [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174. 
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particular procession.1035  This is similar to how local councils frame their by-laws in respect 
of parks and reserves in some areas of Queensland.  The Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa 
Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks, Reserves and Foreshores provides that: “A person shall not 
in any park without the written approval of the Council except at places set apart therefor, 
organise or play a game, the playing of which requires the exclusion from the playing space 
of all persons other than those engaged in that game.”1036  And further, ““The Council may 
close all or any portion or portions of any park set aside for particular games during such 
times as it thinks fit…”1037  In the Barry case, Isaacs J considered that by-laws such as these 
were framed exactly as if the word prohibition were used in the sub-section instead of the 
word regulating.  He regarded that as a fundamental error which could not be justified by the 
statute authorising the by-law.  Both Isaacs and Higgins JJ agreed that the by-law in the Barry 
case was invalid as it had the effect of allowing the council “to make its own unfettered and 
unregulated will at the moment the test of legality or illegality.”1038  In the Municipal 
Corporation of City of Toronto v Virgo,1039 a decision which was cited in each of the above-
mentioned High Court of Australia judgments, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
said at page 93:  
“It appears to their Lordships that the real question is whether under a 
power to pass by-laws ‘for regulating and governing hawkers, etc. the 
council may prohibit hawkers from plying their trade at all in a 
substantial and important portion of the city no question of any 
apprehended nuisance being raised.’…  No doubt the regulation and 
governance of a trade may involve the imposition of restrictions on its 
exercise both as to time and to a certain extent as to place where such 
restrictions are in the opinion of the public authority necessary to 
prevent a nuisance or for the maintenance of order.  But their Lordships 
think there is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition 
                                                
1035 ibid at p 197. 
1036 Reg 24(2) Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks and Reserves and 
Foreshores.  A ‘park’ is defined to mean “any public place, open space, garden, recreation ground, reserve, 
common, foreshore, esplanade, or any land in the area dedicated to or vested in or under the control or 
management of the Council,… and includes ‘canals’ within the meaning of the Canals Act 1958-1987.” 
1037 Reg 25(1) Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks and Reserves and 
Foreshores. 
1038 [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174 at p 197. 
1039 (1896) AC 88 (Privy Council). 
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or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it, and 
indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued 
existence of that which is to be regulated or governed.  An examination 
of other sections of the Act confirms their Lordships’ view, for it shews 
that when the Legislature intended to give power to prevent or prohibit 
it did so by express words…”1040 
 
In Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney-General for the Dominion it was said that: “A power to 
regulate, naturally, if not necessarily, assumes, unless it is enlarged by the context, the 
conservation of the thing which is to be made the subject of regulation.”1041  Dixon J said the 
same thing in Williams v Melbourne Corporation:  
“The purpose of the power is regulation, and this Court has insisted 
upon the limited nature of a power to regulate traffic (Melbourne 
Corporation v Barry).  As I understand it, that decision, when applied to 
traffic… construes the power as enabling the council to prohibit passage 
through the streets only in so far as the council may reasonably consider 
necessary or conducive to the safe, orderly, commodious and proper use 
of them by the heterogeneous components of ‘traffic’ who are making 
an otherwise lawful use of them considered as highways.  The decision 
applied the doctrine ‘that a power to regulate implies the continued 
existence of the thing to be regulated, and that a power to regulate a 
subject does not authorize the donee of the power to prohibit the 
subject matter’.  But this doctrine does not altogether exclude the 
prohibition of particular acts or things…  The nature, operation, and 
apparent purpose of the restraints imposed must be considered and, if 
they fairly answer the description of a regulation of the subject matter, 
the power will sustain them.”1042 
                                                
1040 Virgo was cited and followed by the Privy Council in Ng Enterprises Ltd v The Urban Council (Hong Kong) 
[1996] UKPC 30 at paras [18]-[19], and by the Supreme Court of Canada in Prince George (City of) v Payne [1978] 1 
SCR 458 at p 468. 
1041 [1896] AC 348 at p 363, cited in Ng Enterprises Ltd v The Urban Council (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 30 at paras 
[18]-[19]. 
1042 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142 at pp 155-56, citing Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 
31 CLR 174 at p 211 (Higgins J), emphasis added. 
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Other cases suggest that a power to ‘regulate’ may connote a power to prohibit acts to a 
limited degree, subject always to the interpretation of the nature and extent of the purported 
local government power within the context of the legislation devolving power to local 
governments by the courts.  Noting Justice Dixon’s view in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury, 
Justice Starke observed in Brunswick Corporation v Stewart: “Prima facie a power to regulate and 
restrain a subject matter does not authorize prohibiting it altogether or subject to a 
discretionary licence or consent… But, as might have been expected, this proposition cannot 
be universally applied (Slattery v Naylor (1888) 13 App Cas 446).”1043  In Mineralogy Pty Ltd v 
Body Corporate for ‘The Lakes Coolum’, the Court of Appeal of Queensland cited Swan Hill 
Corporation and Brunswick Corporation v Stewart and stated:  
“The underlying rationale [behind these decisions] is that a power to 
regulate an activity implies that the activity will, despite such regulation, 
be capable of continuing, which it would not do if it were completely 
prohibited.  See City of Toronto v Virgo [1896] AC 88, 93.  Prohibition of 
an activity in part, in a particular case, or in a particular way, may 
however in some circumstances be needed in order to achieve effective 
regulation.  ‘The extent to which such partial prohibition is permissible’ 
the Privy Council has said, ‘depends on the terms of the power to 
regulate and on the context in which the power is to be operated’: Ng 
Enterprises Ld v Urban Council [1997] AC 168, 177.  The Australian 
authorities, a few of which are referred to in that decision are in accord 
with that view…  In Brunswick Corporation v Stewart [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 
65 CLR 88, 95, Starke J said that the court ‘should have regard to the 
body entrusted with the power and the language in which the power is 
expressed and the subject matter with which the body has to deal’…”1044 
 
A discretionary power to grant a license or permit does not connote a power to prohibit.  
When considering the nature and extent of the granting of permits or licenses in respect of 
public places such as parks and reserves under the Land Act 1994 (Qld), for example, local 
                                                
1043 [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 95. 
1044 [2002] QCA 550 at para [8]. 
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councils must be aware that their powers to grant a lease, license or permit in respect of 
parks does not connote an unfettered power to prohibit conduct at parks at their discretion.  
Any power to prohibit conduct at a public place must not be exercised so as to abrogate 
rights.  Young CJ, in Strathfield Municipal Council v Poynting,1045 in the Court of Appeal of New 
South Wales, clarified the nature and extent of a local government power to ‘regulate’ in the 
following fashion: 
“Depending on the words of the grant of power, the cases drew a stark 
distinction between giving power to a statutory body to regulate a trade 
and a power to prohibit.  Thus a by-law excluding chapmen from the 
busiest streets in Toronto was held to be a prohibition and outside a 
power to regulate chapmen; see Toronto MC v Virgo [1896] AC 88.  A 
power to regulate ordinarily does not permit prohibition subject to a 
discretionary power to licence or permit; see eg Swan Hill SC v Bradbury 
[1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746.  These cases show the primal 
dichotomy. 
 
However, it was always recognized under this line of case that to an 
extent, the power to regulate enabled the authority to impose some 
prohibitions.  Thus, had the council in Virgo merely prohibited, for 
instance, trade outside the main railway station, the by-law may have 
survived.  Thus, Isaacs J said in Tungamah SC v Merrett [1912] HCA 63, 
(1912) 15 CLR 407, ‘Regulation may include prohibition.  It depends on 
what is to be regulated.  The regulation of subject matter involves the 
continued existence of that subject matter, but is not inconsistent with 
an entire prohibition of some of its occasional incidents.’” 
 
By-laws such as regulations 24(2) and 25(1) of the Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire 
Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks, Reserves and Foreshores, referred to above, may be ultra vires.  
The facts of the cases where courts have commented on the nature and extent of the term 
‘regulate’ as used in local government enabling legislation concern local government 
prohibitions of conduct which likely threaten a public nuisance, in that, absent the local 
                                                
1045 [2001] NSWCA 270 at paras [127]-[129]. 
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government imposed restraint the conduct will likely cause an obstruction or inconvenience 
to others.  Local governments, in prohibiting conduct which likely threatens a public 
nuisance, are acting in concert with the common law.  The situation in respect of local 
government licenses of publicly exhibited sporting events is very different.  Far from 
prohibiting conduct which likely threatens a public nuisance, such local government license 
actually facilitates the commission of a public nuisance and prohibits the public from 
exercising their public rights.  The decisions of Tungamah SC v Merrett,1046 Brunswick 
Corporation v Stewart,1047 Williams v Melbourne Corporation,1048 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Body Corporate 
for the ‘The Lakes Coolum’,1049 and Strathfield Municipal Council v Poynting,1050 where the courts 
held that local government power to regulate may include a power to prohibit, in a limited 
degree, must be understood in this context.  This is probably what Dixon J had in mind 
when he said in Williams v Melbourne Corporation that: “The nature, operation, and apparent 
purpose of the restraints imposed must be considered and, if they fairly answer the 
description of a regulation of the subject matter, the power will sustain them.”   
 
The effect of Swan Hill Corporation and alike dictum, is that a court would be unlikely to find 
that a power to regulate the use of roads, and a power to regulate the use of bathing reserves 
and the foreshore, under the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), includes a power to exclude 
the public from the use of public places during the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting 
event at such public places.  The term ‘regulate’ as used in sections 60(2)(e) of the Local 
Government Act 1993 (Qld), for example, and the phrase that a local government may make 
a local law “for the good rule” of its local area does not connote a power to prohibit the 
public from the use of roads, beaches, bathing reserves, and the foreshore.  Nor does such 
power to regulate connote a power to suppress such use.  The public maintain public rights 
of use in respect of such public places and all local government power must be exercised in 
such a way to ensure the continuance of such public rights.  The term ‘regulate’ must be 
strictly interpreted by the courts and must not be understood to connote a power to alter the 
                                                
1046 [1912] HCA 63, (1912) 15 CLR 407. 
1047 [1941] HCA 7, (1941) 65 CLR 88 at p 95 (Starke J). 
1048 [1933] HCA 56, (1933) 49 CLR 142. 
1049 [2002] QCA 550 at paras [7]-[8]. 
1050 [2001] NSWCA 270 at paras [127]-[129] (Young CJ). 
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common law or alter common law public rights: Bropho v Western Australia;1051 R v 
Greenbaum.1052  Parliament must use clear language if it wishes for local government to 
possess such power: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms.1053 
 
In the Australian state of New South Wales, local authority powers in respect of roads is 
limited entirely to the carrying out of road works and to otherwise maintain and improve 
roads (sections 71 and 91-102 Roads Act 1993 (NSW)); and a power to regulate traffic in 
connection with road works (see sections 115 and section 122 Roads Act 1993 (NSW), 
which grants power to regulate traffic for a temporary purpose, and a power to direct the 
removal of obstructions of roads, and section 116).1054  The term ‘regulating traffic’ is 
understood, following the dicta of Swann Hill Corporation and like cases, as a limited power.  
Section 144 provides a power to grant a permit for a road event: “A roads authority may 
grant a permit to any person to conduct a road event on a public road.”1055  A ‘road event’ is 
defined to mean a speed contest or such other activity as may be prescribed by the 
regulations for the purposes of this definition.  Regulation 21A of the Roads Regulation 
2008 (NSW) provides that “a filming project (within the meaning of the Local Government 
Act 1993), and any activity that is ancillary to or connected with such a filming project, is 
prescribed as a road event.”  No other classification or further definition of road event is 
enumerated.  A publicly exhibited sporting event is presumed to not be a road event because 
the legislation does not state so in clear unambiguous language: Potter v Minahan;1056 R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms.1057  The power under section 144 does 
not permit a local authority to license an act which amounts to a public nuisance at common 
law.  A court of law construing the meaning of section 144 would be unlikely to hold that 
section 144 provides power to alter the common law public right of way on the highway 
                                                
1051 [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18, citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at p 304; and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93. 
1052 [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at pp 687-88 (Iacobucci J). 
1053 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
1054 Presumably, a local government in the state of New South Wales may use its powers under s 125 Local 
Government Act 1993 (NSW) to abate such obstruction on grounds of public nuisance. 
1055 A Local Council in New South Wales is the roads authority for all public roads within its Local 
Government area, except for any freeway, Crown public road, or any public road declared to be under the 
control of some other authority, eg the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority.  Public roads are vested in fee 
simple in the Local Councils.  See s 145(3) Roads Act 1993 (NSW). 
1056 [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304. 
1057 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
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without the supreme legislature using express and unambiguous words in section 144 
providing a local authority with power to grant an exclusive right to persons to close a road 
for the staging of a sporting event.  The power granted by section 144 must be read to be 
consistent with the common law and to preserve the common law public right of way: Bropho 
v Western Australia;1058 R v Greenbaum.1059 
 
Local Councils are similarly limited in the nature and extent of their powers in respect of 
other public places such as beaches, parks and commons, and not only in respect of roads.  
Section 28 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), couple with regulation 24 of the Local 
Government (Operations) Regulation 2010 (Qld) empowers local authorities with care and 
management and regulation responsibilities in respect of canals in its area.  There is no 
mention of a power for a local authority to close a canal to public use so that the canal might 
be used exclusively by the promoters of the Noosa Triathlon.  Regulations 25 and 26 of the 
Local Government (Operations) Regulation 2010 (Qld) stipulate that a local government will 
have control of bathing reserves and the foreshore where such places have been placed 
under their control by the Governor-in-Council.  Section 28 of the Act provides that a local 
authority may make local laws in respect of such places.  There is no power given to a local 
authority to close a beach to the public for the exclusive use of a sports promoter or to 
otherwise create or contribute to the creation of a public nuisance by obstructing or 
interfering with public rights to use of and enjoyment of a beach, seashore, or foreshore.  
Prior to the repeal of the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), local government powers in 
respect of bathing reserves and the forseshore were contained in sections 935 and 936 of 
that Act.  Those sections specifically used the words, “the local government may manage and 
regulate the use of” the foreshore or bathing reserve.  Following the decisions in Swan Hill 
Corporation and Williams v Melbourne Corporation, for example, the word ‘regulate’ as used in 
sections 935 and 936 must not be understood to empower a local council to prohibit the 
public from using the beach, foreshore and seashore, during the staging of the publicly 
exhibited sporting event or for any other purpose.  Because the staging of a publicly 
exhibited sporting event such as a surfing competition or a triathlon impinges upon public 
                                                
1058 [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18, citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at p 304; and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93. 
1059 [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at pp 687-88 (Iacobucci J). 
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rights of recreation in the sea and at the beach, the courts must, following Bropho v Western 
Australia,1060and Ex parte Simms,1061 for example, hold that a local government does not have 
power under the Local Government Act to abrogate these common law public rights.  The 
words in sections 935 and 936 of the repealed Act and in section 28 of the Local 
Government Act 2009 (Qld) are not irresistibly clear in providing local governments powers 
to abrogate common law rights. 
 
There is no provision in the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) granting power to a local 
authority to license the exclusive use of a park by the promoter of a publicly exhibited 
sporting event to the detriment of the public exercising public rights of use of parks.  In 
Queensland, local authorities are merely trustees of land which is set aside for parks and 
gardens or for use for sport or recreation.  Parks are created, pursuant to the Land Act 1994 
(Qld), following a dedication of land to the public to be held in trust for the public.  Trustees 
of this land are often the local government, but can also be groups such as a showgrounds 
trust or an incorporated sporting association.  Trustees are responsible for managing the land 
subject to the provisions of the Land Act 1994 (Qld).  Pursuant to section 52, all power to 
be exercised by trustees is confined to ‘management and maintenance of a reserve’.  All 
action, including the making of by-laws, must be consistent with the purposes for which the 
reserve was dedicated.  Section 57 empowers a local authority with rights to lease public land 
such as parks; but, following section 52(2), all leases must be consistent with the purposes 
for which the reserve was dedicated, and all leases must be approved by the Crown.  Section 
60 empowers a local authority with rights to grant a permit in respect of public lands; but 
again, such permit must be consistent with the purposes of the land (s 60(2)).  A member of 
the public has the right to use trust land for the purpose for which it was set aside.1062  Whilst 
the precise details of this use may be governed by by-laws which may limit the time or 
manner of use in the interests of safety,1063 a trustee has no power to exclude the public from 
                                                
1060 [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18, citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at p 304; and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93. 
1061 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
1062 See R v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Braim The Times 11 October 1986; Gibbs v Village of 
Grand Bend [1995] 129 DLR (4th) 449 (Ontario Court of Appeal); and North Cronulla Precinct Committee Inc v 
Sutherland Shire Council [1999] NSWCA 438 (3 December 1999) (Court of Appeal for New South Wales).  See 
further the discussion in Chapter 12, above. 
1063 For example, by-laws may prohibit playing golf on a reserve in the interests of the safety of people using it 
for walking. 
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use of a park by granting exclusive possession and thereby impinging on the public’s 
common law right of use.  Section 61(3) of the Land Act makes this very clear: “It is a 
condition of every trustee lease, sublease and trustee permit that the lessee, sublessee or 
permittee holds the lease, sublease or permit so that the land may be used for the purpose 
for which it was reserved or granted in trust without undue interruption or obstruction.” 
Lessees or permit holders of parks and reserves have only very limited rights; a member of 
the public retains their right to walk their dog on leased trust land, though they do not have 
the right to enter a building constructed on that land.  Local authorities or trustees with 
management and care responsibilities over public places may be duty bound, under some 
legislative enactments, to protect public rights relating to recreation and use of public 
parks1064 
 
Despite the absence of statutory power to license sports events which create public 
nuisances by obstructing public rights to use of and enjoyment of the public highways and 
other public places, local authorities purport to exercise power which interferes with or 
obstructs public rights, pursuant to their own local laws.  Looking at just two local councils, 
the local councils where the Noosa Triathlon and the Gold Coast Triathlon take place, 
reveals the extent of this claim to power.  Pursuant to regulation 24(2) Sunshine Coast Regional 
Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks, Reserves and Foreshores the local council 
purports to exercise a power which might create a public nuisance by obstructing public 
rights to recreation.  Regulation 24(2) provides: “A person shall not in any park without the 
written approval of the Council except at places set apart therefor, organise or play a game, 
the playing of which requires the exclusion from the playing space of all persons other than 
those engaged in that game.”1065  Further, under regulation 24(4), it is provided that: “The 
Council may set apart a portion of a park for the purpose of a lawful game or sport and from 
time to time may grant permission to a club or association of clubs, upon such terms and 
                                                
1064 Pursuant to s 8 Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust Act 1983 (NSW), the corporation that is established by 
the Act must “maintain the right of the public to the use of the Trust lands [the parks].”  The corporation 
managing the parks is under a duty not to enable the use of the parks for events which attract crowds of 20,000 
of more persons (s 20A).  The act is silent on the issue of public nuisance. 
1065 Under reg 2 Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law No 5 – Parks, Reserves and Foreshores, 
the term ‘park’ is defined to include “any public place, open space, garden, recreation ground, reserve, 
common, foreshore, esplanade, or any land in the area dedicated to or vested in or under the control or 
management of the Council, or of which the Council is trustee, or in respect of which the Council is 
empowered to make local laws or any part thereof and includes ‘canals’…” 
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conditions as the Council may think fit, to use such portion so set apart…” And, further, 
under rule 25(1), the Council empowers itself with what appears to be an arbitrary power of 
determining which games or sports may be lawfully played in a public place: “The Council 
may close all or any portion or portions of any park set aside for particular games during 
such times as it thinks fit…”  By these by-laws it would appear that the Sunshine Coast 
Regional Council claims a power to appropriate, or to facilitate the appropriation of, the 
whole of, or a part of, a public place for use by a private entity thereby excluding the public 
from the use of the place.  This conduct amounts to a public nuisance at common law 
because public rights of use may be arbitrarily infringed.  It is doubted that a local council 
has the power at law to create such a common law public nuisance.  The statutes which 
grants local authorities the power to care, manage and regulate public places, such as beaches 
and parks – section 28 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) coupled with regulations 25 
and 26 of the Local Government (Operations) Regulation 2010 (Qld), and section 52 of the 
Land Act 1994 (Qld) – do not empower a local authority to lease or license public land to 
private entities or private associations, for a fee, in order to obstruct public rights of use of 
and enjoyment of the public place.  All leases and licenses given must enhance the purposes 
for which the public place is dedicated to public use, not diminish: section 30(c) of the Land 
Act 1994 (Qld).1066  
 
Pursuant to regulation 8 of the Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Noosa Shire Council) Local Law 
No 4 – Bathing Reserves, the Sunshine Coast Regional Council purports to possess power to 
temporarily set apart the whole or a part of a beach for (i) life-saving competitions or 
training, and for (ii) other aquatic activities.  Council also purports to possess power to 
impose restrictions on access to the area set apart for beach sporting events (regulation 
8(1)(b)) and to fine people $1,000.00 for contravening such restrictions (regulation 8(3)).1067  
The local council claims to possess such power to fine even though the public using a public 
beach have a common law public right to use of the beach for their recreation; even though 
section 28 of the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), coupled with regulation 25 of the Local 
                                                
1066 Section 30(c) provides that trustees of public reserves must, “ensure that the community purpose for which 
the reserve was dedicated or the land was granted in trust is not diminished by granting inappropriate interests 
over the reserve or land granted in trust.” 
1067 The regulation imposes a fine of 10 penalty units which, pursuant to s 5(1)(b) Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld). 
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Government (Operations) Regulation 2010 (Qld), does not grant a power to the local 
council to exclude the public from using beaches; and even though the local council may as a 
matter of law be committing a common law public nuisance by excluding the public from 
using the beach or a part of the beach during a beach sporting event.  Following the 
decisions in Bropho v Western Australia,1068and Ex parte Simms,1069 a court will construe the 
Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) very strictly because the power which the Sunshine Coast 
Regional Council purports to exercise under regulation 8 of their Local Law No 4 infringes 
common law rights.  A court would not be likely to construe the Local Government Act as 
granting such extensive power to the Sunshine Coast Regional Council because the Act is 
not irresistibly clear in its language. 
 
Alike the Noosa Shire Council, where the Noosa Triathlon is staged, the Gold Coast City 
Council, where the Gold Coast Marathon is staged, purports to exercise, pursuant to its own 
local laws, powers to exclude the public from public reserves and parks and grant exclusive 
licenses to sports associations for the use of either all or part of a public park.  Regulation 
17(1) of the Gold Coast City Council Local Law No 9 (Parks and Reserves) provides:  
“A local government may grant a licence conferring rights of occupation and use of a 
specified part of a park or reserve. 
Examples⎯ 
A licence might, for example, authorize a sporting association to⎯ 
• mark out a playing field in a specified location on the park or reserve; 
• install specified equipment and facilities (such as goal posts and change rooms); 
• exclude the public from the relevant part of the park or reserve either temporarily (eg during the 
playing of a game) or over the whole of the period of the licence.”   
 
It is unlikely that the Gold Coast City Council has authority to ‘exclude the public’ from a 
public park, despite it’s claim of power to so do.  The Land Act 1993 (Qld) does not grant 
such broad power to the Gold Coast City Council.  Furthermore, section 61(3) provides that 
any license must not obstruct or interrupt the public in the enjoyment of a park or a reserve 
                                                
1068 [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18, citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at p 304; and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93. 
1069 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
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where that park or reserve is dedicated to public use.  The effect of the decision in Melbourne 
Corporation v Barry,1070 is that local government by-laws cannot require written approval for 
use of public spaces.  The primary responsibility on a local council in respect of public land 
such as parks, or commons, is to manage and maintain such places. The local authority in 
such circumstances does not have a right the same as a private owner of land.  As was stated 
by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for the Province of Quebec v Attorney-General for the 
Dominion of Canada: “…a declaration that lands are ‘vested’ in a public body for public 
purposes may pass only such powers of control and management and such proprietary 
interest as may be necessary to enable that body to discharge its public functions 
effectively.”1071  This does not enable a local authority under whose management public 
places are vested to create or contribute to the creation of a public nuisance at common law 
by closing roads, beaches, or parks for the exclusive use of a private entity such as a sports 
association, sports club, or sports promoter.  As was discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
the dedication of land to the public for recreation creates a public right to use of that land 
for recreation.  Any act, such as the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event, which 
affects or infringes upon the public’s common law right to use of the land is a public 
nuisance.  Excluding the public and thereby preventing the public from exercising their 
public right to use of the park for recreation is a common law public nuisance.   
 
The term ‘regulate’ is not used in the Land Act 1994 (Qld); and the term ‘manage’ must 
necessarily connote a power of lesser extent than the term ‘regulate’.  Councils do not have 
regulatory powers under the Land Act and, consequently, have no power to prohibit conduct 
in respect of a park which has been dedicated to the public for public use in Queensland.  
The granting of a lease or license in respect of public land such as parks or commons, under 
the Land Act, must be consistent with the purposes for which the public place was dedicated 
to the public.  There is no power given to local governments under the Land Act to ‘exclude 
the public’ either temporarily or permanently from using public parks and other public 
spaces.  Any act by a local council to exclude the public from use of public places, thereby 
infringing public rights of use of public spaces so dedicated to the public, may be a common 
law offence known as a public nuisance.  No local council in Queensland has authority 
                                                
1070 [1922] HCA 56, (1922) 31 CLR 174. 
1071 [1921] 1 AC 401 (Privy Council) at p 409. 
 355 
devolved to them from Parliament to license or pardon the commission of a common law 
public nuisance because the Act of Parliament which entrusts the care and management 
responsibilities on local council’s in the state of Queensland is makes no mention of granting 
such power to local authorities and is otherwise silent on the issue of public rights and 
common law public nuisance.  Case law dictates that Parliament must use irresistibly clear 
language in the Land Act if Parliament wishes to devolve to local governments powers to 
alter fundamental common law public rights. 
 
In New South Wales, local government powers in respect of land are classified as non-
regulatory (Chapter 6), regulatory (Chapter 7) or ancillary (Chapter 8).  Where land is 
classified as community land, which ordinarily comprises land such as a public park,1072 that 
is, where land is used for public recreative purposes, amongst others, a local government’s 
powers are confined to those which promote only enumerated core objectives under the Act.  
For example, pursuant to section 36F, “The core objectives for management of community 
land categorized as a sportsground are: (a) to encourage, promote and facilitate recreational 
pursuits in the community involving organized and informal sporting activities and games, 
and; (b) to ensure that such activities are managed having regard to any adverse impact on 
nearby residences.”  Similarly, section 36G provides: “The core objectives for management 
of community land categorized as a park are: (a) to encourage, promote and facilitate 
recreational, cultural, social and educational pastimes and activities, and (b) to provide for 
passive recreational activities or pastimes and for the casual playing of games…”  Councils 
may grant a lease in respect of community land such as parks pursuant to section 45(2) Local 
Government Act 1993 (NSW); but only for purposes of public recreation or “the physical, 
cultural, social and intellectual welfare or development of persons” (s 46(4)(a)), or to further 
the core objective of its categorization (s 46(2)). 
 
The case of Seaton v Mosman Municipal Council,1073 underscores a fine distinction in respect of 
local government powers in which the reader is encouraged to consider.  In Seaton, the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal held, dismissing the appeal, that the authority of a council to 
grant a lease of community land under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) empowers it 
                                                
1072 See Note at c 6, pt 2 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). 
1073 [1998] NSWSC 75. 
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to restrict the public right of access to it, provided that such lease is not manifestly 
inconsistent with the use of the community land.  In so holding, the court followed Friends of 
Pryor Park Inc v Ryde City Council.1074  The fine distinction respecting local government power 
which this decision underscores is the distinction between local government power to grant 
a lease of public land for a certain purpose such as a golf links or a zoo, pursuant to the 
legislative schemes of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) or the Land Act 1994 (Qld), 
on the one hand, and a purported local government power to deal arbitrarily with public land 
where the public have already established a common law public right to use of the land, on 
the other.  Whilst a local council may have power to regulate the use which the public make 
of a park or of a part of a park which has been set aside as a golf course consequent to a 
lease to a private entity or a sports association, in the interests of safety and the conservation 
of land, it is doubted that a local council has power to exclude the public from using a park 
consequent to the grant of a license to a private entity or a sports association for exclusive 
occupation of a park or of a part of a park which is already in use by the public for their 
recreation.  In the latter circumstance, the public possesses a common law public right to use 
of the park, and local councils lack a clearly defined power under the statutes to unilaterally 
abrogate.  Legislative enactments will be carefully construed by the courts to determine the 
exact nature and extent of any power devolved to a local authority. 
 
In Seaton, Mason P noted:  
“In Friends of Pryor Park Inc v Ryde City Council (1996) 91 LGERA 302 the 
Court of Appeal discussed Chapter 6, Pt2 of the 1993 Act (ss 25-54).  
The court rejected the argument that it was beyond the power of a 
council to grant a lease over all or part of community land.  The 
legislative scheme was found to have displaced the earlier law 
represented by Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge (1959) 102 CLR 54; 
Storey v North Sydney Municipal Council (1970) 123 CLR 574 and Waverley 
Municipal Council v Attorney General (1979) 40 LGRA 419.  These cases 
stood for the proposition that land used for public recreation and 
enjoyment must be open to the public generally as of right.  In the 
lastmentioned case, Hope JA had said (at 428) that: ‘except in so far as 
                                                
1074 (1996) 91 LGERA 302. 
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the statute otherwise provides, the Council has no power to erect upon 
the park any buildings which are not for the purpose of the use of the 
land as a public park or for public recreation.’   
 
Following this case, the Local Government Act 1919 was amended so as 
to permit the alienation of public reserves, subject to procedures for 
public notice, public objections and ministerial approval.  Friends of Pryor 
Park held that the 1993 Act carried forward such a legislative scheme.  
Subject to compliance with its provisions, s 36 and s 46 in particular, a 
council was held authorised to grant a lease of community land.  Such a 
transaction is necessarily capable of restricting the public right of access 
which had been previously stipulated as unfettered by the trilogy of cases 
to which reference has been made.”   
 
Mason P, in the context of the present controversy, noted also the comments of Gleeson CJ 
(with whose reasons Mahoney P and Meagher JA agreed) in Friends of Pryor Park ((1996) 91 
LGERA at 314): “We are not concerned with whether it was wise of the New South Wales 
Parliament to enact a law giving councils such power, or whether it would be wise of the 
Ryde Council to use the power in the intended manner.  Those are political, not legal, 
questions.  The grant of a lease or licence over a public reserve, in a manner which excludes 
the general public, will often raise sensitive social and political issues.  However, the 
legislation clearly contemplates that such a grant may be made, and the form of 
accountability which it provides is primarily political.  Provided they are acting within the 
law, and in conformity with their legal obligations, it is for elected councillors, not judges, to 
make decisions about the use and management of community land, including public 
reserves.” 
 
Both Seaton and Friends of Pryor Park concerned the proposed leasing of a public building on 
public land to a private entity to conduct a business.  In Seaton the local council sought to 
grant a right of exclusive possession by lease of ‘The Bathing Pavilion’ at Balmoral Beach, a 
facilities building built in 1928, to an entity who would operate a restaurant.  In Friends of 
Pryor Park, part of Pryor Park was to be used by scouts/guides groups and 
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childcare/preschool organizations.  Gleeson CJ said of Pryor Park: “Pryor Park was 
categorized as natural area, bushland and watercourse, by a plan of management which 
acknowledged the presence of the scout hall.  To permit the use, for a period, of part of the 
park, including the scout hall, for a Montessori preschool, will not have such an effect on the 
remainder of the park as to destroy the appropriateness of the general categorization as 
bushland… and watercourse.”1075  Neither case concerned the appropriation of public land 
beyond the reconversion and reuse of an existing building standing on that public land.  It 
could not be argued in either case the public rights of use of the park were arbitrarily 
infringed by the appropriations. 
 
Both Seaton and Friends of Pryor Park hold that the legislative scheme for the granting of leases 
or licenses in respect of public land such as parks must be complied with, section 46 of the 
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) in particular, in order to show that a local government 
power is intra vires.  Section 46 provides that leases or licenses can only be granted by a local 
council where the purpose for which it is granted is consistent with the objectives for which 
the land is dedicated to the public.1076  A lease or license is only lawfully granted where the 
specific purpose of the lease or license encourages, promotes and facilitates recreational, 
cultural, social and educational pastimes and activities, or provides for passive recreational 
activities or pastimes and for the casual playing of games at a place categorized as a park; or 
where the lease or license encourages, promotes and facilitates recreational pursuits in the 
community involving organised and informal sporting activities and games at a place 
categorized as a ‘sportsground’.  The Act also envisions, separately, the construction of 
public facilities and refreshment facilities as within the power of a local government.1077  A 
                                                
1075 (1996) 91 LGERA 302 at p 316. 
1076 See s46(2) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). Other purposes for which a lease or license may be given 
under s 46 include for the provision of public utilities, pipes, conduits or other connections under the surface 
of the ground; the provision of goods, services and facilities; the physical, cultural, social and intellectual 
welfare or development of persons (including, maternity welfare centres, infant welfare centres, kindergartens, 
nurseries, child care centres, family day-care centres, surf life saving clubs, restaurants or refreshment kiosks); a 
filming project; or for camping grounds or caravan parks prescribed by regulations.  Leases or licenses in 
respect of the foreshore (where many beach related publicly exhibited sporting events are staged) are more 
severely limited than those at a park and do not include recreation as a purpose justifying a lease or license.  
Thus, section 36N provides: “The core objectives for management of community land categorized as foreshore 
are: (a) to maintain the foreshore as a transition area between the aquatic and the terrestrial environment, and 
to protect and enhance all functions associated with the foreshore’s role as a transition area, and (b) to facilitate 
the ecologically sustainable use of the foreshore, and to mitigate impact on the foreshore by community use.” 
1077 See s 46(5) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). 
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local council in New South Wales does not appear to possess a power to grant a lease or 
license in respect of parks, beaches or the foreshore, in order to limit or diminish the 
recreational pursuits of the public at such public places.  In interpreting the extent of local 
government power under section 46 of the Local Government Act, a court will have regard 
for the spirit of the statute and the purposes of the land over which a local government 
exercises power.1078  Where land is dedicated to the public, it becomes public land.  A local 
council is not in the position of a private landowner in respect of such land.  They must deal 
with the land only in such manner as is consistent with the purposes of the dedication, 
preserving the manner of use of the land.1079  The common law public right to recreation is 
an important common law principle which a court might cite in its assessment of the nature 
and extent of local government power under section 46 Local Government Act.  A publicly 
exhibited sporting event may diminish the recreational pursuits of the public at public places 
such as parks because such event obstructs or inconveniences the public in their use of the 
park for their own recreation.  The principles at the heart of the dictum in Storey v North 
Sydney Municipal Council,1080 and Waverley Municipal Council v Attorney General,1081 may still 
provide a relevant benchmark against which courts can assess the true nature and extent of 
local government powers under section 46.  In Storey the High Court was concerned with the 
interpretation of a restrictive covenant which prevented the council from using the park in 
question otherwise than as a ‘public reserve’ as defined by the Local Government Act 1919 
                                                
1078 In Church of the Holy Trinity v United States, 143 US 457 (1892) at p 459, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that: “It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.  This has often been asserted, and 
the reports are full of cases illustrating its application.  This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for 
that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in the statute, words broad enough to 
include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation or of the circumstances surrounding 
its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such a broad meaning to the words, makes it 
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.”  Similarly, Roscoe Pound 
wrote that: “…[W]hen… primary indices to the meaning and intention of the lawmaker fail to lead to a 
satisfactory result, and recourse must be had to the reason and spirit of the rule, or to the intrinsic merit of the 
several possible interpretations, the line between a genuine ascertaining of the meaning of the law, and the 
making over of the law under the guise of interpretation, becomes more difficult.  Strictly, both are means of 
genuine interpretation.  They are not covers for the making of new law.  They are modes of arriving at the real 
intent of the maker of existing law.” (Roscoe Pound ‘Spurious Interpretation’ (1907) 1 Columbia Law Review 379 
at pp 383–384). 
1079 As the Privy Council noted in Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney-General for the Dominion [1896] AC 348 at 
p 363, cited in Ng Enterprises Ltd v The Urban Council (Hong Kong) [1996] UKPC 30 at paras [18]-[19]: “A power 
to regulate, naturally, if not necessarily, assumes, unless it is enlarged by the context, the conservation of the 
thing which is to be made the subject of regulation.”  See also Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 56, 
(1933) 49 CLR 142 at pp 155-56 (Dixon J) 
1080 (1970) 123 CLR 574. 
1081 (1979) 40 LGRA 419. 
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(NSW).  Owen J held that the grant of a lease over part of the land to the Boy Scouts’ 
Association was a breach of the restrictive covenant.  He stated at page 579: “To grant the 
proposed lease would result in the total exclusion from the land leased of all members of the 
public other than those who are members of the Boy Scouts’ Association.  I do not think 
that, in the circumstances, it could properly be said that the land was being used for the 
purpose of ‘public recreation, enjoyment or other public purpose of that  nature.’  It would 
not be, in the relevant sense, open to the public generally as of right, to use the words of 
Windeyer J in Randwick Corporation v Rutledge.”   
 
In Australian Posters Pty Ltd v Leichhardt Council, the court, citing Storey, opined that the phrase 
“public recreation” as used in Local Government Acts in respect of public land meant that 
such land had to be “open to the public generally as of right”.1082  Any lease or license in 
respect of parks or reserves which are used for “public recreation” must maintain the 
public’s right to use of the park or reserve.  Any exercise of power to grant a lease or license 
which threatens to infringe common law public rights must be found only in clear and 
unambiguous language in the Local Government Act.  A court will construe the ambit of 
section 46 very narrowly where common law public rights are jeopardized: Bropho v Western 
Australia,1083and Ex parte Simms.1084 
  
Common law courts have never interpreted statutorily devolved local government powers as 
encompassing the power to license the commission of a public nuisance through staging a 
publicly exhibited sporting event: Johnson v City of New York,1085 Attorney-General v Blackpool 
Corporation,1086 and State of New York v Waterloo Stock Car Raceway Inc.1087  In both Johnson and 
Blackpool Corporation the courts interpreted the local government powers in a limited fashion, 
holding that the exercise of power must be in accord with existing law, both statutory laws 
and the common law. 
 
                                                
1082 [2000] NSWLEC 195 at paras [34] and [36]. 
1083 [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18, citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 
277 at p 304; and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yates [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93. 
1084 [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131. 
1085 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906). 
1086 (1907) 71 JP 478. 
1087 96 Misc 2d 350 (1978) at p 358, citing Little Joseph Realty v Town of Babylon 41 NY 2d 738, Court of Appeals 
of New York (1977). 
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In Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation, suit was brought by the Attorney-General, at the 
relation of a ratepayer, for an injunction to restrain the local authority from organizing or 
promoting motor races on the sea front.  The Attorney-General argued that the parade was a 
highway, and that racing upon it was an improper use at common law.  It was also a breach 
of the Motor Car Act 1903 (UK), because the cars necessarily exceeded the speed limit.  The 
parade was also a footway, and the running of motor cars on it was an offence against the 
Highway Act 1835.  The erection of barricades caused obstruction, and constituted a 
nuisance at common law, as well as an offence against the Highway Act.  And the collection 
of crowds and of motor cars waiting to start on the carriage-drive was also a nuisance which 
ought to be restrained.  In defence to the action the local authority argued that: “Some 
latitude must be given to the corporation to allow its use for events causing public 
enjoyment, just as cricketers are allowed temporarily to monopolies portions of public parks.  
Section 44 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 expressly authorizes the closing 
of parks and recreation grounds for purposes of this kind…  The powers of the corporation 
are, of course, not unlimited, but this use is within them as being a bona fide use of a public 
work for a public purpose, viz the creation of an attraction in the off-season, and the 
advertisement of Blackpool.”  Likely, it would be to these policy matters which a 
contemporary local council would appeal in an attempt to justify their purported power to 
license a public sporting event such as a triathlons or a marathon which uses the highway. 
 
Heard before the Lancaster County Palatine Chancery Court, Vice-Chancellor Leigh Clare 
found that the Blackpool local government took an active part in the promotion of the 
motor race: “They did in fact issue notices closing a portion of the parade and tramway to 
the public.  They put up barriers and a grand stand, and the receipts of the grand stand were 
received by the corporation.  The effect of what the corporation did was to exclude the 
public from the use of the parade for any purpose during certain hours on certain days, and 
to stop the tramway service during substantially the same periods.  It was charged by the 
plaintiff that the motor meeting was a great nuisance and caused crowds to assemble and 
generally to block the access from the town of Blackpool to the seashore.  I heard the 
evidence given on this point, and I am satisfied that there was no greater interference with 
the public rights than was inevitable if the corporation were authorized to do the acts which 
they did in furtherance of the meeting.”  The critical factor in the case was to determine the 
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extent of the local authorities powers to license the motor race. “What I have to determine” 
Leigh Clare VC said “is whether the corporation were actually within their powers in what 
they did, or whether they were not.”  Was there an Act of Parliament which permitted the 
local authority to alter the common law by license and promote an act which was a public 
nuisance at common law?  The Vice-Chancellor held that the corporation were in the 
position of trustees of the parade for limited public purposes, namely, for the purpose of use 
by foot passengers, perambulators, invalid carriages, and similar vehicles, and that it was an 
abuse of the parade to allow it to be used for either horses or motor cars, and a fortiori 
motor races.  The court found that the local authority had no right to exclude legitimate 
users of the tramway and parade in or that illegitimate users may have exclusive possession 
of it during certain hours.1088 
 
Just as the Crown may not dispense with the law by a previous license; nor may a local 
authority dispense with the law by any previous license.  If a publicly exhibited sporting 
event threatens a public nuisance on the ground that it might impinge upon a public right, 
no prior license of either the Crown or of a local authority will make such event lawful or 
pardon the perpetrators of the public nuisance at common law.  Even if a local authority has 
the care and management of the public space where the publicly exhibited sporting event is 
staged – such as a public beach or public park – this administrative responsibility does not 
operate as a power to license or pardon an act which is a common law offence.  The New 
South Wales Court of Appeal has stated on more than one occasion that the right of a 
council to exercise care, control and management of land might better be described as a 
responsibility or even a liability, than as an interest having a commercial value.1089  The 
exercise of a purported power to grant rights of exclusive possession of public places to 
promoters of sporting events, by local authorities, is arbitrary and ultra vires Local 
Government Acts and Land Acts. 
 
                                                
1088 ibid at p 480. 
1089 Hornsby Council v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (1997) 41 NSWLR 151 at p 153A-D (Mason 
P); Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 251 at para [96].  See also 
Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28 at para [214] ff, (2003) 213 CLR 1. 
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6. A local authority may be complicit in committing a public nuisance offence 
 
Absent a clear and unambiguous grant of a power from Parliament, a local council has no 
power to grant permits or otherwise license a public sporting event that either causes or 
threatens to cause a public nuisance by impinging on public rights.  A local council may itself 
be liable to prosecution or to abatement of a public nuisance at the suit of the Attorney-
General where that council facilitates a public nuisance by granting a license to a sports 
promoter to stage a sporting event which causes obstruction, interference or discomfort to 
the public in the exercise of their rights; by closing public highways or public places; or by 
otherwise granting license to a sporting event which causes obstruction, interference, 
discomfort or annoyance to the public by drawing crowds of spectators.  This was the 
holding in Johnson v City of New York,1090 where the Court of Appeals of New York noted that 
a local authority’s permit to the Automobile Association of America to allow a car race to 
take place in the streets of New York was not sufficient at law to authorise the race.  The 
local authority’s power was not sufficient because there was no statutory power to grant a 
permit to use the highway for a private purpose.  This was, similarly, the holding in Blackpool 
Corporation.  A local authority found complicit in the commission of a common law public 
nuisance would be liable at common law to unlimited fines, to an injunction to abate the 
nuisance, and to damages. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The legislature must be much clearer in respect of the powers exercisable over public places 
and public highways, particularly the staging of sporting events in public places and public 
highways.  At issue for the legislature in any grant of power is the interference with and 
obstruction of public rights to use of and enjoyment of public places for physical activity and 
recreation.  If public places are to be divvied up among disparate private sporting clubs or 
sporting associations, each of which demand membership fees and fees for use of sports 
grounds under their management, then there is no place for the public to exercise their 
                                                
1090 Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906) at p 146 of the former report. 
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natural right to physical exercise or sport without paying any fee.  Only express statutory 
provisions will obviate arbitrary exercise of power.  The Executive Government, as parens 
patriae and protector of public wellbeing and public rights, has responsibility to manage the 
present situation; to take action, at common law, against local authorities exercising arbitrary 
power which interferes with or obstructs public rights. 
 
The Local Government Acts granting care and management responsibilities for public 
spaces such as beaches and parks to local authorities do not authorize the licensing, by local 
authorities, of activities such as publicly exhibited sporting events which give rise to public 
nuisances at common law.  The only authority which will shelter an actual common law 
public nuisance is an express, and not an implied, legislative provision.  As was stated by the 
Court of Appeals of New York in Hill v City of New York, “The authority which will thus 
shelter an actual nuisance must be express… For, consider what the proposition is.  It 
upholds a positive damage to the citizen and denies him any remedy… Surely, an authority 
which so results should be remarkably strong and clear.”1091 
 
There are very real legal and practical limitations on local government care and management 
responsibilities over public places entrusted to them.  Any act by a local council which might 
see the appropriation of a public place, such as a park or a beach or a public highway, for 
exclusive use by a private entity for a private purpose, and thereby causing an obstruction or 
interference with public rights to use of and enjoyment of the public place, is a public 
nuisance.1092  A local authority has no power to license or pardon the creation of a public 
nuisance by causing a public right to be obstructed, absent a specific grant of power from 
the legislature concerning the specific act which may create or contribute to a public 
nuisance.  There is no express statutory power in Queensland or New South Wales, for 
example, enabling acts which amount to public nuisances at common law to be carried out 
on public places.  It is doubted, further, that a local council possess any implied power to act 
in a way which creates or contributes to a common law public nuisance by obstructing or 
interfering with public rights.  Only Parliament may authorize a public nuisance by effecting 
a change to the common law through legislative enactment. 
                                                
1091 139 NY 495, 34 NE 1090 at p 1092 (1893). 
1092 See discussion in Part 2 of this thesis, above. 
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Indeed, far from Local Government Acts granting any power to local authorities to license 
the commission of public nuisances, Local Government Acts invariably restrict the powers 
to local authorities to only promulgate by-laws to protect the public from public nuisances.  
Note, for example, the power in s 125 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) in New 
South Wales giving power to local governments to abate public nuisances, and section 145 of 
the Local Government Act 2002 (NZ) which provides that local authorities in New Zealand 
may only make by-laws for the purpose of (a) protecting the public from nuisance; (b) 
protecting, promoting, and maintaining public health and safety; or (c) minimizing the 
potential for offensive behaviour in public places. 
 
In understanding the nature and effect of proscriptions on publicly exhibited sporting 
events, on ground of pubic nuisance, it is important to note the limits of a local authority’s 
powers.  With respect to the Noosa Triathlon, and other sporting events held in and about 
the Noosa Shire, which use public roads, public parks, and public beaches, the Sunshine 
Coast Regional Council has no power under statute or at common law to authorise an event 
which is a breach of the common law.  Only Parliament, in this case the Queensland 
Parliament, has sovereignty to alter the common law of the State of Queensland.  The 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the principles of statutory interpretation which 
will construe grants of power narrowly where common law rights are in issue, apply.  Local 
Councils have responsibility to manage public places within their area only unless an express 
grant of power in clear and unambiguous terms is granted. 
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Chapter 15 
 
The role of the Crown in managing public exhibitions of sport 
 
 
The Crown has a pivotal role to play in ameliorating the conflict of rights which the 
common law offence of public nuisance as applied to publicly exhibited sports highlights.  
Three interconnected principles underline the importance of the Crown’s role and suggest 
that the Crown must be concerned in safeguarding public rights.  These principles, assessed 
in this chapter, may be stated thus: (i) the common law constitutional principle of the Royal 
Peace or public peace; (ii) the common law constitutional principle of parens patriae; and (iii) 
jurisprudential exegesis on the relations between public rights, the people, and their 
government. 
 
 
1. Why is the Crown involved in the resolution of a conflict of rights in sports? 
 
Perhaps many governments are unaware of their authority, or their duty, respecting publicly 
exhibited sports events staged at public places.  In R v Jones, Lord Hoffmann stated: “Often 
the reason why the sovereign power will not intervene is because it takes the view that the 
threatened action is not a crime.  In such a case too, the citizen is not entitled to take the law 
into his own hands.  The rule of law requires that disputes over whether action is lawful 
should be resolved by the courts.”1093  Yet, ignorance of the law is no defence.1094  It is no 
                                                
1093 [2006] UKHL 16 at para [84]. 
1094 It is a principle of common law that, generally speaking, ignorance of the law is no defence to a criminal 
charge: ignorantia juris non excusat.  The general principle and its effect is referred to by Lord Bridge of Harwich 
in Grant v Borg [1982] 1 WLR 638 at p 646, where his Lordship described the principle as ‘fundamental’: “First, 
the principle that ignorance of the law is no defence  in crime is so fundamental that to construe the word 
‘knowingly’ in a criminal statute as requiring not merely knowledge of the facts material to the offender’s guilt, 
but also knowledge of the relevant law, would be revolutionary and, to my mind, wholly unacceptable.”  In 
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defence to the infractor of the criminal law; and should likewise be no defence for Crown 
inaction.  Nor does any absence of knowledge of the applicability of the common law 
offence of public nuisance to publicly exhibited sporting events affect the existence of 
relator or ex officio actions to prevent the staging of public sporting events which infringe 
public rights.  The Crown and the courts have an important function to perform, to ensure 
that the common law is preserved and that, where there remain gaps in the legislative agenda 
of Parliament, justice is administered fairly in a balanced and mindful manner.  The Crown is 
involved because it has to be involved.  If the Crown is not involved then the staging of 
publicly exhibited sports events is arbitrary and capricious, and public rights are subject, on a 
cynical view, to the financial motivations or needs of local councils endeavouring to balance 
their modest budgets and of sporting federations desiring maximum publicity.  
Considerations of impingement of public rights and impacts on the environment, and 
assessments of the proper use of public spaces, are not considerations which are wholly and 
consistently recognised or applied by the local council exercising a fictitious, and perhaps 
spurious, power to license publicly exhibited sports.  The Executive ought to provide 
leadership in the management of the interrelationship between the private citizen and 
publicly exhibited sports. 
 
In suggesting that the Executive has a pivotal role to play in the management of competing 
rights between the private citizen and profit-motivated professional sports organisations at 
public places, I am not suggesting that there is a radical step to take.  There are two reasons 
why such this suggestion is not radical.  Firstly, there is considerable historical precedent to 
support the suggestion that the Executive has been a player in the regulation of sport 
through exercising constitutional powers and through convention.  This fact is explored in 
                                                
Gilmore v Poole-Blunden [1999] SASC 186 at para [7], the Supreme Court of South Australia said, after 
consideration of Lord Bridge’s comments in Grant v Borg, that the principle, “…will apply to total ignorance of 
the law.  It will apply to a mistaken understanding of the law and to a situation where the defendant has been 
positively misled as to the effect of the law.  A positive but wrong belief as to the state of the law will be no 
excuse: R v Kennedy [1923] SASR 183. The principle covers a wide variety of circumstances in which ignorance 
of the law will not afford a defence.  Mistake as to the law is only one of them.”  The maxim ignorantia juris non 
excusat was explained by Sir William Evans in Pothier’s Treatise on the law of Obligations [Sir William Evans (ed) GF 
Le Trosne (tr) Pothier’s Treatise on the law of Obligations (Butterworths London 1806) (British Library Shelfmarks 
10659.c.10, 496.e.16), cited in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349 at p 
464 (Lord Goff of Chieveley].  He stated, at pp 394-395: “The rule in its terms is sufficiently satisfied, by 
holding that no man shall, under the pretence of an ignorance of the law, excuse himself from the performance 
of his own obligations, or acquire an advantage, or avoid a detriment, when he has omitted using the means 
ordained by law for those purposes.” 
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Chapter 2, at the beginning to this thesis, wherein historical edicts and regulations are 
detailed.  Secondly, there is at least one jurisdiction where the Executive arm of government 
is authorized by statute to license public sporting events and, in that process, authorized to 
also determine that some sporting events are not lawfully practised in public places.  This 
jurisdiction is France.  This fact is explored in Chapter 16, following, wherein legislative 
reform is promoted. 
 
However, the basic fact remains that if the Crown does not sue to protect public rights then 
there is no remedy for the people and publicly exhibited sporting events may continue to be 
arbitrarily staged to the detriment of the public right of way, the public right of quietude, the 
public right to safety, and the public right to recreation, &c. 
 
Whether any conduct on the part of a sports club, association, competition or event amounts 
to a public nuisance is a question of fact.  The case law as discussed in this thesis provides a 
guide as to the degree to which the Executive ought to manage, either through their Sports 
Minister or through their Attorney-General, the competing interest which arise in the staging 
of public sporting events.  This case law demonstrates two very important factors: namely, 
that,  
(i) the Executive of Government has a crucial role in managing the staging of sports 
in public places and has a responsibility, as parens patriae, to establish policy as to 
the manner in which public sporting events may be staged at public places to 
minimize or avoid infringements of public rights; and  
(ii) the people ought to be aware of their right to petition the Attorney-General for 
relator actions for abatement of public sporting events as public nuisances.  In 
light of this, the public ought to made aware, and the Executive Government 
ought also to be cognisant of the fact, that as few as seven households may 
satisfying the class of the public whose rights are interfered with by a public 
nuisance.  Principally what the Crown is doing in suing for abatement of a 
sporting event as a public nuisance is protecting the more important public right 
which the staging of the sporting event is said to impinge.   
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2. The Royal Peace 
 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority,1095 the 
Court of Appeal examined the interaction between known prerogative powers and 
prerogative powers that might exist.  The facts concerned the Home Secretary’s power to 
issue baton rounds to a chief constable without the consent of the police authority.  The 
court held that the 1964 Police Act gave the Home Secretary the power to do this but went 
on to hold that in any event the Crown had a prerogative power to keep the peace within the 
realm, which was not displaced by the 1964 Act, and the Home Secretary could therefore 
have acted even if the Act had not provided him with one.  Nourse LJ commented that “the 
scarcity of references in the books to the prerogative of keeping the peace within the realm 
does not disprove that it exists.  Rather it may point to an unspoken assumption that it does” 
 
The constitutional notion of the Queen’s Peace is the plinth for all human interactions 
within our common law legal systems.  The peace of our Sovereign Lady the Queen is an all-
embracing atmosphere in our law.1096  “[T]his notion of the King’s Peace, extended, 
elaborated and even a little fantasticated [over the centuries], has coloured with one hue or 
another the whole field of our law, civil as well as criminal.”1097  In Pollock and Maitland’s 
The History of English Law it is noted that, “all criminal offences have long been said to be 
committed against the King’s Peace.”1098  ‘All criminal offences’ includes the common law 
offence of public nuisance.  Conduct which might be regarded as a threat to the Royal Peace, 
or, as would be more commonly noted now, to society, is regarded by the common law as 
unlawful.1099 
 
                                                
1095 [1989] 1 QB 26 (Court of Appeal). 
1096 Sir Carleton Kemp Allen The Queen’s Peace (Stevens and Sons London 1953) citing Maitland, at p 3.  Sir 
Frederick Pollock and FW Maitland The History of the English Law (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1895) 
vol 2, at p 462, note that: “The King’s Peace at first only extended to crimes which were the original pleas of 
the Crown but the King’s Peace by an easy process extended itself until it had become an all embracing 
atmosphere.”  See also R v Magee (1923) 40 CCC 10 at p 12 (Sask Court of Appeal) (Haultain CJS, Lamont, 
McKay and Martin JJA concurring). 
1097 ibid at p 35. 
1098 Sir Frederick Pollock and FW Maitland The History of the English Law (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge 1895) vol 1, at p 22. 
1099 See R v Doot [1973] AC 807 at pp 817-818 (Lord Wilberforce). 
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The Royal Peace is intrinsically linked to the constitutional notion of parens patriae.  The 
Royal Peace emanated from the constitutions of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of Britain, 
before the Conquest, at a time when there was not yet any established comprehensive peace 
of the whole realm.  The King’s Peace is coupled with the concept of kingly jurisdiction over 
the laws, particularly by way of appeal to the King.  The King’s residual benevolence 
encompassed the principle that the King was the general patron and protector of the peace, 
a principle that later came to be known as parens patriae.  In VIII Aethelred 33 we find: “If any 
attempt is made to deprive in any wise a man in orders, or a stranger, of either his goods or 
his life, the king shall act as his kinsman and protector (for maeg and for mundboran), unless he 
has some other.”1100  The Royal Peace is thus a protective jurisdiction, as is parens patriae.  
This law of Aethelred was re-enacted by Cnut (II Cnut 40).1101 
 
William I confirmed the constitutional notion of the King’s peace on the Conquest.  William 
I provided special protection for his followers.  In the third of the The Articles of William I, 
circa 1068, it is provided that: “all the men whom I brought with me or who have come after 
me shall be in my peace and quiet.”1102  Preserving the public peace have long been 
responsibilities of the Crown.  This legal fact was commended in the recent judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Kerr,1103 where Justices Bastarache and Major, for the 
majority, and Justice Binnie, dissenting, commented on the magnitude of the Queen’s Peace 
as it related to an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada of possessing a weapon ‘for a 
purpose dangerous to the public peace.’  “The foundational notion of the ‘public peace’,” 
Justice Binnie remarked, “reaches back to the roots of Anglo-Canadian history prior to the 
Norman Conquest: A self-respecting Anglo-Saxon king would always try to bring order and 
tranquillity to his people, and in Ethelbert’s laws there was already one principle by which 
kings could extend their influence.  That was the principle of the peace.  The mitigation of the 
disastrous effects of ‘self-help’ was attained by the extension of the idea of the king’s peace 
and the responsibility of all, not just of the parties to a quarrel, to see that it was 
                                                
1100 FL Attenborough (ed)(tr) The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1922) 
at pp 108-09. 
1101 ibid. 
1102 See Sir Carleton Kemp Allen The Queen’s Peace (Stevens and Sons London 1953) at pp 8-11 and 23-25. 
1103 [2004] SCC 44, [2004] 2 SCR 371, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 257  (Supreme Court of Canada). 
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observed”1104  The Royal Peace is “the legal name of the normal state of society”; and is “the 
general peace and order of the realm, as provided by law”.1105   
 
Considerations of public order that arise from the staging of public sports are reflected in the 
common law principle that sporting events which occur in public at public places fall 
squarely within the police or supervisory power of the state.1106  In State v Hogreiver, 1107 the 
question on appeal was whether a statute which prohibited the playing of baseball on 
Sundays where any fee was charged, or where any reward, or prize, or profit, or article of 
value was depending upon the result of such game, was unconstitutional.  Argument was 
made that the State violated organic law by prohibiting baseball on a Sunday because the 
statute discriminated against baseball playing as an occupation.  The Supreme Court was 
concerned that unrestrained public exhibitions of sports can lead to regrettable behaviour 
and regrettable harm.  In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court of Indiana noted that 
publicly exhibited sports, such as a game of baseball, were rightfully controllable by police 
power owing to tendency of such games to breaches of the peace.  Justice Dowling stated:  
“The State deals with [sport] in the exercise of its police power, to 
circumscribe certain evils which are likely to result from its unrestrained 
practice, to repress certain known pernicious tendencies, and to protect 
the citizens of the State… 
 
The objects of the game of baseball, as stated in the brief of counsel for 
the appellee, are to furnish entertainment and amusement to the 
spectators of the sport.  It is said to be popular.  It attracts great throngs, 
including persons of all ages and of both sexes.  Both chance and skill 
enter into the doubtful results of the game.  It affords the opportunity, 
and furnishes strong inducements to that species of gambling known as 
‘betting.’  The contests between the players are often close and exciting, 
                                                
1104 R v Kerr v The Queen [2004] SCC 44 at para [63], [2004] 2 SCR 371, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 257 (Supreme Court 
of Canada) (Binnie J, dissenting, citing A Harding A Social History of English Law (Penguin Books 
Harmondsworth Middlesex 1966) at pp 15-21). 
1105 Sir James F Stephen History of the Criminal Law (Routledge London 1996) vol 1, p 185; R v Magee (1923) 40 
CCC 10 (Sask CA) at pp 11-12 (Haultain CJS); Sir James AH Murray New English Dictionary (Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1933) vol 7, p 582; and R v Kerr [2004] SCC 44 at para [66], [2004] 2 SCR 371, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 257. 
1106 State v Hogreiver 152 Ind 652 (1899). 
1107 152 Ind 652, 53 NE 921 (1899). 
 372 
and the decisions of umpires unsatisfactory.  Tumults, riots, and 
breaches of the peace at the games, are not uncommon. 
 
Wherever these conditions exist, the peace and quiet of neighbourhoods 
are liable to be disturbed, and the public order broken.  Under such 
circumstances, it follows that extraordinary police regulation and 
supervision become necessary, and, this being the case, these exhibitions 
fall, unquestionably, within the class of entertainments and occupations 
which, in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, may be 
regulated, restrained, or even prohibited by the people…”1108 
 
Publicly exhibited sporting events occur within the Royal Peace.  The Crown possesses an 
enveloping jurisdiction in order to ensure the peace and good order of the realm through 
preserving fundamental common law rights from untoward circumstances. 
 
 
3. Parens Patriae 
 
In upholding claims against public nuisances, including claims of public nuisance created by 
publicly exhibited sporting events, courts have cited parens patriae jurisdiction as a basis for 
intercession.1109  In citing the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Crown as authority for actions 
against public nuisances, the courts are making use of a broad protective power.   
 
                                                
1108 152 Ind 652 at p 658-659, 53 NE 921 at p 924, (1899). 
1109 In State of New York v Bridgehampton Road Races Corp 44 AD 2d 725 (1974), the Attorney-General of New 
York “instituted an action as parens patriae” of those individuals who had been or would be injured by the 
alleged public nuisance created by the defendant sports corporations.  Other cases where parens patriae 
jurisdiction was cited include: British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at para [67], [2004] 2 
SCR 74, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 1; Attorney-General of Ontario v Dieleman [1994] 20 OR (3d) 229; and Attorney-General 
of New York v Sturm, Ruger & Co Inc 309 AD 2d 91 (2003) at p 110 (Rosenberger J dissenting).  Sir George Jessel 
MR noted in Attorney-General v Cockermouth Local Board (1874) LR 18 Eq 172 at p 176: “Except for the purposes 
of costs, there is no difference between an ex officio information and an information at the relation of a private 
individual.  In both cases the Sovereign, as parens patriae, sues by the Attorney-General.” 
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The history of the parens patriae jurisdiction was discussed at length by La Forest J in the 
Canadian case of Re Eve,1110 which was cited with approval by the High Court of Australia in 
Marion’s Case.1111  Mr Justice La Forest observed in summarizing remarks that:  
“Before going on, it may be useful to summarize my views on the parens 
patriae jurisdiction.  From the earliest time, the sovereign, as parens patriae, 
was vested with the care of the mentally incompetent.  This right and 
duty, as Lord Eldon noted in Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort [(1827) 2 Russ 1, 
38 ER 236] at 2 Russ at p 20, 38 ER at p 243, is founded on the obvious 
necessity that the law should place somewhere the care of persons who 
are not able to take care of themselves.  In early England, the parens 
patriae jurisdiction was confined to mental incompetents, but its 
rationale is obviously applicable to children and, following the transfer 
of that jurisdiction to the Lord Chancellor in the seventeenth century, he 
extended it to children under wardship, and it is in this context that the 
bulk of the modern cases on the subject arise…  The parens patriae 
jurisdiction is, as I have said, founded on necessity, namely the need to 
act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves.  The 
courts have frequently stated that it is to be exercised in the ‘best 
interest’ of the protected person, or again, for his or her ‘benefit’ or 
‘welfare’.”1112   
 
In Re Frances and Benny,1113 Young CJ in Eq (as his Honour then was) said of this munificent 
jurisdiction:  
                                                
1110 [1986] SCC 36 at paras [31]-[43], (1986) 2 SCR at pp 407-17, (1986) 31 DLR(4th) at pp 14-21, cited in 
Marion’s Case [1992] HCA 15 at paras [68]-[70], (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
1111 [1992] HCA 15 at paras [68]-[70], (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
1112 Re Eve [1986] SCC 36 at paras [72]-[73], [1986] 2 SCR 388 (Supreme Court of Canada) (La Forest J).  See 
also Department of Community Services (NSW) v Y [1999] NSWSC 644 at para [85] (Austin J) where His Honour 
cited Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1at p 20, 38 ER 236 at p 243 (Lord Eldon LC); and Re Thomas 
[2009] NSWSC 217 at paras [22]-[30].  Lord Eldon’s exact words in Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1 at 
p 20, 38 ER 236 at p 243 were: “[I]t belongs to the King as parens patriae, having the care of those who are not 
able to take care of themselves, and is founded on the obvious necessity that the law should place somewhere 
the care of individuals who cannot take care of themselves, particularly in cases where it is clear that some care 
should be thrown round them.” 
1113 [2005] NSWSC 1207 at para [17], 
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“The parens patriae jurisdiction derives from the royal prerogative and 
although its origins probably go back to the time of Edward III, in more 
recent centuries the Chancery Division in England and the Equity Court 
in New South Wales have been responsible for exercising the Queen’s 
power to do good to all her subjects, particularly to those who are 
children or otherwise incapable of looking after themselves.  In 
exercising that jurisdiction the court’s concern is predominantly for the 
welfare of the person involved. It is not a jurisdiction that is bogged 
down at all with any technicalities.  It is a quite separate jurisdiction to 
the supervisory jurisdiction that is committed to this court by way of 
prerogative orders under which this court supervises inferior courts and 
tribunals to make sure that they do justice and right to all people before 
them.” 
 
But the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Crown is not only a prerogative power.  It is also a 
duty, as was highlighted by the House of Lords in In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation).1114  
The House explained the concept of parens patriae in the following terms: “…the parens patriae 
jurisdiction… is an ancient prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown going back as far perhaps 
as the thirteenth century.  Under it the Crown as parens patriae had both the power and the 
duty to protect the persons and property of those unable to do so for themselves, a category 
which included both minors (formerly described as infants) and persons of unsound mind 
(formerly described as lunatics or idiots).”  In British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products 
Ltd,1115 the Supreme Court of Canada, citing Stein v Gonzales,1116 attributed the duty of 
enforcing public rights to the Crown’s role as parens patriae. 
 
Parens patriae is a doctrine of jurisdiction, incorporating both powers and obligations.  It is 
perhaps best understood, adopting Montesquieuan language, as the relations between the 
courts, the Executive, and the people, where obligations are fulfilled and authority exercised 
on behalf of the public for the protection of common law rights.  Parens patriae has been 
                                                
1114 [1991] UKHL 1, [1990] 2 AC 1 at p 57 (Lord Brandon of Oakbrook). 
1115 [2004] SCC 38 at para [67], [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 240 DLR(4th) 1. 
1116 [1984] BCSC 344, (1984) 14 DLR(4th) 263 at pp 265 and 268 (McLachlin J). 
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described as “the Court’s inherent jurisdiction as parens patriae to safeguard and oversee the 
welfare of those who are unable to attend to their own welfare…”1117  In respect of common 
law public rights, parens patriae jurisdiction may arise in three distinct contexts.  First, the 
jurisdiction arises as a logical extension of the ancient prerogative duty in respect of children 
and the mentally impaired.  Secondly, parens patriae jurisdiction may be invoked in suits 
involving public rights because public rights are indivisible from the Crown.  Thirdly, 
common law judgments in respect of public land may equate public land as ‘trust land’.  Any 
acts purportedly harming trust land invokes parens patriae jurisdiction. 
 
Parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of ‘those who are not able to take care of themselves’ is 
logically extended from its historical origins in relation to children and the mentally impaired 
to include also circumstances where public rights are harmed generally.  This is so by virtue 
of the legal rule that a private person lacks capacity to sue for a public wrong.1118  It is the 
absence of capacity to resort to the courts which invokes the Crown’s protective mantle.  In 
Alfred L Snapp & Son Inc v Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, the United States Supreme Court saw the 
parens patriae jurisdiction as evolving from a particular duty in respect of certain identified 
persons to a duty to prevent harm generally ‘in the interests of humanity’.  The court 
commented on the doctrine of parens patriae in the following way: 
“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country’.  The parens patriae 
action has its roots in the common-law concept of the ‘royal 
prerogative’.  The royal prerogative included the right or responsibility to 
take care of persons who ‘are legally unable, on account of mental 
incapacity, whether it proceed from nonage, idiocy, or lunacy, to take 
proper care of themselves and their property’.  At a fairly early date, 
American courts recognized this common-law concept, but now in the 
form of a legislative prerogative: ‘This prerogative of parens patriae is 
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is 
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature [and] is a most beneficent 
                                                
1117 Re Jules [2008] NSWSC 1193 at para [7]. 
1118 In Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 477 (Lord Wilberforce): “It can 
properly be said to be a fundamental principle of English law that private rights can be asserted by individuals, 
but that public rights can only be asserted by the Attorney-General as representing the public.”  See further 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at p 482 (Lord Wilberforce), at p 507 (Lord 
Edmund-Davies). 
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function . . . often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, 
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect 
themselves.’”1119 
 
Similarly, in Mexico v Austin Decoster, the United States Court of Appeal, First Circuit, citing 
Snapp at p 602, explained: “[Parens patriae jurisdiction] creates an exception to normal rules of 
standing applied to private citizens in recognition of the special role that a State plays in 
pursuing its quasi-sovereign interests in ‘the well-being of its populace.’”1120 
 
Secondly, parens patriae jurisdiction may be invoked in respect of claims protecting public 
rights by virtue of the constitutional principle that the public’s rights are indivisible from the 
Crown’s rights; that is, that public rights are vested in the Crown.  As Lord Wilberforce 
noted in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers: “In terms of constitutional law, the rights of the 
public are vested in the Crown, and the Attorney-General enforces them as an officer of 
the Crown.  And just as the Attorney-General has in general no power to interfere with the 
assertion of private rights, so in general no private person has the right of representing the 
                                                
1119 458 US 592 (1982) at p 600, citing Mormon Church v United States 136 US 1 (1890) at p 57.  See also Hawaii v 
Standard Oil Company of California [1972] USSC 49, 405 US 251, 92 SCt 885 (1972), where the United States 
Supreme Court made the following comments on the principle of parens patriae at paragraph [21]: “The 
concept of parens patriae is derived from the English constitutional system.  As the system developed from its 
feudal beginnings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which were referred to as the ‘royal 
prerogative.’   Malina & Blechman ‘Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws’ (1970) 
65 NwU LRev 193, 197; ‘State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages’ 
(1970) 6 Col JL & Soc Prob 411, 412.  These powers and duties were said to be exercised by the King in his 
capacity as ‘father of the country.’  Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King’s power as guardian of 
persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves.  For example, Blackstone refers to the sovereign or his 
representative as ‘the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics,’ and as the superintendent of ‘all 
charitable uses in the kingdom.’  In the United States, the ‘royal prerogative’ and the ‘parens patriae’ function of 
the King passed to the States.  The nature of the parens patriae suit has been greatly expanded in the United 
States beyond that which existed in England.  This expansion was first evidenced in Louisiana v Texas 176 US 1, 
20 SCt 251 (1900).” 
1120 Mexico v Austin Decoster [2000] USCA1 237 at para [4], 229 F3d 332 (1st Cir 2000), citing Alfred L Snapp & 
Son Inc v Puerto Rico ex rel Barez 458 US 592 (1982) at p 602.  The principle at common law in the United States 
that parens patriae jurisdiction can only be found in a State’s quasisovereign interests was explained by the United 
States Supreme Court in Alfred L Snapp & Son Inc v Puerto Rico ex rel Barez 458 US 592 (1982) at p 607:  “In 
order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of 
particular private parties, ie, the State must be more than a nominal party.  The State must express a quasi-
sovereign interest.  Although the articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case development – 
neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the 
abstract – certain characteristics of such interests are so far evident.  These characteristics fall into two general 
categories.  First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and wellbeing – both physical and 
economic of its residents in general.  Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily 
denied its rightful status within the federal system.”  See also Mexico v Austin Decoster [2000] USCA1 237 at para 
[5]. 
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public in the assertion of public rights.”1121  And further, at page 481, His Lordship stated: 
“In the Stockport District Waterworks Co v The Mayor of Manchester (1863) 9 Jurist NS 266 Lord 
Westbury LC said this: ‘…the constitution of the country has wisely entrusted the privilege 
[of representing the public] with a public officer, and has not allowed it to be usurped by a 
private individual’.  That it is the exclusive right of the Attorney-General to represent the 
public interest – even where individuals might be interested in a larger view of the matter – is 
not technical, not procedural, not fictional.  It is constitutional.  I agree with Lord Westbury 
that it is also wise.” 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Forest Products observed that the principle of 
indivisibility of public rights and the Crown was first acknowledged by Bracton:  
“By legal convention, ownership of such public rights [as arise in 
circumstances of public nuisance] was vested in the Crown, as too did 
authority to enforce public rights of use.  According to de Bracton: 
‘(It is the lord king) himself who has ordinary jurisdiction and 
power over all who are within his realm…  He also has, in 
preference to all others in his realm, privileges by virtue of the jus 
gentium.  (By the jus gentium) things are his… which by natural law 
ought to be common to all…  Those concerned with jurisdiction 
and the peace… belong to no one save the crown alone and the 
royal dignity, nor can they be separated from the crown, since 
they constitute the crown.’”1122 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court then concluded at paragraph [76]:  
“Since the time of de Bracton it has been the case that public rights and 
jurisdiction over these cannot be separated from the Crown.  This 
notion of the Crown as holder of inalienable ‘public rights’ in the 
environment and certain common resources was accompanied by the 
procedural right of the Attorney General to sue for their protection 
                                                
1121 [1977] UKHL 5, [1978] AC 435 at page 477. 
1122 British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at para [76], [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 240 
DLR(4th) 1, citing SE Thorne (tr) Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press Cambridge 1968) vol 2, at pp 166-67. 
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representing the Crown as parens patriae.  This is an important jurisdiction 
that should not be attenuated by a narrow judicial construction.” 
 
The interconnectivity of public rights and parens patriae jurisdiction is such that absent the 
Crown’s protective jurisdiction it is doubted that common law public rights would exist at 
all.  Viscount Haldane’s dicta in Attorney-General of British Columbia v Attorney-General of Canada, 
which has been cited in Australia,1123 and Canada,1124 indicates that the existence of public 
rights may in fact be due to the protection afforded public rights under the parens patriae 
jurisdiction.  Speaking of public rights of navigation and of fishing in respect of the 
foreshore and the high seas, his Lordship stated:  
“…[T]he subjects of the Crown are entitled as of right not only to 
navigate but to fish in the high seas and tidal waters alike.  The legal 
character of this right is not easy to define.  It is probably a right enjoyed 
so far as the high seas are concerned by common practice from time 
immemorial, and it was probably in very early times extended by the 
subject without challenge to the foreshore and tidal waters which were 
continuous with the ocean, if, indeed, it did not in fact first take rise in 
them.  The right into which this practice has crystallized resembles in 
some respects the right to navigate the seas or the right to use a 
navigable river as a highway, and its origin is not more obscure than that 
of these rights of navigation.  Finding its subjects exercising this right as 
from immemorial antiquity the Crown as parens patriae no doubt regarded 
itself bound to protect the subject in exercising it, and the origin and 
extent of the right as legally cognizable are probably attributable to that 
protection, a protection which gradually came to be recognized as 
establishing a legal right enforceable in the Courts.”1125  
 
A further factor supporting the beneficent jurisdiction of the Crown in respect of public 
rights and publicly exhibited sporting events is the principle that Crown land dedicated to 
                                                
1123 Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr [1999] FCA 1668 at paras [213]-[217]. 
1124 R v Gladstone [1996] SCC 160 at para [69], (1996) 2 SCR 723, (1996) 137 DLR(4th) 648; Re Offshore Mineral 
Rights [1967] SCC 71, [1967] SCR 792 at pp 801, 807. 
1125 [1914] AC 153 at p 169. 
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the public is held in trust for public use and enjoyment.  In Western Australia v Ward, the High 
Court of Australia, citing Randwick Corporation v Rutledge,1126 stated that vesting of land in 
trustees for purposes of the health, recreation, or amusement of the inhabitants of towns, 
and any other charitable purpose, creates a public trust.1127  Where a publicly exhibited 
sporting event is staged at a public place such as a beach or road, the private interests of the 
promoters of, and of the participants in, such sporting event can never supplant public rights 
at common law.  It is a principle of common law, known as the ‘public trust’ principle, that 
the people may enjoy the use of public places free from the obstruction or interference of 
private parties.1128  Only by legislative instrument may public rights and the Crown’s parens 
patriae jurisdiction in respect of public land be abrogated.1129  In Australia, courts have used 
public trust principles and the Crown parens patriae jurisdiction to injunct local governments 
from reclassifying public land or otherwise dealing with public land in any manner 
inconsistent with its designation as public land, unless such power is granted in legislation.1130  
The Canadian Supreme Court, citing United States Supreme Court authority, explained the 
‘public trust’ principle thus:  
“The American law has also developed the notion that the states hold a 
‘public trust’.  Thus, in Illinois Central Railroad Co v Illinois 146 US 387 
(1892), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld Illinois’ claim to 
have a land grant declared invalid.  The State had granted to the railroad 
in fee simple all land extending out one mile from Lake Michigan’s 
shoreline, including one mile of shoreline through Chicago’s central 
                                                
1126 [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at pp 75-76 (Windeyer J). 
1127 [2002] HCA 28 at para [238], (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
1128 See Attorney-General v Parramatta City Council (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 283 at p 290-292 where Roper CJ held that 
the Attorney-General had standing to seek orders restraining a local authority from taking action which was 
‘incompatible with the due exercise of [its] powers’ where that council sought to deal with public trust land in a 
manner inconsistent with its designation ‘as a public reserve, a public place, or cemetery, or any land subject to 
a trust’.  In England, “the inherent power flowing from his office… enables the Attorney-General either to 
bring proceedings ex-officio himself or to consent to the use of his name… [in] relator proceedings for the 
protection of the public interest in the civil courts… to enforce a duty which a public body, such as a local 
authority, owes to the public”: Attorney-General v Blake [1997] EWCA Civ 3008, [1998] 2 WLR 805 at p 820.  See 
also Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 59 at para [54], (1998) 195 CLR 566. 
1129 The High Court of Australia noted in Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28 at para [218], (2002) 213 CLR 
1: “As Windeyer J pointed out in Randwick Corporation v Rutledge [1959] HCA 63, (1959) 102 CLR 54 at p 75 
even if land were dedicated to a public purpose, it did not take the land outside the authority of the 
legislature… Even permanent reserves could be cancelled or the purpose of the reservation altered by statute.” 
1130 Attorney-General v Parramatta City Council (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 283; Attorney-General v Blake [1997] EWCA Civ 
3008, [1998] 2 WLR 805 at p 820; Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 59 at para [54], 
(1998) 195 CLR 566. 
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business district.  It was held that this land was impressed with a public 
trust.  The State’s title to this land was different in character from that 
which the State holds in lands intended for sale…  It is a title held in 
trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the 
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein 
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties [146 US 387 
(1892) at p 452].  The deed to the railway was therefore set aside.”1131   
 
The Canadian Supreme Court noted that the parens patriae ‘public trust’ doctrine has led in 
the United States to successful claims for monetary compensation in cases decided 
exclusively under the common law.1132  “Under the common law in [the United States],” the 
court observed, “it has long been accepted that the state has a common law parens patriae 
jurisdiction to represent the collective interests of the public.  This jurisdiction has 
historically been successfully exercised in relation to environmental claims involving 
injunctive relief against interstate public nuisances:  see, eg, North Dakota v Minnesota 263 US 
365 (1923) at p 374; Missouri v Illinois 180 US 208 (1901); Kansas v Colorado 206 US 46 (1907); 
Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co 206 US 230 (1907); and New York v New Jersey 256 US 296 
(1921).  In Tennessee Copper, Holmes J held for the Supreme Court of the United States, at 
p 237, that, ‘the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, 
in all the earth and air within its domain.”1133  The parens patriae jurisdiction of the Crown in 
                                                
1131 British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at para [79], [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 240 
DLR(4th) 1. 
1132 ibid, citing New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection v Jersey Central Power and Light Co 336 A2d 750 (NJ 
Super Ct App Div 1975); State of Washington, Department of Fisheries v Gillette 621 P2d 764 (Wash Ct App 1980); 
State of California, Department of Fish and Game v SS Bournemouth 307 FSupp 922 (CD Cal 1969); State of Maine v 
M/V Tamano 357 FSupp 1097 (D Me 1973), and State of Maryland, Department of Natural Resources v Amerada Hess 
Corp 350 FSupp 1060 (D Md 1972).  
1133 British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] SCC 38 at paras [78]-[80], [2004] 2 SCR 74, (2004) 240 
DLR(4th) 1 (emphasis added).  In Hawaii v Standard Oil Company of California [1972] USSC 49, 405 US 251, 92 
SCt 885 (1972), the United States Supreme Court referred to these same cases noting the ratio decidendi of 
each case in the following terms at paragraph [22] of their judgment: “This court’s acceptance of the notion of 
parens patriae suits in Louisiana v Texas [176 US 1, 20 SCt 251 (1900)] was followed in a series of cases: Missouri v 
Illinois, 180 US 208, 21 SCt 331 (1901) (holding that Missouri was permitted to sue Illinois and a Chicago 
sanitation district on behalf of Missouri citizens to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River); 
Kansas v Colorado 206 US 46, 27 SCt 655 (1907) (holding that Kansas was permitted to sue as parens patriae to 
enjoin the diversion of water from an interstate stream); Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co 206 US 230, 27 SCt 618 
(1907) (holding that Georgia was entitled to sue to enjoin fumes from a copper plant across the state border 
from injuring land in five Georgia counties); People of State of New York v New Jersey 256 US 296, 41 SCt 492 
(1921) (holding that New York could sue to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the New York harbor); 
Pennsylvania v West Virginia 262 US 553, 43 SCt 658 (1923) (holding that Pennsylvania might sue to enjoin 
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respect of public land cannot be truncated.  It is a pervasive jurisdiction existing behind the 
interests of citizens.  Citing Missouri v Illinois and Tennessee Copper, amongst others, the United 
States Supreme Court commented that: “Both the Missouri case and the Georgia case involved 
the State’s interest in the abatement of public nuisances, instances in which the injury to the 
public health and comfort was graphic and direct.  Although there are numerous examples of 
such parens patriae suits, eg, North Dakota v Minnesota (flooding); New York v New Jersey (water 
pollution); Kansas v Colorado 185 US 125, 22 SCt 552 (1902) (diversion of water), parens patriae 
interests extend well beyond the prevention of such traditional public nuisances.”1134 
 
Parens patriae jurisdiction is a broad jurisdiction. The limits or scope of the jurisdiction have 
not, and cannot, be defined.1135  In Re Thomas, the New South Wales Supreme Court said: 
“The breadth of the jurisdiction has often been emphasized; indeed it has been said that it is 
without limitation, although to be exercised with caution.”1136  The Canadian Supreme Court 
concluded thus:  
“The situations under which it can be exercised are legion; the 
jurisdiction cannot be defined in that sense.  As Lord MacDermott put it 
in J v C [1970] AC 668 at p 703, the authorities are not consistent and 
there are many twists and turns, but they have inexorably ‘moved 
towards a broader discretion, under the impact of changing social 
conditions and the weight of opinion…’  In other words, the categories 
under which the jurisdiction can be exercised are never closed…  [A] 
court may act not only on the ground that injury to person or property 
has occurred, but also on the ground that such injury is apprehended.  I 
might add that the jurisdiction is a carefully guarded one.  The courts will 
                                                
restraints on the commercial flow of natural gas); and North Dakota v Minnesota 263 US 365, 44 SCt 138 (1923) 
(holding that Minnesota could sue to enjoin changes in drainage which increase the flow of water in an 
interstate stream).” 
1134 Hawaii v Standard Oil Company of California [1972] USSC 49 at para [24], 405 US 251, 92 SCt 885 (1972). 
1135 Marion’s Case [1992] HCA 15 at paras [68]-[70], (1992) 175 CLR 218, citing Re Eve (1986) 2 SCR 388 at p 
410, (1986) 31 DLR(4th) at p 16. To the same effect were the comments of Lord Manners who stated in 
Wellesley v Wellesley (1828) 2 Bli N S 124 at p 142, 4 ER 1078 at p 1085 that, “[i]t is ... impossible to say what are 
the limits of that jurisdiction”.  The more contemporary descriptions of the parens patriae jurisdiction over 
infants, in particular, invariably accept that in theory there is no limitation upon the jurisdiction: In re X (A 
Minor) (1975) 2 WLR 335 at pp 339-340, 342, 345, 345-346. 
1136 [2009] NSWSC 217 at para [29]. 
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not readily assume that it has been removed by legislation where a 
necessity arises to protect a person who cannot protect himself.”1137 
 
The existence of public rights, including rights of way, rights to quietude, and rights to 
recreation, for example, are inexorably linked to the beneficent jurisdiction of the Crown.  
Indeed, such rights may owe their existence to this altruistic power. 
 
 
4. Montesquieu’s jurisprudence 
 
The Crown’s parens patriae role is the role of defender of the public rights, and by extension 
perhaps also of the natural rights, of the people.  In the context of sport these public rights 
and natural rights encompass the use of public spaces for enjoyment and recreation in 
whatever diverse manner of recreative use the people desire to pursue uninhibited by private 
interests or by organized activities which infringe upon those rights.  People never truly 
relinquish their natural rights; but rather entrust to a sovereign authority, upon forming civil 
society, the obligation to manifest these natural rights in positive law.  “For Montesquieu… 
civil society exists not for the sake of creating happiness but for the sake of protecting the 
means to happiness, or the means to each individual’s avoidance of unhappiness.  Civil 
society exists in order to secure or liberate good things which exist prior to civil society.  
The individual and his property, the family, its attachments, its customs, its morals and 
religion, predate the establishment of civil society (Bk 18 chs 13, 16.)  For the sake of 
securing these good things civil society transforms them to some extent; but in principle they 
remain to a considerable degree autonomous…”1138   
 
Montesquieu’s two main aims in The Spirit of the Laws are (i) to discover how and to what 
extent each form of government serves man’s liberty and security, and  (ii) to encourage 
government to better administer the laws in conformity with man’s nature.  In 
Montesquieu’s jurisprudence the laws which best preserve the state are those which an 
enlightened statesman promulgates, or an enlightened jurist declares, in cognizance of, and in 
                                                
1137 Re Eve [1986] SCC 36 at paras [74]-[75], [1986] 2 SCR 388 (Supreme Court of Canada) (La Forest J). 
1138 TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at pp 189-90. 
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aid of, complex heterogeneity.  Diversity exists in the variety of governmental models 
discussed in his thesis, in the influence of geography, climate and history on political laws, 
and in the recognition which each statesman and jurist ought to give to man’s nature, his 
natural rights, and his sentimentality in the promulgation of positive law.  Montesquieu 
spoke of law as a relation because he did not regard it as the command of a superior or the 
will of the sovereign.  Laws are the complex relations subsisting amid the exercise of 
authority by the judiciary, the legislature, and the Executive; and amid the people in their 
dealings with their government and their fellow citizens.1139 
 
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu discusses in considerable detail disparate governmental 
models, among them classical republicanism, judicialized monarchism, and autocracy, taking 
for his models historical exemplars of government and politics.  Montesquieu did not decry 
any particular form of politics because he believed that liberty, stemming from a proper 
division of powers among competing institutions within any governmental form, and also 
security, arising from laws protecting life, liberty, and property, could exist in democracies, 
aristocracies, or monarchies since all such states can be constructed to achieve moderation 
(Bk 11, ch 4).  What Montesquieu highlights in his jurisprudence is that whilst the principles 
of all existing governments, the principles which determine who rules, can be shown to be 
correct or legitimate (irrespective of the form which a government takes), the application and 
administration of the principles of some governments can be shown to require improvement 
(Bk 29, chs 16-19). “This seems implied in Montesquieu’s statement that he wishes: ‘to make 
it so that everyone will have new reasons for loving his duties, his prince, his fatherland, his 
laws; that one can better feel his happiness in each country, in each government, in each 
state where he finds himself…’”1140  The key principle for the preservation of any 
governmental form is the principle of moderation (Bk 29, ch 1).  “Throughout his work, 
Montesquieu reiterates the need for moderate law and judging, one grounded in a humane 
conception of natural right.  Montesquieu begins with a quite amorous rendering by a 
French poet of the opening of the De rerum natura, in which Lucretius praises the passions 
                                                
1139 See JN Shklar Montesquieu (Oxford University Press Oxford 1987) at p 71. 
1140 Preface, and see TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) 
at p 22, citing R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn Gallimard Paris 
1949-51) vol 1, at p 230. Montesquieu’s liberalism, with its distrust of all governments, remains an essential part 
of any complete theory of political freedom: JN Shklar Montesquieu (Oxford University Press Oxford 1987) at p 
126. 
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and sexuality.  This sets the tone for the book, encouraging the ‘prudent’ legislator to discern 
a middle state between the worldliness of the Romans and the otherworldliness of 
Christianity…”1141 
 
Montesquieu viewed a state of blind obedience to the will of the collective, and blind 
ignorance of the legal affects of such obedience, as the greatest calamity that could befall a 
state.1142  A democratic model of government which establishes mores by simple majority 
can prove as illiberal as a despotic model.  Montesquieu tries to show in a dispassionate way 
the contradictions in the kind of republicanism he considered the greatest challenge to his 
principles; that characterized by extensive direct political participation, de-emphasis on 
prosperity, and a deep sense of community.1143  A republic form of government which rests 
on the passion of public spirit or ‘virtue’ and which animates such a community and such a 
government, is incompatible with human nature.  Montesquieu cited the classical republican 
model of government of ancient Rome as a model incompatible with nature and therefore 
inherently volatile.  Liberty is sacrificed to political and cultural homogeneity in a republic of 
‘virtue’, just as can occur in a despotic government or monarchic government.   
 
A democracy can fail to support public rights generally, and diverse recreative practices in 
particular, and may in fact undermine such rights and practices.  In Dewar v City and Suburban 
Race Course Co, the court warned of the dangers arising from tyranny by majority rule.  
Injuncting public horse races on Sundays, the court stated that: “No majority, however large, 
                                                
1141 PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism (University of 
Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at p 77. 
1142 JN Shklar Montesquieu (Oxford University Press Oxford 1987) at pp 87 and 110, citing Pensées in A Masson 
(ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Les Editions Nagel Paris 1950-55) vol 2, at p 1252. 
1143 In Bk 8, ch 2, Montesquieu writes: “The principle of democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of 
equality is lost, but also when the spirit of extreme equality is taken up and when each citizen wants to be the 
equal of those chosen to command him.  So the people, finding intolerable even the power they entrust to 
others Then the people, incapable of bearing the very power they have delegated, want to manage everything 
themselves, to debate for the senate, to execute for the magistrates, and to cast aside all the judges.  When this 
is the case, virtue can no longer subsist in the republic.  The people are desirous of exercising the functions of 
the magistrates, who cease to be revered.  The deliberations of the senate are slighted; all respect is then laid 
aside for the senators…  We find in Xenophon's Banquet a very lively description of a republic in which the 
people abused their equality… Democracy has, therefore, two excesses to avoid — the spirit of inequality, 
which leads it to aristocracy or to the government of one alone, and the spirit of extreme equality, which leads 
it to despotic power…”  See R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn 
Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1; AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr) Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 112; or JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Charles de Secondat, 
Baron de Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws (G Bell & Sons London 1914). 
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is entitled to interfere with the common right of a minority, though small, to the enjoyment 
of the comfort and quiet of their homes, and the free use of the public thoroughfares which 
lead to them.  The Legislature alone, acting for the common weal, has this power entrusted 
to it.”1144  Montesquieu was much concerned with the establishment of a ‘humanized’ or 
‘humane’ society.  He wanted to uncover the political conditions which promote it.  His 
jurisprudence is the idea that any constitution which fails to honour natural rights and the 
complex relations subsisting in the concept of law, in the administration of power and of 
law, is incompatible with human nature – diversity, liberty, tranquility and security are the 
four pillars upon which law rests in Montesquieu’s jurisprudence.1145  Montesquieu is viewed 
for  “the seriousness of his concern for natural right” and “the seamlessness he saw between 
a stable constitutionalism and the protection of natural rights.”1146 
 
Montesquieu’s warnings of the inherent instability of a political society where cultural 
identity is homogenized by passion and sovereign will, whether republican or monarchical, is 
perhaps most clearly illustrated by the contest of authority between the monarch and 
Parliament in Britain prior to the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution in 1688.  In the 
context of sports, this contest of authority was played out in the Declaration of Sports of James 
I on 24 May 1618; the further promulgation of that declaration by Charles I on 18 October 
1633 as The King’s Majesty’s declaration to his subjects concerning lawful sports to be used; and the 
subsequent hostility to these Declaration of Sports by puritans who gained power in Parliament 
in the lead-up to the English Civil War.  Puritan hostility to the Declaration of Sports grew, 
enforcement of the declaration ended in 1640, and the Interregnum Parliament ordered the 
book publicly burned in 1643.   
 
The actions of both James I and Charles I, despite their obvious political failings, evidence, 
to a degree, the concern for the peoples recreations which the Crown ought to show as 
protector of public rights.  James I, finding “that his subjects were debarred from lawful 
recreations upon Sundays after evening prayers ended, and upon Holy-days; …he prudently 
considered that, if these times were taken from them, the meaner sort who labor hard all the 
                                                
1144 [1899] 1 IR 345 at p 356. 
1145 See TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at pp 4-5. 
1146 PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial Activism (University of Chicago 
Press Chicago 2003) at p 240. 
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week should have no recreations at all to refresh their spirits… and did therefore in his 
princely wisdom publish a Declaration to all his loving subjects concerning lawful sports to be 
used at such times, which was printed and published by his royal commandment in the year 
1618.”  James I proclaimed that the people should not be molested in their recreations, 
stating, “as for our good people’s lawful recreation, our pleasure likewise is, that after the 
end of divine service our good people be not disturbed, letted or discouraged from any 
lawful recreation, such as dancing, either men or women; archery for men, leaping, vaulting, 
or any other such harmless recreation, nor from having of May-games, Whitsun-ales, and 
Morris-dances; and the setting up of Maypoles and other sports therewith used…”  
Although, “bear and bull-baiting, interludes, and (at all times in the meane sort of people by 
law prohibited) bowling” were not to be permitted on Sunday.1147  The Crown was not 
legislating to grant a right otherwise denied to them by legislation.  The power of puritanical 
parliamentarians was not directly threatened.  Rather, the Crown sought to fulfil a parens 
patriae duty to preserve public rights in the face of opposition from majoritarian puritanical 
rule. 
 
What was perhaps missing from the fracas between the royalists and the parliamentarians 
was a prudent moderating authority which could engage with the Crown, the legislature and 
the people to promulgate laws reflective of the natural rights of man.1148  There can be no 
law or strict rules for the guidance of political societies beyond the law of nature, according 
to Montesquieu.1149  And it is clear from Montesquieu’s writings in praise of the moderating 
power of a judiciary within the constitutional monarchical governmental system in the early 
books of The Spirit of the Laws leading up to the constitutionalism fully presented in books 11 
                                                
1147 The Book of Sports as set forth by Charles the I (Issued by King James, May 24 1618 and re-enacted Oct 18 
1633) (Baker London 1533 [1633] reprinted 1709) (British Library Shelfmarks G.14061.(6.) T.1810.(14)).  See 
also D Wilkins Concilia (Brussels 1964) vol iv, at p 483; and  —‘Styles of Belief, Devotion, and Culture – James 
I/Charles I, from The King’s Majesty’s Declaration to his Subjects Concerning Lawful Sports to be Used’ The Norton 
Anthology of English Literature 
<http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/17century/topic_3/sports.htm> (1 June 2008). 
1148 “The crucial innovation,” in Montesquieu’s constitutional theory, “is adding a third power, of a distinctly 
nonpredatory and more reasonable character, to provide the individual security that his liberal predecessors 
seek, without their constant worry about regression into war.  A judicialized constitution builds the safety valve 
into the everyday system, in accord with the actual judicial practices and legal customs developed in many 
European countries through a “Gothic” common law and court system (see Bks 6, 12, and 28): PO Carrese The 
Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the rise of judicial activism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 
2003) at p 25. 
1149 TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 274. 
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and 12, that this pillar of his constitutionalism is also a weapon in his critique not only of 
autocratic despotism but of the moral despotism in classical republican virtue and classical 
political philosophy.  A judicial depository of laws, in tempering both Executive power and 
censorious majoritarianism, embodies the balance and complexity that are ‘the excellence’ of 
constitutional monarchism (Bk 5 ch 10).  But an activist Executive may pander to 
majoritarianism, particularly in respect of public sports, and may promote public sports and 
ignore the public’s rights.  Montesquieu argues that the very structure of politics can 
determine affairs safely, but only if constituted so that decisions are made both as necessity 
requires and in accord with a moderate, humane conception of natural right.    His analysis 
of the separation of powers in the English constitution observes that the “three powers 
ought to form a repose,” but since “by the necessary motion of things, they are constrained 
to move, they will be forced to move in concert” (Bk 11 ch 6).1150  Governments can avoid 
the cycle of despotism and popular revolution only through the employment of ‘intermediate 
dependent powers’ who possess the ‘prudence and authority’ to propose compromises and 
restore the rule of law (Bk 5 ch 11, 290-91).1151  Yet to say that Montesquieu believes that 
judges alone are saviours of civil rights is to also misunderstand Montesquieu’s theory.  
Contrarily, Montesquieu believed that full respect needed to be paid to the complex 
character of the separation of powers and the complex character of man’s sensibilities.  For 
Montesquieu, the idea that any power, even judging, could rule absolutely does not square 
with our nature.1152   
 
Montesquieu’s humane, softer conceptions of moderation and natural right directly guide his 
version of constitutionalism, jurisprudence, and judging.  Better is it to say, that the 
                                                
1150 In Bk 5, ch 14, Montesquieu also writes: “To form a moderate government, it is necessary to combine the 
several powers; to regulate, temper, and set them in motion; to give, as it were, ballast to one, in order to enable 
it to counterpoise the other.  This is a masterpiece of legislation; rarely produced by hazard, and seldom 
attained by prudence.”  See R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn 
Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1 at p 405; AM Cohler BC Miller and HS Stone (tr) Montesquieu: The Spirit of the 
Laws (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1989) at p 112; or JV Prichard (ed) T Nugent (tr) Charles de 
Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws (G Bell & Sons London 1914).  See also Bks 6, 12, and 28: PO 
Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the rise of judicial activism (University of Chicago Press 
Chicago 2003) at p 25. 
1151 See further PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at p 33.  See also TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 47. 
1152 See PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the rise of judicial activism (University of 
Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at p 28-29. 
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government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humour and 
disposition of the people in whose favour it is established (Bk I, ch 3).  Careful attention to 
the administration of justice and to the contents of the statute-book is also necessary if the 
liberty of the subject is to be safeguarded.1153  The people can only possess their public rights 
where the political superstructure engages with the people to protect those rights.  If a 
culturally homogeneous majoritarian society determines the laws based purely on their 
passions for particular pursuits, then diversity of cultural pursuits and the substantive nature 
of public rights and natural rights are crippled.  Such a ‘democratic’ society may arbitrarily 
impinge on public rights to recreation and limit diversity in recreative and sports practice in 
preference for and in favour of a narrow pool of jingoistic sports.  The danger is that the 
members of a society may become so homogeneous in their sports practices that any trace of 
cultural diversity vanishes.  In the context of sports, such danger becomes evident in the 
conflict between persons using public spaces such as beaches, parks and the highway.  
Ought the individual citizen’s public right and natural right to pursue his own play and 
recreation at a public place dedicated to him for his use be always subservient to the 
jingoistic cultural passions of a majority? 
 
The law is the relations existing between the disparate players in political society.  The most 
influential sphere of social life is the political sphere, the sphere in which men deliberately, 
intentionally, and authoritatively choose and shape a collective way of life.1154  Montesquieu 
“…argues that liberty can of itself achieve security only if our activities and passions are 
structured according to the dynamics prescribed by the laws of nature…  Nature indicates 
that politics must be structured in terms of multiple powers and perspectives that at once 
check and facilitate the free movement of political passions and energies.”1155  Liberty, 
complex constitutionalism, and natural right are the three principles of Montesquieuan 
                                                
1153 MH Waddicor Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1970) at p 135. 
1154 For Montesquieu, the nature of a society is derivative primarily from the nature and principle of the 
government, not vice versa.  “The principle of each government has a supreme influence on the laws…  One will 
see the laws flow from it as from their source: Bk 1 ch 3, R Caillois (ed) Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu 
(Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edn Gallimard Paris 1949-51) vol 1, at p 238.  This is why the notion of ‘the 
legislator’ plays so great a role throughout The Spirit of the Laws.”  TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 44. 
1155 PO Carrese The cloaking of power – Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the rise of judicial activism (University of Chicago 
Press Chicago 2003) at p 20. 
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jurisprudence which underscore successful socio-political society.1156  When Montesquieu 
writes of law as the relations between the government and the people, what he is saying is 
that the law can only be realized when the disparate organs of government engage with each 
other to facilitate liberty.  The genius of a moderate politics – of the spirit of laws properly 
conceived – is to grasp our nature in all its complexity and constitute laws and institutions 
that will preserve all its dimensions.1157 Montesquieu asks of us that we acknowledge the 
principled difference between liberty and short-term utility and the distinction between 
separation of powers and a formless policy-making or administrative power in a government.  
Montesquieu links the means of complex constitutional forms and enduring natural rights to 
the ends of liberty and natural rights.  The spirit of the laws is the spirit of constitutional 
government, where all organs of government exercise a moderate and prudent discretion in 
promoting individual tranquillity.1158  Liberty and justice are confirmed in the very structure 
of a government where a complex constitution and a separation of powers operates in 
partnership to prudently administer the laws.  If governments boldly legislate or radically 
transform the law, they sacrifice not only the forms but the ends of a decent legal order.1159   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The common law principles of the Royal Peace and parens patriae, and jurisprudential logic 
touching on the prudence of recognizing natural rights and public rights, compound to form 
a constitutional rule of behaviour for the Executive government within a complex 
                                                
1156 See further PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism 
(University of Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at pp 106-107; MH Waddicor Montesquieu and the Philosophy of 
Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1970) at pp 39-40 and 43, citing Pensée 883. 
1157 ibid. 
1158 The intention of the work as a whole has been to prove what should be the spirit of the legislator (Book 29 
ch 1); TL Pangle Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1973) at p 271.  The 
spirit of the legislator should be one of ‘moderation’.  This spirit of moderation as Montesquieu emphasizes is 
intimately connected with the realization that ‘liberty’ or ‘security’ is the true goal.  Moderation also includes a 
certain mellowness, softness or humanity (Bk 19 ch 5; Bk 29, ch 2). In conjunction with his discussion of 
moderation Montesquieu also consider the ‘prudence’ of the legislator (Bk 19, ch 5; Bk 29, chs 5, 7) – the 
capacity to adapt goals to particular circumstances.  The key circumstance to be considered is the nature of the 
regime for which the laws are to be given; the legislator must adapt his general understanding of the needs to 
be satisfied to the way those needs appear in his own political order (Bk 19, ch 5; Bk 29, ch 3).  The legislator 
must also reflect on how the law will change the circumstances; he must try to foresee the indirect as well as the 
direct effects of a law (Bk 19, chs 4, 5; Bk 29, chs 4, 5). 
1159 PO Carrese The Cloaking of Power – Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism (University of 
Chicago Press Chicago 2003) at p 107. 
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constitution.  In some common law jurisdictions, the Executive fails to see its lawful 
function as protector of public rights, and in lieu, through organizations managed directly by 
the Executive, facilitates and financially supports the staging of publicly exhibited sporting 
events to the detriment of public rights.  In the Australian state of Queensland, for example, 
the Crown operates through several private companies, such as Queensland Events 
Corporation Pty Ltd ACN 010 814 310,1160 and Gold Coast Events Co Pty Ltd ACN 010 
949 649,1161 which companies are private companies limited by shares registered with the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, to support publicly exhibited sporting 
events.  Neither of these private companies is supported by any legislative enactment 
granting them authority to act in contradistinction to the common law.  Similarly, in the state 
of Victoria the Executive operates Victorian Major Events Company Limited ACN 050 270 
089, a public company limited by guarantee.1162  There is no legislative enactment of the 
Victorian Parliament providing this public company with power to act in contradiction to 
the common law.  
 
Facilitating the staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event which infringes public rights, by 
the Executive, is unlawful at common law as being a public nuisance.  Just as local 
governments may not license the commission of a public nuisance, neither may the 
Executive, either directly or through a corporation, give money or other support for the 
staging of a publicly exhibited sporting event which creates a public nuisance.1163  The 
Crown’s behaviour in such circumstances places them in the position of an accomplice to 
                                                
1160 In Queensland, the Executive operates through an organization called ‘Queensland Events’, managed under 
the personal portfolio of the Premier of Queensland, to promote and financially support publicly exhibited 
events, including sporting events, in Queensland: <http://www.qldevents.com.au/> (7 Aug 2008). Register of 
Appointees to Queensland Government Bodies < http://statauth.premiers.qld.gov.au/board-
details.aspx?bid=757> (7 August 2008). 
1161 GCEC is the primary vehicle for the Government 50% ownership of the Gold Coast Motor Events Co 
which conducts the IndyCar event on the Gold Coast: Register of Appointees to Queensland Government 
Bodies < http://statauth.premiers.qld.gov.au/board-details.aspx?bid=727> (7 Aug 2008) 
1162 see < http://www.vmec.com.au/home.html> (7 Aug 2008).  Victorian Government Organisations 
Register < http://www.agencies.vic.gov.au/public/entityshow.asp?mode=search&ID=845&minID=> (7 Aug 
2008). 
1163 “Neither the King nor the lord of the manor can give any liberty to erect a common nuisance”: Dewell v 
Sanders (1619) Cro Jac 490, 79 ER 419; Fowler v Sanders (1617) Cro Jac 446, 79 ER 382.  “It is generally laid 
down in the books, that the Crown cannot pardon a common nuisance whilst it remains unredressed, and is 
continuing; so as to prevent abatement of it, or a prosecution against the offender: though his Majesty might 
afterwards remit the fine.  As the continuation of a nuisance is, of itself, a fresh offence in point of law; this 
doctrine may be supported on the ground that the King cannot… dispense with the laws by any previous 
license.” J Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown (Butterworths London 1820) at p 91, citing 12 Co 30, 2 Hawk b 2 c 37 
s 33, 4 Bla Com 398, Ld Raym 370, 713. 
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the commission of a common law offence.  The Executive’s obligations are those confined 
to their parens patriae jurisdiction to protect public rights from arbitrary infringement.  The 
Executive lacks power to alter the common law unilaterally or arbitrarily.   
 
“Political liberty is to be found,” writes Montesquieu, “only in moderate governments; and 
even in these it is not always found.  It is there only when there is no abuse of power.  But 
constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to 
carry his authority as far as it will go.  Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself 
has need of limits?  To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that 
power should be a check to power” (Bk 11, ch 4).  If the Executive wishes to promote 
homogeneous cultural pursuits to the detriment of public rights, the Executive must turn to 
Parliament and ask Parliament to change the common law and to give power to the 
Executive to operate organizations in support of publicly exhibited sporting events.  Such 
grant of power by Parliament ought to be made prudently in due consideration of extant 
public rights and the impact which the staging of publicly exhibited sporting events may 
cause to such public rights. 
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Chapter 16 
 
Toward a modern regulatory framework 
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that a sporting event staged at a public space such as a beach, a 
park, or on a road, may be unlawful as a common law public nuisance.  A public sporting 
event may create a public nuisance by obstructing or interfering with the public in the 
exercise of their right of way on the highway, in respect of the right of navigation or of 
fishing at the foreshore and in the sea, or in respect of their right to recreation on a beach or 
in a park.  Further, a public sporting event may create a public nuisance in drawing crowds 
which obstruct or interfere with the preceding nominated public rights or which, in creating 
noise, impinge the common law public right to quietude.  Public rights to safety and to life 
may also be impinged by the staging of sporting events in public.  This thesis does not argue, 
however, that publicly exhibited sports events should be unlawful when they are staged at 
public spaces.   
 
Public exhibitions of sporting competition have commendable cultural and social benefits 
for the citizens of a State.  Yet such cultural and social benefits ought not justify the 
narcissistic display of sporting competition to the harm of individuals or minorities who may 
desire recourse to the same public space where publicly exhibited sports events are staged.  
Members of the public who desire recourse to a public park in order to sit and read a book 
ought not be peremptorily required to surrender their right to use of the public park to a 
sporting federation.  Public nuisance precedents emphasize that public rights are at risk of 
subjugation to the mercenary intentions of sporting associations.  These modern mercenary 
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intentions can dissipate the cultural and social benefits accruing to citizens witnessing public 
exhibitions of sport.  There exist justifiable grounds for limiting an unchecked mercenary 
intention on the part of sporting associations staging public exhibitions of sport where those 
intentions impinge upon public rights. 
 
It is not suggested that beach or surf sports, or sports which utilize public beaches, parks and 
highways, should not be conducted at all.  That would be detrimental for culture and for 
seaside communities whose localized economies oftentimes rely on major sporting events.  
Public sporting events which utilize public spaces, such as beaches, public parks and public 
highways are important cultural events, particularly so in countries such as Australia where 
the beach, and sport generally, are fundamental aspects of lifestyle.  Rather, what is suggested 
here is that public sports events such as Triathlon, Marathon, Ironman competitions, and 
Surf Lifesaving competitions should be conducted in such a way as to not arbitrarily interfere 
with, obstruct or impinge upon common law public rights.  Furthermore, in light of the 
susceptibility of such public sporting events to proscription as public nuisances at the suit of 
members of the public, such sporting events ought to be protected by law.  Presently, almost 
every public sports event which appropriates public spaces for use by elite athletes 
competing in a sponsored competition is in danger of abatement under the common law 
rules dealing with public nuisances.  Only those public sporting events for which specific 
legislative enactments have been promulgated, such as motorsport, horseracing and 
professional boxing, may be protected from proscription by a suit for abatement on grounds 
of public nuisance.1164  This is so because there is no general legislative enactment to protect 
all sports; to protect such important cultural activities.  Strict legal logic reveals that public 
sporting events which utilize public beaches, parks or highways are, at common law, a public 
nuisance per se because they obstruct the public right to free use of, enjoyment of, or 
passage along the public beaches, parks, or highways.  It matters not that the public sports 
are tolerated, or even enjoyed.  In public nuisance suits public rights prevail always over the 
self interest of sports associations or sports club promoting a particular sport.  The common 
law prescribes that this is the result in any conflict between organized sport on the one hand, 
and individual citizens exercising their public rights, on the other.  And the only means by 
                                                
1164 See, eg Australian Grand Prix Act 1994 (Vic). 
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which this common law may be changed is by Parliament formally altering the common law 
by legislation.   
 
If we desire to champion the staging of public sporting events as cultural endeavours, rather 
than merely as pecuniary activities, then we ought to ensure, as a society, that such events are 
free from legal challenge and that they are staged lawfully, giving due and full consideration 
to the interference with public rights which might arise by the staging of such sporting 
events at public places.  The license of the Crown is not sufficient in law to alter this 
common law proposition.  Nor is the license of any local government sufficient, under 
existing legislative arrangements.  It has been known since at least the seventeenth century 
that “none can prescribe to make a common nuisance”: Dewell v Sanders,1165 Fowler v 
Sanders.1166  And powers granted to local governments in their enabling legislation do not 
change this position.  Whilst local governments in jurisdictions such as Queensland or New 
South Wales, for example, are empowered to make laws for the “peace, welfare and good 
government” of their local area, such powers do not include a power to alter the common 
law.  Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words in a statute – 
Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131.  Furthermore, there is a 
presumption against a parliamentary intention to infringe upon common law rights and 
freedoms – Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 (Lord Steyn); K-
Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ).1167 
 
The Crown has a choice of only three options when facing this legal conflict.  The Executive 
can either ignore the issue entirely and risk undermining their position as parens patriae, or it 
                                                
1165 (1619) Cro Jac 490, 79 ER 419. 
1166 (1617) Cro Jac 446, 79 ER 382. 
1167 See further Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18), citing Potter v 
Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yeats [1925] HCA 53, 
(1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93; and Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131.  And see the 
discussion in Chapter 14 of this thesis.  We know from judicial pronouncements such as of the High Court of 
Australia in Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18), citing Potter v 
Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yeats [1925] HCA 53, 
(1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93; and Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131, that powers granted 
in local government enabling legislation, such as powers to make laws for the ‘peace, welfare and good 
government’ over their area, do not include a power to license a public nuisance or to alter the common law.  
Such legislation does not use irresistibly clear language.  The power to make by-laws regulating a subject matter 
does not extend to prohibiting it and must not prevent or even suppress the thing or course of conduct to be 
regulated – Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at p 762 (Dixon J) 
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can institute civil proceedings to abate each and every public sporting event which causes an 
obstruction of the public beaches, parks, or highways, in order to protect and preserve the 
public rights of the people from arbitrary impingement, or, alternatively, the Executive can 
manage the situation by facilitating a legislative agenda to authorize each and every sporting 
event which utilizes public beaches, parks, or highways, in the public interest.  The Crown 
may not act arbitrarily, as it presently appears to do through public event promotional 
corporations, by supporting economically and politically the staging of publicly exhibited 
sporting events in contradistinction to its primary duty as parens patriae to protect and 
preserve public rights.  The Crown’s duty is to protect public rights from unfettered 
impingement by public sporting pursuits.   
 
If the Crown wishes to engage with the people to promote publicly exhibited sporting 
events, the Crown must first turn to Parliament and ask Parliament to promulgate law to 
alter the common law rules and to grant power to the Crown to so act.  The doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy applies.  Parliamentary enactment will likely have positive results 
for the preservation of public rights, for the protection of culturally significant sporting 
activities, and for diversity in sports practice.  Diversity in the types of sports publicly 
exhibited and in the manner in which such sports are publicly exhibited ought to be an 
important objective in any modern statute regulating sport.  An unregulated public sporting 
environment can lead to either an oligarchic sporting culture where there is domination by a 
small number of financially wealthy sporting associations harming diversity; or this 
unregulated public sporting environment can lead to an anarchic sporting culture where 
there is exponential growth in the number of publicly exhibited sporting activities to the 
harm of public rights.   One situation fails to protect the cultural and social benefits accruing 
from diversified practice of diverse sporting pursuits.  The other situation fails to protect 
public rights from unreasonable sports practice.  Parliament has an essential role to perform 
in regulating public sporting endeavour so as to simultaneously guarantee diversity in sports 
practice and the protection of public rights.  The only viable means of regulating publicly 
exhibited sporting endeavour, to ensure a balance between diversified sporting practice and 
the protection of public rights, is through legislative intervention. 
 
 396 
Public rights and public exhibitions of sporting events are incompatible.  Statutory 
intervention will ensure that an appropriate balance is achieved between the interests of 
private citizens and the benefits of culturally significant public sporting events.  Public rights 
can be protected and the narcissism and immoderation of public sporting events minimized.  
This form of regulation best ensures that a wide number of considerations are applied in 
determining how, when and where publicly exhibited sporting events are staged.  There are 
three possible modes of statutory regulation which Parliament may use.  These three modes 
of regulation are:- 
(1) Amend Local Government Acts to grant power to local governments to authorise 
publicly exhibited sports events, because existing legislation granting powers to local 
government to make local laws for the “peace, welfare and good government” of 
their local area do not include or encompass a power to alter the common law or to 
prevent or even suppress public rights or common law rights - Swan Hill Corporation v 
Bradbury [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at p 762 (Dixon J); Bropho v Western 
Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18), citing Potter v 
Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re 
Yeats [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93; and Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 
33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131.1168 
(2) Promulgate a new statute, being State and Territory statutes within Australia and not 
a Commonwealth statute, for each and every publicly exhibited sports event 
authorising such sports event and declaring that such sports event is not a public 
nuisance; or 
                                                
1168 See further the discussion in Chapter 14 of this thesis, and see Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 
NE 715 (1906); Hill v City of New York 139 NY 495, 34 NE 1090 at p 1092 (1893); Attorney-General v Blackpool 
Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478.  Local authorities lack powers to alter common law rules without a further grant of 
power from the State.  Public nuisance is a common law rule existing to protect and preserve public rights and 
no local authority may act arbitrarily to remove these public rights from the people without express grant to so 
do from the supreme legislature.  The supreme legislature must use irresistibly clear language in its enabling 
legislation to ensure that a local authority is sufficienly empowered:  see Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 
24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18), citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; 
Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yeats [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93; and Ex parte Simms [1999] 
UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131; Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at p 
762 (Dixon J); R v Greenbaum [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at pp 687-88 (Iacobucci J)(‘Courts must be 
vigilant is ensuring that municipal governments are not permitted by their enabling legislative enactments to 
make by-laws which impinge upon civil or common law rights’); Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 
539 at p 587 (Lord Steyn) (‘There is a presumption against a parliamentary intention to infringe upon common 
law rights and freedoms’); K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ). 
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(3) Establish a new Act of Parliament to cover the field; being State and Territory 
statutes within Australia and not a Commonwealth statute.  This new statute would 
grant power to the Minister of Sport to issue a license to promoters of proposed 
publicly exhibited sporting events which comply with criteria detailed in the Act. 
 
 
1. Amend Local Government Acts 
 
Most local governments already possess care and control management responsibilities for 
public spaces within their local area pursuant to legislation.  Such responsibilities include 
powers that are devolved from the State to a local authority,1169 and may be withdrawn from 
the local authority by the State at any time.1170  Many local governments already exercise a 
degree of practical authority over publicly exhibited sporting events because they in fact 
grant licenses to sporting associations to use of land under the care and management of the 
local government.  However, such licenses are inadequate as a matter of law to protect the 
publicly exhibited sporting event from proscription as a common law public nuisance, 
because such license has no weight in law to authorize the commission of a public nuisance 
or obstruct or interfere with public rights.1171 
 
                                                
1169 Local governments are entirely creatures of statute and have only such powers as are delegated them by the State 
of which they are a subdivision – see section 51 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW); Attorney-General v Blackpool 
Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478; R v Greenbaum [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at p 687 (Iacobucci J); Breard v 
Alexandria [1951] USSC 71, 341 US 622 at p 640, 71 SCt 920 at p 931; Avery v Midland County [1968] USSC 60, 
390 US 474 at p 480, 88 SCt 1114 at p 1118; Hunter v Pittsburgh [1907] USSC 157, 207 US 161 at pp 178-79. 
1170 See, eg, section 51 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). 
1171 See further the discussion in Chapter 14 of this thesis, and see Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 
NE 715 (1906); Hill v City of New York 139 NY 495, 34 NE 1090 at p 1092 (1893); Attorney-General v Blackpool 
Corporation (1907) 71 JP 478.  Local authorities lack powers to alter common law rules without a further grant of 
power from the State.  Public nuisance is a common law rule existing to protect and preserve public rights and 
no local authority may act arbitrarily to remove these public rights from the people without express grant to so 
do from the supreme legislature.  The supreme legislature must use irresistibly clear language in its enabling 
legislation to ensure that a local authority is sufficienly empowered:  see Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 
24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18), citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; 
Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In re Yeats [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93; and Ex parte Simms [1999] 
UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131; Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at p 
762 (Dixon J); R v Greenbaum [1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at pp 687-88 (Iacobucci J)(‘Courts must be 
vigilant is ensuring that municipal governments are not permitted by their enabling legislative enactments to 
make by-laws which impinge upon civil or common law rights’); Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 
539 at p 587 (Lord Steyn) (‘There is a presumption against a parliamentary intention to infringe upon common 
law rights and freedoms’); K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ). 
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It is possible that a simple amendment to local government legislation can have the effect of 
legalising publicly exhibited sporting events that are presently spuriously licensed by local 
governments.  It is also possible that such amendment could require a local government to 
appraise the impact of the proposed public sporting event prior to granting a license.  Such 
appraisal could weigh the following factors:  
1) the impact on public rights against the cultural, social and economic benefits to the 
local community; 
2) the manner in which the sporting association that is staging the public sporting event 
proposes to limit impingement of public rights; 
3) whether the proposed public sporting event unreasonably impinges on recreative 
pursuits at the place where the proposed event is to be staged; 
4) the degree of violence occurring in the proposed public sporting event, in order to 
minimize displays of violence; 
5) impacts on the environment by the staging of the public sporting event; 
6) impacts on the local economy by the staging of the public sporting event; 
7) the degree and manner in which the proposed public sporting event is to be staged 
to limit excessive displays of one sport more than any other, ensuring diversity in 
sports practise in the local community; 
8) whether a fee is charged to spectators of the proposed public sporting event, and 
whether such fee charged is reasonable.  (This criterion is designed to test whether a 
proposed public exhibition of a sport is motivated to support social integration 
amongst citizens or whether a proposed public exhibition of a sport is singularly 
pecuniarily motivated.) 
 
This amendment to Local Government Acts might state, simply, that publicly exhibited 
sporting events licensed by a local authority pursuant to the Act, and in consideration of the 
number of factors detailed in the Act, is not a public nuisance. 
 
 399 
 
2. Promulgate a new statute for each sporting event 
 
Individual statutes already exist to authorise the staging of individual sports events in public, 
though none of these statutes yet make reference to public nuisances, to to public rights 
which may be said to be impinged upon by the staging of the publicly exhibited sporting 
events the subject matter of these statutes, or to any circumstances of interference with 
public rights which may be said to be caused by the sporting event.  Such statutes regulate 
specific sports such as boxing and horseracing, and specific sporting events such as the 
Australian Grand Prix in Melbourne and the Indycar motor race at the Gold Coast in 
Queensland.  And we may look to present-day statutes of various common law jurisdictions, 
such as the Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 1986 (NSW); the Racing Administration Act 
1998 (NSW); the Racing Act 2002 (Qld); the Horse Racing Act, Revised Statutes of British 
Columbia 1996, c. 198; the New York Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law c. 
47-A;1172 and sections 18600-18618,1173 and sections 19420-19421,1174 of the California 
Business and Professions Code, for example, for guidance as to the manner in which 
authority is presently utilised to regulate sport. 
 
The only means by which the use of public streets or highways, or public parks, or public 
beaches, may be legitimized for sports events is legislation.  It has been long established in 
our law that the Crown cannot alone license a public nuisance.   And a local authority or 
local council likewise lacks such power, even where legislation might grant to them 
management responsibilities in respect of public roads, public parks and public beaches.  
Such local authorities, being administrative organs of the State, are in the same position as 
the Crown and cannot alone license a public nuisance, which is a common law crime.1175  
                                                
1172 Section 101 establishes the New York state racing and wagering board in the following terms: “There is 
hereby created within the executive department the New York state racing and wagering board, which board 
shall have general jurisdiction over all horse racing activities…” 
1173 Chapter 18600, the Boxing Act, establishes the State Athletic Commission for California, with a board, the 
members of which are appointed by the Executive and Legislature of the State. 
1174 Sections 19420-19421 establishes the California Horse Racing Board, with members appointed by the 
Governor of the State of California. 
1175 It has been known since at least the seventeenth century that “none can proscribe to make a common 
nuiance, for it cannot have a lawful beginning by license or otherwise, being an offence at common law”: Dewell 
v Sanders (1619) Cro Jac 490, 79 ER 419; Fowler v Sanders (1617) Cro Jac 446, 79 ER 382. See further the 
discussion in Chapter 14 of this thesis, and see Johnson v City of New York 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715 (1906); Hill v 
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Only Parliament may authorise the commission of what may otherwise amount to a public 
nuisance crime.  And only through legislative edict may the common law be changed.  
Salmond on Torts notes, in respect of public nuisance: “These principles are as old as any in 
the common law and can now be altered only by legislation.”1176  These principles were also 
noted by the Court of Appeals of New York in Johnson v City of New York, where Chief 
Justice Cullen, speaking for the court, said: “Highways are constructed for public travel, and, 
as already said, the acts of the defendants [in using the highway for a motorcar race] were 
doubtless an illegal interference with the rights of the traveller…  It is entirely possible that 
as a matter of fact the plaintiff did not know that the race on the highway was illegal, but it 
was illegal not from any want of permit, but because there was no statutory power to grant 
a permit to use the highway for a private purpose.”1177   
 
Owing to these foregoing principles, when motorcar races are held in the public streets, 
contemporary State legislatures invariably pass legislation authorising the events.  The Motor 
Racing Events Act 1990 (Qld) is the statute authorising the conduct of the Gold Coast Indy 
motorcar race about the streets of the city of Gold Coast in Australia.  The Act provides, in 
sections 5G(3) and 12(5), that an activity carried on by or under the direction of the state, or 
by or with the permission of the sports promoter, within the area for the motorcar race and 
during the period of time designated for the race does not constitute a nuisance.  Section 36 
of the Australian Grand Prix Act 1994 (Vic) provides that the Australian Grand Prix, which 
takes place on the public roads about Albert Park in Melbourne, Australia, does not 
                                                
City of New York 139 NY 495, 34 NE 1090 at p 1092 (1893); Attorney-General v Blackpool Corporation (1907) 71 JP 
478.  Local authorities lack powers to alter common law rules without a further grant of power from the State.  
Public nuisance is a common law rule existing to protect and preserve public rights and no local authority may 
act arbitrarily to remove these public rights from the people without express grant to so do from the supreme 
legislature.  The supreme legislature must use irresistibly clear language in its enabling legislation to ensure that 
a local authority is sufficienly empowered:  see Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 
CLR 1 at p 18), citing Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; Ex parte Walsh and Johnson, In 
re Yeats [1925] HCA 53, (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p 93; and Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 
131; Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury [1937] HCA 15, (1937) 56 CLR 746 at p 762 (Dixon J); R v Greenbaum 
[1993] SCC 166, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at pp 687-88 (Iacobucci J)(‘Courts must be vigilant is ensuring that 
municipal governments are not permitted by their enabling legislative enactments to make by-laws which 
impinge upon civil or common law rights’); Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 (Lord 
Steyn) (‘There is a presumption against a parliamentary intention to infringe upon common law rights and 
freedoms’); K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ). 
1176 RVF Heuston and RA Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (20th edn Sweet & Maxwell London 
1992) at p 92. 
1177 186 NY 139, 78 NE 715, Court of Appeals of New York (1906), at p 147 of the former report.  Italics 
mine. 
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constitute a nuisance.  Section 38 of that Act provides that the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) 
does not apply to the grand prix racing.  The use of the word “nuisance” in sections 5G(3) 
and 12(5) of the Motor Racing Events Act 1990 (Qld), and in section 36 of the Australian 
Grand Prix Act 1994 (Vic), may be ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the term 
nuisance includes the specific common law offence of public nuisance in contradistinction to 
private nuisance such as that created by noise.  Given that these statutes deal with the subject 
matter of motor car racing, a noisesome public sporting activity, and given that the purpose 
of such legislation is to void a common law rule, and to take away common law public rights, 
including such public rights as the right to use of the highway and the right to quietude, the 
use of the general word “nuisance” may not be sufficient to encompass the common law 
offence of public nuisance.  Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words.1178  And there is a juridical presumption against a parliamentary intention 
to infringe upon common law rights and freedoms.1179  Parliament must use irresistibly clear 
and unambiguous words in its statutes.  The use of the word “nuisance” in the 
abovementioned motorcar race statutes may not be regarded as irresistibly clear and 
unambiguous to also encompass the common law offence of public nuisance.  Thus an 
amendment to these Acts, may be required to cover public nuisance as well as private 
nuisance. 
 
Specific language is appropriate where a change in the common law is the desired result of 
legislation such as the Motor Racing Events Act 1990 (Qld).  A similarly clear and 
unambiguous provision may be required for each and every sporting event which utilizes the 
public streets and highways for their competitions, including cycling events, running events 
or marathons, triathlon races, motorcar races, or cart racing, as well as for events using 
                                                
1178 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at p 131 (Lord 
Hoffmann). In K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ) the High 
Court of Australia referred to “a well established and conservative principle of interpretation that statutes are 
construed, where constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and 
freedoms at common law.”  See also Benson v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942) AC 520 at pp 526-527. 
1179 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 (Lord 
Steyn). In Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304 O’Connor J said: “It is in the last degree 
improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the 
general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.”  Aff’d: Bropho v Western 
Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para [13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at pp 436-
437; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49 at 
para [11], (2002) 213 CLR 543; and K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] 
(French CJ). 
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beaches and parks such as surfing championships, Ironman championships and surf 
lifesaving competitions.  For each and every public sporting event proposed a statute, 
expressing clearly and unambiguously that such a public sporting event does not constitute a 
public nuisance, would be necessary. 
 
Statutes purporting to authorize the use of public places exclusively for major sporting 
events, such as the Commonwealth Games and the World Swimming Championships, 
absent specific reference to the common law of public nuisance, are also probably deficient.  
Legislation of the Victorian Parliament established corporations for the management of the 
Commonwealth Games and the World Swimming Championships: Commonwealth Games 
Arrangements Act 2001 (Vic) and World Swimming Championships Act 2004 (Vic).  Both 
Acts, in sections 20-25 and sections 42-50, respectively, provided that various state Acts on 
environmental law, planning law, and environmental and ecological management, such as the 
Coastal Management Act 1995 (Vic), did not apply to the development or use of a venue for 
the respective sports events.  But neither Act specifically authorized the use of a public place 
for a sporting event, which use subsequently infringed upon public rights.  Neither Act 
mentioned the common law, and neither Act authorized the use of public places which 
might otherwise amount to a public nuisance at common law.  The use of public spaces, 
such as beaches, for sports events, not only raises environmental and conservation issues, 
but also impacts upon public rights, which must be relinquished for the duration of the use 
of the public space.  Sporting events using public places must be conducted lawfully, 
according to the rule of law, and not according to the exercise of an arbitrary power by a 
corporation established under an Act of Parliament.  It is incumbent upon Parliament to 
state expressly, by way of statute, that they prefer a private interest (such as the World 
Swimming Championships held under the auspices and at the behest of a private association 
– the Fédération Internationale de Natation) to take precedence over a public right for a 
limited duration.  In the absence of express statutory authorization, public sporting events 
which utilize public places, or highways, such as beaches, public parks, and public roads, may 
be challenged as being unlawful as a public nuisance at common law.  To remedy this 
shortcoming, the Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2001 (Vic) and World 
Swimming Championships Act 2004 (Vic), and any future Act of any common law state 
which purports to enable and promote public sporting events to take place in public places 
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or public highways, ought to contain a provision which states that the common law of public 
nuisance does not apply or otherwise states that use of a designated public place or a 
designated portion of the public highway, for the purposes of the respective public game 
being staged, is not a public nuisance.  A common law public nuisance may be allowed only 
pursuant to express statutory edict which has the effect of altering the common law. 
 
The promulgation of a new statute for each and every publicly exhibited sports event would 
be a laborious and contrived mode of regulation.  The number of sports events which are 
exhibited publicly at public spaces (including events such as triathlons, marathons, surf 
lifesaving championships, surfing events, beach cricket, beach volleyball, acrobatic aeroplane 
competitions, swimming events, and bicycling events, to name but a few) creates a long list 
of statutes which would need to be drafted, debated, read, reviewed, voted upon, passed, and 
promulgated by Parliaments.  Whilst a singular formula could be adopted for each statute, 
thereby ensuring that each separate statute read similarly, the sheer number of statutes 
required to ensure that each and every publicly exhibited sporting event was lawfully 
conducted so as to not create a public nuisance through impingement of public rights would 
create a cumbersome code.  
 
 
3. A statute to cover the field 
 
A general statute that regulates the staging of publicly exhibited sports events would be the 
most coherent mode to employ.  Such statute would provide a consistent application of 
policy and law across a state’s territory. 
 
The objectives of this type of statute might include ensuring that:  
1) the rights of individual citizens to use of public spaces is not arbitrarily infringed,  
2) the interests of individual citizens to use of public spaces for their health and 
recreation are protected,  
3) publicly exhibited sports events support social integration amongst citizens,  
4) culturally significant sporting events are protected,  
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5) environmental, economic, social, and moral considerations are taken into account in 
determining which publicly exhibited sports events receive license. 
 
States could adopt a general statute alike that of the Code du Sport of France.  The new Code 
du Sport of France which regulates the establishment of sports federations in France, and 
which establishes penalties for using drugs in sport competitions, also regulates how sports 
are to be practised at public places. 
 
The principles upon which the French government rely in claiming a regulatory authority 
over all sport practised in public is detailed in Article L111-2 of the Code du Sport.  The 
principles are consistent with the role of the government as parens patriae.   Article L111-2 
provides that the objectives of the government are to develop access to sporting and 
recreative services and spaces, whilst supporting “collective services of natural and rural 
spaces”, and supporting social integration amongst citizens. 
 
Pursuant to Article L322-5 the French ministry of sport can close temporarily or 
permanently a sports establishment or event where the activities of such establishment or 
where such event presents health risks or where there is risk to physical or moral safety.   
 
Pursuant to Article 331-6 and Regulation R331-6 Section 4: Epreuves et compétitions 
sportives sur la voie publique of the Code du Sport, Partie réglementaire – Décrets, any sport event 
held partly or entirely on a public highway requires authorization by government and the 
organizers of such sport event must obtain authorization prior to staging such sport 
event.1180  Sanction is given by a prefect of the Department where the sport event is 
proposed to the staged, or, where more than twenty Departments are involved in the staging 
of any sport event on public highways, by the Minister of the Interior.1181  Publicly exhibited 
                                                
1180 The regulation provides: “Article R331-6 Toute épreuve, course ou compétition sportive devant se disputer 
en totalité ou en partie sur une voie publique ou ouverte à la circulation publique, exige, pour pouvoir se 
dérouler, l'obtention préalable, par les organisateurs, d'une autorisation administrative délivrée dans les 
conditions et sous les garanties définies par la présente section.” 
1181 In the political and administrative organization of France there are 100 Departments.  A Department, under 
the French system of government, is roughly the equivalent of a county or shire council or a local government 
area.  Code du Sport Partie réglementaire - Arrêtés Article A331-2 provides: “Article A331-2 Créé par Arrêté 
du 28 février 2008 - art. (V) L'autorisation prévue à l'article R. 331-6 est délivrée sous réserve des exceptions 
prévues aux articles A. 331-6 et A. 331-8 :  1° Par le ministre de l'intérieur, lorsque le parcours sur lequel doit se 
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sport events such as the Tour de France cycling race which make use of public roads must 
therefore now obtain the license of the Minister of the Interior of France.  Comparable 
tournaments in Australia, such as the Tour Down Under, are not subject to the same level of 
scrutiny, although they may be a public nuisance at common law because they obstruct the 
public right of way on the public highway. 
 
Breaching the regulatory framework established under the Code du Sport attracts penal 
penalty, not civil remedies.  Pursuant to Article L312-14 the staging of a public sporting 
event in violation of regulations or in an enclosure not approved in accordance with the 
statute is punishable by two years imprisonment and a fine of €75,000.00. 
 
The movement toward legislative reform and the establishment of consolidated laws for 
public exhibitions of sport is, however, not confined to France.  Recent legislative 
enactments of the Parliaments of the Australian states of New South Wales and of Victoria 
consolidate into one Act, respectively, the laws relating to major events and to venues used 
for such events and create a legislative framework for the authorization of the use of public 
venues and public spaces such as roads for sporting events that are declared to be major 
sporting events.1182  Also included within the framework are comprehensive rules on 
advertising, aerial advertising, the use of airspace at events, ticketing and commercial aspects 
such as the use of logos at major sporting events.   
 
Though these enactments of New South Wales and of Victoria are limited in their scope in 
that they only create a legislative regime for the conduct and management of sporting events 
declared to be a “major sporting event”, they provide a very good first step toward the 
establishment of a comprehensive and uniform sports code and support the argument of this 
thesis that public exhibitions of sport are a special category of human activity that depend 
upon sanction from Parliament for legitimacy.  In respect of the New South Wales Major 
                                                
dérouler l'épreuve inclut des voies situées dans plus de vingt départements distincts ;  2° En vertu d'une 
délégation ministérielle permanente, par le préfet du département dans lequel le départ de l'épreuve est donné, 
si le nombre des départements intéressés par la manifestation est égal ou inférieur à vingt.  Dans le cas où 
l'épreuve comporte des points de départ différents, sans que le nombre des départements respectivement 
traversés soit au total supérieur à vingt, l'autorisation est délivrée par le préfet du département où est établi le 
siège du groupement organisateur de l'épreuve. 
1182 See Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) and Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
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Events Act 2009, it is worth noting that only one publicly exhibited sporting event has been 
authorized under the Major Events Regulation 2010 in New South Wales – the Sydney 
International FIFA Fan Fest.  Under the Victoria legislation, the Major Sporting Events Act 
2009, the term “major sporting event” is defined pursuant to section 3 to include sporting 
events such as the Australian Tennis Open, the Australian Grand Prix, and the Australian 
Rules Football Grand Final, and analogous events.  Further, the Victoria Act defines “sports 
event”, under section 3 of the Act, to mean:  
“(a) a type of match, game or other event; or  
(b) a series of matches, games or other events; or  
(c) a tournament,  
involving the playing of sport (whether or not for competition) at a 
ground or other place (whether indoors or outdoors) to which persons 
are admitted on payment of a fee or charge, or after making a donation, 
to view the playing of the sport or to enter or remain at the ground or 
place and, in the case of sports event that consists of a series of matches, 
games or other events or a tournament, includes any opening or closing 
ceremonies connected with the series or tournament.”   
Excluded from this definition are sports events staged at public places such as beaches and 
parks and roads at which members of the public spectate without paying any fee to so do, 
including triathlon events, surfing events and surf-lifesaving tournaments.  The many public 
sporting events that take place at beaches and parks and on roads are not covered by the 
legislation. 
 
The objectives of these major sporting events Acts are varied.  In respect of the Major 
Events Act 2009 of New South Wales the objectives of the Act include: 
(a) to attract, support and facilitate the holding and conduct of major 
events in New South Wales, in particular, events that are anticipated to 
be of a large scale with a significant number of participants or 
spectators (whether of a sporting, cultural or other nature), 
(b) to increase the benefits flowing from major events to the people of 
New South Wales, 
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(c) to promote the safety and enjoyment of participants and spectators 
at major events, 
(d) to prevent unauthorised commercial exploitation of major events at 
the expense of event organisers and sponsors, 
(e) to enable authorities that are to manage, co-ordinate or regulate 
major events to be established or designated by regulation, 
(f) to make provision for the following matters in relation to major 
 events:  
(i) traffic control and the co-ordination of transport and 
 parking, 
(ii) the regulation of commercial exploitation of the events, 
including the prevention of ambush marketing and 
unauthorised use of official titles and insignia, 
(iii) safety and crowd management, 
(g) to ensure that government agencies are authorised to facilitate and 
support the holding and conduct of major events.” 
 
The New South Wales Act,1183 and Victoria Act,1184 each establish that an event may only be 
declared to be a major sporting event where such event is at an international, national or 
State level and it is in the public interest to so declare.  The New South Wales Act establishes 
that the declaration must be made by way of regulation on the recommendation of the 
responsible Minister.1185  The Victoria Act establishes that the Governor in Council may 
make an order that an event is a major sporting event on the recommendation of the 
responsible Minister.1186  In making a regulation under the New South Wales Act or an order 
under the Victoria Act, the responsible Ministers must have regard to and assess: 
(a) the size of the event, 
(b) the likely number of spectators for the event, 
(c) the likely media coverage of the event, 
(d) the projected economic impact of the event, 
                                                
1183 Section 5(1) Major Events Act 2009 (NSW). 
1184 Section 9(1) Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
1185 Section 5(1) Major Events Act 2009 (NSW). 
1186 Section 7 Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
 408 
(e) the potential contribution to New South Wales’s or Victoria’s 
international profile as a host of major events, 
(f) the commercial arrangements for the event, 
(g) the views of the event organiser, including the organiser’s event 
management experience and expertise, 
(h) factors affecting the operational organisation of the event, such as 
 the following:  
(i) preparation of road and transport management plans, 
(ii) emergency management plans, 
(iii) security plans and consultation with police and emergency 
 services, and 
(i) the views of local councils directly affected by the event in relation to 
the arrangements made or to be made for the event.1187 
 
The responsible Ministers do not have to consider the impact of the major event on 
common law public rights such as the right to quietude, the right of way on the highway, the 
public right to health, or the right to recreation at the place where the event is proposed to 
be staged, for example, in determining whether to recommend that a regulation or order be 
made declaring a proposed event to be a major sporting event.  Whether the common law 
public right to safety is taken into consideration in determining whether a proposed public 
sporting event is to receive license by virtue of the duty on the responsible Minister to assess 
emergency management plans and security plans for a proposed major sporting event is 
debatable.  But, at the least, both enactments require the Minister to assess emergency 
management plans, security plans, and to consult with police and emergency services.1188  In 
this respect, both enactments are a positive step toward a comprehensive and balanced code.  
Perceptible in the list of factors which the responsible Ministers must assess prior to 
recommending the making of a regulation or order declaring a major sporting event is the 
parens patriae duty of the Crown. 
 
                                                
1187 Section 5(3) Major Events Act 2009 (NSW); section 9(2) Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
1188 Section 5(3) Major Events Act 2009 (NSW); section 9(2) Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
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Both Acts also promulgate rules on the establishment and administration of major events 
authorities to manage and conduct a major sporting event; rules on the obligations and 
powers of government agencies in respect of major events; and rules on the management of 
road and traffic areas in concert with Commissioners of Police.  Along with the declaration 
of an event as a major sporting event, pursuant to regulation under the New South Wales 
Act, the regulation must designate either a major event authority or a government agency or 
a public official as the “responsible authority” for the conduct of the major event.1189  In 
establishing a uniform sports code throughout common law jurisdictions, parliamentary 
responsibility, and parens patriae duty, in respect of a publicly exhibited sporting event could 
be ensured in a fashion alike that established under section 9(2) of the New South Wales 
Act, whereby a major event authority established for the purposes of managing and 
conducting a major sporting event is subject to the control and direction of the responsible 
Minister in the exercise of its functions.1190 
 
Both the New South Wales and Victoria major sporting events Acts empower the 
responsible Minister to temporarily close a road or part of a road where a road may be used 
for the preparation for or for conducting a major sporting event.1191  The Acts exclude from 
operation extant road safety and road management Acts,1192 and establish a duty on the part 
of the responsible Minister to consult with the roads authority and local government.1193  The 
Acts also penalize persons for using a road or a part of a road which is in use for the 
preparation for or conduct of a major sporting event.1194  There is no duty on the responsible 
Minister to consider the impact of the temporary closure of a road or a part of a road on the 
common law public right of way on the highway in the New South Wales Act nor in the 
Victoria Act; though the New South Wales Act establishes a duty, on the part of the 
responsible authority managing the major sporting event to ensure that a road is not closed 
                                                
1189 Section 8 Major Events Act (NSW). 
1190 Section 9(2) Major Events Act 2009 (NSW). 
1191 Sections 26-29 Major Events Act 2009 (NSW); and sections 108-113 Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
1192 The major events Acts also exclude the operation of the Road Safety Acts and Road Rules from operation 
in respect of major sporting events – see section 22(4) of the Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) respecting Road 
Transport (General) Act 2005 (NSW), and section 113 of the Major Sporting Events Act (Vic) respecting Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic). 
1193 Sections 109, 110 Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic). 
1194 See section 24 of the Major Events Act (NSW), establishing a penalty of 20 penalty units, and see section 
30 of the Major Events Act (NSW) establishing a penalty of 30 penalty units, and see sections 105-108 of the 
Major Sporting Events Act (Vic) establishing a penalty of 20 penalty units. 
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for a period longer than is necessary to serve the purpose for which the road is closed.  The 
duty imposed on the responsible Minister to take into consideration road and transport plans 
for the proposed major sporting event in determining whether the recommend a license to a 
major sporting event may be sufficient consideration of the common law public right to use 
of the highway.  But a uniform and balanced sports code ought to require, in clear and 
unambiguous terms, the Minister to account for the common law public right of use of the 
highway in determining whether to recommend whether a sporting event receive a license 
for public exhibition.  
 
In establishing a uniform sports code in respect of all public exhibitions of sport, the public 
right to safety could be protected in a fashion similar to the safety and crowd management 
provisions of both the New South Wales and Victoria Acts.  These Acts contain penal 
sanctions for any person at a major sporting event who possesses a weapon, a lit distress 
signal or fireworks, a laser pointer, dangerous goods, an animal, a horn or bugle or whistle or 
loud hailer, or a flag larger than one metre square, or who throws any bottle, stone or 
projectile.1195  A person must not disrupt a match, game, sport or event without reasonable 
excuse,1196 nor may a person damage or deface any building, fence, barrier, barricade, seat, 
chair, table, structure, vehicle, craft, truck, pipe, tap, tap fitting, conduit, electrical equipment, 
wiring or sign, nor damage any trees, plants or other flora within an event venue or event 
area at a major sporting event.1197  The Victoria Act also prohibits persons from climbing on 
any fence barrier or barricade or any roof or parapet of a building within an event venue or 
event area; and also prohibits persons from deliberately obstructing the view of any other 
person.1198  And section 44(1) of the New South Wales Act provides that a person must not 
use indecent, obscene or threatening language, behave in an offensive or indecent manner, 
cause serious alarm or affront to a person by disorderly conduct, or obstruct a person in the 
performance of the person’s work or duties.1199 
 
                                                
1195 See sections 62-68 of the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic); and sections 41(1) and 43(4) and (7) of the 
Major Events Act 2009 (NSW). 
1196 Section 67 of the Major Sporting Events Act (Vic) imposes a penalty of 60 penalty units. 
1197 Sections 69 and 70 of the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic) imposes a penalty of 20 penalty units. 
1198 Sections 72, 73 and 74 of the Major Sporting Events Act (Vic) imposes a penalty of 10 pen units. 
1199 Section 44(1) of the Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) imposes a penalty of 10 pen units. 
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Both the New South Wales and Victoria major sporting events Acts contain provisions 
empowering a major sporting event authority and the police to respond to persons 
disrupting or interrupting any sport event or engaging in behaviour which is a risk to the 
safety of persons at a sporting event or endangering the person or another person at a 
sporting event.1200  Such persons may be directed to leave and not re-enter a sports venue or 
event area.  If a person appears to be intoxicated or using indecent, obscene or threatening 
language or behaving in an offensive or indecent manner they may be directed to leave and 
not re-enter a sports venue or event area. 
 
These several penal sanctions on spectators and others at a major sporting event or at a 
sports venue or event area are analogous in their scope to those penalties imposed upon the 
retinue at tournaments in the middle ages pursuant to the Statuta Armorum of Edward I in 
1292.1201  Furthermore, the sanctions against those persons possessing weapons or projectiles 
or acting disruptively at a sporting event, under the New South Wales and Victoria Major 
Events Acts, may be seen as an appropriate mechanism to protect the common law public 
right to safety at a publicly exhibited sporting event, thereby obviating the need to have 
recourse to the common law remedies under a public nuisance suit. 
 
Whilst these major sporting events enactments of New South Wales and of Victoria provide 
some degree of consideration for the impact of publicly exhibited sporting events on the 
common law public right of safety, an informed and balanced code of sport would also 
                                                
1200 Pursuant to section 83 of the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic), a person who is believed on 
reasonable grounds to be a person who has committed an offence under the Act may be directed to leave and 
not re-enter a sports venue or event area.  Further, pursuant to section 84, a person may be directed to leave 
and not re-enter a sports venue or event area if the person is:  
(a) disrupting or interrupting any match, game, sport or event organised by the event organiser; or 
(b) the person is engaging in conduct which is a risk to the safety of that person or other spectators; 
or 
(c) the person is causing unreasonable disruption or unreasonable interference to spectators of the 
event or persons engaged in the conduct or management of the event or event venue.   
Pursuant to section 46(4) of the Major Events Act 2009 of New South Wales, a person may be directed to leave 
a major sporting venue where the person is causing a significant disruption or inconvenience or behaving in an 
offensive manner or in a manner likely to endanger the person or another person or is otherwise contravening 
a provision of the Act or a regulation. Section 43(1)(e) of the Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) provides that a 
person may be prohibited from entering a major event venue or facility or any part of a major event venue or 
facility:  
(i) if they are in possession of any prohibited thing, or  
(ii) if, in the opinion of a person authorised by the responsible authority, they are or appear to be 
intoxicated. 
1201 See n 56 and accompanying text in Chapter 2, above. 
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require the Executive to consider the impact of a proposed publicly exhibited sporting event 
on other common law public rights such as the right to quietude, the right to use of the 
highway, and the right to recreation at public places such as public beaches and parks, as well 
as the impact on the environment, and the impact on the health of participants in and 
spectators at sporting events, in determining whether to recommend the staging of a publicly 
exhibited sporting event.  Missing from these New South Wales and Victoria Acts are 
provisions in respect of the public right to health at sporting events, in particular.  Both 
players and spectators at sporting events ought to have need to be protected from the harm 
which can be caused by weather, particularly in circumstances where summer sporting events 
are staged on very hot summer days with much exposure to the sun and very hot 
temperatures posing health risks for players and spectators alike.   
 
The New South Wales and Victoria Major Sporting Events enactments inadequately protect 
common law public rights such as the public right to quietude or the public right to 
recreation, there being no reference to the need for the Executive to take into account the 
impact of the staging of a major sporting event on the public rights of the community 
wherein such major sporting event is proposed to be staged.  Under section 25 of the Major 
Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic), the Minister may make guidelines in relation to minimum 
event planning standards for event organisers of major sporting events including, but not 
limited to— (a) traffic and transport management; (b) emergency management; (c) 
environmental impact management; and (d) event security.  But there is no duty on the 
responsible Minister to account for the impact of a publicly exhibited sporting event on the 
public right to quietude or the public right to health and safety.  These considerations must 
be included in any legislative reform.  The Major Events Act 2009 of New South Wales not 
only fails to protect common law public rights or to minimize harm to the public in the 
exercise of their public rights during the staging of a major event at a public place, but in fact 
a person is not liable at all, under sections 51(6) and 53(3) for “…(c) the emission of noise, 
including permissible noise levels, on or from the land, or (d) activities that affect the 
amenity of the locality, by the doing of anything that is reasonably necessary to be done by 
or under, or as a consequence of the operation of, this Act, that is reasonably necessary to be 
done in order to comply with or give effect to a policy, strategy or plan prepared and 
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implemented by the responsible authority for the purposes of this Act…”  Furthermore, 
pursuant to section 61 of that Act, there is no liability in nuisance: 
“Anything done or omitted to be done by any person: 
(a) in the exercise of functions under this Act or the regulations 
(including functions which, by this Act, are taken to be functions under 
another Act or instrument), or 
(b) pursuant to any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations 
(including provisions which, by this Act, are taken to be provisions of 
another Act or instrument), 
does not constitute a nuisance.”  
 
The question remains as to whether section 61 of the New South Wales Major Events Act 
2009 would be interpreted strictly and narrowly, following the decisions in Potter v Minahan 
and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson, because this section may be 
interpreted broadly as seeking to take away from the people a means for enforcing a 
common law public right, namely a suit at common law for public nuisance.1202  There is a 
presumption against a parliamentary intention to infringe upon fundamental rights and 
freedoms at common law.  The people ought not be left without recourse to a remedy or an 
appeal mechanism against a recommendation to grant a license to a major sporting event if 
their public rights are unreasonably impinged upon.  Recourse to judicial review of the 
Ministerial decision to recommend a regulation declaring a major sporting event may not be 
an adequate remedy.   In establishing a uniform sports code, provisions ought to be 
established to adequately protect public rights.  And consideration must also be had as to 
                                                
1202 Potter v Minahan  [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex 
parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at p 587 (Lord Steyn).  In Potter v Minahan, O’Connor J said: ‘It is 
in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or 
depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.’ Potter v 
Minahan  [1908] HCA 63, (1908) 7 CLR 277 at p 304.  Aff’d: Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 at para 
[13], (1990) 171 CLR 1 at p 18; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at pp 436-437; K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor 
Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] (French CJ).  In Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton [2001] HCA 14 at 
para [27]-[29], 204 CLR 290 at pp 298-99 McHugh J noted that: “Courts have long held that a statute should 
not be construed as amending fundamental principles, infringing common law rights or departing from the 
general system of law unless it does so with ‘irresistible clearness’.  The legislative intention to do so, it is often 
said, must be ‘unambiguously clear’.”  In K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4 at para [47] 
(French CJ) referred to “a well established and conservative principle of interpretation that statutes are 
construed, where constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and 
freedoms at common law.” 
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establishing a legal mechanism for adequately resolving disputes between sports organization 
wishing to stage and promote their sport and the public exercising their public right to 
quietude, use of the highway or public right to recreation.  
 
Given that common law public nuisance is a real concern affecting the legitimacy of publicly 
exhibited sporting events in common law jurisdictions, the establishment of a broad 
regulatory framework alike that of France’s Code du Sport, and incorporating some of the 
elements of the Major Events Act 2009 of New South Wales and the Major Sporting Events 
Act 2009 of Victoria, would effectively protect public rights.  Culturally important public 
sporting events can also be protected.  Any harm that might flow from the unregulated 
staging of public sporting events can be minimized.  Such a statute addresses the 
fundamental issue that public rights and public sporting events are discordant.  Should a 
general statute be the preferred solution, five essential elements are necessary in ensuring an 
effective regulatory framework.  First, the statute would need to establish a licensing system, 
as was first promulgated by Richard I in the year 1194 and similarly to that promulgated by 
France’s Code du Sport.  This statute would mandate that any sporting event proposed to be 
staged at a public place, such as a road, a beach or a park, and any sporting event to which 
crowds of spectators may be drawn, must be approved by the Minister for Sport.   
 
Second, when granting or refusing approval to a proposed public sporting event, the 
Minister for Sport would be required to consider a number of factors to redress the 
incompatibility of public rights and public exhibitions of sport.   At least eight factors ought 
to be addressed by the Minister in determining whether to grant or refuse a license: 
1) whether public rights are impinged by the staging of the proposed sporting event, 
and if so, whether the promoters of the proposed sporting event have taken or 
propose to take steps to minimize harm to public rights; 
2) whether the proposed sporting event is of cultural significance, accruing cultural and 
social benefits to local residents at the place where the proposed sporting event is to 
be staged; 
3) whether the proposed public sporting event unreasonably impinges on recreative 
pursuits at the place where the proposed event is to be staged 
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4) the degree of violence occurring in the sporting event proposed to be staged in 
public, with the objective that displays of violence are to minimized as much as 
possible; 
5) the environmental impacts of the proposed sporting event; 
6) the economic impacts of the proposed sporting event; 
7) diversity, and whether the proposed sporting event contributes to or detracts from a 
diverse practice of sports in the local area where the public sporting event is 
proposed to take place; 
8) whether a fee is charged to spectators of the proposed public sporting event, and 
whether such fee charged is reasonable. (This criterion is designed to test whether a 
proposed public exhibition of a sport is motivated to support social integration 
amongst citizens or whether a proposed public exhibition of a sport is singularly 
pecuniarily motivated.) 
Ultimately, the task for the Minister is to balance the need to protect and support public 
rights on the one hand whilst protecting and supporting culturally and socially beneficial 
public sporting events on the other.     
 
Third, the statute would need to provide that a sporting event for which approval has been 
granted does not constitute a public nuisance. 
 
Fourth, the statute would need to provide appeal mechanisms against a decision to grant a 
license where members of the public believe that their public rights are unreasonably 
impigned upon by the granting of the license to stage the public exhibition of sport. 
 
Fifth, the statute would need to establish penalties for individuals and for sporting 
associations who promote, finance, stage, or assist in the staging of, a sporting event at a 
public place, or a sporting event to which spectators attended or were invited to attend, 
without a license or in contravention of the Act.  A sanction of two years imprisonment and 
a fine of the equivalent of a €75,000.00 value, as is mandated under the French Code du Sport, 
would appear to be an appropriate deterrent. 
 
 416 
It is recommended that, in order to avoid risks of corruption, and in order to minimize the 
potential financial influence of sporting associations over local government officials, a statute 
should establish a centralized source of power rather than to allow a dual regulatory 
framework as is established in France pursuant to the French Code du Sport.  A Minister of 
Sport, supported by his government department and his public servants, and being 
accountable to the other members of Cabinet and to Parliament, would be the most 
appropriate person to grant or refuse approval of licenses for proposed publicly exhibited 
sporting events.  This framework would avoid local governments jockeying against each 
other for prized public sporting events.  Should local governments have authority to license 
publicly exhibited sports events there is a risk that financially wealthy sporting associations 
would exercise a degree of control over local government officials.  Were local governments 
to exercise control, the rules and framework under which a license is to be granted or 
refused could be unreasonably compromised, leading to detriment of public rights and to 
loss of diversity in the practice of sport. 
 
Where the regulatory framework is administered by a central authority there is a greater 
likelihood that the parens patriae responsibility of government will be applied, that diversity in 
sports practice will be enhanced, and that public rights will be protected.  Provided that a 
new legislative framework to license public exhibitions of sport is appropriately phrased, 
there ought to be little danger in according the Crown responsibility to administer this new 
legislative framework.  It is a basic rule of constitutional law that the organs of government 
must themselves operate through law.1203  The ministers of the Crown are responsible to 
parliament and to the populace that elected them.1204  For every exercise of Crown power 
some minister is answerable.1205  There is no reason to doubt that the Crown would sanction 
a very wide variety of public exhibitions of sports for the public good. 
 
 
                                                
1203 See ECS Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (Longman London 1992) at p 98. 
1204 See Wade and Bradley (ibid) at chapters 7 and 14. 
1205 Sir William R Anson The Law and Custom of the Constitution (Clarendon Press Oxford 1908) vol II, pt 1, at pp 
62-72.  Maitland argues that the practice, in medieval times, by which the royal will had to be signified in 
documents bearing a royal seal, such seal being applied by one of the king’s ministers, is the foundation of our 
modern doctrine of ministerial responsibility.  See FW Maitland The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1965) at pp 202-203. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
Only by the foregoing statutory means may the conflict between public rights and public 
sporting events be resolved.  Absent legislative authority, public exhibitions of sport 
conducted by individuals, corporations, or sports associations, at public places such as roads, 
beaches and parks, will continue to be harmful activities in that they have capacity to harm 
public rights and create public nuisances. 
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Chapter 17 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood Justice Hardie Boys noted: “…[N]uisance is one of those 
areas of the law where the courts have long been engaged in the application of certain basic 
legal concepts to a never-ending variety of circumstances; and that will continue to be so, for 
by its very nature the law of nuisance is intimately involved with the developing use of the 
environment, both natural and manmade, in which we all live.”1206 
 
A high level of intellectual curiosity and an open-minded appreciation of the nuances of 
common law rules, and particularly common law public nuisance, are the motivations for 
this thesis’ arguments.  This thesis has proved that publicly exhibited sporting events may 
create common law public nuisances by impinging on public rights.  The public rights that 
might be impinged by the staging of a sporting event at a public place include the public 
right of way, the public right to quietude, the public right to safety, the public right to life, 
and the public right to recreation.  Public sporting events may impinge upon public rights 
directly, such as where the competitors in a public sporting event use a highway or a beach 
or park, or the foreshore or the sea, themselves and thus obstruct or interfere with the 
public’s right to use of those places.  Or public sporting events may impinge upon public 
rights indirectly, such as where the event draws together a crowd of spectators which crowd 
obstructs or interferes with public rights to use of public places, or where a crowd causes 
discomfort to the public in the exercise of a public right to quietude or safety.  Any license 
given to sporting event promoters purportedly authorizing them to stage their sporting event 
at a public place, whether given by a local government authority, or by the Crown, is 
spurious at law and is ineffectual.  Neither the Crown nor a local authority can license a 
                                                
1206 [1984] 1 NZLR 525 at p 530. 
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public nuisance.  Neither has power devolved to them from the supreme legislature under a 
statute to alter the common law by their purported license. 
 
Our beachgoing family, that family innocently enjoying their recreation, depicted in the 
opening of this thesis, possesses lawful common law rights superior to those of a promoter 
or organizer of a publicly exhibited sporting event in possession of a license, which it is 
argued is inadequate authorisation.  Their right to use of the beach and public parks, for their 
recreation and enjoyment, may not be displaced by any body except Parliament, and only 
pursuant to the promulgation of legislation taking away from them their common law public 
rights. 
 
Part One of the thesis argued that public rights are extant at all public places where the 
public make use of such public place ‘as of right’.  Public rights exist at parks, beaches, 
village and town greens and commons, as well as at more conventionally recognized places 
such as highways, the foreshore and the sea.  In Part Two of this thesis, the particulars of the 
common law offence of public nuisance was set out in some considerable detail.  This 
methodology was chosen in order to forestall any possible prejudice which might have been 
held against the use of public nuisance in the assessment of the lawfulness of public 
exhibitions of sport.  Part Three of the thesis detailed sports-related public nuisance 
precedents.  These precedents explained the factual circumstances of sports-related public 
nuisances and provided explanation for the many ways in which a publicly exhibited sporting 
event might create a common law public nuisance.  The outcome of the detailed analysis of 
precedents and jurisprudential commentary, in these first three parts of this thesis, is that the 
public possess a public right of way on the highway, a public right of quietude, a public right 
of safety, a public right to life, a public right to navigation, a public right to fishing, and a 
public right to recreation, each of which may be infringed by the staging of a sporting event 
at a public place such as a highway, a beach, or a park.  These public rights, identifiable 
through the lens of public nuisance precedents, are fundamental common law rights which 
may not be abrogated but by clear and unambiguous words in legislative enactment.  Part 
Four of this thesis assessed the role of the Crown and of local authorities in respect of public 
sporting events.  In this final part the common law doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty 
and parens patriae, and the principles of statutory interpretation, compounded to reveal the 
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logical conclusions that the Crown has a critical role in protecting public rights against the 
actions of publicly organized sport and that the Crown must turn to Parliament to ask for 
new laws in balancing the competing interests of the public and of the promoters of 
organized sport.  The Crown must not promote public exhibitions of sport which create 
public nuisances by impinging upon public rights and must, instead, turn to Parliament to 
ask for new laws to authorise the Crown to promote public exhibitions of sport. 
 
These findings dictate that a new legislative regime ought to be established to protect public 
rights on the one hand, and to safeguard culturally significant publicly exhibited sporting 
events by ensuring they are lawfully conducted, on the other.  The promulgation of a new 
statutory regime licensing publicly exhibited sports events, is the remedy most advantageous 
for society and for the proper regulation of the use of public spaces.  This remedy enables 
society, through its representatives in the Executive of government, to allow or disallow 
those sports that are, respectively, laudable or offensive to them.  In this way society can 
control the permissible levels of violence inherent in sports and the permissible levels of use 
of sparse public space, rather than have incremental concentrations of repugnant violence 
and incessant augmentation of public sporting activity, accented by television and radio 
mediums, forced upon them, in an aggrandized fashion, by overeager athletes and acquisitive 
sports corporations or federations. 
 
Public competitions of sports and games are not to be staged in public according to 
whatever standards and mores may be appealing to the players, or to the promoters and 
managers, of those sports and games.  The role of the common law in regard to public 
exhibitions of sport is to reinforce the norms and mores of the people, as a whole.  These 
norms and mores are designated as common law public rights under public nuisance 
jurisprudence.  The use of public spaces for recreative and sporting practices is a public right 
of all people in a society.  The public ought not to tolerate the unabated and wanton display 
of public sporting contests absent maintaining some measure of control over which public 
sports are appropriate for the society wherein a sport is practised and how such public sports 
are played.   
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There is a very real danger, as was known to the Crown and to the Parliaments of previous 
centuries, that sport is disposed to gratuitous cruelty, to the corruption of the communal 
ethic, and to the disturbance of peaceable people spending their time in quietude or in 
healthful recreation at public spaces, often for the sake of profit.  Today, the dangers remain, 
yet are exacerbated; there being today a very real need to check an aggrandizement of 
violence in sport and an incessant desire to make money from public exhibitions of sporting 
contests where such aggrandizement or desire impinges upon public rights.  The common 
law offence of public nuisance is a barometer with which we may logically and commendably 
measure the degree to which, and the means by which, publicly exhibited sporting 
competitions harm the public in the exercise of their public rights.  The idea that public 
sports ought to obtain communal sanction through Parliament balances the excessiveness 
and overindulgence to which public sports are prone with the vast cultural, social and 
economic benefits that accrue in the staging of public cultural pursuits.  We need only look 
to historical regulation to see that governmental action can benefit the public practice of 
sport.  The original Royal Proclamation of Richard I in the year 1194,1207 whilst noting that 
tournaments were a sport engendering harm, nonetheless allowed the sport to be practised 
publicly in England because the benefits accruing to the state through the promotion of 
virtue, gallantry and chivalrous conduct in the knights of the realm outweighed the inherent 
dangerousness and iniquity of the sport, provided, however, that any such practice be 
confined and regulated so as to safeguard rights and protect the peace.  So too, for our 
tournaments today. 
 
                                                
1207 See the Proclamation on Tournaments of Richard I dated 20th August 1194: Foedera vol i, at p 65; W Stubbs 
(ed) Hoveden: Chronica magistri (Longman London 1868-1871) vol iii, at p 268; and R Howlett (ed) Chronicles of the 
reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I, edited from the manuscripts (Longman London 1884-1889) vol ii, ch IV at p 
422. 
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